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**NYLON CURTAIN**

**Transnational and Transsystemic Tendencies in  
the Cultural Life of State-Socialist Russia and  
East-Central Europe**

**Edited by György Péteri**

**August 2006**

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## Preface

This book includes articles which were originally published in two consecutive theme issues of *Slavonica*: Vol. 10, Nr. 1 (November 2004) for essays 1-4, and Vol. 11, Nr. 1 (April 2005) for essays nr. 5-8. We wished to collect and reissue the essays in one book in order to make more visible an important part of the work accomplished within the frameworks of a collaborative project initiated and organized by the Program on East European Cultures & Societies in Trondheim.

The project, *Discourses of Global Ambitions and Global Failures: Transnational and Transsystemic Tendencies in State Socialist Russia and Central Europe*, received generous support from the Norwegian Research Council and from the Faculties of Arts and Social Sciences of the Norwegian University of Science and Technology. Between December 2000 and February 2003, we held three conferences to discuss the design and, then, the preliminary results of our project. The Collegium Budapest, Institute for Advanced Study, should be mentioned with gratitude for having provided us with a friendly and conducive environment for our concluding discussions, 31 January – 2 February, 2003.

We also wish to thank for the generosity of Maney Publishing ([www.maney.co.uk](http://www.maney.co.uk)), the publishers of *Slavonica*, for their permission and assistance towards producing and publishing this book.

Except for some minor revisions, the essays are included here as they appeared in *Slavonica*.

György Péteri

Trondheim – Dragvoll, August 2006

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# NYLON CURTAIN — TRANSNATIONAL AND TRANSSYSTEMIC TENDENCIES IN THE CULTURAL LIFE OF STATE-SOCIALIST RUSSIA AND EAST-CENTRAL EUROPE

## Introduction

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### *Nylon instead of Iron*

In the world before 1989, everybody was familiar with the origins of the metaphor ‘Iron Curtain’ that had been so powerful throughout the post-Second World War era. It is less common, however, to recognize Winston Churchill’s speech (Fulton, 5 March 1946) as the very first occasion after 1945 when communism was depicted as a global challenge and threat to the Christian Civilization. Let us visit the text again:

From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic an iron curtain has descended across the Continent. Behind that line lie all the capitals of the ancient states of Central and Eastern Europe. Warsaw, Berlin, Prague, Vienna, Budapest, Belgrade, Bucharest and Sofia; all these famous cities and the populations around them lie in what I must call the Soviet sphere, and all are subject, in one form or another, not only to Soviet influence but to a very high and in some cases increasing measure of control from Moscow. . . .

In a great number of countries, far from the Russian frontiers and throughout the world, Communist fifth columns are established and work in complete unity and absolute obedience to the directions they receive from the Communist centre. Except in the British Commonwealth and in the United States where Communism is in its infancy, the Communist parties or fifth columns constitute a growing challenge and peril to Christian civilization.<sup>1</sup>

This indeed is a powerful piece of ‘mental mapping’: it localizes in Soviet Russia the core and source of what it then describes implicitly as a new Barbarian menace, which the ‘Christian World’ had not been confronted by anything similar to ever since the Ottoman expansion into Europe in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. By introducing the concept of ‘Iron Curtain’, Churchill also seems to

have suggested that an insurmountable and impenetrable divide had arisen between the ‘Christian’ (capitalist) and the Moscow-controlled ‘Barbarian’ (communist) world. First to fall to the latter were the ‘ancient [Christian] states of Central and Eastern Europe’, ending up on the wrong side of Churchill’s civilizational divide.<sup>2</sup> His suggestion implied an asymmetric closure brought about by the Curtain or, at least, a closure for influences flowing from West to East much tighter than the closure for influences flowing from East to West.

Considering the growing literature on economic, cultural, and political interpenetration between East and West during the Cold War, it is time to ‘deconstruct’ this Iron Curtain or, rather, to re-construct it so that it resembles more what we now know about the actual nature of the systemic divide between East and West. Hence the suggestion, argued along many lines in the contributions of book, that Nylon rather than Iron Curtain would be the appropriate metaphor to describe what was actually separating the worlds on the two sides of the Cold War front line.

Embeddedness in the global system, challenges from and responses to the global environment, and aspirations of global significance and impact were from the very beginning decisive features of the communist experiment. East Central Europe, Soviet Russia, and the other communist countries have all been part of the modern global experience, and this seems to have been the case not in spite of, but, rather, because of the Sonderweg that their modernizing communist elites often seemed so eager to develop and pursue. The *differentia specifica* of the state socialist modernization was constituted by four elements:<sup>3</sup> First, it aimed at a sudden take-off to modernity from a backward position in the global system of capitalism, at a time when the latter had already taken shape around a core that exhibited high dynamism and an overwhelming development potential. Second, it accepted the economic and technological standards and terms of success prevailing in the advanced core area of the global system, and expressly defined as its foremost objective to catch up with and beat the core societies. Third, the state socialist regimes proposed to achieve these ends by redefining the rules of the game, by replacing the internal driving forces of economic, technological, and scientific development in a market economy with administrative coercion and political mobilization. Indeed, at a certain stage, communist modernizing elites even tried to redefine the cultural–anthropological codes and expected an entirely new type of human behaviour to emerge, a new ethos described as ‘the New Socialist Man’ or, as Aleksandr Zinov’ev called it (and vociferously critiqued and ridiculed), a *Homo Sovieticus*. Fourth, the communist world constituted itself as a rival model of global pretensions that would gradually replace the ‘decadent’ capitalist regime all over the world.

It seems that when we address issues pertinent to global dimensions of societal development during and after the Cold War era, when we focus on what united the two systemic hemispheres, on interactions between, and histories shared by them, we are in fact concerned with what Fernand Braudel’s path-breaking work identified as the intermediate (*conjunctures*) and secular (*histoire de la longue*



*durée* or *structures*) levels of the historical process. These are the levels, under a surface of the immense variation of ‘events’, where common (shared) conditions, circumstances, enablements, and constraints inform human activities and development in a fundamental manner, and where the commonality (globality) of human drama becomes apparent.<sup>4</sup> Arguably, the communist experiment may be epitomized in the paradox of global ambitions, often going hand in hand with policies of national and systemic isolation which, in the end, yielded global defeat.

The term ‘Nylon Curtain’ has been chosen also to direct the reader’s attention to a particular work of David Riesman, one of the few sober voices of the early Cold War era in the US. I have in mind his wonderful imaginary report from 1951, ‘The Nylon War’, staging a scenario where the US, within the framework of ‘Operation Abundance’, was for months bombing the Soviet Union with consumer goods. This highly instructive piece of fiction was originally published in *Common Cause* (Vol. 4, No. 6 (1951), 379–85), starting with the following words:

Today — August 1, 1951 — the Nylon War enters upon the third month since the United States began all-out bombing of the Soviet Union with consumers’ goods [ . . . ] Behind the initial raid of June 1 were years of secret and complex preparations, and an idea of disarming simplicity: that *if allowed to sample the riches of America, the Russian people would not long tolerate masters who gave them tanks and spies instead of vacuum cleaners and beauty parlours*. The Russian rulers would thereupon be forced to turn out consumers’ goods, or face mass discontent on an increasing scale.<sup>5</sup> (Emphasis added — G. P.)

Riesman’s most amusing thought experiment bears witness to his impressive knowledge of Soviet society as it actually worked: of the economy of shortage, of the dominance of bureaucratic coordination and the absence or weakness of market mechanisms of adjustment between production and consumption, of elite privileges, and, last but not least, of (systematically and systemically frustrated) consumer desires among the inhabitants of the USSR. In this sense, Riesman’s fiction, which led many Americans to believe that Operation Abundance was actually under way,<sup>6</sup> was an early reminder of the fundamental fact that even communist controlled societies were part of the global world. A ‘Nylon War’ appeared credible and could be believed to have been effective because it was generally understood that even ‘simple people’ behind the Nylon Curtain were knowledgeable about living standards, tendencies of consumption, available and accessible consumer goods, etc. in the West, and were also aware of and increasingly frustrated by the intolerably poor performance experienced in their home countries. As Gregory Castillo shows in a recent paper,<sup>7</sup> it was, indeed, part of the policies of US and West German authorities to make inhabitants of the ‘Eastern Bloc’ conscious of the systemic gap in consumer satisfaction, living conditions, and living standards. At the West-Berlin exhibition entitled *Wir bauen ein besseres Leben*, opened at the German Industrial Exhibition in 1952, the

domestic life of an ‘average skilled worker and his family’ in the West was to be put on display. ‘Attached to every household object was a tag indicating country of origin, retail price, and the number of hours of labour, as measured by a skilled worker’s wage, needed to purchase the item.’ For East German visitors it was probably not simply their Western counterparts’ easy access to these goods that was upsetting — but also the fact that many of those items, could not be acquired in the GDR even if they had the right kind of incomes for them. The German-German experience applies to other communist countries too, although there the flow of information in the 1950s was certainly not as smooth as between the pre-Wall Germans.

The curtain was made of Nylon, not Iron. It was not only transparent but it also yielded to strong osmotic tendencies that were globalizing knowledge across the systemic divide about culture, goods, and services. These tendencies were not only fuelling consumer desires and expectations of living standards but they also promoted in both directions the spreading of visions of ‘good society’, of ‘humanism’, as well as of civil, political, and social citizenship. Michael David-Fox’s contribution to this book on Romain Rolland’s special relationship to the USSR and to Soviet culture is highly relevant in this respect. David-Fox clearly shows that a reliable understanding of the phenomenon of fellow-travellers requires, among other things, the careful study of the historically and culturally contingent ways in which images of one another (of the social/cultural project of socialism and of the artistic–intellectual–political project of Rolland) were constructed in a transnational and transsystemic interaction and how these images gave rise to and sustained the relationship of bondage between fellow-travellers and Stalin’s regime.

Finally, but just as emphatically, it needs to be made explicit that Nylon, as opposed to Iron, was the epitome of industrial modernity in the early post-war decades. Thus, the imaginary bombardment of Soviet citizens with the products of Du Pont’s told also of the advantage the Western world had over state-socialist Russia and Eastern Europe, whose official regimes were still obsessed with counting the tons of iron and coal produced.<sup>8</sup>

### *Ambiguous Globality*

Russian and East European societies have been characterized, both before and after the collapse of communist rule, by strong (and deliberately promoted) transnational tendencies: preceding the post-1989 scramble for entry into NATO and the EU, the Moscow-centred integration in the Comecon and the Warsaw Pact had often been thought of as the embryo of a future communist world order.

The idea goes back, of course, to the founders of ‘scientific socialism’. Marx was well aware of the cosmopolitan tendency inherent in the capitalist economic order. In the Communist Manifesto he claimed this tendency would prevail not only in the economic but also in the ideological and cultural fields of societal life:

The need of a constantly expanding market for its products chases the bourgeoisie over the entire surface of the globe. It must nestle everywhere, settle everywhere, establish connections everywhere.

The bourgeoisie has, through its exploitation of the world market, given a cosmopolitan character to production and consumption in every country. To the great chagrin of reactionaries, it has drawn from under the feet of industry the national ground on which it stood. . . . In place of the old local and national seclusion and self-sufficiency, we have intercourse in every direction, universal inter-dependence of nations. And as in material, so also in intellectual production. The intellectual creations of individual nations become common property. National one-sidedness and narrow-mindedness become more and more impossible, and from the numerous national and local literatures, there arises a world literature.<sup>9</sup>

The other side of this same coin was, in Marx, the idea of a transnationally oriented proletariat and the prophecy of a communist world revolution to be accomplished with their agency. The proletariat of this cosmopolitan capitalist world order ‘had no homeland’, as it was put in the Manifesto. It was the agent singled out by Marx for putting an end to the capitalist world order (and, thus, putting an end to history), and replacing it with a communist world order, based on and shaped by the free association of fully emancipated human individuals.

Thus, communists, who took over and monopolized government in Russia, and later, in East Central Europe, had the uneasy task of harmonizing this crucially important globalist legacy (providing their power with a mission and legitimacy) with a number of historical circumstances, which, from the point of view of systemic globalization, had a constraining and debilitating effect. I will only list a few of these that I think are most important:

(1) Communist rule, to begin with, could only be established and consolidated in one country: Russia.

(2) Soviet-Russian communism had developed by the mid-1930s a heavily nationalist, even ethnocentric orientation<sup>10</sup> and, even when it showed some appetite for expansion, its Soviet systemic, ‘world-revolutionary’ motives were hard to distinguish from motives of a Russian, imperial and revanchist nature.

(3) When systemic-and-imperial expansion into East Central Europe actually took place in the second half of the 1940s, it created a core area of communist world-revolution that was in itself very heterogeneous in terms of levels of economic, technological, and social development.<sup>11</sup>

The ‘socialist camp’ was established mostly on the wrong side of the borderline between successful and unsuccessful modernization attempts in Europe of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. It could be argued that state socialism originated from the European periphery of modern economic and societal

development in the wake of failures and half-successes of modernization efforts, and/or as a response to the frustrating and humiliating experience of sustained underdevelopment or semi-development within the capitalist world system.

Nonetheless, the communist world system (a term used by the contemporaries!) resulting from the Second World War, was seen by Moscow as well as by the international network of communist parties in a long-term perspective, as the first phase of escalation into a global communist order. Indeed, considering the global pretensions of the state socialist system, we can safely claim that the communist project in Eastern Europe has been the largest deliberately designed experiment in globalization in modern history.<sup>12</sup>

These factors may help to explain the almost Janus-faced nature of the ways in which communist modernizing elites related to the outside world.

On the one hand, they were conscious of their world-revolutionary mission of globalizing what was claimed and believed to be possibly the most developed social formation. They were, indeed, cultivating and, at least in some early periods, even captivated by a mentalité characterized by ‘the superimposition of a better “soon” on a still imperfect “now.”’<sup>13</sup> This gave them certain hubris — an excessive feeling of superiority. This state of mind, however, was actually generated and sustained not only by what Sheila Fitzpatrick called ‘the discourse of socialist realism’ but also by what I propose to term *the discourse of systemic relativism*. Systemic relativism construed the social world of state socialism as something essentially different from that of capitalism or any other social formation. In this view, capitalism and socialism were just as incommensurable as the world of Newtonian physics is with the world of quantum mechanics. Systemic relativism may be said to have been especially influential and powerful in economic thought. It suggested that under state socialism economic activity obeyed other laws, than under capitalism. Behind seemingly similar phenomena, such as wage-labour, piece-rates, money and commodity relations, prices, markets, etc., a completely different world was hiding. The status of systemic relativism in state-socialist discourses is interestingly illustrated in the East German debate on architecture, where systemic relativist arguments were mobilized both on the part of the socialist realist ideologues, ‘celebrating Prussian neoclassicism while denigrating its social and political context’ and by Hermann Henselmann who, before he himself converted to socialist realism, tried to argue for ‘transplanting [“formalist”] modernism into the healthy context of socialist patronage’.<sup>14</sup> Another instructive example is the transformations that film genres like the Western and the Musical underwent when the socialist *Unterhaltungsindustrie* of DEFA appropriated and domesticated them for use in the GDR — discussed in Jon Raundalen’s contribution. The formula applied by Hungarian communist composer András Mihály in 1950 to the contemporary Western reception of Bartók, so eloquently analysed by Danielle Fosler-Lussier,<sup>15</sup> is a case in point too. Finally, the case of Witold Gombrowicz offers an altogether different perspective:

as argued by Knut Andreas Grimstad, the Polish émigré writer challenges any discourse of systemic relativism by transposing onto it his own ‘globalized’ biography. Owing to his transatlantic strategies, he becomes free from the constricting environment of European nationalisms and their totalizing demands by becoming a ‘Witold Gombrowicz’ who knows no bounds or allegiances whatsoever. The might of systemic–relativist discourse necessitated even the re-appropriation of the communist countries’ own historical, cultural, and artistic heritage from the pre-communist era.<sup>16</sup>

On the other hand, discourses of superiority or systemic relativism notwithstanding, communist elites could only for short periods of time completely forget about the hard facts of their countries’ economic, technological, and social–cultural backwardness. Nor could they entirely ignore long-standing intellectual–cultural traditions that had yielded self-images of relative backwardness ever since the first half of the nineteenth century. They could, of course, happily live with the fact that Soviet or Hungarian musical production was lagging behind Western contemporary music in terms of experimentation and the use of new twentieth century techniques.<sup>17</sup> But they were increasingly concerned about their regimes’ poor economic and technological performance. It was not only about growth rates, and even less was it about such indicators of military–industrial might as tons of coal and steel per year, a typical obsession of the 1930s, 40s, and 50s. Nor was it only about low efficiency or the chronic problems with quality. It was just as importantly and alarmingly the failure of state socialism to appropriate and adopt the main tendencies of international technological development and their failure to pioneer such changes. Out of fifty major technical advances that were made during the post-war era and still shape our lives today, only three appeared first in a socialist country.<sup>18</sup>

Thus, two opposite states of mind, self-perceptions dominated by the feeling of superiority or inferiority, combined to form the mentality of the communist elite and their seemingly capricious oscillations between the extremes of offensive or defensive, integrationist or isolationist postures. Such fluctuations (cyclical movements) in self-perception and in discourses and policies shaping communist attitudes towards the systemic Other are clearly tangible in the development of the Russian–Soviet myth of childhood analysed by Catriona Kelly in her important study written within the framework of our project.<sup>19</sup> The first phase, until about 1932, is an era of ‘suprematist internationalism’ characterized by readiness to admit Russia’s backwardness and an openness to learn internationally, but also by a confidence in Soviet ‘leadership in some (many) areas’. There was a keen interest in Western trends as they manifested themselves in legislation, educational institutions, literature on education, theories of child psychology, etc. And even though there appears, in the 1920s, a certain amount of ‘national triumphalism’ over Soviet Russia’s openness to change and the political leadership established in the international youth and children’s ‘movement’, contemporary propaganda was

still placing more emphasis upon ‘the need to free children from backwardness than on the Soviet Union’s (“exemplary”) achievements in improving their lives’. During the mid-1930s, this internationalism began to be eroded and a new, ‘patriotic’ phase in representations of childhood commenced. ‘The idea that children lived better in the Soviet Union than they did anywhere else was now trumpeted everywhere.’ Soviet (Russian) patriotism went hand in hand with isolationism and xenophobia. Bringing the cycle to completion, a partial revival of internationalism can be observed from the post-Stalin Thaw onwards, even though with a great deal of ‘patriotism’ remaining in place.

Michael David-Fox has recently published an inspiring essay on Aleksandr Arosev, an old Bolshevik, head of the All-Union Society for Cultural Ties Abroad (VOKS), 1934–37.<sup>20</sup> The essay starts with a rather unexpected, even shocking image. On 4 June 1935, having escorted his wife to the border station, on her way to Prague, Arosev wrote this about the feelings and thoughts overwhelming him upon the train’s departure:

For a long time I walked in the direction in which the train disappeared. . . Like a Scythian or a Mongol, I harbour inside me a great longing (*toska*) for the west and nothing acts on me like the evening sky or the setting sun. I adore the west and would like to follow the sun.<sup>21</sup>

The same Arosev, in his letters to Stalin from 1929 and 1931, triumphantly reported about Europe and America having been enfeebled and terrified by Soviet achievements and referred to Europe (the West) as ‘the old prostitute’, predicting her destruction. This dualism is not simply a result of different publics (a secret diary meant for an unspecified future reader on the one hand, and the letters to Stalin on the other); nor is it fully explained, to my mind, by reference to the dissonance or divergence between Arosev’s cultural affinities and his political convictions, otherwise so skilfully analysed by David-Fox. Rather it reflects the inevitable oscillation between two diametrically opposite states of mind among the Leninist modernizing elite of a relatively backward country: the hubris of systemic superiority on the one hand, and the admission of the developmental (economic, social, and cultural) inferiority, implying the rejection of the ‘really existing’ social world under state socialism (*the painfully imperfect here and now*).<sup>22</sup> In accordance with what I tried to argue above, I think this dualism applies by necessity to communist elites in the whole Eastern European region. Indeed, it could be shown to have applied in Stalin’s case as well. The two sides could, in fact, be present in one and the same text, as in Stalin’s speech delivered to the first federal conference of the functionaries of socialist industry in 1931.<sup>23</sup> On the one hand, there is the claim of Soviet systemic superiority:

Crises, unemployment, waste, destitution among the masses — such are the incurable diseases of capitalism. Our system does not suffer from these diseases because power is in our hands, in the hands of the working class; because we are

conducting a planned economy, systematically accumulating resources and properly distributing them among the different branches of the national economy. We are free from the incurable diseases of capitalism. That is what distinguishes us from capitalism; that is what constitutes our decisive superiority over capitalism. [. . .] our system, the Soviet system, affords us opportunities of rapid progress of which not a single bourgeois country can dream.'

On the other hand, this passage is followed by a stylized, educational review of Russian history and the Soviet present as one of military, technological, economic, and cultural backwardness concluding with the following words:

We are behind the developed countries by 50–100 years. We have to eliminate this gap in ten years' time. Either we succeed in eliminating the gap or they will trample us down.

It appears to me that there is a crucially important relationship between (Soviet, GDR, Hungarian, or other) communist self-perception and their ways of relating to the outside world. Perceptions of one's own position vis-à-vis the West moves between the two extreme points of superiority and inferiority, while the possible political attitudes can be placed on an axis stretching from a basically offensive to a basically defensive posture. In terms of actual results, combinations between various postures and self-perceptions give rise to at least two variants of isolationism and integrationism at the systemic level.

A state socialist regime is characterized by isolationism when its dominant discourses, policies, and institutions are geared to minimize interaction with the outside world, especially with their systemic Other. Depending on whether behind the isolationist posture there is a self-perception of superiority or inferiority in relation to the West, it should be meaningful to distinguish between offensive and defensive isolationism respectively. In terms of cultural interaction with the rest of the world, the period of Zhdanovschina until the early 1950s is certainly characterized by offensive isolationism: discourses of Soviet systemic and Russian national superiority asserted themselves and combined with ferocious attacks on foreign influences, especially on patterns and ideas that were deemed 'alien' from a systemic point of view. Defensive isolationism is a rare bird in the history of state socialism and that is quite understandable: a regime that acts from a platform of perceived inferiority (i.e., a regime in which not even its major beneficiaries, its elites, believe) cannot but be a rather short-lived regime, however successful it may be in its isolationism. I think closest to this pattern were the communist elites in Hungary between 1973 and 1978, and in the USSR between 1968 and 1985: there was little bragging about systemic superiority, a great number of internal documents revealing growing concerns about the increasing gap to the disadvantage of the socialist camp in terms of economic performance and technological development, and an increased propensity to 'solve' problems through more regimentation.

Conversely, a state socialist regime is rightly described as integrationist when its dominant discourses, policies and institutions are geared to engaging in interaction

with the outside world with a view to systemic expansion or/and to learning and catching up. Offensive integrationism is probably the right characterization of Soviet expansion into East Central Europe from 1947 to 1952, and it went hand in hand with an offensive isolationism manifest in their relation to the US and towards ‘Marshallized’ Western Europe. This is a period of aggressive efforts to propagate, in East Central Europe, Soviet patterns of institutionalizing and organizing cultural, social, and economic life, efforts based on and promoted by the assertion of the unquestionable superiority of Soviet Music, Soviet Literature, Soviet Architecture, Soviet Science, etc. An excellent empirical study of this pattern is Kiril Tomoff’s contribution to this book, ‘Prague Spring of 1948 and the Soviet Construction of a Cultural Sphere’, or Greg Castillo’s superb analysis of developments in East German architecture and interior design in the 1940s and 1950s, showing the active participation of Germany’s Soviet Military Administration (SMAD) in the attacks in 1951 on ‘modernist abstraction’ and ‘formalism’ and the role of learning from the Soviet Union in ‘the battle for a new German architecture’. Finally, defensive integrationism was the dominant pattern, for example, in Hungary’s (but also Poland’s and the USSR’s) cultural and academic relations with the West during most of the 1960s. Deliberate efforts were made to import and ‘domesticate’ Western economic knowledge in such areas as business management, industrial and agricultural organization, statistical, econometric analysis, linear programming, etc. The communist cultural–political leadership allowed hundreds, perhaps even thousands of Hungarian, Polish, and Russian scholars in the social sciences to participate in the fellowships program of the Ford Foundation and spend a year or more at US institutions of higher learning. As this important episode of peaceful co-existence shows, there were periods when the discourses of socialist realism and systemic relativism were effectively kept at bay.

Having lived three decades in a communist country and having acquired personal experience from crossing GDR and USSR boundaries in the 1970s and 1980s, I would never blame anyone for using the concept of Iron Curtain for the division between the First and Second World in the pre-1989 era. Yet, it seems crucial for the intellectual well being and development of the historical and social study of state socialism to be able to see the complications and complexities of the East–West division and of the communist project. These complications and complexities arose out of communism’s ambiguous globality, from its self-defeating attempt to create an alternative civilization without ever being able to define genuinely new terms and standards of economic, social, and cultural progress. To the extent there was an Iron Curtain it was required by the complete failure of communism’s attempt at emancipating social progress from capitalism. This failure and the awareness about it, however, had generated alternating periods of increased isolation, regimentation, and terror, and periods of ‘Thaw’, increased openness, emulation, and the softening of Iron into Nylon.



## Notes

<sup>1</sup> W. Churchill's 'Sinews of Peace' speech is accessible at several web-sites. The section above was copied from <<http://www.hpoul.org/churchill/>> on 30 May 2004.

<sup>2</sup> Churchill's Fulton speech was rightly considered by Larry Wolff as an indication of the strength of the Enlightenment tradition to conceive the Eastern parts of Europe as a region whose 'Europeanness' and belonging to 'the civilized world' is steadily questioned and, if at all, only partially admitted. Cf. Larry Wolff, *Inventing Eastern Europe. The Map of Civilization on the Mind of the Enlightenment* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1994), p. 370.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. György Péteri, 'On the Legacy of State Socialism in Academia', in *Academia in Upheaval. Origins, Transfers and Transformations of the Communist Academic Regime in Russia and East Central Europe*, ed. by Michael David-Fox and György Péteri (Westport, CN and London: Bergin and Garvey, 2000).

<sup>4</sup> Fernand Braudel, *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II*, first published in 1949; a substantially revised version was published in English in 1966 by Fontana Press (Glasgow), in 2 vols. Later elaborations on the 'divisions of time' can be found in his *Civilization and Capitalism 15<sup>th</sup>-18<sup>th</sup> Century*, 3 vols (New York: Harper & Row, 1979–84).

<sup>5</sup> David Riesman, 'The Nylon War' from 1951, in his *Abundance for what? and other essays* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday Inc., 1964), p. 67. Many thanks to Victoria de Grazia for drawing my attention to this work of Riesman.

<sup>6</sup> Op. cit., pp. 75–76.

<sup>7</sup> Gregory Castillo, 'Revolutions in Cold War Domesticity: Model Homes and Model Citizens in Divided Germany, 1948–1958', paper presented to the conference 'Discourses of Global Ambitions and Global Failures' February 2003, at the Collegium Budapest, arranged by the Program on East European Cultures and Societies (PEECS) Norwegian University of Science and Technology, Trondheim.

<sup>8</sup> In the 1957 musical *Silk Stockings* (based on the 1939 film comedy *Ninotchka* with Greta Garbo), the communist female character played by Cyd Charisse fell for the temptations of exclusive silk and satin underwear. By the time MGM released the musical, however, 'Nylons' had brought about a 'democratic revolution' in Western fashion (cf. Susannah Handley, *Nylon. The Story of a Fashion Revolution* [Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999]). However, what became cheap and easily accessible products for the Western customers, turned into objects of frenetic adoration (with little chances to get hold of them even at exorbitant prices) in the countries of state socialism. The author of these lines remembers that simple nylon rain coats or wind breakers (*orkán kabát*) changed owners in Budapest on the black market of the early 1960s at prices close to an average monthly salary, but cost a trifle only 300–400 kilometers away in the West, in Vienna.

<sup>9</sup> The text of the 1848 Manifesto of the Communist Party is available at <[http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1848/communist\\_manifesto/ch01.htm](http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1848/communist_manifesto/ch01.htm)> accessed for this text on 1 June 2004.

<sup>10</sup> Cf. David Brandenberger, *National Bolshevism. Stalinist Mass Culture and the*

*Formation of Modern Russian National Identity* (Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press, 2002).

<sup>11</sup> Indeed, one can argue that there were several cultural and developmental ‘nylon curtains’ separating various parts of the Soviet Bloc — which is in evidence also in Soviet traveling cadres’ ‘mental maps’ over East Central Europe in the postwar era: for a study of Soviet images of Czechoslovakia see Lars Peder Haga, *Oppdagelse og oppdragelse: sovjetiske reisekadere rapporterer fra Tsjekkoslovakia 1945–1949* [Discovering and upbringing: The reports of Soviet traveling cadres from Czechoslovakia 1945–1949, diploma thesis in history], PEECS, Norwegian University of Science & Technology, 2003).

<sup>12</sup> This tendency caused a great deal of anxiety among Western politicians and scholarly observers of liberal and conservative persuasion. James Burnham wrote this in 1964: ‘The new [communist] rulers understood their initial territory to be the base for the development of a wholly new civilization, distinguished absolutely not only from the West but from all preceding civilizations, and destined ultimately to incorporate the entire earth and all mankind.’ (*Suicide of the West. An Essay on the Meaning and Destiny of Liberalism* [New York: The John Day Company, 1964], p. 17).

<sup>13</sup> The formula comes from Sheila Fitzpatrick’s essay, ‘Becoming Cultured: Socialist Realism and the Representation of Privilege and Taste’, in her *The Cultural Front. Power and Culture in Revolutionary Russia* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1992), p. 227.

<sup>14</sup> Cf. Gregory Castillo ‘Blueprint for a Cultural Revolution: Hermann Henselmann and the Architecture of German Socialist Realism’, in this book.

<sup>15</sup> See Danielle Fosler-Lussier’s contribution to the present book and her PhD dissertation, *The transition to communism and the legacy of Béla Bartók in Hungary, 1945-1956* (Berkeley: University of California, 1999).

<sup>16</sup> The Hungarian-French historian Francois (Ferenc) Fejtő once told this anecdote from a conference in the 1960s about futurology: he was approached by a Russian scholar who said ‘You know, I am impressed to see that you can seriously discuss the scholarly study of possible futures. We in the USSR cannot even predict what kind of a past we are going to have!’

<sup>17</sup> As Rachel Beckles Willson’s chapter in this book demonstrates, Western reception of East European music was not at all indifferent either for the practitioners of the musical field or for cultural politicians. Just as much as it was a matter of national (and systemic) identity, it was also a source of national s (and systemic) pride, which clearly transpires, for example, from the reception in Budapest of the Hungarian contributions to the 1968 Darmstadt International Summer School of Contemporary Music.

<sup>18</sup> They were the satellite (1957), plastic foil tent (1954), and the laser (1960). Cf. Table 12.7 in János Kornai, *The Socialist System. The Political Economy of Communism* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), pp. 298–300.

<sup>19</sup> Catriona Kelly, ‘The Little Citizens of a Big Country’. *Childhood and International Relations in the Soviet Union*, *Trondheim Studies on East European Cultures & Societies*, No. 8 (April 2002).

<sup>20</sup> Michael David-Fox, ‘Stalinist Westernizer? Aleksandr Arosev’s Literary and Political Depictions of Europe’, *Slavic Review*, 62.4 (Winter 2003), 733–59.

<sup>21</sup> The imagery used by Arosev here is strongly reminiscent of the one used by French travelers of the Enlightenment describing their impressions acquired in the Eastern parts of Europe. As if Arosev internalized Count Louis-Philippe de Ségur's view, who wrote this about Petersburg: 'there are united the age of barbarism and that of civilization, the tenth and the eighteenth centuries, the manners of Asia and those of Europe, coarse Scythians and polished Europeans' (quoted by Larry Wolff, *Inventing Eastern Europe. The Map of Civilization on the Mind of the Enlightenment* [Stanford, Cal.: Stanford University Press, 1994], p. 22).

<sup>22</sup> Significantly, this dualism is detectable also in the reports on post-1945 visits to Czechoslovakia by officials of the All-Union Society for Cultural Ties Abroad (VOKS). Visiting Praha to teach their Czech comrades about insuperable Soviet-Russian achievements in the cultural-academic domain, VOKS' travelers reported back to Moscow their astonishment over the fact that in the Czech lands 'Derevni ne pokhozhi na derevni', as in Czech villages they found stone-paved sidewalks and streets. (A. Karaganov's report on his trip to Romania and Czechoslovakia, June 7–16 1945, GA RF F. 5283 Op. 22, D. 22, L. 39, cited by Lars Peder Haga, *Oppdagelse og oppdragelse*, 2003), p. 49, 57.

<sup>23</sup> J. V. Stalin, speech, 'The Tasks of Economic Executives', delivered at the First All-Union Conference of Leading Personnel of Socialist Industry, 4 February 1931, is accessible at <<http://ptb.lashout.net/marx2mao/Stalin/TEE31.html>> (accessed last: 1 June 2004).

# ‘MULTIPLICATION BY NEGATIVE ONE’: MUSICAL VALUES IN EAST–WEST ENGAGEMENT

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*The cold war is typically regarded as enforcing cultural boundaries; however, it also drew artists and administrators into parallel circumstances and beliefs through processes of negation. One Hungarian music critic characterized the situation as ‘multiplication by negative one’, for just as the mathematical operation retains the quantity perfectly when changing the sign, so the Western values that were so vehemently opposed in Hungary were in some ways maintained through this very opposition.*

*This premise is considered here through an examination of postwar views of the music of the Hungarian composer Béla Bartók. The conscious rejection of Western values played a key role as Hungarian Communists formulated their own musical values; and engagement with Western standards of value helped to motivate both the ban on some of Bartók’s music from 1948 to 1955 and its revival in 1955–56. Likewise, when in the 1970s the American composer George Rochberg wanted to turn away from avant-garde musical styles he associated with Western cold war thought, Bartók’s music served as a central model for his postmodern aesthetics because it offered precisely those expressive tonal resources that had been rejected by elite serialist composers.*

Just as the political map of Europe became polarized in the years after 1945, so too did judgements about what was valuable in the arts. Standards of aesthetic worth in music became significantly more dogmatic during these years, in tune with political developments both East and West. In Eastern Europe, musicians increasingly felt obliged to subscribe to the tenets of socialist realism, producing music that was accessible to the masses; in Western Europe, many composers felt pressure to divorce music from the public sphere, subscribing to the elite tenets of aesthetic modernism. These two aesthetic views are sometimes conceived by historians of the arts as two utterly independent orders of thought; one scholar, for instance, has argued that the East–West debate ‘soon disintegrated into two

solitudes talking past one another.’<sup>1</sup> In many cases, however, the evidence suggests quite a different model: each side listened to what the other was saying, and the interaction between the two sides was crucial in determining what musical styles would mean in the years to come.

To take an example: the conscious rejection of Western values played a key role as Hungarian Communists formulated their own musical values between 1948 and 1950. When a French music critic enumerated the faults of the great Hungarian composer Béla Bartók, saying that Bartók had not used radical enough techniques, a Hungarian critic took that as an opportunity to define a Hungarian Bartók for whom these faults were virtues, sketching a picture of Bartók that was in every detail the mirror image of what the French critic valued in Bartók’s music. The Hungarian critic, András Mihály, described this process with remarkable insight: ‘Let us switch the signs,’ he wrote, ‘as when the mathematical formula is multiplied by negative one, and before us stands the picture of Bartók that we love.’<sup>2</sup>

This switching of signs betrays more than a mere rejection of Western values: for just as the mathematical operation retains the quantity perfectly when changing the sign, so the Western values that were so vehemently opposed were in some ways maintained through this very opposition. Though socialist thinkers aimed at negation, they often preserved the categories and terms of debate that were prominent in the West; likewise, ‘changing the sign’ of East European values helped to define Western ideas about music. The supposedly opposite values defined in musical discourse did not so much sever as reaffirm the connections between Eastern and Western Europe during the early cold war years.

In this paper, I will consider two instances in which Bartók’s music was subject to a slightly more sophisticated version of multiplication by negative one: in both of these instances, people who wanted to express rebellion against the social order under which they were living ‘changed the sign’ of that order, and by this inversion arrived at something akin to the art of the opposing social order. In the Hungarian case, the works of Bartók that were forbidden by the state became symbols of freedom in the days leading up to the 1956 revolution; and in the West, where Bartók’s music seemed passé and not sufficiently modern, its appropriation as a source for a post-modern work called into question the modernist values of that musical culture.

### *Sounds of freedom*

Many of Bartók’s most distinguished musical works were forbidden in Hungary from 1950 to 1955, disappearing from radio broadcasts and concert life. Officials who were trying to build a socialist musical life deemed these works dangerous because they resembled too closely the musical styles of West European modernism, particularly that of Schoenberg and Stravinsky, and because Bartók himself represented a strain of Hungarian modernism that seemed incompatible

with Soviet-style socialist realism. I have described elsewhere how propaganda broadcasts by the Voice of America affected Hungarian policy, forcing officials to define their position against Bartók more clearly and to defend it more vehemently.<sup>3</sup> These attacks were not a one-time affair; Hungarians continued to feel the pressure of West European and American opinion throughout the period.

This pressure became particularly acute in 1955 as the tenth anniversary of Bartók's death drew near; in preparing for this occasion, Hungarian officials worried about a possible recurrence of the American attacks. Mátyás Rákosi, the powerful Secretary General of Hungary's Communist party, decided that the best way to avoid a propaganda disaster was pre-emptively to provide internationally visible signs of support for Bartók's music without spending too much money or making any ideological concessions to Western views of the composer's importance. In April 1955, high-level functionaries Gyula Kállai and Erzsébet Andics presented to the Party's Secretariat a series of recommendations for the Bartók festivities that emphasized the competitive aspect of the planning process:

According to our information they are preparing large-scale Bartók celebrations in Western Europe and also in America. The executor of Bartók's will, Viktor Bátor (now a resident of New York) is attempting to make the Bartók year serve the reactionaries with his selection of the International Bartók Committee. Precisely for this reason, in the Hungarian and international organization of the Bartók year it is necessary to emphasize that Bartók is ours in two senses: he belongs to progressive humanity and to the believers in peace, and to us as Hungarians.<sup>4</sup>

Rákosi, who not long before had resumed dictatorial control over the government as Hungary's Premier, complained that the program Kállai and Andics proposed was too large and expensive, particularly considering that 'a significant portion of music, and of Bartók's music, is extremely inaccessible to the broad masses.'<sup>5</sup> In the end, despite his desire to downplay the anniversary, Rákosi did agree that the celebrations should begin in September 1955, 'so that the Americans don't get ahead of us.'<sup>6</sup> To Rákosi's unmusical mind, the Bartók anniversary was just one more event in the cultural arms race, one that should do its work in the international context but have as little impact as possible on the domestic scene.<sup>7</sup>

Despite Rákosi's wish to limit the importance of this anniversary year, 1955 brought the re-emergence of many works into the repertory that had been heard seldom or not at all since 1950. As early as January the Radio, generally one of the most doctrinaire of Hungarian institutions, had initiated a plan to broadcast the complete cycle of Bartók's piano works in a weekly series; included on the very first of these programs on 1 January 1955 was 'Music of the Night,' part of the previously forbidden *Out of Doors* suite. Some of the banned works had already begun making their way back onto the Radio's programs in 1954; but the announcement that the Radio would broadcast a systematic cycle of Bartók's

music indicated more definitely that the division of Bartók's oeuvre would no longer be strictly enforced.

Aside from Rákosi's agenda of impressing the West with the Hungarian state's open avowal of Bartók's music, the new acceptance of these ideologically problematical works may also be attributed to the struggles for supremacy among different factions of the Party following Stalin's death early in 1953. Rákosi's attitude toward Bartók's music had not changed, but constant administrative conflicts may have permitted musicians more leeway simply because no energy could be expended to enforce the Party's musical line. To conform to the new Soviet policy of collective leadership, Soviet politicians had installed 'Muscovite' Communist Imre Nagy as Premier in Hungary in mid-1953, while Rákosi remained Secretary General of the Party. Upon his accession to the premiership Nagy introduced a reform program, a 'New Course,' which aimed to improve Hungarians' standard of living and to undo the most severe abuses of power perpetrated by Rákosi's Stalinist regime, from the terrorist tactics of the secret police to the suppression of art.<sup>8</sup> Rákosi, of course, opposed Nagy at every turn, finally wresting control back from him in the spring of 1955, when he had Nagy expelled from the Party. From 1953 to 1955, as the power relations between Nagy and Rákosi shifted, economic and cultural policy veered wildly back and forth, leading the nation into an ever more perilous and confused situation.

The re-emergence of dissonant music from silence thus closely paralleled the rise in public unrest that would lead to the failed Hungarian revolution of 1956. These long-forbidden sounds became more and more widely acknowledged as symbols of resistance to the violent and exploitive policies of the Rákosi regime. Reformist intellectuals demanded the right to hear Bartók's music; they also reclaimed him as a speaker of difficult truths and therefore as a significant symbolic ally in their quest for personal and political freedoms. As Bartók's most dissonant works became a palpable presence for audiences, Bartók himself became a mythic figure, lauded in poetry and transformed into an icon for the struggle to be free. Demands for the rehabilitation of Bartók's music were certainly not the main impetus behind the revolutionary fervour that seized Hungary in 1955 and 1956, but they did provide a means for intellectuals to articulate their goals for Hungarian culture and come to terms with their Stalinist past.<sup>9</sup>

Beginning in 1954, some musicians publicly challenged the Party's long-undisputed positions about many of Bartók's works. One of the first published statements of this kind was musicologist Bence Szabolcsi's essay, 'The Changing Sound of Music in History,' published in 1954.<sup>10</sup> Szabolcsi argued that great art speaks the truth, an emphasis received by many as a defence of Bartók against the forced optimism of the early 1950s.<sup>11</sup> Szabolcsi's account of Bartók portrays the composer as an artist alone and suffering in the dismal, feudalistic world of turn-of-the-century Hungary — but does so in language that reflected the situation in

which Szabolcsi himself lived:

‘It is impossible to continue living like this’—with this gesture the young Béla Bartók resigns from Hungarian and European society in 1900. It is impossible to continue living like this, because the world has become narrow, dark, and vile—even culture and the intellect, which he claims as his own, are in travail and dying [. . .]. The artist must settle his accounts with the entire world of the past; he must fight it with fist, tooth and nail, and must show the better and truer world that is already awakening somewhere and is sure to come.<sup>12</sup>

In the text of his article, Szabolcsi argued for Bartók as the continuation of the best and most enlightened elements of the European art music traditions of the ‘classical’ past; in its subtext, he placed Bartók at the very heart of Hungarian artists’ fight for personal and artistic freedom.

Likewise, in a 1955 tribute to Bartók, the Hungarian poet Gyula Illyés claimed Bartók’s most modern music as a site of active resistance to tyranny. Illyés’s poem about Bartók celebrates dissonance, noting that ‘what is cacophony to them is comfort to us.’ In an early stanza of this poem, Illyés demanded that there be no sonic serenity in the concert hall until there existed peace in the hearts of Hungarians:

... Földre hullt  
pohár fölcattanó  
szitok-szavát, fűrész foga közé szorult  
reszelő sikongató  
jaját tanulja hegedű  
s éneklő gége ...

... Let the violin,  
Let singing throats learn  
The shattering curse-crash of glass  
hurled to the floor, the howling  
cry of file thrust into  
the teeth of the saw ...<sup>13</sup>

For Illyés, Bartók’s music represented the sounding of truth in the face of falsehood — an honest ‘cry of pain, transcending countless falsely sweet melodies’ — bringing back to life all the truths that Hungary’s Stalinist government had suppressed or denied for years.

Furthermore, a 1955 article appearing in the Party’s own theoretical journal, *Társadalmi Szemle* (Social Review), explicitly endorsed several of the works the Party had banned in 1950. Although its author, András Mihály, had previously professed agreement with the Party’s suppression of Bartók’s ballet, *The Miraculous Mandarin*, now he described its message as sympathetic and progressive:

The third [stage work], *The Miraculous Mandarin*, is the most bitter and the most dismal, yet our feeling is that in this dismal, savage work, in this ‘death-dance,’ Bartók is showing the right path [. . .]. *Duke Bluebeard’s Castle* speaks of hopelessness, and the *Wooden Prince* speaks of forgiveness, but the *Mandarin* finds only one thing important: the will, the unbridled strength, which alone enables a person to overcome the savage, murderous world. If you truly want something, whether you be a person or a class, whether you be a nation or a



people, you cannot die until you have reached your goal. In its own savage, dark symbolism, the *Mandarin* is the apotheosis of action.<sup>14</sup>

By including the forbidden *Mandarin* in the gathering ranks of those who supported revolutionary reform, Mihály metaphorically linked the struggle within the plot of the work and the struggle to win Bartók's music its rightful place in the repertory with the struggle of the Hungarian people against the 'savage, murderous world' they were trying to overcome.

Among Communist intellectuals, this kind of response to Bartók's music — loyalty to socialism along with rebellion against Soviet cultural norms and strict Party controls — was becoming more and more common. In November 1955, at a meeting of the Party organization of the Hungarian Writers' Association, a group of fifty-nine writers and other intellectuals — all of them Communists — presented a defiant manifesto objecting to many of the Party's policies, particularly those affecting creative artists. In a memorandum read aloud by poet Zoltán Zelk, they complained of excessive censorship, mentioning in particular the banning of Bartók's *Miraculous Mandarin* as well as that of Imre Madách's play *The Tragedy of Man* and other important works.<sup>15</sup> At a 1956 meeting of the reformist Petőfi Circle, the treatment of Bartók was cited prominently as one of the 'crimes of the Stalinist press.'<sup>16</sup>

For many intellectuals, this protest remained symbolic, pertaining less to the sound of the music than to the idea of it. When the writers demanded that *The Miraculous Mandarin* resound once again from the stage of the opera house, they fought not specifically for that work but for what it meant to them, namely free access to all banned works of any genre. But for others, especially for musicians, the particular sounds of Bartók's music meant a great deal. On 10 October 1956, a mere thirteen days before the outbreak of the ill-fated revolution, a small group of chamber musicians presented an entire evening of Bartók's works, most of which had seldom been heard since 1950. The group, which included the young composer György Kurtág, presented a program that included Bartók's *First Sonata for Violin and Piano*, 'Music of the Night', the *Third String Quartet*, and selections from 'For Children'. That anyone at all had Bartók's music on their minds during these tumultuous times — enough so to seize the moment for the performance of works whose future availability remained uncertain — may indicate that within a select group of musicians, these works carried a heightened artistic and symbolic significance. Elsewhere in Eastern Europe, too, Bartók's forbidden music carried a special charge: beginning in 1956 it was featured prominently at the earliest Warsaw Autumn festivals of modern music, heralding the beginning of the musical thaw in Poland.<sup>17</sup>

In the spirit of Imre Nagy's contemporaneous calls for political reform, most of the Hungarian demands for Bartók's rehabilitation remained profoundly loyal to socialist political goals. Indeed, the portrayals of Bartók adapted many of the

rhetorical strategies that had been devised by the Party back in 1950. Illyés's repeated characterizations of Bartók as 'stern' and 'serious' reflect standard socialist realist descriptions of the positive and committed socialist hero;<sup>18</sup> and several accounts displayed continued anxiety about the 'darkness' of Bartók's music. These new interpretations thus bore striking continuities with the Stalinist past. Still, they also expressed a novel and powerful sentiment in the acknowledgment that some grim representations of the world possess genuine value as conveyors of truth: rather than rejecting music that reflected these truths, Mihály and Szabolcsi now suggested that the difficult works be embraced<sup>19</sup> precisely because of their truth-telling power.

The appropriation of Bartók's most dissonant sounds as symbols of truth in the face of tyranny might seem to be merely the logical outcome of this music's repression by an overzealous regime: after all, it is a truism that art takes on greater meaning when it has been forbidden. At Soviet suggestion, Hungarian officials had discouraged the continuation of national traditions — such as Bartók's brand of modernism — that reinforced 'formalist' values or challenged the pre-eminence of Soviet music. Visiting Soviet composers lectured Hungarians on proper and improper methods of composing with folk songs and encouraged them to emulate Soviet-Russian traditions. This heavy-handed attempt to impose a transnational style onto Hungarian musical culture — a culture that had learned to perceive itself as national not too many decades before — only strengthened some Hungarian artists' desire for cultural autonomy.

Another process was also at work, however, one that was characteristic of the cold war practice of 'multiplication by negative one'. In emphasizing the truth of Bartók's dissonant music, Hungarians arrived at a discourse that had existed in the West since the mid-1940s, one that equated difficult music with the idea of political freedom, and consonance with subservience, or even worse, with collaboration. After the fall of the Nazi regime, the idea of modernist music came fairly rapidly to be associated with anti-Nazism, particularly with the ritual utterance of once-forbidden sounds. The post-war atmosphere in the West was so charged that the links between dissonance and truth, between consonance and falsehood seemed self-evident to some thinkers.

Early in the Communist period, such dogmatic stances had provided Hungarian officials with a simple way to define the correct socialist position: in the process of 'multiplication by negative one', socialists overturned Western musical values, replacing them with equal but opposite socialist values. In the face of repressive control, however, even some composers who had had little contact with the West multiplied by negative one again, coming up with a reasonable facsimile of Western aesthetics simply through negation. Particularly for young composers, the private, insolent pleasure of hearing forbidden sounds may have played a role in guiding their aesthetic preferences. In a recent interview, the Hungarian composer György Ligeti characterized the composition of his *Musica ricercata* (1951–53, premiered 1969) as follows:

In Communist Hungary, dissonances were forbidden and minor seconds were not allowed because they were anti-socialist. I knew very little Schoenberg, Berg or Webern and practically nothing of Cowell or Ives, but I had heard about clusters. They were forbidden, of course, as was twelve-tone music. As a reaction to this I very naively decided to write music which was built on the forbidden minor seconds. I was an anti-harmonist because harmony, tonal harmony was permitted in Communist Hungary and chose dissonances and clusters because these were forbidden.<sup>20</sup>

Ligeti's reversal, a twice-reflected mirroring of West European ideals, attempted to undo what he perceived as the distorting limitations placed on musical creativity.

The Western discourse of truth was so pervasive that it was eventually transmitted not only via this mirroring effect, but also directly, through word of mouth and the covert circulation of texts about music. What little contact Hungarian musicians had with Western music criticism after 1950 strongly reaffirmed the mapping between aesthetic modernism and freedom, allowing them to appropriate the connection between difficult sounds and the idea of truth. Despite state censorship, Hungarian musicians became aware of Theodor Wiesengrund Adorno's *Philosophy of Modern Music* in the early 1950s, and the emphasis in that volume on the truth-telling power of dissonance surely did not go unnoticed.<sup>21</sup> Adorno dismissed all tonal music, saying, 'it is not simply that these sounds are antiquated and untimely, but that they are false.'<sup>22</sup> This idea resonates profoundly with Illyés's and Szabolcsi's representations of Bartók's dissonant music as a purveyor of difficult truths against the falsehood of tamer kinds of musical expression.

In addition, Adorno's writings and those of his fellow critic René Leibowitz elaborated a preoccupation with the 'level of development of musical style,' a desire that the techniques of music composition should advance as a continuing technological development that would express and enhance the newness of modern life. Another West European critic and conductor, Hermann Scherchen, likewise denounced the East European tendency to compose works that 'fall back on the earlier stages of development of the musical idiom.'<sup>23</sup> While it is unlikely that these critics foresaw this effect, their rhetoric of musical progress may have exacerbated Hungarian intellectuals' concern about the economic and cultural 'backwardness' of their country as compared to more 'developed' West European nations. The growing sense that Soviet exploitation was stunting Hungary's economic and cultural progress played a key role in Nagy's acquisition of public support. Furthermore, as Judit Frigyesi has shown, Hungarian modernism had traditionally served as a cultural marker of progress away from Hungary's feudal past toward comprehensive social and political modernity.<sup>24</sup> In this context, assertions of musical 'progress' from the West can only have frustrated those Hungarian intellectuals who were educated in this tradition.

Ironically enough, Hungarians' struggles with the problems of freedom and constraint in the arts may have integrated them more closely than ever before into the musical thought of Europe as a whole; for both East and West European musical thinkers were increasingly preoccupied with these ideas. Questions about what musical practices best represented freedom abounded in music criticism all over Europe during the early cold war years. Socialist critics on both sides of the Iron Curtain regarded increasingly systematic West European compositional practices based on Schoenberg's twelve-tone principle as musical representations of constraint, and therefore as unfree; members of the West European avant-garde and East European reformists, in turn, expressed indignation at the institutional restrictions placed on composers in East Bloc lands, regarding as regressive any attempt to suppress abstract understandings of music in favour of representational ones. East Europeans were as concerned with the aesthetic and political import of particular musical styles as their Western counterparts were: the process of 'multiplication by negative one' not only separated the two cultures, but also bound them together more closely than ever.

### *Post-modern collage and socialist realism*

The stylistic polarity that made 'multiplication by negative one' an apt metaphor for the opposing musical values of the 1950s did not last long, nor did it ever become all-pervasive. While some Western critics, such as Adorno and Scherchen, regarded twelve-tone music as the best bulwark against the populism promulgated in the East, the relative merits of modernist and tonal idioms remained the subject of controversy, and many composers continued to employ a variety of tonal styles. Still, the twelve-tone technique and other serial methods remained prestigious and influential among academically trained composers until the 1970s, when the abandonment of this technique by some prominent composers began to garner critical attention.

That historical departure merits closer examination. While the political context was utterly different from that of the mid-1950s, here, too, principles of negation were at work as composers defined their musical ideals. In the early- to mid-1970s, participants on both sides of the Iron Curtain experienced a decline of the bipolar opposition in favour of something more complex and more negotiable. The moral certainty and cohesive crusading spirit of the early cold war years yielded to a new diversity of expression; this brought with it a new possibility of critique, since statements opposing the status quo, while not yet innocuous, no longer seemed quite as threatening to the global order.<sup>25</sup> Where formerly the distinction between aesthetic modernism and populism was at least partly defined by the cold war political division between West and East, the collapse of the geographical divide into détente made the breaching of the populist-modernist divide more feasible than it had been.

One manifestation of this freedom was that critiques of the avant-garde gained a

new prominence in the West. These critiques seem to have drawn some of their force from the political atmosphere of the day. The composer György Ligeti has described how the Western avant-garde lost its moral imperative and fell into uncertainty after the decline of socialism in Eastern Europe in the 1980s; but the seeds of this uncertainty were sown at the moment of détente, when musicians began more openly to question the ethical superiority that the avant-garde had been asserting since the end of the Second World War.<sup>26</sup> Even as the polar oppositions of cold war culture were breaking down, the dynamic of ‘multiplication by negative one’ still played a role: challenges to modernism were mounted through the negation of its values, most notably through the range of phenomena known as post-modern.

A particular moment of Bartók’s reception from this period offers a suggestive instance of ‘multiplication by negative one’, a precise reversal of values to achieve a post-modern critique of post-war modernism. George Rochberg’s *Third String Quartet* (first performed in 1972) is famous for its conspicuous pastiche of earlier styles: it is often considered an early and significant exemplar of postmodernism in music. The quartet is perhaps equally well known, however, for the texts that accompanied it, inflammatory essays by the composer that called for the rejection of the modernist styles that had seemed central to academic music in the 1950s and 60s — particularly serialism.<sup>27</sup> The larger question of where stylistic postmodernism fits into the musical politics of the cold war will remain beyond the scope of this essay; but Rochberg’s quartet and his vision of postmodernism provide a case study in which the indirect influence of socialist musical thought on that of the West may be perceived.<sup>28</sup>

Rochberg’s quartet draws extensively on the gestural language of past composers, particularly Bartók, Mahler, and Beethoven.<sup>29</sup> Rochberg’s imitation of Bartók is rarely literal, but the borrowing of both specific figures and larger formal procedures from Bartók’s quartets leaves little doubt about their provenance. The five-movement design of Rochberg’s quartet, with the second and fourth movements comprising closely related material and the central movement providing the introspective core of the piece, pays direct homage to Bartók’s Fourth Quartet and his other symmetrically designed works. In addition, gestural references to Bartók’s music are present in Rochberg’s first movement and in the marches that constitute the second and fourth movements, and to a somewhat lesser extent in the finale; only in the third movement are they absent.<sup>30</sup> Rochberg’s first and fifth movements feature not only Bartókian string techniques (glissandi, tremolo *sul ponticello*, notes specified *non vibrato*, pizzicato that allows the string to slap against the fingerboard) but also passages whose musical rhetoric imitates Bartók’s, particularly the use of series of contrasting textures that interrupt each other.<sup>31</sup> Rochberg’s tonal language seems indebted to Bartók’s, as well; even at its most difficult the music seems not so much to evade tonal associations as to temporarily blur them, only to assert them more strongly at a

later point.<sup>32</sup>

Because the Bartókian sound is featured in the introduction and returns many times, the listener may be inclined to hear it as the ‘natural’ or unmarked dialect against which the allusions to styles of the more distant past stand out. This is noteworthy because composers

of Rochberg’s generation had largely turned away from Bartók’s music as a model since the early 1950s. Rochberg’s early works, such as the *First Symphony* (1948–49) and the *First Quartet* (1952), bore conspicuous traces of Bartók’s melodic and harmonic practices, presented without quotation marks or irony; Rochberg left these practices behind when he turned to serialism. When Rochberg returned to Bartók’s style as a source for the *Third Quartet*, he was using it not ironically but as an expressive resource, as a language he had earlier trusted to convey both pathos and austerity.

The boundaries between different historical styles play an essential role in generating the quartet’s form. In the first movement, for example, the harsh Bartókian gestures of the opening are superseded by a sweet chorale, played *molto espressivo* in a Beethovenian vein. Just as contrasting themes might help to guide the listener through the form in a more traditional work (e.g. the first and second themes of a sonata movement), in Rochberg’s first movement the interface between the strident Bartókian material and the Beethovenian chorale is the central organizing idea. This use of stylistic contrast not only drives the form of the quartet, but also seems deliberately designed to maximize the affective force of the whole. Where in a Romantic work gestures within a style might take on affective significance, here it is the conflict between styles that generates the affect; the movement from harshness to sweetness noted above seems calculated to deliver emotional release. The stylistic diversity of Rochberg’s quartet is thus not merely a formal trick; it is part of a larger agenda of rehabilitating older tools for the purpose of heightening musical expression.

Even with its use of diverse styles from the past, Rochberg’s post-modern quartet is not a relic of music from another time. It is instead reminiscent of music from another place: from Eastern Europe, the realm of socialist realism. Art from the ‘backward’ cultures of the East has often seemed to Western observers like an intrusion of past styles into present time; this perception was cultivated with especial vigour during the immediate post-war years, in attempts to put more distance between modernism and its perceived others, and has persisted to the present day.<sup>33</sup> The temporal distance thus asserted has been a prominent feature of cold war criticism of music and the other arts. Among other functions, it has served to reassure the creators and consumers of modern art in the West that their way of creating art was clearly correct, because it was musically forward-looking and historically appropriate to its time.

Rochberg’s pastiche in the *Third Quartet* is reminiscent of one element of socialist realism in particular: its appropriation of past music toward a kind of ‘posthistorical’ modernism. As Boris Groys has explained, socialist realist

thinkers by no means saw their use of older styles as reactionary: rather, because their new world was past the end of capitalist history and culture, it was possible to select the politically progressive elements from that entire history, leaving behind the regressive ones, to create an alternative modernism that would express this timeless culture. In this worldview, everything was supposed to be made new, even the classics. Groys writes that socialist realist artists were in theory supposed to have

no reason to strive for formal innovation, since novelty is automatically guaranteed by the total novelty of superhistorical content and significance. Nor does this aesthetics fear charges of eclecticism, for it does not regard the right to borrow from all ages as eclectic; after all, it selects only progressive art, which possesses inherent unity. The reproach of eclecticism would be justified if the quotations were of something the aesthetics had itself determined to be reactionary, and from time to time such charges did in fact threaten writers and artists with dire consequences. Socialist realism as a whole, however, could be considered eclectic only by an outside, formalistic observer who sees nothing but combinations of styles and ignores the high ideological qualities (ideinost') and 'popular spirit' (narodnost') that unite them.<sup>34</sup>

This eclectic approach often resulted in a pastiche style that was usually disparaged by critics in the West as a reactionary, nineteenth-century sound — despite the presence of harmonic and melodic twists that would hardly have been likely in that era.

Rochberg's free combination of historical styles and his terms for describing his music are surprisingly congruent with the approaches and tenets of socialist realism as Groys described them: in Rochberg's thinking, as in socialist realism, all past styles are available for use as long as they support the project of expressively communicating the correct human values. Rochberg referred to an

enlargement of perspective which potentially placed the entire past at my disposal. I was freed of the conventional perceptions which ascribe some goal-directed, teleological function to that past, insisting that each definable historical development supersedes the one that has just taken place either by incorporating or nullifying it.<sup>35</sup>

Rochberg saw it as 'mandatory' to regard the past and the present within a 'web of living ideas',<sup>36</sup> unconstrained by notions of progress. Like the socialist realists, Rochberg valued a mimetic, gestural music that transmitted meaning as clearly as possible.<sup>37</sup> He has passionately advocated a 'human,' expressive music, recalling the language that socialist critics used to call for an accessible music ('Out from the coldly lit world of the laboratory — out among the people!' <sup>38</sup>). Like socialist realist thinkers, Rochberg was convinced that music should not have to break from history in order to say something new; and convinced that the new things that need to be said are not foremost abstract things, but things related to human life, the

imitation and revelation of human experience. To Rochberg, the composer should choose the best means for doing that, irrespective of the origin or historical provenance of those means.

Rochberg's celebrated return to emotional expression is widely attributed to the tragic death of his son, and there is little doubt that the need to find a musical language for his strong feelings was the crucial impetus for the change in his music in the late 1960s and early 70s. The reasons why he chose the somewhat curious vehicle of pastiche, however, may also be related to other concerns, namely the issues of cold war politics that were raised by the political left during that period. In his 1970 essay 'Humanism versus Science,' Rochberg criticized the scientific disciplines for bringing the world to the brink of nuclear disaster, and chastised humanists for their willingness to follow science to that brink. The essay, full of a sense of humankind's imminent self-destruction, offers a parable about a group of people subsisting many years after a nuclear holocaust who learn that their ancestors had through their own hubris unleashed destruction upon their world. When the people in the story discover traces of music from before this holocaust, Rochberg explains, it is either 'precisely logical and cold mere patterns of sound relationships and configuration', or 'unrestrained in a hysterical, chaotic way'; this music is abhorrent to a culture that now knows nothing but myths and the humanity of song.<sup>39</sup> In Rochberg's eyes, the problems with modernism as practiced in the 1950s and 60s were intimately connected with the arms race, the new privileged position technology held in society, and artists' pursuit of technical innovation at the expense of human communication. Thus, while Mark Berry has construed Rochberg's commitment to 'a new social, economic, racial, and political order' as having little or nothing to do with his stylistic pluralism, the social vision and the artistic goals may well be expressions of a single and coherent outlook, cultural and musical critique in one.<sup>40</sup> Regardless of the extent to which Rochberg would acknowledge this parallel, his criticisms of serial and technological music reflect the historical context of détente, joining the revisionists who had begun to challenge the military and cultural values promoted during the early cold war years.

This is not to suggest that Rochberg's pastiche was necessarily a deliberate appropriation of socialist realism as a style; no evidence has yet surfaced that would indicate that this was the case. The congruence of approach seems to have come about as another instance of 'multiplication by negative one' — that is, the ideology of modernism as practiced in the West had been shaped in direct opposition to that of socialist realism with such precision that in negating that practice of Western modernism Rochberg could arrive at a conceptual practice resembling socialist realist music.

Rochberg's new style offered a critique of modernism by adapting an older modernist technique to his new aesthetic aims. While the pastiche technique is superficially akin to the modernist practice of collage, Rochberg's results were different from those of modernist artists. Rosalind Krauss has explained that



modernist collage necessarily presents a challenge to the idea of meaning itself; collages by Picasso or Braque force the viewer to consider the surface of the work, drawing attention away from issues of affective ‘content’ to some extent.<sup>41</sup> Rochberg’s collage, by contrast, seems to want to have it both ways, retaining emotional expression along with the dislocation brought by different styles of communication. *The Third Quartet* seeks to affirm that representation can remain intact even in the context of polystylism: the length of the Beethovenian slow movement in particular asks that the listener sink back and let that style accomplish the expressive illusions for which it is equipped. While according to Krauss the subject of modernist collage is inherently impersonal, Rochberg’s pastiche allows the personal to intrude on the impersonal, enabling a commingling of modernist form with neoromantic expression.

Rochberg’s postmodernism also overturned modernist values through its approach to its audience: its integration of esoteric and accessible culture is unabashedly middlebrow. Audience members from the elite culture of high modernism found the quartet nearly unlistenable at the time of its premiere. To their ears, Bartók’s music was hardly distinguishable from pop music in practical terms — as ‘moderately modern’ music featured regularly in public concerts, it had lost any oppositional power it might once have had. Seen from this elite viewpoint, Rochberg’s quartet consists almost solely of imitations of ‘classical hits’: Bartók, Beethoven, and Mahler acting as nearly interchangeable staples of public concert life. To members of the general public for whom Bartók still seemed modern, though, the quartet seemed to bring together the most disparate elements: Rochberg’s distinctions were drawn for their ears, not for the ears of his fellow composers, and in that sense the quartet moves toward being an accessible art, if not necessarily a truly populist one. Rochberg offered this audience something both new and familiar while leaving the most elite audience out in the cold.<sup>42</sup> The composer’s choice of audience both underlines his rejection of the culture of elite modernism and affirms an affinity with socialist realism, which one commentator has called ‘the disaster of middlebrow taste.’<sup>43</sup>

### *Listening to the Cold War*

Participants in the transmission of values across the cold war divide could be all the more vehement about their convictions because of the political stakes involved: music was compelling not only in its own right, but also for the position it claimed within a system of contested cultural values. Bartók’s *Miraculous Mandarin* became more meaningful when it was suppressed, and for many it has remained a vivid symbol of artistic freedom to the present day. Rochberg’s re-use of mannerisms from earlier styles might have seemed like innocuous pastiche had it been produced in another era; but in the cold war context, in which the imitation of styles from the past carried the stigma of socialist realism, it became a much

more inflammatory artistic statement. These political meanings were not merely a supplement to the primary artistic meanings of the works. While Bartók could not have envisioned the political implications of the *Mandarin*, let alone intended them, they became an essential part of Hungarian listeners' experience of the work. Rochberg's critique of modernism as an artistic practice and his doubts about the ethical validity of the arms race were two facets of one conviction; both facets inform our understanding of the *Third Quartet* in meaningful ways.

This merging of musical style and political judgment offers significant implications for the history of musical style. During the early years of the cold war, political pressures led many composers and critics to dogmatism as the cultures were defined in contradistinction to one another. The instances of 'multiplication by negative one' described in this essay indicate that borrowings across the battle lines — whether direct or via negation — could represent a retreat from one extreme toward the other. Once such borrowings became possible, they increased the range of styles available on both sides of the divide, contributing to the oft-described pluralism of concert life after about 1960. Cold war pressures may thus have helped to establish the heterogeneity of late twentieth-century culture precisely through these processes of negation. In this light, it seems advantageous to regard the competing paradigms of East and West not as separate cultural systems, but as two parts of a single, larger system in which musical values were determined by large-scale processes of engagement and negation as well as by local judgments about music. It is a characteristic paradox of cold war culture that even though Eastern and Western values claimed to be strictly opposed, the East–West traffic in ideas contributed significantly to the establishment of an international musical community in which there was widespread agreement on what issues were at stake, if not on how to resolve them.

## Notes

<sup>1</sup> Friedemann Sallis, 'The Reception of Béla Bartók's Music in Europe after 1945', in *Settling New Scores: Music Manuscripts from the Paul Sacher Foundation*, ed. by Felix Meyer (Basel: Paul Sacher Foundation and Mainz and New York: Schott, 1998), pp. 255–58.

<sup>2</sup> András Mihály, 'Válasz egy Bartók-kritikának' (Response to a Bartók-critique), *Új Zenei Szemle* (New music review), 1.4 (September 1950), 55. Mihály was responding to René Leibowitz, 'Béla Bartók ou la possibilité du compromis dans la musique contemporaine,' *Les Temps modernes*, 3.25 (October 1947), 705–34.

<sup>3</sup> See Fosler-Lussier, *The Transition to Communism and the Legacy of Béla Bartók in Hungary, 1945–1956* (Ph.D dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 1999), particularly chapter 2.

<sup>4</sup> Erzsébet Andics, 'Javaslat a Titkárságnak Bartók évforduló megünneplésére' (Recommendation to the Secretariat regarding celebration of the Bartók anniversary), 9 April 1955. Hungarian National Archives, Records of the Hungarian Workers' Party

(hereafter MOL-MDP), Titkárság (Secretariat), 276. f., 54. cs., 363. oy.e.

<sup>5</sup> Minutes of the Secretariat of the Hungarian Workers' Party, 25 April 1955. MOL-MDP, Titkárság (Secretariat), 276. f., 54. cs., 363. ö.e.

<sup>6</sup> Minutes of the Secretariat of the Hungarian Workers' Party, 25 April 1955.

<sup>7</sup> An internal government document reports that the public took an 'immense interest' in the anniversary festivities; since official reports generally portrayed events in the most positive possible light, it is difficult to assess the extent of this interest. See 'A zene és táncművészeti főosztály jelentése a hangversenyrendezésről' (Report of the music and dance division on the organizing of concerts), in Melinda Berlász and Tibor Tallián, eds., *Iratok a magyar zeneélet történetéhez, 1945–1956* (Documents pertaining to the history of Hungarian musical life, 1945–1956), vol. 1 (Budapest: MTA Zenetudományi Intézet, 1985), p. 241.

<sup>8</sup> See Aczél and Méray, *The Revolt of the Mind: A Case History of Intellectual Resistance Behind the Iron Curtain* (anonymous translation) (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1959), pp. 153–54.

<sup>9</sup> On the role of Hungarian intellectuals in the pre-1956 period, see György Péteri, 'New Course Economics: The Field of Economic Research in Hungary after Stalin, 1953–1956,' in *Intellectual Life and the First Crisis of State Socialism in East Central Europe, 1953–1956* ed. by György Péteri (Trondheim: Program on East European Cultures and Societies, 2001), 47–79; and András B. Hegedűs, 'The Petőfi Circle: The Forum of Reform in 1956', *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics*, 13.2 (1997), 108–33. On 'unofficial' discourses in the arts, see Maruška Svašek, 'The Politics of Artistic Identity: The Czech Art World in the 1950s and 1960s', *Contemporary European History*, 6.3 (1997), 383–403.

<sup>10</sup> During the early post-war years, Szabolcsi (1899–1973) led the 'Bartók Seminar' at the Academy of Music in Budapest, where the analysis of Bartók's works was central to the study of new music. See Lóránt Péteri, 'Szabolcsi Bence és a magyar zeneélet diszkurzusai (1948–1956)' (Bence Szabolcsi and the discourses of Hungarian musical life), master's thesis, 2003, unpublished; and György Ligeti, 'Neues aus Budapest: Zwölftonmusik oder 'Neue Tonalität'?' (News from Budapest: Twelve-tone music or 'new tonality'?) *Melos*, 17.2 (February 1950), 47.

<sup>11</sup> György Kroó, *Szabolcsi Bence. A Liszt Ferenc Zeneművészeti Főiskola Tudományos Közleményei* (Scholarly Publications of the Ferenc Liszt Academy of Musical Arts), vol. 2, no. 5 (Budapest: Liszt Ferenc Zeneművészeti Főiskola, 1994), p. 586.

<sup>12</sup> Bence Szabolcsi, 'A zene történelmi hangváltásairól' (The changing sound of music in history) in Szabolcsi, *Népzene és történelem: tanulmányok* (Folk music and history: essays) (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1954), p. 174.

<sup>13</sup> Gyula Illyés, 'Bartók,' in the volume *Csak tiszta forrásból: Antológia magyar írók és költők műveiből Bartók Béla emlékére* (Only from a pure source: Anthology from the works of Hungarian writers and poets in memory of Béla Bartók), ed. by Ilona Fodor (Budapest: Zeneműkiadó, 1965), p. 11. While I have aimed for literal fidelity to the text here, more poetic translations of Illyés's poem are available: see Claire Lashley's in Gyula Illyés, *Selected Poems*, ed. by Thomas Kabdebo and Paul Tabori (London: Chatto and Windus, 1971), pp. 50–53 (reprinted in *Bartók and His World*, ed. by Peter Laki

[Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995]), pp. 302–05; or Robert C. Kenedy's in the volume *In Quest of the 'Miracle Stag': The Poetry of Hungary*, ed. by Adam Makkai (Chicago: Atlantis-Centaur and Budapest: Corvina, 1996), pp. 639–43. Illyés's 'Bartók' and other poetic utterances about Bartók are discussed in Peter Laki's 'The Gallows and the Altar: Poetic Criticism and Critical Poetry about Bartók in Hungary' in *Bartók and His World*, ed. by Laki, pp. 79–100.

<sup>14</sup> András Mihály, 'Bartók Béla,' *Társadalmi Szemle* (Social Review), 10.10 (October 1955), 25.

<sup>15</sup> Tamás Aczél and Tibor Méray, *The Revolt of the Mind: A Case History of Intellectual Resistance Behind the Iron Curtain* (anonymous translation) (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1959), p. 347. The Miraculous Mandarin returned to the opera house on 1 June 1956. See *Iratok a magyar zeneélet történetéhez 1945–1956*, vol. 2, ed. by Melinda Berlász and Tibor Tallián, pp. 121–24.

<sup>16</sup> Géza Losonczy's statement before the Petőfi Circle, in *A Petőfi Kör vitái hiteles jegyzőkönyvek alapján*, IV.: *Partizántalálkozó, Sajtóvita* (Debates of the Petőfi Circle, based on authentic minutes, vol. 4: Partisans' meeting, press debate), ed. by B. András Hegedűs and M. János Rainer (Budapest: Múzsák, 1956-os Intézet, 1991), p. 171.

<sup>17</sup> The *Fifth String Quartet* was performed at the first Warsaw Autumn festival in 1956; *The Miraculous Mandarin* was played in 1958 and 1960, the *Fourth String Quartet* in 1958, the *Second Piano Concerto* and the *Music for Strings, Percussion and Celesta* in 1960, and the *Sonata for Two Pianos and Percussion* in 1961. The *Concerto for Orchestra* was also performed in 1956 and 1959.

<sup>18</sup> See Clark, *The Soviet Novel*, pp. 61–63.

<sup>19</sup> It is also noteworthy that both Mihály and Losonczy expressed their regrets in the ritual form of self-criticism — their remarks went well beyond what the custom required, to be sure, but the form of their statements only confirmed their support for that tradition. See Kövér, *Losonczy Géza*, p. 252.

<sup>20</sup> György Ligeti, 'Interview: György Ligeti in conversation with Toru Takemitsu', Ligeti Letter, Ligeti Collection of the Paul Sacher Foundation, 1 (1991), 8. Cited in Friedemann Sallis, *An Introduction to the Early Works of György Ligeti* (Köln: Studio Verlag Schewe, 1996), p. 104.

<sup>21</sup> Ligeti, for instance, apparently had access to Adorno's book from the early 1950s. See Wolfgang Burde, *György Ligeti: Eine Monographie* (György Ligeti: A Monograph) (Zürich: Atlantis-Musikbuch-Verlag, 1993), p. 43.

<sup>22</sup> Theodor W. Adorno, *Philosophy of Modern Music*, trans. by Anne G. Mitchell and Wesley V. Blomster (New York: Seabury Press, 1973), p. 34.

<sup>23</sup> Hermann Scherchen, 'Die gegenwärtige Situation der modernen Musik' (The current situation of modern music), *Melos*, 16.10 (October 1949), 258.

<sup>24</sup> Judit Frigyesi, *Béla Bartók and Turn-of-the-Century Budapest* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1998), particularly chapter 3, 'The Romantic Roots and Political Radicalism of Hungarian Modernism.'

<sup>25</sup> See Keith L. Nelson, *The Making of Détente: Soviet–American Relations in the Shadow of Vietnam* (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995), pp. 54–55; and Phil Williams, 'Détente and US Domestic Politics', *International Affairs*,

61.3 (Summer 1985), 432–33.

<sup>26</sup> ‘With the collapse of practical, existing socialism the ice began to crack under the feet of the true-believing, socially critical avant-garde’. ‘Wohin orientiert sich die Musik? György Ligeti im Gespräch mit Constantin Floros’, *Österreichische Musikzeitschrift*, 49 (1994), 5–8.

<sup>27</sup> Rochberg’s essays have been collected in a volume entitled *The Aesthetics of Survival*, ed. by William Bolcom (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1984).

<sup>28</sup> The connections between postmodernism and cold war politics have only begun to be addressed. Paul Griffiths makes the link implicitly through the juxtaposition of topics in the last few pages of his *Modern Music: A Concise History*, rev. edn (New York: Thames and Hudson, 1994), pp. 194–97. See also Andreas Huyssen, ‘Mapping the Postmodern’, in *After the Great Divide: Modernism, Mass Culture, Postmodernism* (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1986), p. 197; Boris Groys, ‘A Style and a Half: Socialist Realism between Modernism and Postmodernism,’ in *Socialist Realism without Shores*, ed. by Thomas Lahusen and Evgeny Dobrenko (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1997), pp. 76–90; and Augustin Ioan, ‘A Postmodern Critic’s Kit for Interpreting Socialist Realism’, in *Architecture and Revolution*, ed. by Neil Leach (London and New York: Routledge, 1999), pp. 62–66.

<sup>29</sup> Many critics mention the presence of Bartók as one of the referents of the quartet; but few have acknowledged the specificity of the borrowings or their pervasiveness. That the quartet is modelled in its overall shape on Bartók’s *Fourth Quartet* is mentioned by Michael Walsh in ‘Kronos Quartet Passes the Test,’ *San Francisco Examiner*, 28 March 1980, p. 31; the resemblance between Rochberg’s marches and the march in Bartók’s *Sixth Quartet* is mentioned by Max Harrison in ‘Rags to Rochberg’, *The Times* (London), 20 April 1974, p. 9.

<sup>30</sup> Compare, for instance, the open-string accompaniment figure in mm. 12–17 of the second movement of the Rochberg to that of mm. 151–55 of the fifth movement of Bartók’s *Fourth Quartet*; or the figure marked ‘strident’ in the same Rochberg passage with the accented rhythmic figure in mm. 115–16 of the viola part of the first movement of Bartók’s *Fourth Quartet*.

<sup>31</sup> Compare mm. 103–27 of the first movement of Rochberg’s quartet with mm. 95–150 of the fifth movement of Bartók’s *Fourth Quartet*.

<sup>32</sup> See Joan Templar Smith, *The String Quartets of George Rochberg* (Ph.D. dissertation, Eastman School of Music, 1976), pp. 192, 309–10.

<sup>33</sup> A recent *New York Times* article portrayed art from Eastern Europe as a kind of ‘Brigadoon’, untouched by the modernism of Jackson Pollock, and stressed its need to ‘catch up.’ Michelle Falkenstein, ‘Art Nurtured in Communism Has Advocate,’ *New York Times*, 15 July 2001.

<sup>34</sup> Boris Groys, *The Total Art of Stalinism: Avant-Garde, Aesthetic Dictatorship, and Beyond* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), p. 49.

<sup>35</sup> Rochberg, ‘On the Third String Quartet,’ in *The Aesthetics of Survival*, p. 239.

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 240

<sup>37</sup> Rochberg, ‘Reflections on the Renewal of Music’, in *The Aesthetics of Survival*, p. 238.

<sup>38</sup> Endre Szervánszky, 'Bartók-bemutató' (Bartók premiere), *Szabad Nép* (Free folk), 25 April 1947, p. 4.

<sup>39</sup> Rochberg, 'Humanism versus Science', in *The Aesthetics of Survival*, p. 167.

<sup>40</sup> Mark Berry, 'Music, Postmodernism, and George Rochberg's Quartet', in *Postmodern Music/Postmodern Thought*, ed. by Judy Lochhead and Joseph Auner (New York and London: Routledge, 2002), p. 237.

<sup>41</sup> See Rosalind E. Krauss, *The Originality of the Avant-Garde and Other Modernist Myths* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1985), pp. 32–40.

<sup>42</sup> This inverts Thomas Crow's paradigm in which modernists deployed low-cultural topics in order to criticize common tastes and behaviours for a high-culture audience. Thomas Crow, *Modern Art in the Common Culture* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1996), chapter 1, 'Modernism and Mass Culture in the Visual Arts,' especially pp. 32–33.

<sup>43</sup> Evgeny Dobrenko, 'The Disaster of Middlebrow Taste, or, Who "Invented" Socialist Realism?' *The South Atlantic Quarterly*, 94.3 (summer 1995), 773–806.

# LONGING FOR A NATIONAL REBIRTH: MYTHOLOGICAL TROPES IN HUNGARIAN MUSIC CRITICISM 1968–1974

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*The article analyses the reception of György Kurtág's The Sayings of Péter Bornemisza op.7 in Germany in 1968 and Hungary in 1968 and 1974 in terms of cultural values and ambitions that were incommensurably divided in the Cold War era. Initially contextualizing The Sayings within Hungarian post-war musical society, it then explains the 'delegation' of Hungarians who travelled to Darmstadt to perform it (and other contemporary works) there. German reception reveals a sense of feeling in the cultural 'centre', and a tendency to exoticize the Eastern visitors. Hungarian reception back home reveals both a pretence that the German reception had been wildly successful, and a need to assert a positive future for Hungarian music that drew on mythical tropes of regeneration and redemption. When The Sayings was subjected to musicological study in 1974 this tendency was yet stronger, the work itself seen as a statement about a positive future and a rebirth for Hungarian music.*

The history of Hungarian music and music criticism during the twentieth century could be very crudely characterized as two-stage: the first fuelled by nationalist consciousness, the second by a communist state system. My concern here is with the tension between the two forces, the way that dissatisfaction with post-war development under communism stimulated a return to earlier notions of national self-definition. Whereas at the level of theory, nationalism and communism are irreconcilably distinct from one another, on the level of everyday discourse they frequently compete.

Reforms made in the education system during Hungary's brief Stalinist regime were pervasive in academia long after destalinization. In the case of musicology, they were foundational, because the faculty at the Liszt Academy was only established in 1951. However, the teaching work and musical 'outreach' programmes of Kodály straddled the pre- and post-communist takeover periods. In combination with the substantial heritage of Bartók, this meant that national concerns retained a strong presence even within the structures of State socialism. It

is safe to say that aside from the contestable period from 1949 to 1953, musicology was defined more strongly by its understanding of its own traditions than by communist rationale.<sup>1</sup>

The ‘traditions’ that were emergent just before the war can be charted not only in the pioneering work of Bartók and Kodály, but also in the writings of leading critic Aladár Tóth, as well as aesthete Antal Molnár and musicologist Bence Szabolcsi.<sup>2</sup> To summarize a lengthy and differentiated process, by 1940, Bartók had become the measure against which music of the twentieth century could be evaluated. This attitude provided a pinion in responses to new music in the early 1960s, even when they were formulated with recourse to Marxist theory.<sup>3</sup> The fact that Bartók had suffered in Hungary’s conservative climate throughout his life there was conveniently forgotten, as was the way Kodály had been heralded the true beacon of Hungary’s musical future in the same period.<sup>4</sup> What could not be forgotten so easily, however, in that key participants in the matter were still living and active, was the treatment that Bartók’s works had suffered under Stalinism. It was a blot on the national conscience rendered all the larger by what appeared to be a compositional vacuum between 1945 and 1960: there had been no new musical work in the period which could be considered a worthy descendent in the Hungarian line.

For this reason, music criticism of the later 1950s and 1960s displays an urgency in its quest for a leading direction, a leading compositional figurehead to fill a gap left not only by Bartók’s departure and subsequent death, but by the poverty and compromised nature of the compositional attempts made subsequently. The aim of this article is to present a particularly interesting instance of the trend, in which writers strive to argue for Hungarian music as having found its true path in a synthesis with European modernist currents. The construction of Eastern European music as ‘other’, as the rustic cousin of Western Europe ‘proper’, emerges strongly in writing from both Hungary and Germany (the putative centre). Each side viewed Hungarian music with an orientalist perspective, characterizing it as exotic, barbaric, and backward.<sup>5</sup>

In order to draw out the longing for national productivity, I shall point to the use of mythological patterns in a selected group of writings. Through reference to ‘tradition’, ‘our music’, and in the determination to move forward from the recent past — and even the grey present — they aspire to a revival of a more distant past. Most obvious is a longing for a redemptive process leading to a rebirth; but in one case the missionary-like role of Hungarian music, a good force for the rest of the world, is also apparent. Such myths are commonly identified in narratives of national emergence, and are transferred into the cultural sphere very smoothly, particularly through the use of symbols which become subsumed into the mythic structure.<sup>6</sup> The power of certain symbols — particular works by Bartók and Kodály — will become clear below. And as has been argued by György Schöpflin, myths of redemption, rebirth, and electing are especially common in Central Eastern



Europe, where territories have shifted due to forces exerted primarily from outside, and where there is a sense of being a ‘last bastion’ of Europe, a protective barrier against the barbarous East.<sup>7</sup> As my account makes clear, the construction remained inescapable on both sides: Western music having been seen as more progressive during the early post-war years, Hungary was anxious to ‘catch up’ — without losing its special barbaric essence.

The writings relate to a moment in musical history that was, in quite practical terms, a new beginning: the foundation in 1968 of the Budapest Chamber Ensemble (Budapest kamaragyüttes), a performing ensemble dedicated to new music. It was a clear sign of enterprise, and the premières on the programme of the launch concert could easily be construed with the same optimism. In that the ensemble’s début appearance took place in Darmstadt, a major centre for progressive music in the West, the ‘electing myth’ — the music’s missionary role — was also readily forthcoming. This, ironically, was able to function within the ‘Eastern Bloc’ structure: the East was now a civilizing force for the West.

What might have rather confounded the unity of the emerging myths was the nature of the Darmstadt reception, but as will be demonstrated below, the events were made to fit the frame. More problematic, however, was the longest and most challenging work on the programme, Kurtág’s *The Sayings of Péter Bornemisza* op.7, which was in itself a setting of a Christian text about redemption. It might have seemed the perfect embodiment of the urge for national revival, because it narrates a passage of sin, penitence, and death, followed by rebirth in spring. But something about the musical setting made it ambiguous, less ideologically determined than was required for the task. Some writers were quietly, but unmistakably doubtful about its potentially leading musical position. In a revealing twist, however, the doubts voiced cautiously in 1968 were all but eradicated in 1974, when the work was subject to two lengthy studies. Although the writer of one, János Kárpáti, was reticent about the work’s ultimate message (and his obfuscation is revealing),<sup>8</sup> György Kroó argues for an unequivocal statement of redemption.<sup>9</sup> The urgency for national renewal in music had apparently mounted, rather than been resolved.

### *The context in Hungary*

When András Mihály formed the Budapest Chamber Ensemble in 1968, he followed the footsteps of Kurt Schwertsik and Friedrich Cerha in neighbouring Vienna, who in 1958 established an ensemble devoted to the performance of new music. Schwertsik and Cerha were struggling with the conservative attitudes of the Austrian capital as had Schoenberg fifty years before them; certainly the latter’s *Verein für musikalische Privataufführungen* was another forebear to the Viennese ensemble’s concert series, which was named ‘die reihe’. Likewise, the Budapest Chamber Ensemble had a heritage in the New Hungarian Musical Society (Új Magyar Zenei Egyesület), which functioned 1910–12 and then spasmodically

between 1932 and 1938. However, if Vienna's 'die reihe' was a rather delayed addition to the European post-war developments in new music, the Budapest Chamber Ensemble was an extreme latecomer. In the ten years following the war, a rash of centres for the research and performance of new music had emerged: the International Ferienkurse in Darmstadt (1946), the Donaueschinger Musiktage für Zeitgenössische Tonkunst (1950), the studio for electronic music in Cologne (1951), the Domaine musical in Paris (1954), the Experimentalstudio in Gravesano (1954), and Warsaw's Autumn Festival (1956).<sup>10</sup> Budapest's only analogous endeavour in the field of the Western avant-garde was a rather low-key concert series founded in 1962 entitled 'Chamber Music of our Time' (Korunk Kamarazenéje).

This indicates not only that performers would have encountered difficulties when preparing new music in 1968,<sup>11</sup> but also that Hungarian composers would have had limited access to the so-called Western avant-garde. Indeed, contrary to research published in Germany, it remained extremely unusual for Hungarian composers to attend Western centres of new music throughout the 1950s and 1960s. To ascertain precisely how many musicians critics and composers actually attended in these years is beyond the scope of this particular research project, it is clear that the number of composers ranged only from 0 to 2.<sup>12</sup> Composers were less constricted within the Eastern Bloc, however, and it is likely that the Warsaw Autumn festival was a more useful source of information, from 1956 onwards. Indeed, the new Hungarian piece programmed in the 1968 concert which was the most obviously indebted to the 'Western' avant-garde of the time drew on techniques frequently associated with Polish experiments. Endre Székely's *Musica nocturna* was built up from sonorous sound masses, which it interleaved with melody and rhythmic patterns in both strict and aleatory formal patterns. Gábor Darvas' *Medal* was also evidence of integration with new techniques, combining electronics with live performance. Three other composers on the programme, however, produced less experimental pieces, although not, in the case of two of them, through lack of interest in or ignorance of the new. Whereas Rudolf Maros' works from the 1960s were fundamentally influenced by the Polish School (his *Euphonia I, II, and III*), his *Musica da camera per II* indicates a shift 'back to Bartók' rather than forward to a new adventurous path. And while, analogously, Zsolt Durkó's works from the early to mid 1960s experimented with timbre and texture quite boldly, his *Dartmouth Concerto*, conceivably in response to its original commissioning body (America's Hopkins Center, Dartmouth College in 1966), was relatively bland. Mihály's own offering, *Three movements*, was firmly rooted in the 'Hungarian' syntax which his work had never left: Bartókian rhythm enriched with chromatically intensified moments.

These works may be positioned relatively simply, then, between the pole of 'West' and 'East', but György Kurtág's *The Sayings of Péter Bornemisza* op.7, emblematically and symbolically, resists the categorization. To list even the more

obvious reference points of influence implies an eclecticism — Bach, Bartók, Schoenberg, Webern, Penderecki — but misses what is perhaps the most fundamental divergence from both Western and Eastern poles as outlined above. Namely, *The Sayings* is a musical ‘essay’ in reaction to a profoundly penitential text, and the musical techniques are fundamentally entwined in an interpretation of that. (This will be discussed in more detail below.) Emphasizing the disparity between the other works and *The Sayings* are the musical forces: whereas the former employ Mihály’s ensemble (a wind quintet, string quintet, and percussion), in two instances expanding it with voice and/or tape, *The Sayings* is for soprano and piano alone. Furthermore, whereas none of the ensemble pieces exceeds fifteen minutes in length, *The Sayings* lasts for forty-five.

### *The context in Germany*

Not only was the Darmstadt Summer School the first of the centres established after the war, it was also the one of most defining importance over the coming twenty years. In the form of its lecture programmes, debates, and premières it provided the most intensely focused location of the often controversial striving for musical progress. At the beginning it was envisaged as a destination for composers who would then teach or interpret their works, but the seminars in composition took over within a couple of years. The trend towards twelve-tone and serial techniques intensified and in 1953 the celebration of Webern elevated him to the symbol of a prophet. By the latter half of the 1950s, however, the danger of sterility in the new techniques was driving composers to new paths — aleatoricism, open form, and sound clusters, for instance — and the arrival of the American John Cage in 1957 signalled a new challenge to be met from the outside. During the 1960s a diversification occurred, with explorations not only in sound masses and textures, but also in the ‘dramatization’ of musical form, graphic scores, noise composition, aleatorics, minimalism, and politically ‘engaged’ music.<sup>13</sup>

The 1968 festival was dominated by Stockhausen. One two-hour concert was devoted to his *Hymnen*; another evening to pieces by three of his assistants in the Cologne Studio; but most importantly, he ran his ten-day composition course for fourteen composers and performers, the culmination of which was the project entitled ‘Musik für ein Haus’. In this four-hour musical installation, the fourteen students (including Saschko Gavrilloff, Heinz Holliger, and Aloys Kontarsky) improvised according to instructions laid down by Stockhausen (drawing on his book of meditation, ‘Aus den Sieben Tagen’) in the five rooms of a two-storey house. The audience wandered from room to room. There was no counterbalance to Stockhausen in the form of Boulez in 1968, because the latter had to withdraw from his course because of illness. For those more interested in composition than improvisation or meditation, however, seventeen concert pieces were put on, of which ten were world premières and five were German premières; Giselher Klebe’s opera on Schiller’s *Die Räuber* was also performed. The key debate of the

year for musicologists revolved around the question of whether the nineteenth century was ‘dead’.

### *The reception in Germany*

The vocabulary of almost all nine reviewers reveals the difficulty they had with responding to premières from the ‘peripheral’ regions of Europe.<sup>14</sup> For the *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, the Hungarian concert was interesting from the point of view of ‘cultural history’ and the Eastern Bloc orchestral works were interesting as ‘information’. Similarly, Friedrich Hommel of the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, noted that the Hungarian concert was the best of the ‘South East European’ encounters, thus revealing that his comparative framework set the concert apart from the main body of events. Hungary’s rivals for his praise here were the orchestral works of Ivan Spassov (Bulgaria), Tiberiu Olah and Constantin Mierenu (Rumania), Vinko Globokar (Yugoslavia), and Valentyn Sil’vestrov (Ukraine). Of all the writers, Hommel alone makes a positive statement about the Eastern influx, but his apparently ‘inclusive’ view seems to lean more towards the idea that these peripheral regions will be subsumed into the centre rather than the centre being diversified by the periphery. His review is summed up by the suggestion that Darmstadt should feel encouraged by the evidence that even Eastern composers are now able to contribute to the *common cause* (Gemeingut), and that this will allow Darmstadt to build on its achievements to date.

Critics were made aware of Hungary’s difficulties through the lecture presentation by Imre Fábíán, which introduced the concert. Indeed, one review categorizes the concert itself in the same way as the lecture: part of ‘Information über Neue Musik in Ungarn’ (Reviews, 12). Like Hommel, this writer is keen to contextualize the peculiarity of the new Hungarian music, explaining that the composers only came to know serialism in the late fifties, and that their eclecticism is linked to their domestic situation. The polite tolerance of these writers, however, should not be mistaken for enthusiasm. Hommel’s review is generally descriptive rather than complimentary. Carefully exposing Fábíán’s rationale for Hungary’s backwardness in his opening paragraphs, he paves the way for a tolerant reception of a group of pieces which clearly did not sit comfortably at all with the listeners in Germany. Székely’s *Musica notturna* fitted in rather better than the other works: ‘one could almost say [that it is in the] best tradition of Darmstadt’, he wrote. Maros is referred to as ‘the Hungarian Henze’, and his agile, multi-faceted instrumentation noted; but reference to his ‘intentional melodiousness’ is certainly no compliment: melodies may be nice, but niceness is of limited interest. Mihály’s long-windedness is alluded to, but the most explicitly chiding remark is aimed at Durkó’s work, which sounded to Hommel like an unsuccessful combination of Bartók and Stravinsky’s *Gebrauchsmusik*.

Székely’s *Musica notturna* was praised in the *Darmstädter Tagblatt*, whose critic sensed fantasy and formal control; and by the writer for the *Frankfurter*

*Rundschau*, for whom it was more meaningful than those of Maros and Mihály (which were too indebted to traditions in general and Bartók specifically). The reviewer for the *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* also placed Székely at the head of the composers born before WWI (thus excluding Kurtág and Durkó from the race for the ‘modern’), commenting on his Polish models. Likewise, Darvas, whose use of recorded material differentiated him from the rest, was also praised for his breaking with the past. Although over decorative and artificial, for Hommel, he was ‘modern’. Funk, of the *Frankfurter Rundschau*, suggested that he drew on a richer palette of colours even than Székely and had more poetic meaning than Durkó. Although Darvas was received very critically by some (his overemphasis on consonance was alienating for the *Darmstädter Tagblatt*, for instance), there is no doubt that his and Székely’s attempts to be ‘up to date’ made their works the most adaptable to the critical categories of the Darmstadt commentator.

In this context it is hardly surprising that *The Sayings* was heard with some confusion. In fairness, most critics had a good word or two for it. For Funk, Kurtág was the only composer to refrain from chamber music niceties (this compares usefully with Maros’s superficial melodiousness: Kurtág provided *content*, not just *appearance*); and his intensely gestural music met well with the sung text’s world of devilish temptation and sin. For the *Darmstädter Tagesblatt*, similarly, Kurtág found convincing sounds for horror and terror in an ‘orgy’ of pianistic dissonance; for the *Darmstädter Echo*, impressions were strong and memorable. Hommel praised the strength of the piano part, which for Norbert Ely of the *Wiesbadener Kurier*, alone would have made the trip to Darmstadt worthwhile.

All these writers had reservations, however. The material exhausted itself and ‘Spring’ was unconvincing (*Darmstädter Tagblatt*); it was long-winded (*Darmstädter Echo*); and the piano part ‘sounded like a bad imitation of Stockhausen’ (*Neue Zürcher Zeitung*). Stockhausen’s quasi Indian meditations at the same course provided an example for the sort of ‘spiritual’ qualities sought after in music in 1968: when Funk complained that *The Sayings*’ ‘Geistlichkeit’ was overblown, it was presumably the Christian, penitential, notion of the sacred, or of spirituality, which disturbed him. Norbert Ely’s remark that the piece could not disguise its roots in the nineteenth century is similarly telling, given the Darmstadt course’s lecture series and discussions on the vital role of the nineteenth century in the music of today. Kurtág evidently drew on the nineteenth century in the wrong way — for students on the course, *The Sayings* was ‘too nineteenth century’!<sup>15</sup>

### *The reception in Budapest*

#### 1968: NATIONAL TRIUMPH

The Hungarian report on the same concert is set into sharp relief by the reviews discussed above. In the November edition of *Muzsika*, Imre Fábíán’s account

appeared under the title ‘Our new music’s great acclaim in Darmstadt’, thus making his fundamental point — that there was a national triumph away from home (Reviews 1). Fábíán’s task was complex, however, and his presentation is a rich source from which to examine relations between East and West, as well as between past and present within Hungary.

He seems to reach out to sceptics in his opening paragraph, acknowledging Darmstadt’s notorious extremes of experimentation, questionable musical initiatives, showing off and clowning around. Having acceded to this, he rather pointedly remarks that the eccentricities were actually but a façade masking the true Darmstadt line, which no composer of any significance could afford to ignore. The dual strategy to hook his readers — reassurance and then implicit reproach — is a mere platform, however, for Fábíán to make his main statement.

The Darmstadt summer courses, he explains, are now beyond the storms of the progress imperative anyway. Music is no longer valued there in terms of novelty alone: a higher order of musical and artistic principles are now holding sway. Darmstadt is now matured and purified. And, independently, but in tandem with this advance, the Hungarian avant-garde has been making great steps: it is now more secure technically, as well as denser in musical terms and more closely linked to traditions. Fábíán’s stage is thus set for a moment of *kairos*. Darmstadt of the past was perhaps a sick institution; but it has now passed through its convalescence. Having been confined to ‘fluids only’, it is now ready for solids. Hungary, having struggled with production difficulties in the recent past, now has a range of ripe fruits to serve up.

At least three strands of potential mythology can be extracted from this account. First, there is the suggestion of improvement, a delicate reference to the still recent fallow post-war years. Those problems are now overcome, Fábíán suggests, invoking a path of redemption. Two elements enable another myth to suggest itself: the secure technique and reference to traditions (another myth — shared descent) will surely lead to a rebirth. Finally, and most ambitiously, there is the idea that Hungarian music will have something special to offer in a place which has a dirty past itself: it participates here in a myth of electing, in that it will *civilize* Darmstadt.

Before describing the concert and its reception, Fábíán provides a brief account of the central discussion at the summer course, which revolved around the question of whether the nineteenth century was dead. The emphasis of his account is on the Hungarian composer Ligeti’s contributions, especially the latter’s acknowledgement that the agreed answer — that it was certainly not dead — would have been outrageous and sacrilegious a few years earlier in Darmstadt. (Ligeti (b. 1923) had left Hungary in 1956 and established himself as a strong voice in the West.) The gradual cleansing of Darmstadt in the form of its return to its history reinforces Fábíán’s persuasive tone for his Hungarian sceptics. And Darmstadt must be on the verge of full recovery if it accepts, and is accepted by, Ligeti, a Hungarian. (Perhaps there is a further point being made here, a note of

reproach to the state regarding Ligeti's lack of recognition in Hungary.) Fábíán also explains that he himself gave a lecture at the summer course in which he provided a historical context for the Hungarian programme, outlining Hungary's double heritage — in Hungary herself, and in Europe. His case appeals for acceptance both in Hungary, and to the West.

He then goes on to outline the concert programme and describes its reception: 'the concert was received with unambiguous and great success by professionals and audience members alike'. The performers gripped the listeners' attention, and the opening piece, Székely's *Musica notturna*, was received with such acclaim that it all but determined the atmosphere of the whole concert — as the subsequent press reports demonstrated. The *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung's* article, 'Long awaited encounter', identified the concert as the most interesting of the performances from East and Central Europe. The local papers emphasized the Hungarian works' rare musical qualities; the specialist press could hardly have provided more complimentary reviews and the audience response exceeded expectations too.

Although the reasons for such blatant distortion may be multiple, one seems of overriding importance. Fábíán is making a statement against the isolation of Hungary from Europe, and identifies the value of Mihály in the future. Now is the moment to grasp the nettle, Fábíán seems to be crying out: Mihály's ensemble must be given as much as possible to do here at home. It can be a blessing for our entire musical life. Shadowing this position is his bitterness regarding Hungary's absorption into the Eastern Bloc, and the recognition that by recovering her national autonomy, the country can be reborn and become a player in the West. Fábíán knows that Mihály has opened the door, but everyone must want to walk through it for it to have any effect.

#### 1968: REDEMPTION AND REBIRTH (1)

By the time Fábíán's review was out, however, the concert had been repeated in Budapest. It received at least six reviews, of which five articulated an analogous sense of a historical turning point in the programme's overcoming of the past and heralding the future: they echoed Fábíán's myths of redemption and rebirth. György Kroó's review refers in passing to the dangers of succumbing to 'ghetto-like greyness' and 'damaging one-sidedness' in concert programming. (Reviews 2, 126.) The given evening, however, was not of this order at all, it says, and describes the packed concert hall, the thousands reached via the radio broadcast, the programme's quest not only for the 'sound of the times' but also for that of the future, and the way the enterprise would 'give wings' to composers (Ibid., 125). At last, wrote Előd Juhász (Reviews 3) and István Homolya (Reviews 4), Hungarian music of today can find its deserved place at home and in the rest of the world. For András Pernye the birth of the ensemble signified the opening of a new chapter in the performance of modern music (Reviews 5); and for István Raics, *The Sayings* was a fitting close for the concert which was undoubtedly a 'landmark' in the

development of ‘our’ music (Reviews 6). János Breuer was the lone sour voice in this respect, noting the excessive length of the programme (Reviews 7).

It had been a long evening even in Darmstadt, but it was yet longer in Budapest, where an additional work by Pál Kadosa was performed. Given that his *Serenade* was written in 1968 for the combination of instruments offered by the newly-formed ensemble, the reasons for its omission might at first seem mysterious. But in Darmstadt it would likely have caused derisive mirth. *Serenade* is a string of pieces of folksy jollity which, despite bearing passing similarities to each, lacks both the wit of Milhaud and the craftsmanship of Martinů. Kroó remarked that the piece was a refreshing splash on the programme, and was received warmly by the audience. Breuer also referred to the audience response, noting that in general, the applause was an accurate measure of each work’s significance. If the word count of his review is a measure of his own evaluation, Kurtág won the day, followed by Mihály and Maros; Kadosa and Durkó tagged along after them, leaving Székely and Darvas as filling material in between.

Kroó’s rhetorical style, rich in adjectives and metaphors, made for radio reviews which were a pleasure to listen to in terms of their rich vocabulary and his evident joy in bringing words to musical experience. The sense of wonder which his writing intimates here rather spills over in the review, not only in respect of *The Sayings* (‘the unambiguous and shattering statement of a great composer and individual’), but also in reference to the other works. Aside from one query (discussed below), he had not a critical word. Székely’s piece was the composer’s ‘most concentrated, best work’ and Darvas’ use of electronics was full of ideas: ‘look how the techniques which arrived here ten years ago as if the magic of an alien world, furnish so firmly the experimental fantasy of a Hungarian musician today!’ The virtuosic qualities of Mihály’s work were rarely to be heard these days, he claimed, and he even questioned where in Europe or America such beautifully written works as that of Maros could be heard! All the other reviewers found critical points to make: for Pernye, Darvas’ piece was protracted, for Homolya it was banal, Raics and Juhász also had minor reservations about Darvas, and the latter was critical of Székely too. Breuer compared Durkó’s work unfavourably with his earlier ones. Only Maros and Mihály were lavished with unstinting praise by all writers.

It is surely no accident that Kroó invoked Europe and America in support of his eulogy. As a prelude to his comments about Durkó’s *Dartmouth Concerto* (commissioned, he notes, in America) he also mentions a recent detailed and admiring article in ‘London’s Tempo’.<sup>16</sup> Kroó was probably genuinely moved by the out of the ordinary event in Hungarian musical life; he looked to the future with hope. But the absence of critical comments indicates that he was out of touch with Western European or American music (a fair enough position!) and was unable to measure the quality of the works with any accuracy, in his chosen terms. Most importantly, however, it is a sign that he was making a statement of local political significance. Like Fábrián, he supported all the adventurousness and Westward-



looking activities of the Hungarian avant-garde. And in the stagnating official culture of Budapest, he knew his own message had to be unambiguously loyal to the cause.

Two voices were more equivocal with regard to the longest work on the programme, *The Sayings*. Breuer expressed his respect with some difficulty. He suggested that the real significance of the work would probably be revealed only after repeated listening (and thus leaving open what the significance might be). He wrote that it was ‘cruelly true’ music (again, hardly an unambiguous statement); and that it was ‘inspired’ music. Like all the writers, he had praise for the performers to whom, he wrote, the audience were grateful at the end of the ‘tiring evening’.

Pernye, whose reviews of Kurtág in earlier years often shared certain concepts with those of Breuer, articulated a more complex sceptical position. He drew on the vocabulary he had formulated over the previous decade, which sought to argue for a balance of resolution over tension, with the former located within a broad understanding of consonance (including perfect fifths) and the latter, in dissonance.<sup>17</sup> Whilst formulating his position with the axioms of Socialist Realism, as if in acknowledgement that his dialectical harmonic taxonomy was of limited applicability to *The Sayings*, he made a relatively tolerant case for Kurtág’s individuality:

The closing D major chord of *Cantata profana* would not have come to him even as an epilogue, not even to the extent that it was possible for Penderecki’s *Hiroshima* or *Stabat Mater* to have a sort of resolution. Kurtág himself wants to bring his own system of standards into being; his darkness and his light only exist for himself, and in such a way that one always contains the other.

Pernye explains this last suggestion by pointing to a relationship between the first three movements (‘Confession’, ‘Sin’, and ‘Death’) and the fourth (‘Spring’). The first three, he writes, follow techniques of the New Viennese School (although they are even more lean and unrelenting); and the vocal writing’s intervallic leaps in these movements shatter the words being sung, thus producing an almost unbearable tension. The fourth movement, which he refers to as ‘the resolution’, is built from the same musical material, but ‘shows its other face’: ‘With this strict economy Kurtág avoided the danger of an epilogue-like resolution. He succeeded in making the problem find its own resolution without any kind of external interference, while not reducing tension for a moment either’.

Kurtág’s compositional ‘authenticity’ was evidently laudable. However, these comments should be understood through a broader knowledge of Pernye’s vocabulary. Writing in 1962, he expressed concern about the way ahead for music presented at ‘Chamber Music of our Time’, asking whether Hungary’s new interest in techniques of the interwar avant-garde actually represented a dead-end path, rather than an initiative with consequences. His reasoning became clear at the end of his paragraphs about Kurtág’s *Eight Piano Pieces* op.3. Music, he wrote, always rests on two pillars: one is that of individuality, the other is that of society. If the

composer succeeds through his creative talent in making everyone else suffer with him, his works are still merely private affairs. We must not, he urged, neglect the purifying role of art: artists with real conscience must portray the person who is able to overcome his suffering; unless they do that, they speak only to the small community of fearful and mournful people. Such artists, concluded Pernye, do not shape society. And Kurtág, we infer, is in danger of being one of those.<sup>18</sup>

When Pernye writes, therefore, that *The Sayings* is ‘the voice of fear’, he clearly misses something in Kurtág’s message:

Kurtág’s artistic and creative disposition is rooted in the recognition that an artist can never rule life, only serve it. [This disposition] does not want to seize fate by the throat, but rather simply accept it. Kurtág’s music moves with bowed head, and wants anything — will accept anything — apart from violence . . .

Kurtág’s music is the voice of fear. . . the fear that arbitrarily and lawlessly, from the outside, it should have to resolve problems which it has not lived and experienced in their entirety. The fear that it might become the master of something of which, lawfully, it should be the servant.

In other words, Kurtág’s music is cowardly. It avoids its greater role, which is to bring people closer to one another and offer them consolation. It does not dare to grasp society and throw a shining light on its future path.

Pernye’s sociological reservations about *The Sayings* were not expressed by other reviewers, but not because they had none. It seems that none dared, or was really equipped, to speak up critically against the work. As Homolya put it, the ‘thought content’ of *The Sayings* ‘explores regions we have not experienced in Hungarian music since Kodály’s *Psalmus Hungaricus* and Bartók’s *Cantata profana*. The profundity of Kurtág’s statement was too shocking for complaints about style or technique to carry any significance. For instance, Juhász ventured cautiously to suggest that it fell short of the perfection one might dream of, but that all its attributes were parcel to the whole. ‘Perhaps’, he wrote, ‘a contemporary word setting more adequate to Hungarian prosody could be imagined, and perhaps the length of the work (40 minutes!), despite its concentration, will not seem justified to every listener’. But he instantly refutes his own hesitation, insisting upon the incontestability that the content determined the means, i.e. that such intense impulses, fluidly rolling formal motion, and poetic contrasts could barely be conceived any other way.

The unwillingness to criticize the work suggests that the concert was accompanied by powerful forces of legitimization. On the side of the political status quo, there was Mihály’s embeddedness in the Ministry. On the side of national redemption and rebirth, the fact that the concert was essentially a repeat of a reputedly successful appearance in Western Europe, must have figured strongly (even though Fábíán’s review of Darmstadt was published after the Budapest concert). Perhaps it was no longer acceptable to voice doubts about the necessity

for investigating modern currents.

But Kroó raised a characteristically penetrating question, even though he did formulate it in the manner of a respectful enquiry. His ‘harmonic semantics’ shares some concepts with that of Pernye, but he seems to accept Kurtág’s use of dissonance and consonance as of universal resonance.

. . . from the distorted and grotesque intervals of the diabolical fugue, from the cries of terror, passing through the oppressive visions of nocturnal spectres, escaping whirlpools, arriving at the meditation with a miraculous certainty, the relief, the firm ground of hope, to the optimism of small musical steps, legato melodic curves, the shining crystalline design, so that finally after the lofty reflection over life’s entirety it can swing over into the spring of thirds and fifths, into the promise of pentatony. (Reviews 1, 128.)

However, he is concerned about the lack of promise and hope in the vocal writing: ‘isn’t there a deficiency of authentic prosody in the melodic, singing, wonderful melodic waves of the third and fourth parts?’, he asks. ‘The Webernesque shadow is not lost even with the arrival of morning, of Spring’ (Reviews 1, 129). So Kroó, like Pernye, sought more spiritual reassurance than Kurtág offered: where was the comfortingly smooth union of declaimed text and music at the close? Where was the folk song, that joyous, natural, truthful consummation of man and nature? For a work embodying the much-needed rebirth of Hungarian music, Kroó admits here a nagging doubt.

#### 1974: REDEMPTION AND REBIRTH (2)

That two articles dedicated to *The Sayings* were published in 1974 indicates that for at least two major writers, Kurtág’s work had come to represent a significant contribution to post-war Hungarian music. This is made very clear in György Kroó’s pioneering book *Why is the music of our century beautiful?*, which comprises a collection of essays by various writers, based on works by composers from Mahler to Kurtág (via a representative list of composers working in Western modernism).<sup>19</sup> Kroó thus staked a claim for *The Sayings* as the most important Hungarian work of recent years.

The opening paragraphs of his essay leave us in no doubt as to his attitude regarding *The Sayings*. He draws on two moments in history (the sixteenth century and the early 1920s) and two leading figures at those times (Péter Bornemisza and Kodály) in order to underscore the weightiness of Kurtág’s contribution:

Between January 1963 and August 1968, so for close to six years, the work was being prepared. The composer invokes the poet of the sixteenth century, with his doubts, fears and uncertainties, and reveals thereby the anguishing, sinful man living close to death — but still hoping — in the darkness of our own time. The model of the *Psalmus Hungaricus* is unmistakable behind the impulse and intention. It is not only the writers Mihály Vég Kecskeméti<sup>20</sup> and Péter Bornemisza who suggest the parallel, and the correlation does not stop with the

Biblical source either. The moral conviction and attitude instilled into the work, the impulse to preach to its own time is also common to each [. . .]. Moreover, the historical contexts for the genesis of the two works are strikingly analogous: reference to an individual tradition, the creation of the past through art, was just as timely in 1963 as it was for Kodály in 1923.<sup>21</sup>

So far as the broad historical comparison goes, Kroó has a point which withstands scrutiny: Kecskeméti and Bornemisza each wrote religious texts during the Hungarian Reformation which they infused with political statements and commentary on contemporary events.<sup>22</sup> Kecskeméti's 'Psalm 55', set by Kodály, calls the wrath of God onto the baser impulses disturbing the town (assumed to be Kodály's town of origin, Kecskemét, where the poet was probably mayor) and then praises the solace God provides for the faithful. Kurtág's compilation of Bornemisza's truly vast output of sermons, while portraying human evil and invoking the Almighty's merciful gaze, is entirely lacking, however, the sense of self-righteousness and sustained conviction imparted by 'Psalm 55'. In only two of the twenty extracts of texts is the preacher invoked and in the first of these, the opening movement entitled 'Confession', the paralyzing guilt and impotence of the speaker is paramount.

As for the topical necessity for recourse to musical tradition, drawing together the historical moments of 1923 and 1963 is a confusing step. In 1923 Hungary was undergoing a swing towards conservative nationalism. Bartók's Dance Suite, composed for the same occasion as *Psalmus Hungaricus* (the fiftieth anniversary of the unification of Buda, Óbuda, and Pest), and the composer's reticence about the sources of peasant music within it, seem to be products of Bartók's emerging 'cultural pluralism'<sup>23</sup> which evolved in response to the nationalist hostilities prevalent in the early 1920s. Kroó's idea that it was timely to refer to local tradition could be paralleled by almost any period, on these terms. And to suggest that Kurtág — a renowned introvert and recluse barely noticed by the state — be compared with Kodály — a lively member of official musical society who was already a major public figure — was to stretch the point beyond credibility.

János Kárpáti's study also betrays the need to establish the merit and importance of the work.<sup>24</sup> Rather than legitimizing it through reference to history, however, he seeks to differentiate *The Sayings* from over-abstracted music which lacks external reference by emphasizing its ethical statement. This technique is also clear in his 1963 book on Schoenberg (the first Hungarian monograph on a twentieth-century Western composer), in which Kárpáti stresses the moral stance of the composer, setting it against the composers' devotees' fetishization of his conceptual compositional systems.<sup>25</sup> He thus rescues and habilitates Schoenberg within a discursive habitus in which acceptable music has a social function. In his 1974 article on *The Sayings*, likewise, he proposes that Kurtág sought a material of ethical content for his reflection, and found it in Bornemisza's writing, a 'human manifestation of shattering strength, authenticity and validity'.<sup>26</sup> It was not the

text's language which was important to the composer, he explains, but the message it contained.

For Kroó and Kárpáti to furnish their theses, they needed a system through which to interpret the music, as opposed to merely the text. This article is not the place to explore their system in detail, but a very basic description should be sufficient.<sup>27</sup> Each draws on the hermeneutic tradition of reading musical shapes as representations of movement, and vocalizations as mimetic of human expression. Their understanding of emotional tension and release in music is framed by tonality's dissonance and consonance. Kroó does not shy away from the music's more abstract layer: he even includes an extended passage explaining the workings of dodecaphony. He also brings history into his analysis, suggesting generic models for the work's sections and is able, thereby, to find connotative significance in musical structures. Both writers focus on the way that the music serves the meaning and prosody of the text: their interpretations point to congruence. Using the hermeneutic tools as explanatory, they read the text's meaning into the musical fabric. Furthermore, as the meaning of the text is understood to have a wider social significance (as discussed above), their system amounts to a form of musical semantics applicable on a social level.

To sketch out their interpretations, then, they note that 'sin' is portrayed with dense chromatic figuration, closing funnel-like shapes, dissonance and grotesque use of the voice, and that this is intensified in the shift towards the theme of 'death'. Once the ensuing 'spring' is reached, the musical materials reflect the joy of rejuvenation in perfect fifths and fourths, major thirds, enlivening tempo, 'enthusiastic' figuration, as well as the rustic references to bleating lambs, the melodic curves, romantic chains of trills, and widely spaced intervals.<sup>28</sup>

For Kroó, this is sufficient to set aside the concerns about 'authentic prosody' and lingering shadows which he voiced in 1968. Having presented the work as a clearly-defined philosophical statement about worldly and unworldly forces of good and evil,<sup>29</sup> he concludes that the message is one of redemption. Despite the horrors of sin and of death, there is hope, spring,

and light to follow. *The Sayings* ends in joy.<sup>30</sup> He does not deny that there are still narrow intervals and timbres of sadness at the end, but he now diagnoses them as memories of the past. And although the concluding piano ostinato in the depths of the keyboard is 'dark', it is, he writes, 'the budding branches hanging above the deep water which come to our mind' at that point.<sup>31</sup>

Kárpáti, in contrast, finally refrains from asserting any meaning for the work's closing passage (he refers to the final movement as 'epilogue-like'); but in earlier stages of his article he does propose a core idea for the 'spring' section. Namely, following the horror of self-examination and guilt ('Sin' and 'Death'), sinners have only one road ahead: they believe in their own redemption. So where Kroó maps onto the final 'Spring' the fully-fledged Christian teleological goal, Kárpáti finds new life only in the form of nature's revival in Spring. He hears no distinct or

certain way forward for the penitent sinner, and cannot draw his thesis to a harmonious conclusion.

This, clearly, is to set aside the key question of the work as defined by Kárpáti. If Kurtág selected the text for its content and desired to make a moral statement, then it follows, in Kárpáti's terms, that we should try to understand the statement. But Kárpáti balks at the challenge. Although he repeatedly points to the music's concordance with the text, and thus the possibility of reading a meaning from the music, his final paragraph, in which he reflects on the work's ultimate message, vacillates peculiarly between music as abstract structure and music as meaning. He leaves us with the sense that he dares neither to assert the strength of the music as music, nor to state the meaning he finds embodied within it:

If we were to search in the text for an explanation for these musical connections, we might well end up with a very artificial result. It is much more natural to emphasize the musical content, significance and atmosphere of this melody's descending line. The peaceful calm radiating from it allows the vibrating impulses of certain parts of the work to come to rest, for the feverish tone to relax and for the devilish coldness to give way to the newly humane tone. In this way the musical connections, the system of thematic and motivic equivalences is no self-fulfilling formal bravura, no closed private world, but a tool of content, in which the text and the music, in a unity indivisible to the ultimate degree, find their true and dignified aim.<sup>32</sup> (My italics)

'This melody's descending line', coupled with Kroó's ostinato in the depths of the piano, was the stumbling block. For the ending cannot be interpreted so smoothly as a concordance between text and codified musical symbols. Where the voice enunciates the text, 'the famished chilled poor are warmed and given life anew', the melodic line is softly, but in traditional semantics, wearily and *dysphorically*, descending. There is a rupture in the complicity of word and music.

Kroó's teleology does not rest entirely on these somewhat simplistic hermeneutic devices. As does Kárpáti, he draws on an important ingredient of post-war new music discourses in Hungary: Thomas Mann's *Doctor Faustus* (1947). György Lukács' seminal essay on *Doctor Faustus* provided a powerful means to respond to music deemed to be dodecaphonic from 1949 onwards.<sup>33</sup> To summarize a long story, Mann's associating his fictive composer's invention and use of dodecaphony with a Faustian pact with the devil which was concurrent with Germany's descent into Nazism, led Hungarian critics and musicologists to interpret dodecaphony as lethal, apocalyptic and even fascist. So when Kárpáti and Kroó invoke Leverkühn's pact with the devil in the context of *The Sayings*, they are considering the composer's use of dodecaphony in his first movements ('Confession', 'Sin' and 'Death'); but also the implications of the work's statement about tragedy and redemption on a social level. In particular the recycling of musical materials is useful to their interpretations: Kárpáti reads the transformation of 'Sin' materials in 'Spring' as nature's dialectical law of passing away and rebirth; and Kroó points to the parallel with Leverkühn's 'Apocalipsis cum figuris', in which all elements are

Janus faced — they are both positive and negative. But Kroó, finally, reads a purely positive ending, seeking the end to the flickering duality of the materials, explaining that Kurtág's music promises that one *can relinquish the pact with the devil*.<sup>34</sup>

It is almost as if Kroó finds his view of Hungarian musical evolution through the 1960s manifested in *The Sayings*. His 1971 overview, *Twenty-five years of Hungarian Music*, characterizes the period from the mid-1950s to the mid-1960s as a time of necessary re-engagement with the avant-garde from outside Hungary.<sup>35</sup> But he goes on to celebrate the composers' return to their own traditions in the ensuing years, as if consolidating research which brought them sufficiently up to date. As he put it in a summary statement in 1974: '[t]he period from 1965 to 1970 provides encouragement. After service to international fashion the search for the national tone becomes an inner necessity, the stuffy atmosphere of locked-up studios is replaced by the desire to meet the public'.<sup>36</sup> That inner necessity was to resume loyalty to Hungary, and *relinquish obligations to international fashion*.

### *England, 2002*

This article was intended to illustrate how from today's perspective, critical writing in Hungarian musicology 1968–74 betrays a need for rebirth, but whilst the observations above are clear-cut in several respects, those addressing the area of specifically musical interpretation should be tempered with one more piece of secondary literature. In 1985, a further substantial study of *The Sayings* appeared, taking the debate about redemption a stage further. For Margaret McLay, *The Sayings* was 'not a work about death or sin, but rather about the renewal of life'.<sup>37</sup> She too read the text's message of redemption ('Kurtág has arranged his text to end with the mention of stars and the springing forth of new life, after the unpleasantness of sin and the gloom of death') onto the piece as a whole.<sup>38</sup> Without any need for national reconsolidation, the instinct of McLay was to seek a synthetic unity between word and music, an instinct which is characteristic of its time. However, she finds herself faintly dissatisfied: 'Kurtág could be accused of understating this final message, for it is possible that for some listeners the aggression of the first section may overwhelm the calmer second part'.<sup>39</sup> Whereas Kárpáti and Kroó neglected to consider them, McLay treats the conflicting symbols at the end as points for critique.

Today's reading is more inclined to embrace the discontinuity between sung text and musical symbol, to value them and interpret them as messages for the current time. In interpreting the position of *The Sayings* in Hungarian music history, Kroó's strategy of comparison with earlier landmarks may well be helpful, but rather than *Psalms Hungaricus*, Bartók's *The Miraculous Mandarin* seems an appropriate model. Kroó's suggestion might be reconstructed in the following way:

Between January 1963 and August 1968, so for close to six years, the work was being prepared. The composer invokes a private world of sin, perversion and debasement, with its desires, fears and uncertainties, and reveals thereby the anguishing, sinful man living close to death — but periodically experiencing hope — in the darkness of the public sphere. The model of *The Miraculous Mandarin* might be employed to illuminate the impulse and intention. The moral questioning and contradictions instilled into the work, the impulse to criticize its own society and the struggle to reconcile natural yearning with responsible civil living is also common to each [. . .]. Moreover, the narratives and musical materials suggest that individual tribulations, alienation and the role of human nature in the quest for self-expression, were just as topical for Kurtág in 1963 as they were for Bartók in 1919.

This reading would not have assisted the cause of new music in 1968 or 1974; nor would it have affirmed that Hungarian musical society had a leading moral figurehead to look towards. But it is the work's ambivalence which is striking today, its mixed message of 'hope — but. . .'. A fitting interpretation might follow the words of George Steiner, for whom '[t]here is no synagogue, no *ecclesia*, no *polis*, no nation, no ethnic community *which is not worth leaving* [. . .] because it will behave in ways that we may or must come to find unacceptable'.<sup>40</sup> The tone in which *The Sayings* speaks today is ultimately circumspect: longing for a positive message, but expressing caution in the face of nationalist, communist, and Christian, teleology.

## Notes

<sup>1</sup> Comparable research in music and musicology in the other Warsaw Pact countries is barely existent. The only really clear picture is available about Poland, where the Warsaw Autumn festival — a festival of music which was 'progressive' in the Western sense — dominated the scene after 1956. Poland differed from Hungary in another important respect: it had less sense of its own tradition (no equivalent to the nationalism of Kodály and Bartók) and was consequently less protective after World War II. See A. Thomas, *Polish Music since Szymanowski* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming 2004).

<sup>2</sup> D. Fosler-Lussier describes the two composers' propaganda efforts as leading to the creation of one of Anderson's imagined communities (Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism* (1983; London: Verso, 1991). See *Béla Bartók and the Transition to Communism in Hungary, 1945–1955* (PhD dissertation, University of California at Berkeley, 1999), pp. 267–79.

<sup>3</sup> See R. Beckles Willson, *Ligeti, Kurtág and Hungarian Music in the Cold War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming 2006).

<sup>4</sup> See A. Dalos "'Nem Kodály-iskola, de Magyar". Gondolatok a Kodály-iskola eszméjének kialakulásáról' (Not Kodály school, but Hungarian. Thoughts about the evolution of the Kodály school concept), *Holmi*,



xiv.9 (September 2002), 1175–91; L. Péteri, ‘Szabolcsi Bence és a magyar zeneélet diskurzusai’ (Bence Szabolcsi and Hungarian music discourses), *Magyar Zene*, xli.1 (February 2003), 3–48; A. Wilhelm ‘Prolegomena Szabolcsi újraolvasásához’, *Holmi*, xxi.9 (September 1999), 1100–08.

<sup>5</sup> See L. Wolff, *Inventing Eastern Europe. The Map of Civilization on the Mind of the Enlightenment* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994) for an account of the way Eastern Europe was constructed in the imagination of Western Europe during the eighteenth century.

<sup>6</sup> An overview of approaches to myth, symbol, and ritual in relation to nations can be found in ‘Ethno-symbolism’ (A. D. Smith, *Nationalism and Modernism* (London and New York: Routledge, 1998), pp. 170–98.

<sup>7</sup> ‘The Functions of Myth and a Taxonomy of Myths’, in *Myths and Nationhood*, ed. by G. Hosking and G. Schöpflin (London: Hurst & Company, 1997), pp. 19–36.

<sup>8</sup> J. Kárpáti, ‘Kurtág György: Bornemisza Péter mondásai opus 7. Gondolatok a szöveg zene és szerkezet kapcsolatáról’ (Thoughts about the connection between text, music, and structure), *Magyar Zene*, xv (1974), 115–33.

<sup>9</sup> ‘Kurtág György: Bornemisza Péter mondásai, 1963–68’, in *Miért szép századunk zenéje?*, ed. by G. Kroó (Budapest: Gondolat, 1974), pp. 317–68. Translated by M. L. Tóth as ‘Les “Dits de Péter Bornemisza” de György Kurtág’, in György Kurtág: *Entretiens, textes, écrits sur son œuvre*, ed. by Albèra, Barras, Bergère, Cecconi, and Russi (Geneve: L’Ages d’Homme, 1995), pp. 221–53.

<sup>10</sup> U. Dibelius, *Moderne Musik nach 1945* (Munich: Piper, 1998), pp. 237–69.

<sup>11</sup> Just such an ensemble had already been accompanying new ballet productions in Pécs since 1962, directed by János Sándor. Imre Eck choreographed nineteen contemporary Hungarian works between 1961 and 1966, the majority of which were written specifically for the Pécs Ballet. J. Breuer *Negyven év magyar zenekultúrája* (Forty years of Hungarian music culture) (Budapest: Zeneműkiadó, 1985), p. 387. These works were not generally experimental in the avant-garde sense, however.

<sup>12</sup> I am grateful to Jürgen Krebber, of the Internationales Musikinstitut Darmstadt, for providing me a list of Hungarians who attended the festival between 1946 and 1968. The research of Inge Kovács suggests that a substantial delegation travelled there every year, but this is probably based on Hungarian names listed in the archive, without regard for whether or not they still lived in Hungary, or whether they actually succeeded in attending, having enrolled in advance. I. Kovács, ‘Die Ferienkurse als Schauplatz der Ost-West-Konfrontation’, in *Im Zenit der Moderne: Die Internationalen Ferienkurse für Neue Musik Darmstadt 1946–1966*, vol. 1, ed. by Giannmario Borio and Hermann Danuser (Freiburg im Breisgau: Rombach Verlag, 1997), pp. 116–39.

<sup>13</sup> See J. Shintani, ‘Ein Blick auf die Anfänge der Klangflächenkomposition Ligeti — Cerha — Penderecki’, in *Von Kranichstein zur Gegenwart. 50 Jahre Darmstädter Ferienkurse* (Darmstadt: DACO Verlag, 1996), pp. 307–20.

<sup>14</sup> All reviews are listed in the Appendix.

<sup>15</sup> See W. Brennecke, ‘Kurtágs Anfänge in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (1961–1969)’, in *György Kurtág*, ed. by Friedrich Spangemacher (Bonn: Boosey & Hawkes,

1986 (Musik der Zeit 5)), pp. 18–27.

<sup>16</sup> This is presumably Stephen Walsh, ‘An Introduction to the Music of Zsolt Durkó’, *Tempo*, 85 (1968), 19–24.

<sup>17</sup> I discuss this in detail in ‘Beyond Socialist Realism in Hungary: 1961–63 responses to Kurtág’s opp. 1–4’, in *Colloquium: Socialist Realism and Music: Anti-Modernisms and Avant-gardes*, Brno 1.–3. 10. 2001 (Colloquia on the History and Theory of Music at the International Music Festival in Brno, vol. 36), ed. by Petr Macek, Mikulás Bek, and Geoffrey Chew (Praha: Editio Bärenreiter, forthcoming 2004). See also Rachel Beckles Willson, *György Kurtág’s The Sayings of Péter Bornemisza Op.7* (Basingstoke: Ashgate, 2004).

<sup>18</sup> *Magyar Nemzet*, 12 May 1962.

<sup>19</sup> Strauss, Debussy, Schoenberg, Webern, Stravinskii, Kodály, Berg, Bartók, Prokofiev, Honegger, Dallapicciola, Shostakovich, Lutosławski and Penderecki. *Miért szép századunk zenéje?*, ed. by G. Kroó (Budapest: Gondolat, 1974).

<sup>20</sup> The poet of Kodály’s text for *Psalmus Hungaricus*.

<sup>21</sup> Kroó, 1974, p. 319. Translated by M. L. Tóth as ‘Les “Dits de Péter Bornemisza” de György Kurtág’, in *György Kurtág: Entretiens, textes, écrits sur son œuvre*, ed. by Albèra, Barras, Bergère, Cecconi, and Russi (Geneve: L’Ages d’Homme, 1995), pp. 221–53.

<sup>22</sup> See *A History of Hungarian Literature*, ed. by T. Klaniczay (Budapest: Corvina, 1982); and *The Oxford History of Hungarian Literature from the Earliest Times to the Present*, ed. by L. Czigány (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984).

<sup>23</sup> The term is used by Malcolm Gillies in ‘The Dance Suite’, *The Bartók Companion* ed. by M. Gillies (London: Faber & Faber, 1993), p. 488.

<sup>24</sup> J. Kárpáti, ‘Kurtág György: Bornemisza Péter mondásai opus 7. Gondolatok a szöveg zene és szerkezet kapcsolatáról’ (Thoughts about the connection between text, music, and structure), *Magyar Zene*, xv (1974), 115–33.

<sup>25</sup> J. Kárpáti, *Arnold Schönberg* (Budapest: Zeneműkiadó, 1963).

<sup>26</sup> Kárpáti, 1974, p. 115.

<sup>27</sup> I discuss musical techniques in ‘To say and/or to be? Incongruence in The sayings of Péter Bornemisza op.7’, *Music Analysis*, 22.3 (2003), 315–38.

<sup>28</sup> Kroó, 1974, pp. 364–65.

<sup>29</sup> Kroó, 1974, p. 321 and p. 364ff.

<sup>30</sup> Kroó, 1974, pp. 364–65.

<sup>31</sup> Kroó, 1974, p. 365.

<sup>32</sup> Kárpáti, 1974, p. 133.

<sup>33</sup> ‘The Tragedy of Modern Art’ (1948), reprinted in György Lukács, *Essays on Thomas Man*, trans. by Stanley Mitchell (London: Merlin Press, 1964), pp. 47–97.

<sup>34</sup> Kroó, 1974, p. 368.

<sup>35</sup> G. Kroó, *A magyar zeneszerzés 25 éve* (Twenty-five years of Hungarian composition) (Budapest: Zeneműkiadó, 1971).

<sup>36</sup> ‘Hungarian Music since 1945’, in *A Concise History of Hungarian Music*, ed. by G. Kroó and B. Szabolcsi (Budapest: Corvina, 1974), p. 103.

<sup>37</sup> M. McLay, *The Music of György Kurtág 1959–1980* (unpublished doctoral thesis, University of Liverpool, 1985), p. 237.

<sup>38</sup> McLay, 1985, p. 319.

<sup>39</sup> Ibid., p. 237.

<sup>40</sup> ‘Totem or Taboo’ in G. Steiner, *No Passion Spent, Essays 1978–1996* (London: Faber & Faber, 1996), p. 237.

## *Appendix*

### REVIEWS CITED

- 1./ I. Fábián, ‘Új zenénk óriási sikere Darmstadtban’, *Muzsika*, xi.11 (1968), 1–12.
- 2./ G. Kroó, *A mikrofonnál Kroó György. Új zenei újság 1960–1980* (György Kroó at the microphone. New Music Magazine 1960–1980) (Budapest: Editio Musica, 1981), pp. 126–29.
- 3./ E. Juhász, ‘Hét magyar újdonság a Budapesti Kamaragyüttes hangversenyén’, *Magyar Zene*, ix.4 (1968), 429–37.
- 4./ I. Homolya’s review in *Filharmóniai Műsorfüzet*, 40 (1968), 20–22.
- 5./ A. Pernye’s review in *Magyar Nemzet*, 8 October 1968.
- 6./ I. Raics’s review in *Muzsika*, xi.12 (1968), 21–22.
- 7./ J. Breuer’s review in *Népszabadság*, 15 October 1968.

Reviews 8–13 are housed in the archive of the Internationales Musikinstitut Darmstadt (along with many other near-duplicates and versions of the same reviews published in different newspapers). References are as complete as possible.

- 8./ F. Hommel’s review in *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*.
- 9./ *Darmstädter Tagblatt*.
- 10./ K. L. Funk’s review in *Frankfurter Rundschau*.
- 11./ *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*.
- 12./ C-H. Bachman.
- 13./ N. Ely’s review in *Wiesbadener Kurier*.
- 14./ *Darmstädter Echo*.

# A PIVOTAL TURN: PRAGUE SPRING 1948 AND THE SOVIET CONSTRUCTION OF A CULTURAL SPHERE<sup>1</sup>

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*This article begins to describe the Soviet Union's attempt to create a cultural sphere in the emerging Eastern Bloc through the lens of musical ties, exchanges, and competitions. Focusing on a pivotal international festival, Prague Spring 1948, it strives to reveal Soviet aspirations, strategies, and expectations for its cultural sphere during one of the Cold War's most formative periods. It argues that the festival marked the moment at which two cultural spheres in Europe became operationally distinct. Within the Soviet sphere, it also argues that Soviet confusion and insecurity, prevailing attitudes among East Central European musicians, and Soviet efforts to placate them created a baseline of internal diversity and an emphasis on competition with the West from which Soviet discipline later could be imposed more aggressively. By characterizing Soviet decision makers' overarching visions in early 1948, it provides a descriptive starting point for study of the construction of a Soviet cultural sphere and the transformation of the Soviet cultural 'system' that resulted from its contact with an East Central Europe that it sought to dominate politically, economically, and militarily. It thus initiates a study of how the Soviet Union's imperial presence in East Central Europe changed Soviet society and culture.*

At the end of the Second World War, Europe was divided and much of it was occupied by the military forces of the victorious Allies — primarily the Soviet Union, the United States, and Great Britain. Even long before the war had ended, Stalin, Roosevelt, and Churchill had begun to meet to discuss the post-war order. Within two years of the war's end, the strains between the Allies about that order, which had never completely disappeared through years of co-operation, burst into outright competition and finally developed into a Cold War confrontation between two nuclear superpowers, the Soviet Union and the United States. The two superpowers sought to carve out and demarcate spheres of control within Europe, and what began as strategic and political confrontation soon became competing

projects for global influence that had significant cultural overtones. In order to understand the nature and extent of these efforts and Cold War competition in Europe, the superpowers' cultural activities must be investigated. This article begins to describe the Soviet Union's attempt to create a cultural sphere in the emerging Eastern bloc through the lens of musical ties, exchanges, and competitions. It focuses on one specific, pivotal international festival, Prague Spring 1948. By examining the Prague Spring festival, this article reveals Soviet aspirations, strategies, and expectations for its cultural sphere during one of the Cold War's most formative periods. It argues that the festival marked the moment at which the two cultural spheres in Europe became operationally distinct. Within the Soviet sphere, it also argues that Soviet confusion and insecurity, prevailing attitudes among musicians in the peoples' democracies, and Soviet efforts to placate them created a baseline of internal diversity and an overriding emphasis on competition with the West from which a later, more aggressive imposition of Soviet discipline in East Central Europe could begin.

Scholarly writing about the Cold War has been overwhelmingly dominated by concern with high politics and, especially, superpower diplomacy. The few exceptions to this focus have revealed American cultural strategy in Europe or analysed the role of Western-style popular culture (especially rock music) in the Soviet sphere.<sup>2</sup> But Soviet cultural policy goals, cultural competition strategies, and the practices that helped create a Soviet cultural sphere after the war have been comparatively ignored.<sup>3</sup> This article strives to begin addressing this lacuna by analysing Moscow's intentions at a pivotal moment near the start of the Cold War.

Throughout this article, repeated reference is made to a 'Soviet music system' or a 'Soviet cultural system,' the components of which can be described as 'Soviet-style.' These convenient if imprecise appellations require some explanation and qualification to avoid the appearance that they represent an immutable ideal type, pre-formed in the Soviet Union and ready for transplantation abroad.<sup>4</sup> I follow the lead of György Péteri and Michael David-Fox in eschewing such an understanding for one that acknowledges the dynamic nature of the 'system' and its capacity for continual transformation inspired by contact with East Central Europe.

Still, 'Soviet cultural system' and its related phrases remain useful shorthand. For the remainder of this article, they are meant to refer to an interlocking set of institutions and discursive practices which produced, oversaw, and disseminated the artistic products created in the Soviet Union and organized, financed, and disciplined Soviet cultural practitioners. Institutionally, this 'system' was comprised of three primary branches: 1) a set of creative unions (the Composers' Union, the Writers' Union, the Artists' Union, etc.) nominally independent of both governmental and party bureaucracies; 2) a governmental bureaucracy comprised of performance ensembles, theatres, museums, and so forth, which was crowned by a co-ordinating oversight body (the Committee on Artistic Affairs); and 3) a party bureaucracy capped by a changing committee in the Central Committee apparatus

(usually short-handed as Agitprop).

Discursively, the ‘system’ was characterized by efforts to establish and police the boundaries of appropriate musical creativity. Appropriate music was theoretically labelled ‘socialist realist,’ but socialist realism was never precisely defined, either positively or by exemplar. Instead, the Soviet ‘system’ was characterized by vague and often nonsensical instructions from governmental and party oversight institutions that were interpreted, often creatively and broadly, by musicians, especially members of the Composers’ Union. The primary restriction on these interpretations was that they had to stay within relatively broad boundaries that excluded the radical experimentation with musical form, atonality, serialism, and other features characteristic of high musical modernism in the West. Political authorities reserved the right to intervene into musical politics, which they did rarely, but dramatically and to traumatic effect. Aside from these distressing interventions, however, Soviet composers and musicologists generally used their privileged access to musical expertise to distribute the comparatively generous resources allocated to the music sphere as their leadership saw fit, to establish their own hierarchies of prestige and privilege (subject to state intervention), to educate their successors, to minimize the lasting effects of party intervention, and most generally to produce the Soviet Union’s musical culture. It was this system that the Soviets eventually sought to replicate in East Central Europe.

Efforts to do so depended on Soviet-sponsored musical exchanges that typically fell into one of three categories: cultural delegations, adjudicated international competitions, and expert consultations. These three types of musical exchange served distinct but mutually supporting purposes. The most common type of exchange immediately following the war was the cultural delegation, the primary purpose of which was the exhibition of exemplary Soviet music.<sup>5</sup> But the Soviets sought more than just to exhibit their musical culture. They also wanted to *demonstrate its superiority* over any other music production system, a goal which they pursued vigorously through the participation of Soviet musicians in adjudicated international competitions.<sup>6</sup> Finally, in the expert consultation, prominent individual artistic experts were sent to cities in the emerging Soviet bloc on extended business trips during which they usually directed the creative efforts of an artistic institution in the host country and thereby helped *constitute* the Sovietized system there. For example, a prominent opera director from Moscow might visit Hungary and direct a production of a Soviet opera or ballet at the opera and ballet theatre in Budapest.<sup>7</sup>

Examining all three types of exchange during the Prague festival provides a sense of Moscow-based decision makers’ goals for international musical exchanges, their perceptions of the effectiveness of those exchanges, and the measures that they sought to enact in order to achieve those goals. Before discussing the festival in detail, however, an important caveat is in order. This examination of a single festival is not a substitute for a detailed investigation of the

dynamics of each type of exchange over the entire period. It cannot provide an understanding of the real diversity of expectations and experience that pertained to different countries within the emerging cultural sphere. Further, it does not seek to provide a realistic sense of the reception of Moscow's policies in those countries or the transformation of musical culture prompted by the Soviet presence in each.<sup>8</sup> Instead, it seeks to characterize Soviet decision makers' overarching visions for the entire cultural sphere at one distinct, pivotal point in time. It can at best hope to provide a descriptive baseline from which further developments in the construction of a Soviet cultural sphere can be traced. To the extent that it almost exclusively focuses on Soviet perceptions and actions, it also provides the baseline for a study of the transformation of the Soviet 'system' described above that resulted from its contact with the cultural sphere it sought to dominate politically, economically, and militarily. It thus initiates a study of how the Soviet Union's imperial presence in East Central Europe changed Soviet society and culture.

### *Planning Prague Spring in an uneasy Europe*

Prague began to host an annual music festival each spring as early after the war as 1946. Each year, delegations from around the world would descend on Prague to take part in a festival of concerts, competitions, and exhibitions. But the 1948 festival in particular took place at a moment of tremendous flux, both within Czechoslovakia and in Europe as a whole. Since the 1947 festival, a number of things had happened to solidify existing divisions within Europe and push the superpowers toward their Cold War. In June 1947, the United States had offered all devastated European countries participation in the enormous economic relief package known as the Marshall Plan, an offer that countries in the emerging Soviet bloc were forced to reject. In September 1947, East Central European Communist parties, most still part of nominally co-operative ruling coalitions, were invited to join a new political coordinating body dreamed up in Moscow — the Cominform. And in March 1948, the Soviet Union walked out of the Allied Control Commission, abandoning the co-operative decision-making structures established as the war was coming to a close. Within two weeks of the festival's conclusion, the Berlin Blockade would begin and the emerging Soviet bloc would receive its first decisive split when Tito and the Yugoslavs were expelled from Cominform.

These European-wide developments precipitated or took place amidst domestic turmoil in the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia, as well. In July 1947, the Kliueva–Roskin Affair in the Soviet Union triggered a new ideological offensive against international collaboration and foreign contacts, especially cultural, scientific, or artistic contacts with the West.<sup>9</sup> And in February 1948, the Central Committee announced the most thoroughgoing intervention into the music realm it would ever take, disciplining the Soviet Union's most accomplished and internationally recognized composers and culminating in the First All-USSR

Congress of Soviet Composers in April 1948.<sup>10</sup> In Czechoslovakia, events were even more explosive. In February, the prime minister accepted the resignations of all non-communist ministers in the Czechoslovak government, precipitating a crisis that would only be resolved coincidentally during the Prague Spring festival with the ratification of a communist-based constitution and the final consolidation of communists in power.

It was in the midst of these tumultuous events that the 1948 Prague Spring festival was planned and took place. According to Soviet sources, the planning of the music festival was entirely in the hands of local cultural leaders, especially the Czech Composers' Union and the Czech Philharmonic.<sup>11</sup> Invitations to prospective Soviet participants in both the Smetana Piano Competition and the Second International Congress of Composers and Music Critics that were taking place during the festival were sent in time to get the approval of the Soviet Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs in mid-January 1948.<sup>12</sup> Unfortunately, the Soviet music world had just started down the slippery slope to Central Committee intervention. The participants and the agencies that represented them to the party leadership did not get approval to participate before the beginning of the public party intervention of early February and the brouhaha surrounding it. The issue of Soviet participation in the Prague Festival was only revisited in March.

By then, the festival was only two months away, and time was running short. At the beginning of March, the Committee on Artistic Affairs consulted with the organizers from the Czech Philharmonic, discussed the financial ramifications of the trip with the Second Secretary of the Soviet embassy in Prague, and received clearance from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The head of the Committee, P. Lebedev, assembled a comprehensive recommendation for the Soviet delegation.<sup>13</sup>

Possibly after further prompting by the Soviet embassy in Prague,<sup>14</sup> the Central Committee apparatus only took up the issue at the very end of March when Lebedev submitted a new, very short report that just addressed the issue of composers' and musicologists' participation in the Second International Congress of Composers and Music Critics.<sup>15</sup> After checking with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Composers' Union, bureaucrats in the Central Committee apparatus essentially endorsed Lebedev's two proposals, introducing only three minor changes designed to strengthen the Soviet presence on the piano jury, shore up the ideological credentials of the delegation's musicologists, and maintain the new domestic leadership of the Composers' Union at home for the duration of the proposed trip to Prague.<sup>16</sup>

The final delegation as recommended by the Committee on Artistic Affairs, the Composers' Union, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Central Committee apparatus was thus comprised of four performance musicians, including an accompanist (E. L. Gilel's, K. K. Ivanov, M. P. Maksakova, and B. M. Iurtaikin), three piano jurists (A. B. Gol'denveizer, L. N. Oborin, and P. A. Serebriakov),



three composers (T. N. Khrennikov, Iu. A. Shaporin, and V. P. Solov'ev-Sedoi), and two musicologists (T. N. Livanova and B. M. Iarustovskii). The creative proclivities of these twelve musicians demonstrate the musical face that the Soviet decision-makers in Moscow sought to present to the world. That face was one of excellence in instrumental and vocal performance and accessibility in symphonic, choral, and music theatrical composition.

When this proposal finally reached the upper levels of the party leadership, however, the whole project received a peremptory dismissal. In the post-war Stalin period, any international travel had to be approved by the Politburo, and complicated proposals like the Prague Spring delegation were often routed through the Secretariat on their way to the top. In most cases, both the Secretariat and the Politburo merely rubber-stamped what were thoroughly investigated, carefully considered, and well-documented recommendations. In this case, however, the Secretariat did not approve. In a short, terse decision, it noted that Soviet composers were busy with organizational and explanatory work connected with the barely completed All-USSR Congress of Soviet Composers, and the most outstanding concertizing musicians could not be spared for a trip to Prague. So, the entire proposal was rejected.<sup>17</sup>

This episode demonstrates first and foremost how preoccupied the most powerful Soviet leaders were with domestic cultural developments in early 1948. This is not to say that Stalin and his innermost circle were ignoring international affairs. Such a claim would be patently absurd in the face of the Frankfurt Charter (9 February), the Czechoslovak crisis (20–25 February), and the decision to abandon the Allied Control Commission (20 March). Rather, international deliberations at the highest level in early 1948 were entirely political and strategic. Artistic and musical life was worthy of attention even in this highly charged international atmosphere, but only domestic Soviet artistic and musical life.

The bureaucrats within the party's cultural oversight apparatus were not so preoccupied, and sometime in the first eleven days after the Secretariat decision of 8 May, the top party leaders were persuaded that the Soviets would miss an important cultural opportunity if they did not participate in the festival. When the Politburo heard the issue on 19 May, it overturned the earlier decision and agreed to send a delegation to Prague, only slightly changing its membership from the proposals of late March by replacing Maksakova with another soprano<sup>18</sup> (N. D. Shpiller) and the accompanist with an operatic baritone (A. P. Ivanov).

But all was not well. By the time the Politburo finally voted to send the Soviet delegation, the festival had already begun, and its organizers had been told on the eve of the first day that no Soviet delegation would participate.<sup>19</sup> Programmes were set, and the Soviets were not on them. Soviet indecision and inefficiency thus created a huge organizational headache for the festival's leadership<sup>20</sup> and ensured that the delegation's greeting would be other than ecstatic, a response undoubtedly amplified by the recent communist coup. But the last-minute Soviet

decision to participate was only one component of a nearly disastrous chain of events started by the Czechoslovak political crisis that began just months earlier. Entire delegations from the United States, England, and France decided to boycott the event, as a result of which the only internationally recognized artists from the original participant list who remained were Eva Bandrovskaja-Turskaja from Poland and Erich Kleiber from Austria.<sup>21</sup> When the Soviet delegation, too, announced that it would not participate, the festival was devastated. All of that changed when the Soviet artists finally arrived on 27 May, and the festival was even extended nine days to 12 June to accommodate the changes.<sup>22</sup>

*Performing to a new sphere: Soviet participation and impressions, part I*

One of the most active proponents of Soviet participation in the festival was I. Lazarev, Second Secretary of the Soviet Embassy in Prague. Immediately after the conclusion of the festivities, Lazarev sent a glowing report about Soviet participation that reveals how non-musical decision-makers thought about the sorts of cultural exchanges embodied in the Prague Spring 1948 festival. Lazarev's report exhibits the combination of pride, condescension, and arrogance characteristic of the Soviet Union's self-presentation and self-image on the international musical stage.

Lazarev described the arrival of the Soviet delegation as though the Soviets were the festival's saviors. He noted that 'the program of the festival was constructed with an overt preponderance of compositions by Czech composers, and also with complete preponderance of Czech performance musicians. Undoubtedly, this did not facilitate the festival's success.'<sup>23</sup> In the eyes of the Soviet functionary, the entire first week of the festival had gone by with barely any mention, and the concerts were quite poorly attended. Even the internationally renowned Eva Bandrovskaja only managed to draw a half auditorium. The arrival of the Soviet delegation, on the other hand, completely changed the character of the festival, and immediately after Shpiller's first concert, the organizers decided to cover up the festival's poor first week by extending its dates nine days and allowing much more time for performances by Soviet musicians. In the end, the Soviets' contribution to the performance aspect of the festival was quite significant, by any measure. Lazarev itemized eight different solo concerts, reported that Soviet performers made multiple additional recordings for radio broadcasts, and noted that the two operatic singers also sang the lead roles in three separate operas. Besides these concert performances, Lazarev described visits that the delegation took to provincial cities across Czechoslovakia and their presentations at major factories in and around Prague. He also noted with obvious pleasure that Oborin's evaluation of the piano competition suggested that any second-flight Soviet pianist could easily have walked away with first prize.<sup>24</sup> Despite some positive remarks about individual artists from other countries, Lazarev concluded with heavy self-

congratulatory praise:

Evaluating the meaning of the participation of the Soviet pianists L. N. Oborin, E. Gilel's and singers A. P. Ivanov and N. D. Shpiller, one can remark that their performances demonstrated to the entire world the fact that the Soviet Union occupies the leading position in musical and vocal culture among all other countries of the world. [. . .] One can also note that only thanks to the participation<sup>25</sup> of the Soviet artists was the Prague festival a success.

Lazarev did not depend exclusively on his own subjective observations to support his proud recitation of Soviet success. Rather, he devoted a good deal of attention to articles published in the Czechoslovak press, quoting substantial segments of glowing reviews.<sup>26</sup> Even these accounts, however, were coloured by the shadows cast by the recent political upheaval, for Lazarev also noted with satisfaction how many of the concerts were attended by members of the Czechoslovak leadership and diplomatic corps. In fact, he considered the presence of a Soviet artistic delegation during this period of political upheaval to be especially important:

One can also note that the participation of Soviet artists in the festival during this political moment that is so tense for Czechoslovakia (the elections and sacking of the president), to a certain degree exerted a beneficial influence on the development of the political situation, for the participation of Soviet musicians showed that the Soviet government is responsive to the requests of the<sup>27</sup> Czechoslovak government and the Czechoslovak communists.

Lazarev's report thus suggests that Soviet political operatives on the ground in the countries of the emerging Soviet bloc recognized probably better than their superiors in Moscow how musical exchanges could serve political ends, theoretically exhibiting Soviet good intentions and the successes of the Soviet system. The *actual* reception of these 'good intentions,' however, is a question beyond the bounds of this article.

One of the actual Soviet participants in the Prague Spring 1948 festival drew much more detailed and far ranging conclusions from his own experiences and observations. B. M. Iarustovskii attended the festival as the Soviet Union's representative musicologist, a role he acquired because of his administrative position in the Central Committee apparatus. Iarustovskii was the only musician to hold a full-time post in the party's main cultural oversight department, a post that was regularized in the aftermath of the party intervention into musical affairs that took place in February 1948. Iarustovskii was thus ideally situated to articulate Soviet positions at the festival and to view the proceedings that took place there with an eye to evaluating them for higher ranking decision makers in Moscow.

When he returned from the festival, Iarustovskii compiled a report for his superiors that included a five-point program for musical exchanges with the new peoples' democracies. He argued that the overriding purpose of Soviet performance delegations should be to compete with their Western counterparts. He

thus noted that the summer of 1948 was the ideal time to expand musical and even theatrical tours of the emerging Soviet bloc because of the recent and ongoing Western boycott.<sup>28</sup>

In order to compete successfully, Iarustovskii suggested that Soviet delegations should be modelled more closely on those of their competitors. Considering that any cultural delegation was intended to demonstrate the superiority of the Soviet production system, this suggestion may seem unwise or even dangerous, especially in the growing tide of anti-cosmopolitanism in the Soviet Union. However, Iarustovskii's exact recommendations demonstrate that he thought that Soviet performance musicians could compete successfully with their Western counterparts on whatever terms were most familiar to the intended audience. Thus he noted that the primary problem with Soviet tours up to the summer of 1948 was their haphazard and chaotic planning, especially compared to tours by artists from Western Europe and the United States. The lack of preparation *in planning* — not the artists' musical preparation — caused confusion that alienated concert and theatre audiences. The distribution of Soviet touring artists was also extremely problematic, 'for until now, these trips have had an episodic character, as a result of which for months there will have been no touring artists, and then at exactly the same time a large number of our ensembles and soloists will be concentrated all at once.' Compared with Western tours, planned 'well ahead of time and precisely', the Soviet tours were not making the desired impression on audiences, especially in Czechoslovakia and Poland.<sup>29</sup>

Iarustovskii also suggested emulating Western practice in a more surprising area — material compensation for the touring artists. Iarustovskii summarized the prevailing system as follows:

Now, thanks to the fact that tours of our artists and collectives are looked on as visits from guests, the artists receive daily (from the Soviet Union), free food and hotel rooms, full honorariums for all of their concerts, and very often, they retain their salaries from their workplaces in the Soviet Union. As a result of this, our touring artists' trips turn out in the majority of cases to be materially unprofitable, and sometimes simply burdensome for the budget of the Ministry.

In other words, the Soviet government was subsidizing concert tours, and the touring artists were allegedly profiting too extravagantly, causing resentment among the leaders of concertizing and theatre organizations at home, putting off target audiences in the peoples' democracies, and generally creating an unhealthy atmosphere. The solution: limit performers' pay to a concert honorarium similar to those provided 'for any touring artist from the West'.<sup>30</sup>

This suggestion again implies adjusting Soviet practices to models familiar to audiences in the peoples' democracies, though it also served the purpose of saving scarce resources. If it partially reduced one of the prime incentives for Soviet artists to participate in international tours, that was a price Iarustovskii was willing to pay.

Modelling the economics of international concert tours on Western practice, however, could potentially create problems later when the economic system on which Western practice was predicated was replaced by Soviet-style, planned economies across the bloc. The removal of the Soviet food and housing payments put the entire financial burden of visiting tours on the host government, and by the early 1950s, Politburo decisions approving international tours and exchanges typically noted that the host country would subsidize the trips.<sup>31</sup>

If the ramifications of Iarustovskii's proposal to model Soviet tours on Western practices was fraught with potential long-term problems, he also suggested measures that could help alleviate some of those problems. He suggested making musical exchanges reciprocal and inviting artists from East Central Europe to tour the Soviet Union. This suggestion stemmed from the clearly uncomfortable personal position in which Iarustovskii found himself when the Soviet delegation arrived at the Prague festival. As Lazarev noted earlier, the director of the Czech Philharmonic, Kubelik, greeted the Soviet contingent 'coldly'. While Lazarev explained the cold reception by referring to the scheduling nightmares caused by bungled Soviet decision making, Iarustovskii thought that Kubelik resented the fact that initial invitations to tour the Soviet Union had gone unmentioned for well over a year.<sup>32</sup>

This incident also suggests an important characteristic of musical exchanges that is difficult to assess from sources produced by the party and government apparatus in Moscow: the distinction between the strident, arrogant assumption of cultural superiority issuing from the Kremlin and the insecurity of even the proud and loyal Soviet musicians who were approved to embody those exchanges when they were still a relative novelty. For both Lazarev and Iarustovskii to mention Kubelik's coldness but neither blame him for it nor even suggest a link between it and the recent political developments in Czechoslovakia is striking indeed, especially considering that Kubelik would defect within the year.<sup>33</sup> The embarrassment of the Soviet delegation about their belated arrival and their inability even to discuss reciprocity with their colleagues is as palpable as it could be in dry reports written by operatives within the Central Committee bureaucracy and diplomatic corps.

Though Iarustovskii's policy recommendation concentrated primarily on the structural aspects of prospective concert tours, he also touched briefly on the musical content of these tours. He suggested paying closer attention to programming choices and playing more pieces by the late nineteenth-century romantic composers that the Soviets affectionately dubbed the 'Russian classics' and by 'Slavic, contemporary composers.'<sup>34</sup> In other words, Iarustovskii sought to cultivate a sense of historical cultural similarity and contemporary artistic linkage between the increasingly Russocentric Soviet Union and the predominantly Slavic countries of the emerging Soviet sphere. How Hungary, Romania, and Albania figured in Iarustovskii's scenario is not clear.

It would not take long for Iarustovskii's suggestions to bear fruit, especially

those that called for taking advantage of the Western boycott to strengthen the Soviet cultural presence in East Central Europe and for extending more frequent and significant reciprocal invitations to musical colleagues in the emerging Soviet sphere. By the early 1950s, there was a dramatic increase in the flow of musical and other artistic delegations from East Central Europe into the Soviet Union, as just a cursory examination of the Politburo approvals of international musical exchanges in 1947 and 1950 demonstrates. Between October 1946 and November 1947, the Politburo approved twelve decisions allowing fifteen different musical exchanges between the USSR and other countries. Only one of those permitted artists from the Soviet sphere of influence to visit the Soviet Union.<sup>35</sup> In 1950, the Politburo made twenty-nine such decisions about thirty-two exchanges, and eleven — just over a third — of those decisions entailed visits from artists from East Central Europe or North Korea.<sup>36</sup> Musical exchange in the Soviet cultural sphere thus increasingly became a two-way affair.

*The Second International Congress of Composers and Music Critics:  
Soviet participation and impressions, part II*

Prague Spring 1948 was thus the moment at which the cultural spheres of the West and the Soviet bloc became operationally distinct, through both Western boycott and rising Soviet attention to cultural exchanges, which became increasingly systematized and increasingly based on the Western models with which East Central European audiences were presumably more familiar. But in May and June 1948, the musical content of the Soviet sphere was still undefined. In this light, another main component of the Prague Spring 1948 festival is worthy of detailed attention. The discussions at the Second International Congress of Composers and Music Critics and the Soviet delegation's reactions to those discussions provide insights into the disparate views of musical analysis and evaluation that adhered across the bloc and into how the Soviets proposed to deal with that heterogeneity.

The Congress took place 20–29 May 1948 as part of the Prague Spring festival. Like the festival's performance components, it was significantly marked by unpredictable ramifications of the dramatic political events of the year. Most notably, a bit of drama was lent by the presence of the leftist German composer Hanns Eisler. Eisler had just been deported from the United States, Czechoslovakia issued him a transit visa, and his stopover coincided with the dates of the Congress.<sup>37</sup> His shabby treatment by the Americans played directly into the hands of the Soviets, who could make (disingenuous) hay about the unpredictable vicissitudes of musical production in the postwar United States. The benefits of Eisler's participation were partially offset when many, but not all, composers and musicologists from North America, England, and France boycotted. Unlike the performance components of the festival, the Congress was not extended to accommodate the Soviet delegation, so their arrival late on the 23 May meant that

the Soviets missed almost half of the meeting, including Eisler's presentation.<sup>38</sup>

Nevertheless, the Soviets began to participate as soon as they arrived, immediately joining the Congress's three working groups for the meetings of 24 May. For the next six days, the assembled composers, musicologists, and music critics continued discussing such issues as the role of tradition in contemporary composition, the social function of music and of composers, the state of music performance in the West, and a number of issues relating to national musical particularity and the applicability of the general issues to each national case.<sup>39</sup> At the end of these discussions, the Congress's governing board passed a series of resolutions that provide an extremely useful view of the diverse but directed consensus about the state of contemporary music in the emerging Soviet sphere and in the world as a whole.<sup>40</sup>

The most concise statement of the Congress's findings was the 'address' drafted at the initiative of the Soviet delegation and approved in the second resolution.<sup>41</sup> In the address, the Congress's leadership pointed to a crisis in contemporary music caused by a polarization of 'so-called "serious" and "light" music.' Both types of music reached their own state of crisis, 'serious' music because of its increasingly individualistic, subjective content and complicated, constructive form, and 'light' music because of its banality, standardization, and, in many countries, monopolization by cultural 'industries.' The delegates unanimously agreed that such a crisis was particularly unacceptable 'in our epoch, when new social forms are being born and when all human culture is entering a new era and placing new and unavoidable tasks in front of the artist.' Before listing the general outlines of a solution to this crisis, the address paused to make an extremely significant statement intended to preserve national particularity and diversity across the emerging bloc:

The Congress does not want to give any concrete recipes or instructions to musical creativity; the Congress understands that each country and each people should find its own path and its own methods. However, common [to all of these paths] should be a deep understanding of the causes and essence of the musical crisis, and common [to all] should be our striving and our will to overcome it.<sup>42</sup>

Finally, the Congress noted that the crisis should be surmounted if all composers considered 'progressive' ideas and the feelings of the masses, if all artists turned to national culture and avoided the cosmopolitan tendencies of modern life, if composers paid more attention to concrete musical forms (operas, oratorios, cantatas, romances, mass songs, and so forth), and if composers and music critics tried harder to educate the populace.<sup>43</sup>

This resolution reveals the outstanding characteristics of the consensus about music during the pivotal year of 1948. Most importantly, the Congress agreed to ensure that national particularity would be preserved in culture, if not in politics or economic organization. Of course, this sort of language had been used to describe

the postwar phenomenon of peoples' democracy in general, but the pretence to 'separate national paths' in politics had been dropped with the advent of the Cominform nine months earlier and the increasing co-ordination of the activities of national communist parties throughout the emerging bloc ever since. The same was not to occur in music for at least another year.<sup>44</sup>

This potentially surprising concession to local national culture actually makes sense in the light of contemporary domestic developments in Soviet cultural policy. Throughout the late 1940s, even during the peak of the anti-cosmopolitan campaigns hinted at in the Congress' address, Soviet cultural policy makers sought to preserve national forms that they thought should appeal to mass audiences. That is not to say that these policy makers evaluated music based on its actual popularity with mass audiences.<sup>45</sup> Indeed, they did not, as the Congress' diatribe against 'American entertainment' music clearly suggested. In fact, the list of 'more concrete genres' suggests that the Soviets intended to insist on some specific guidelines reminiscent of those recently sketched out at home.<sup>46</sup> Nevertheless, the repeated calls to develop contemporary music on the shoulders of national traditions could give musicians throughout the Soviet sphere hope to pursue their own musical developments. Soviet efforts to construct a cultural bloc on which and from which to launch their globalization efforts should be evaluated with this in mind. To be a bloc did not necessarily mean to be monolithic.

In a much more secretive realm, however, the creative proclivities that the Soviet delegation observed in Prague were cause for concern back in Moscow. In his report to the Central Committee, Iarustovskii enumerated and analysed the causes of that concern, and in so doing further demonstrated Moscow's global ambitions in the music realm. No doubt unintentionally, he also sketched out the contours of disagreement and diversity that would prevail throughout the Soviet cultural sphere for years to come.

Iarustovskii's analysis was based on more than twenty-five presentations at the Congress, informal discussions with other delegates, and additional impressions gathered during the Soviet delegation's trip to Poland following the festival.<sup>47</sup> He was pleased to report that some of the creative and theoretical positions expressed in the presentations corresponded with or supported Soviet priorities for international culture. For example, Hanns Eisler described the 'dependency' of composers and musicologists working in the 'Anglo-Saxon Bloc' on 'customer-entrepreneurs.' Others complained about the 'assault of the American "cultural" industry on France, the Netherlands, and elsewhere.' Yet others raised more theoretical questions about Marxist musical aesthetics. And Iarustovskii thought that almost everyone received the Soviet delegation's presentations with a sincere desire to understand the recent developments in the musical life of the Soviet Union. Only a few outriders from the United States and the Netherlands proved visibly hostile, confrontational, and provocative.<sup>48</sup>

The Czechoslovak delegation was so favourably disposed to their Soviet



counterparts that they surprised Iarustovskii, Khrennikov, and Shaporin with a proposal to form an ‘International Communist Musical Organization,’ and other speakers at the Congress repeatedly suggested forming an international ‘Association of Progressive Musicians.’ Creating some sort of international association seemed indispensable because of developments at a parallel congress that took place in Amsterdam immediately after the Prague festival.<sup>49</sup> At the Amsterdam congress of the Association of Contemporary Music, one of the American delegates announced that American financiers had put together a ‘dollar fund’ dedicated to supporting contemporary music by paying for performances and publication of new music. Despite this offer, Iarustovskii claimed, many delegates even at the Amsterdam congress were reportedly eager to participate in the sort of progressive association suggested by the Czechs.<sup>50</sup> Much as they may have liked the idea, Iarustovskii and his Soviet colleagues were hamstrung by the overly centralized nature of decision-making about international matters in Moscow. Without receiving instructions from the Central Committee, the Soviet delegation could not commit to anything except hypothetical future discussions about an international association based on the Soviet model. When he returned to Moscow, however, Iarustovskii pushed for Central Committee authorization to allow the Composers’ Union to play an active role in the formation of such an association in the near future.<sup>51</sup>

This incident demonstrates how unprepared the Soviet domestic cultural apparatus and its representatives abroad were for systematic competition with the West even in 1948. Isolated from the international music scene for years, they did not find out about the ACM congress in Amsterdam until they encountered friendly delegates in Prague. Still reeling from party intervention into musical life at home just months earlier, they seemed insecure and unprepared to lead any sort of collaborative association abroad. In fact, their colleagues in Czechoslovakia seemed to have had far more initiative, not to mention experience, organizing activities on this front. Still, the Soviet delegates also found sympathetic colleagues, seemingly interested in the Soviet music system and eager to cooperate in the construction of an integrated sphere.

In the highly charged atmosphere of early 1948, it should perhaps come as no surprise that the delegates from Czechoslovakia would approach the Soviet delegation with offers of cooperation. At the almost contemporaneous celebration of Charles University’s 600<sup>th</sup> anniversary in Prague, a number of highly placed Czech officials plied the Soviet delegation with requests for information and closer ties. Apprehension during the on-going political crisis and careerist opportunism may have combined in varying degrees to render Czechoslovak delegates in both cultural fields eager to convey their enthusiasm to their Soviet counterparts.<sup>52</sup> Over the next several years, the Sovietization of East Central European cultural life would proceed with the participation of Soviet cultural experts like the delegates to the Charles University celebration and to Prague Spring 1948. John Connelly has

recently shown the extent to which Sovietization of higher education depended on local elites who sought to adapt to their national contexts a Soviet system about which they sought information from Soviet experts. Though these experts played important roles, they were not decisive in the Sovietization of higher education, which was driven more by national dynamics in each country.<sup>53</sup> Though conclusions about the motivations of non-Soviet delegates to the Prague Spring festival who appear in Soviet sources are necessarily speculative, it is very likely that the presence of the Soviet delegates encouraged musicians who were sympathetic to the communists to seek information about the Soviet system and to solidify their own professional positions by displaying interest in it and a willingness to direct future Sovietization efforts in their own countries.

Whatever motivated his Czech colleagues to suggest co-operation, Iarustovskii found other causes for concern in identifying sympathetic figures. As he had earlier with regard to performance tours, he presented a series of observations that focused on these concerns. First, he and his colleagues had discovered that the creative proclivities of their counterparts were far closer to the oft-pilloried Western modernists than to their own:

The process of deep and wide democratization characteristic of modern Czechoslovakia and Poland has still only weakly touched the artistic intelligentsia, the majority of whom occupy incorrect, undemocratic creative positions. Formalist, modernist tendencies in the work of artists, composers, [and] theater directors presented themselves extremely broadly and variously.<sup>54</sup>

The situation was so troublesome that Soviet singers slated to perform in operas during the Prague festival were even forced to withdraw rather than participate in such 'extreme formalism.' The most prominent opera theatres in Prague and Poznan — and the paintings on exhibition throughout Poland and Czechoslovakia<sup>55</sup> — all confirmed the suspicion that modernism was well-entrenched.

Iarustovskii's discovery of such modernist proclivities would not have startled any observers familiar with the music scene of his Czechoslovak hosts, which the Soviet delegation clearly was not. Between the two world wars, Czech composers formed two separate avant-garde groups. The first centred around Alois Hába, his students, and a group of communist composers who were attracted to Hába's social criticism. Hába is best known for his experimentation with quarter-tone and sixth-tone music, which he taught to a circle of students after founding a department of microtonal music at the Prague Conservatory in 1934. He directed the department until it was closed in 1949. Having emerged from the avant-garde tradition of the Second Viennese School, Hába used microtonal techniques to adapt Moravian folk music to avant-garde music composition.<sup>56</sup> The other intra-war avant-garde group was typified by Bohuslav Martinů, a nationalist, modernist composer who was much closer in artistic temperament during the seminal 1930s to jazz and the constructivist and neo-classical tendencies of Stravinskii and the French Les Six. Though Martinů fled to the West to avoid Nazi persecution during the war and

never returned, composers sympathetic to his compositional approach were still active in post-war Czech musical life.<sup>57</sup> Despite the constrictions imposed during the war, this modernist terrain was not very hospitable to Soviet socialist realism, whatever the political proclivities or career interests of the Czech musicians whom the Soviets encountered in 1948.

Iarustovskii was bound to be disapproving. Still, his observation about the creative proclivities of his counterparts highlights an extremely important feature of future musical relations throughout the Soviet cultural sphere. Namely, contacts with East Central European colleagues could continually provide artistic alternatives to Soviet musicians. Though Iarustovskii was not at all receptive to those alternatives, others surely were.<sup>58</sup>

Iarustovskii did not merely make note of the prevalent place of modernist music in Poland and Czechoslovakia, he also sought to explain it. His explanation reveals the global aspirations of the Soviet cultural system and some of the potential obstacles to achieving global goals. Iarustovskii argued that the success of modernism could be explained by two general tendencies. First, the incredible prestige of Paris as an ‘aristocratic ‘Mecca’ of art’ drew considerable attention in East Central Europe, so the ‘schools of Picasso, Stravinskii, and more minor but “fashionable” composer-aesthetes’ had become the ideal for composers throughout the sphere. The pull to Paris was so strong that the Polish government continued to send aspiring Polish artists to Paris while repeatedly turning down Soviet offers to open their own conservatory doors to Polish students.<sup>59</sup>

Second and perhaps even more disturbing, leftist musicians, including many communists, maintained a strong sense of correlation between leftist political views and a so-called leftist artistic orientation:

They were genuinely surprised by the ‘events’ in the USSR because they consider our political convictions incompatible with the pursuit of classical traditions in art. They are sure that revolutionary views should coincide with ‘revolutionistness’ [sic] in creativity. It is from this [that they are] drawn to quarter-tone music which is calculated for a refined ear, to searching for a ‘revolutionary,’ ‘unusual’ language, and so forth.<sup>60</sup>

The conviction that revolutionary political and social views should coincide with abandoning musical traditions and searching for new, experimental musical forms had powerful political supporters even in local communist parties and the communist press. Consequently, the proponents of ‘realistic, democratic’ music were few, especially among the most talented composers. Perhaps worst of all, some of the most highly touted Soviet cultural figures were thus dismissed with indifference. An exhibit by the Soviet socialist–realist painter Aleksandr Gerasimov in Czechoslovakia received a terrible critical reception, and the songs of Solov’ev-Sedoi, a huge popular success in the Soviet Union, failed completely to impress the progressive Czech composers of Prague.<sup>61</sup>

The problem was so pervasive that Iarustovskii could think of nothing but a

political solution: ‘it would be extremely useful to present these questions in the newspaper *Za prochnyi mir, za narodnuiu demokratiuu* and to explain their mistakes to workers in the propaganda departments of these countries’ Central Committees.’<sup>62</sup> Though this report only envisions a political solution, a hint of future solutions dependent upon loyal musicians in each country already has a very faint presence in this early report. Namely, each of the figures that Iarustovskii named in his report would assume leading roles in the adaptation of their musical life to the Soviet system. In Czechoslovakia, chief among these figures was Zdeněk Nejedlý, to whom Iarustovskii referred as a prominent politician in attendance at the festivities. Nejedlý was educated as a musicologist, but he was already well established by 1948 as a top-level communist functionary, the head of the Ministry of Education from 1948 on. A wartime inhabitant of Moscow, Nejedlý would become the single most dominant personality in Czech cultural life by the early 1950s.<sup>63</sup> But Iarustovskii also singled out Antonín Sychra (Czechoslovakia), Zofia Lissa (Poland), and Oskar Danon (Yugoslavia) for their attempts to pose questions of Marxist musical aesthetics in official presentations to the Congress and noted that Soviet delegates used their presentations to call attention to the work of Czech composer Josef Stanislav, who had been ‘snubbed’ earlier.<sup>64</sup> Sychra had been a member of the communist underground during the war, he completed his doctoral dissertation in Prague in 1946, and has been considered one of the most enterprising of organizers of Czech musical life in the 1940s. He undoubtedly saw in the increasing Soviet presence in Czechoslovakia an opportunity to increase his influence in that process and he did indeed become one of the most influential members of the Czechoslovak Composers’ Union.<sup>65</sup> Similarly, Lissa capitalized on her interest in Marxist musical aesthetics and her connections with Soviet authorities forged during her wartime residence in Tashkent and Moscow to establish a dominant career in Polish music institutions (like the Polish Composers’ Union and the musicology institute at Warsaw University).<sup>66</sup> Stanislav was one of those communist composers who had been attracted to Hába’s circle before the war. A visitor to Moscow as early as 1933, he wrote music for leftist theatre before the war and mass songs in the late 1940s and 1950s.<sup>67</sup> Alone among the composers mentioned in Iarustovskii’s report, his creative proclivities were aligned well with those of the Soviet delegation. The positive, if passing, attention paid by Iarustovskii to these individuals suggests that he had begun to identify a sympathetic cohort among the attendees at the congress and suggest some of the agents of the imposition of discipline across the cultural sphere that would begin later.

Iarustovskii thus pointed out a sharp contradiction in the reception of the Soviet delegation and the ideas about music that it presented. Many composers received them well, but few agreed with their creative positions. Iarustovskii also made it clear that a number of his colleagues — not mentioned by name — also resented what they considered a Soviet intrusion. Afraid that the Soviet delegation had

arrived to ‘install order’, many composers at the congress either completely skipped the Soviets’ presentations or just sat and listened passively. Just as Soviet composers had done months earlier at the First All-USSR Congress of Soviet Composers, the delegates to the Second International Congress of Composers and Music Critics in Prague saved their most critical remarks for the corridors. Undoubtedly used to disgruntled murmuring at large ceremonial events, Iarustovskii suggested that the Soviet presentations were nevertheless useful, especially because they raised issues that young composers in the audience could consider when embarking on their own creative endeavors.<sup>68</sup>

After his lengthy analysis of the causes of the creative disjuncture between the Soviet delegation and those of the other peoples’ democracies, Iarustovskii completed his report with two extremely short structural recommendations. First, he noted that non-experts in the bureaucracies of VOKS (the All-USSR Society for Cultural Exchanges) and the Slavic Committee were doing the lion’s share of propagandizing Soviet musical ideas abroad. Since they clearly had not been doing an effective job, he suggested turning over such efforts to the Composers’ Union. Second, as noted above, he suggested having the Composers’ Union take an active role in organizing an international association of progressive musicians.<sup>69</sup>

Iarustovskii’s report thus demonstrates that Soviet cultural decision-makers in Moscow sought a dominant role for Soviet music on an international level. The comparisons with Paris, the concern about the Association of Contemporary Music congress in Amsterdam, and the interest in some sort of international association of ‘progressive’ composers all point in the same direction. However, the report also demonstrates that Iarustovskii foresaw serious obstacles to these ambitions. Even sympathetic composers and musicologists in the Soviet bloc held strong views dissonant with those expressed in the recent party intervention at home, and the Soviet delegates themselves seemed insecure about some aspects of their global claims and were even more clearly embarrassed by overly centralized decision making which prevented them from joining initiatives suggested by their like-minded international colleagues. Their grand pretensions guaranteed that the Soviet music system would continue to propel itself into competition with the West and commence more systematic efforts to forge an integrated cultural sphere in East Central Europe. On the other hand, the thinly veiled insecurity and ideological commitment to building on national traditions kept open the possibility that the cultural sphere would not be monolithic.

In the press, lessons learned in Prague were given a much more brazen tone than the somewhat ambivalent findings communicated in the more secret realm of the Central Committee. The confident and aggressive interpretation of the global music scene published in *Sovetskaia muzyka* at the beginning of its special report on Prague demonstrates that, first and foremost, to be a cultural bloc meant to engage in co-ordinated musical competition with the West. *Sovetskaia muzyka*’s lead editorial in the July issue began with an unequivocally worded proclamation of Soviet superiority, claiming that the Congress in Prague had demonstrated that

‘contemporary bourgeois music’ characteristic of Western Europe and the Americas was hastening down a ‘path to complete degeneration, into a dead end.’ The Congress had also ‘given spectacular confirmation of the correctness and timeliness of the Central Committee resolution of 10 February’. The degeneration of ‘bourgeois’ music was said to have a number of causes: anti-humanistic individualism and soulless formalism, the collapse of national musical culture in a majority of the countries of Europe and America, the sharp division between the artistic demands of audiences and the antisocial striving of modernist composers, and the extremely poor material conditions in which most musicians in bourgeois countries lived.<sup>70</sup>

This unequivocal attack created two rhetorical poles between which there was very little ground. Individualism, international standardization, formal experimentation, and little state support for the arts were conflated into one pole, implicitly leaving collectivism, national diversity, audience accessibility, and generous state subsidies in the other. Carefully crafted for a domestic Soviet audience, the editorial sought to vindicate what was still an unpopular ideological intervention into musical life just months earlier by translating international competition into domestic terms. Thus, the editorial continued by giving a much fuller characterization of the internal contradictions of ‘bourgeois’ musical life, a characterization that leaned heavily on the distinction between ‘serious’ music written for an ever-shrinking, increasingly elite audience on the one hand, and ‘light music’ that was dominated by the jazz-based American entertainment industry which filled radio waves, records, and movie screens with ‘neurotic’ jazz intonations in ‘New York and Vienna, Paris and Rome, Shanghai and Singapore.’<sup>71</sup>

Most of the rest of the editorial was spent giving a brief history of twentieth-century music in the West through the foggy lens of typical vulgar Marxist theory, but one passage in particular stands out because of what it shows about the Soviet digestion of the Prague Spring 1948 festival:

The upsurge of the social movement and political consciousness of the people, especially strong in the countries of the new democracies, exerts a strong influence on the ideological-creative demarcations in the ranks of the artistic intelligentsia *of the West*. Everything best, everything healthy and life-affirming in music is entering the camp of democracy. But this does not mean that these musicians have already fully freed themselves from the weight of formalist delusions. Thus the necessity to reevaluate all of one’s creative positions now stands at its full height before artists who are really interested in the path of their art.

Evidence of this ideological-creative watershed appeared at the International Congress of Composers and Music Critics in Prague, which laid the foundation of a new era in the development of contemporary *Western* music. . . .<sup>72</sup>

The public lesson learned from Soviet participation in Prague Spring 1948 was that the battle with the West was set to intensify. The Cold War had gained its cultural dimension.

### *Ramifications and conclusions*

Soviet participation in the Prague Spring Festival of 1948 reveals many things about evolving Soviet efforts to create a cultural sphere within its emerging political and strategic bloc. In the shadow of the Marshall Plan and Cominform abroad and near the end of the ideological discipline of the Zhdanovshchina in the Soviet Union itself, the music festival in Prague was a pivotal point in Soviet cultural strategy. The Western boycott of the festival and of concert tours in the Soviet sphere following it provided the Soviet Union with the opportunity to make Soviet touring artists an overwhelming international musical presence in that sphere. It was at the festival that the Central Committee apparatus's resident musician realized this opportunity, and it was not long before that opportunity would be exploited. A cursory examination of Politburo confirmations of international touring plans throughout the post-war Stalin period reveals a sharp increase in the number and extent of such tours. The Politburo approved just six delegations abroad in 1947. In 1950, they approved at least twenty, and in 1951, no fewer than thirty-seven.<sup>73</sup>

It will be recalled that Iarustovskii also called for greater co-ordination of these cultural exchanges by music professionals and their professional organization, the Composers' Union. Though the Composers' Union did not build the administrative apparatus necessary to provide that sort of coordination during the Stalin period, its leadership was consulted much more regularly in an effort to improve the information foreign representatives received about Soviet musical life.<sup>74</sup> However, a later institutional reorganization did mark a second shift in Soviet priorities and the structural treatment of its cultural sphere. In 1951, the Committee on Artistic Affairs took control of musical exchanges with East Central Europe, leaving VOKS to deal with the West, thus signalling a greater degree of integration within the bloc.<sup>75</sup>

On the other hand, Soviet experience at the Prague Spring 1948 festival also demonstrated that musical exchange throughout the Soviet cultural sphere could always be a two-way street. This particular delegation in mid-1948 may not have been particularly receptive to the 'formalist' musical ideas held by many of their colleagues, even politically sympathetic ones. But the exposure that they received would be an extremely important continuing feature of all musical exchanges.

For example, coverage of international issues in *Sovetskaia muzyka*, the only professional music journal in the Soviet Union, also expanded after the festival, though less dramatically than the musical delegations. In 1946 and 1947, *Sovetskaia muzyka* carried a total of 104 pages of international coverage, just over

six per cent of its entire print space. At its high points in 1949 and 1951, coverage had expanded to 159 and 173 pages respectively, or 12 per cent of the total for each year.<sup>76</sup> This marked expansion in international coverage is surprising considering the intense anti-cosmopolitan campaign that began in earnest in the arts in January 1949, but it suggests that coverage of the Soviet cultural sphere outweighed concern about international contacts.

Perhaps even more significant than a quantitative measure of print space devoted to international topics is the impressionistic sense that coverage became substantially more systematic after 1948. Rather than just devoting a large special section to an international event like the Prague Spring 1948 festival, the journal began to print short, regular reports from around the emerging bloc. The overall impression is one of steadily increasing attention to international topics and especially to information about developments in the musical life of countries in East Central Europe.

Though a quantitative measure of this impressionistic sense is necessarily problematic, there is one that illustrates the point. From 1946 to 1949, nine of the forty issues of *Sovetskaia muzyka* contained absolutely no coverage of international topics. From 1950 to 1952, every single one of the thirty-six issues carried at least some international coverage. In fact, that trend seems to have started with the Prague Spring 1948 festival itself. Beginning with the issue that covered the festival, there were only three more issues to the end of 1952 that published no international reports. One of those was the issue immediately following the Prague 1948 issue, and another was the issue in which the anti-cosmopolitanism campaign in the arts first broke.<sup>77</sup>

Diversity within the Soviet cultural sphere ensured that this two-way exchange of musicians, music, and musical ideas would become increasingly important to musical life within the Soviet Union as well. Even after the sphere had become more tightly integrated, multiply layered connections between the countries that comprised it and the musicians who embodied those ties could have decisive effects. In fact, a very different Prague Spring almost exactly twenty-years later would prove for many Soviet musicians a decisive push toward an open dissidence nearly inconceivable in the postwar Stalin period.

## Notes

<sup>1</sup> For their insightful comments and helpful suggestions on earlier drafts of this article, I would like to thank the participants of the series of conferences in Budapest, Hungary (14–17 December 2000 and 31 January– 1 February 2003) and Trondheim, Norway (8 September 2001), associated with the Across and Beyond the East–West Divide project tirelessly organized by György Péteri and of the meeting of the University of California Multi-Campus Research Unit on World History, 8–9 February 2003, University of California, Irvine. Research and writing support was generously provided by Fulbright-Hays and by the Faculty Senate of the University of California, Riverside.



<sup>2</sup> For one example of United States policy, see Reinhold Wagnleitner, *Coca-Colonization and the Cold War: The Cultural Mission of the United States in Austria after the Second World War* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1994). For the role of rock in the Soviet Union, see especially Timothy W. Ryback, *Rock around the Bloc: A History of Rock Music in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990).

<sup>3</sup> The Soviet Union's earlier international music policy and goals have received scholarly attention recently in Caroline Brooke, 'Soviet Music in the International Arena, 1932–41', *European History Quarterly*, 31.2 (2001), 231–64.

<sup>4</sup> The complexities of the transplantation and transformation of Soviet academic institutions and practices in East Central Europe is productively addressed directly in Michael David-Fox and György Péteri, 'On the Origins and Demise of the Communist Academic Regime', in *Academia in Upheaval: Origins, Transfers, and Transformations of the Communist Academic Regime in Russia and East Central Europe*, ed. by David-Fox and Péteri (Westport, Connecticut, and London: Bergin and Garvey, 2000), pp. 3–38.

<sup>5</sup> For two examples of performance ensemble delegations, see RGASPI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 1062, l. 92 (Protokol #55 Politbiuro TsK VKP(b), pt 308 (17 December 1946), to Bulgaria and Hungary) and RGASPI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 1066, l. 64 (Protokol #59 Politbiuro TsK VKP(b), pt 301 (17 October 1947), to Poland). For two examples of smaller delegations to international meetings, see RGASPI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 1066, l. 67 (Protokol #59 Politbiuro TsK VKP(b), pt 315 (24 October 1947), to Poland) and RGASPI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 1090, l. 104 (Protokol #83 Politbiuro TsK VKP(b), pt 555 (19 September 1951), to Romania). The Soviets also hosted delegations; for one example see RGASPI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 1089, l. 86 (Protokol #82 Politbiuro TsK VKP(b), pt 409 (5 July 1951), from Hungary).

<sup>6</sup> For one example of this enforced rigor, see RGASPI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 1087, l. 55 (Protokol #80 Politbiuro TsK VKP(b), pt 279 (16 February 1951)) and RGASPI, f. 17, op. 133, d. 239, ll. 16–20, especially l. 20 (OKhLI to Malenkov, 30 April 1951).

<sup>7</sup> For this example, see RGASPI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 1087, l. 13 (Protokol #80 Politbiuro TsK VKP(b), pt 62 (19 January 1951)), which sent N. S. Dombrovskii and V. I. Ponomarev to Hungary for three months to work on opera and ballet.

<sup>8</sup> The other articles in this volume, in one way or another, turn attention to these questions.

<sup>9</sup> On the K-R Affair, see Nikolai Kremmentsov, *The Cure: A Story of Cancer and Politics from the Annals of the Cold War* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002).

<sup>10</sup> On the brouhaha of 1948 and its aftermath, see Kiril Tomoff, *Creative Union: The Professional Organization of Soviet Composers, 1939–1953* (unpublished doctoral thesis, University of Chicago, 2001), chapter four.

<sup>11</sup> RGASPI, f. 17, op. 118, d. 45, ll. 120–120ob (Czech Composers' Union to VOKS); RGASPI, f. 17, op. 118, d. 45, ll. 122–22ob (Czech Philharmonic to VOKS).

<sup>12</sup> RGASPI, f. 17, op. 118, d. 45, l. 118 (secret memo from P. Lebedev (VKI) to A. A. Kuznetsov (UPA TsK VKP(b)), 4 March 1948). Lebedev cited the decision by V. N. Zorin (zam.ministra ID) of 15 January 1948.

<sup>13</sup> RGASPI, f. 17, op. 118, d. 45, l. 118.

<sup>14</sup> Evidence of the embassy's prompting can be deduced from RGASPI, f. 17, op. 125, d. 636, ll. 283–87 (a packet of materials pertaining to the original invitation sent from the embassy in Prague to the Central Committee on 25 March 1948), but it is not conclusive.

<sup>15</sup> RGASPI, f. 17, op. 118, d. 45, l. 124 (Secret memo, P. Lebedev to A. A. Kuznetsov, 30 March 1948).

<sup>16</sup> RGASPI, f. 17, op. 125, d. 636, ll. 289–90 (undated report, Shepilov to Suslov). Shepilov had received Lebedev's memos in a report from Kuznetsov on March 31 (RGASPI, f. 17, op. 118, d. 45, l. 124, marginal notation), so his report was probably written at the beginning of April. The personnel changes were the following: P. A. Serebriakov was added to the Smetana piano competition jury, B. M. Iarustovskii, the resident musician in the Central Committee apparatus, replaced K. K. Sakva, and songwriter V. P. Solov'ev-Sedoi replaced V. G. Zakharov. The replacement of the folkish Zakharov with the more contemporary Solov'ev-Sedoi may also have sought to soften for international audiences the emerging Russocentric bias in popular music that was asserting itself by mid-1948.

<sup>17</sup> RGASPI, f. 17, op. 118, d. 45, l. 116 (Protokol #348 Sekretariata TsK VKP(b), pt 285g. (8 May 1948)). This file is actually materials to the Secretariat decisions, which are listed separately. For the complete set of materials to this decision, see RGASPI, f. 17, op. 118, d. 45, ll. 116–24. For just the protocol, see RGASPI, f. 17, op. 116, d. 348, pt 285g.

<sup>18</sup> RGASPI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 1070, l. 38 (Protokol #63 Politbiuro TsK VKP(b), pt 143 (19 May 1948)).

<sup>19</sup> RGASPI, f. 17, op. 125, d. 636, l. 312 (I. Lazarev to VOKS, 17 June 1948).

<sup>20</sup> RGASPI, f. 17, op. 125, d. 636, l. 312. Lazarev noted that the main organizer from the Czech Philhar

monic, the conductor R. Kubelik, greeted the delegation 'coldly' because he had completely reworked the festival's program twice — once when the Soviets announced they were not coming and again when they changed their minds.

<sup>21</sup> RGASPI, f. 17, op. 125, d. 636, l. 320 (Iarustovskii to Shepilov [July 1948]).

<sup>22</sup> RGASPI, f. 17, op. 125, d. 636, l. 312.

<sup>23</sup> RGASPI, f. 17, op. 125, d. 636, l. 312.

<sup>24</sup> RGASPI, f. 17, op. 125, d. 636, ll. 312–15.

<sup>25</sup> RGASPI, f. 17, op. 125, d. 636, l. 315.

<sup>26</sup> RGASPI, f. 17, op. 125, d. 636, ll. 313–14.

<sup>27</sup> RGASPI, f. 17, op. 125, d. 636, l. 315.

<sup>28</sup> RGASPI, f. 17, op. 125, d. 636, l. 320–26 (Iarustovskii to Shepilov, undated), here l. 321. For the dating, see RGASPI, f. 17, op. 125, d. 636, l. 316 (Riurikov to Tekhsekretariat, 2 July 1948).

<sup>29</sup> RGASPI, f. 17, op. 125, d. 636, l. 321.

<sup>30</sup> RGASPI, f. 17, op. 125, d. 636, ll. 321–22.

<sup>31</sup> For a couple representative decisions from 1950, see RGASPI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 1079, l. 91 (Protokol #72 Politbiuro TsK VKP(b), 6 February 1950) and RGASPI, f. 17, op. 3, d.

1081, l. 7 (Protokol #74 Politbiuro TsK VKP(b), pt 24 (25 April 1950)).

<sup>32</sup> RGASPI, f. 17, op. 125, d. 636, l. 322.

<sup>33</sup> For Kubelik's defection, see Arthur Jacobs, 'Kubelik, Rafael (Jeronym),' in *The New Grove Dictionary of Music and Musicians*, ed. by Stanley Sadie, x, 288–89.

<sup>34</sup> RGASPI, f. 17, op. 125, d. 636, l. 322.

<sup>35</sup> This conclusion is based on perusal of the Politburo protocols from 1947: RGASPI, f. 17, op. 3, dd. 1062–67. For the one decision approving the visit of a delegation of Polish musicians and writers, see RGASPI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 1066, l. 64 (Protokol #59 Politbiuro TsK VKP(b), pt 301.2 (17 October 1947)).

<sup>36</sup> These data have been compiled from the Politburo protocols for 1951: RGASPI, f. 17, op. 3, dd. 1079–86.

<sup>37</sup> B. Iarustovskii, 'Na Mezhdunarodnom s"ezde kompozitorov i muzykal'nykh kritikov v Prage,' *Sovetskaia muzyka* 1948, no. 5 (July 1948), 11–20, here pp. 11–12.

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 12.

<sup>39</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 12–20.

<sup>40</sup> The resolutions were published in *Sovetskaia muzyka* as 'Rezoliutsiia 2-go Mezhdunarodnogo s"ezda kompozitorov i muzykal'nykh kritikov v Prage', *Sovetskaia muzyka* 1948, no. 5 (July 1948), 9–10.

<sup>41</sup> For evidence that the Soviet delegation proposed the 'address' and its contents, see RGASPI, f. 17, op. 125, d. 636, l. 323.

<sup>42</sup> 'Obrashchenie 2-go Mezhdunarodnogo s"ezda kompozitorov i muzykal'nykh kritikov v Prage', *Sovetskaia muzyka*, 1948, no. 5 (July 1948), 7–8.

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 8.

<sup>44</sup> For an excellent exploration of the Sovietization of Hungarian musical culture through the lens of Bartók reception, see Danielle Fosler-Lussier, *The Transition to Communism and the Legacy of Béla Bartók in Hungary, 1945–1956* (unpublished doctoral thesis, University of California, Berkeley, 1999), especially chapters 1 and 3. For an investigation of an intriguingly peculiar cultural example of Sovietization in Hungary in 1950, see Lóránt Péteri, 'A "Szovjet Zene" Magyarországon: Ilja Golovin Budapestre érkezik', *Magyar Zene*, xl.2 (May 2002), 201–12. For a study of the Sovietization of Polish and East German musical culture, see David Tompkins, *Composing the Party Line: Music and Politics in Poland and East Germany, 1948–1957* (unpublished doctoral thesis, Columbia University, 2004).

<sup>45</sup> For an extended discussion of the various meanings of 'cosmopolitanism' in the Soviet Union and the ramifications of those meanings on music policy from the centre in Moscow to the periphery in Central Asia, see Tomoff, *Creative Union*, chapter five.

<sup>46</sup> For a description of the scandals surrounding the Party's efforts to intervene in Soviet musical life, see Alexander Werth, *Musical Uproar in Moscow* (London: Turnstile Press, 1949). For an analysis of those events using archival data, see Tomoff, *Creative Union*, chapter four.

<sup>47</sup> For Iarustovskii's description of the trip to Poland, see RGASPI, f. 17, op. 125, d. 636, l. 324.

<sup>48</sup> RGASPI, f. 17, op. 125, d. 636, ll. 322–23.

<sup>49</sup> For discussion about whether the Soviet Union should participate, see RGASPI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 636, l. 307 (Riurikov to Tekhsekretariat, 14 June 1948).

<sup>50</sup> RGASPI, f. 17, op. 125, d. 636, ll. 323–24.

<sup>51</sup> RGASPI, f. 17, op. 125, d. 636, ll. 324, 326.

<sup>52</sup> For the Charles University example, similar requests from a number of Czech and other national groups, and analysis of their possible motivations, see John Connelly, ‘The Sovietization of Higher Education in the Czech Lands, East Germany, and Poland during the Stalinist Period, 1948–1954’, in *Academia in Upheaval: Origins, Transfers, and Transformations of the Communist Academic Regime in Russia and East Central Europe*, ed. by Michael David-Fox and György Péteri (Westport, Connecticut and London: Bergin and Garvey, 2000), pp. 141–79, especially, pp. 153–54.

<sup>53</sup> John Connelly, *Captive University: The Sovietization of East German, Czech, and Polish Higher Education, 1945–1956* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000). See especially pp. 50–55 for the discussion of Soviet experts.

<sup>54</sup> RGASPI, f. 17, op. 125, d. 636, l. 324.

<sup>55</sup> RGASPI, f. 17, op. 125, d. 636, ll. 324–25.

<sup>56</sup> Mirosław Perz, ‘Czechoslovakia,’ in *The New Grove*, v, 122–23. Jiří Vysloužil, ‘Hába, Alois’, *Grove Music Online*, ed. by L. Macy (Accessed 14 January 2004), <<http://www.grovemusic.com>>.

<sup>57</sup> Perz, 122–23. Brian Large, ‘Martinů, Bohuslav (Jan)’, in *The New Grove*, xi, 731–35.

<sup>58</sup> For brief discussion of Central Committee complaints about the lively interest in formal experimentation and music composed in the West at the Moscow Conservatory in the late 1940s and early 1950s, see Tomoff, *Creative Union*, chapter five.

<sup>59</sup> RGASPI, f. 17, op. 125, d. 636, l. 325. Iarustovskii was undoubtedly referring to Hába, though the reference is not direct.

60 Ibid.

<sup>61</sup> RGASPI, f. 17, op. 125, d. 636, ll. 325–26. Solov’ev-Sedoi’s songs apparently made a much more positive impression on working-class audiences during the Soviet delegation’s visits to local factories.

<sup>62</sup> RGASPI, f. 17, op. 125, d. 636, l. 326.

<sup>63</sup> John Tyrrell: ‘Nejedlý, Zdeněk’, *Grove Music Online*, ed. L. Macy (Accessed 14 January 2004) <<http://www.grovemusic.com>>. For Iarustovskii’s reference to Nejedlý, see RGASPI, f. 17, op. 125, d. 636, l. 324.

<sup>64</sup> RGASPI, f. 17, op. 125, d. 636, l. 322. I have assumed the Danon to whom Iarustovskii referred was Oskar Danon, though he did not use first names in any case. The identity of Sychra and Lissa are clear.

<sup>65</sup> Josef Bek: ‘Sychra, Antonín’, *Grove Music Online*, ed. by L. Macy (Accessed 14 January 2004) <<http://www.grovemusic.com>>.

<sup>66</sup> Zygmunt M. Szweykowski, ‘Lissa, Zofia’, *Grove Music Online*, ed. by L. Macy (Accessed 14 January 2004) <<http://www.grovemusic.com>>.

<sup>67</sup> Jiří Macek, ‘Stanislav, Josef’, *Grove Music Online*, ed. by L. Macy (Accessed 14

January 2004) <[http:// www.grovemusic.com](http://www.grovemusic.com)>.

<sup>68</sup> For an analysis of the grumbling overheard during the All-Union Congress in Moscow, see Tomoff, *Creative Union*, chapter four. For the corridor talk in Prague, see RGASPI, f. 17, op. 125, d. 636, l. 326.

<sup>69</sup> RGASPI, f. 17, op. 125, d. 636, l. 326.

<sup>70</sup> ‘Progressivnye muzykanty mira v bor’be za demokraticeskoe muzykal’noe iskusstvo,’ *Sovetskaia muzyka* 1948, no. 5 (July 1948), 3–6; here, p. 3.

<sup>71</sup> Ibid., pp. 3–4. Indeed, the success of American-style popular music was spreading rapidly among youth audiences even in the Soviet Union, a development of great concern to Central Committee bureaucrats just over a year later. See, for example, RGASPI, f. 17, op. 132, d. 234, ll. 102–10 (Kruzhkov and Tarasov to Suslov, 2 November 1949). For analysis of one component of this youth culture, see Mark Edele, ‘Strange Young Men in Stalin’s Moscow: The Birth and Life of the Stiliagi, 1945–1953’, *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas*, 50.1 (2002), 37–61.

<sup>72</sup> ‘Progressivnye muzykanty’, p. 5. Emphasis added.

<sup>73</sup> These data are compiled from Politburo protocols from 1947, 1950–51: RGASPI, f. 17, op. 3. The number of musicians in each delegation ranged from as few as one well into the hundreds.

<sup>74</sup> For example, see RGASPI, f. 17, op. 132, d. 419, ll. 50–154.

<sup>75</sup> RGASPI, f. 17, op. 119, d. 257, ll. 157–58 (Protokol #550 Sekretariata TsK VKP(b), pt 125-s (February 1951). Perusal of Politburo protocols before and after this decision seems to confirm this division of labour in practice, but firm conclusions require more detailed research.

<sup>76</sup> These data are compiled from the contents of all *Sovetskaia muzyka* issues, 1946–1952. Of the 122 pages (nine per cent) devoted to international coverage in 1948, forty-eight of them reported on or analysed the Prague Spring festival, more than any other single international event in the post-war Stalin period. In 1950, international coverage dropped to 123 pages (nine per cent), and in 1952, to 129 pages (nine per cent).

<sup>77</sup> *Sovetskaia muzyka*, 1946–1952. The three issues with no international coverage were *Sovetskaia muzyka*, 1948, no. 6; *Sovetskaia muzyka*, 1949, no. 1; and *Sovetskaia muzyka*, 1949, no. 9.

# THE 'HEROIC LIFE' OF A FRIEND OF STALINISM: ROMAIN ROLLAND AND SOVIET CULTURE<sup>\*</sup>

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*After considering existing biographical, sociological, and political explanations for Western intellectual Sovietophilia in the 1930s, this article develops what is called a transnational or transsystemic explanatory framework. It does so through an in-depth case study of Romain Rolland, perhaps the most distinguished interwar European intellectual to become an uncritical apologist for Stalinism. The article analyses points of direct contact between the French writer and the Soviet system, in particular his 1935 Soviet visit and audience with Stalin. It also considers the role of intermediaries between Rolland and the Soviets, including Rolland's longtime correspondent Maksim Gor'kii, the Old Bolshevik cultural diplomat Aleksandr Arosev, and Rolland's Russian wife Mariia Kudasheva. Finally, the article examines the cultural and intellectual underpinnings of Rolland's affinity for the USSR, including his participation in a pan-European, anti-fascist culture; it juxtaposes this to Soviet views of Rolland, including the mass celebration of Rolland within the emergent Stalinist culture.*

The lives and work of many western intellectuals in the twentieth century were intimately bound up with Stalinism. But the French writer Romain Rolland (1866–1944) belongs to an especially interesting club: he joined the most celebrated interwar 'friends of the Soviet Union', illustrious western visitors who came to be lionized in an unprecedented way during the rise of Stalinist culture in the USSR in the 1930s. Like Bernard Shaw, Henri Barbusse, André Gide, and Lion Feuchtwanger, he was granted an audience by Stalin himself; his 1935 Moscow tour was treated as a milestone of cultural propaganda inside the USSR as well as a state visit of the highest level. The elderly Rolland — musicologist, *grand écrivain*, playwright, biographer, popular enlightener, pacifist, anti-fascist, earnest man of conscience, outspoken defender of French-German, pan-European, and East–West reconciliation — remained silent during the purges and was perhaps the most famous European intellectual to become an uncritical apologist for Stalinism in the

1930s.

This paper begins with the premise that the willingness of many of the twentieth century's leading minds to lend their talent and moral authority to one of the world's most repressive regimes, despite all the explanations that have been brought to bear, remains a great historical puzzle. While the challenge in the twenty-first century is perhaps to recapture the multitude of motivations behind intellectual panegyrics to Stalinism, and not simply to dismiss them with an easy condemnation, it is worth recalling that only a few years ago (and even today in the realm of biography and Rolland studies) there has been rather a tendency to present individual figures such as Rolland in the best possible light. David James Fisher, the most important English-language biographer of Rolland and a scrupulous analyst of his subject's political engagements, in 1988 took a moment to elucidate his own interior life:

I turned to French high culture because the world of the French intellectual was closely linked to sociopolitical change [. . .] I found a soul mate in Romain Rolland. I subsequently discovered that I was searching for someone who epitomized integrity, an individual articulating and defending, in moments of crisis, an idealistic stance grounded in a sense of fundamental decency [. . .] My perspective clearly tilts toward a critical appreciation of Romain Rolland the man and of his dilemma in finding an engaged position pertinent to his era.<sup>1</sup>

Bernard Duchatelet, a foremost Francophone expert on Rolland and editor of the 1992 publication of Rolland's *Voyage à Moscou*, based his authoritative 2002 account of Rolland's day-to-day activities on thousands of pages of Rolland's still unpublished journals. His work contains a number of forthright condemnations of Rolland's blindness vis-à-vis the USSR, but ultimately stresses Rolland's 'complexity', his 'greatnesses' as well as his mistakes. Duchatelet's perspective is completely shaped by the personal writings of Rolland, whose voluminous self-reflection often crossed the line into graphomania. However, the massive quantity of Rolland's own self-analysis does not always transform itself into quality. At one point in Rolland's post-purge, post-Pact, Vichy-era personal reconsiderations, he reasserted the non-partisan, independent role of the intellectual; this privately articulated stance is seized by Duchatelet as proof that Rolland himself had found the solution to his Soviet mistakes.<sup>2</sup> But, at the end of his life, Rolland was far from capable of grappling with all the reasons he fell under the Stalinist spell — in particular, his fascination for Stalin as a man of action, his attraction to many aspects of Stalin-era culture, and the overlap in his own intellectual formation with elements shaping the Soviet order. Nor was Rolland's hypertrophied 'interior life' a useful means to decipher the broader cultural and political developments that linked Soviet culture to the European 'friends of the Soviet Union'. Thus Duchatelet in 2002, like Fisher in 1988, ends up responding to Rolland's Sovietophilia by reflecting not primarily on the interaction of those historical ideas and circumstances driving Rolland's pro-Soviet stance but on a proper formula for

intellectuals' political engagement. In their different ways both scholars admire Rolland, defend him as much as they feel decently possible, and adopt biographical approaches that cannot fully excavate Rolland's interactions with the Soviet order.

Much of the broader historiography of the fellow-travelers, while placing intellectuals' relationship with the Soviet Union at the center of analysis, falls prey to defects that are in certain respects quite similar to the biographical prism. Instead of empathizing with an individual, however, they have tended to condemn intellectuals as a class; since this literature aims to treat intellectuals as a group it might be termed the sociological approach. Indeed, exposing the blindness of 'the intellectuals' has been the primary goal behind an extensive body of scholarship surrounding the topic of western intellectuals and Soviet communism. This literature has, perhaps understandably given the topic, been overtly politicized to a degree that has limited the questions asked. Authors have often been satisfied to focus almost exclusively on stinging indictments of political sycophancy on the part of western visitors or, in a significant wing of the literature, the qualities of intellectuals in general prompting them toward ideological blindness, utopianism, or even 'treason'.<sup>3</sup> This tradition of judging the intellectuals (either on the pan-European and American Left or in a specific national context) has certainly been capable of illuminating many of the common features and fallacies of Sovietophilic intellectual life, and has already adduced a range of specific factors drawing western intellectuals to Soviet communism. Even so, these treatments of pro-Soviet intellectuals have rarely been written by specialists in Soviet history or on the basis of Soviet archival documents.<sup>4</sup> This is understandable; until quite recently, Soviet history was effectively de-internationalized (with the exception of a largely isolated sub-field of foreign policy) in part because the construction of Soviet communism was seen as thoroughly unique, domestic, and *sui generis*. Like the biographies, then, the literature devoted to pro-Soviet intellectuals as a group has been overwhelmingly shaped by the sources and perspectives generated by western observers themselves — representing just one side of a particularly twentieth-century cross-cultural encounter. As a result, much of the Soviet side of the story has been reduced to assumptions about the ease with which the Soviets manipulated their visitors, rather than examining what evidence of intellectuals' actual interaction with the Soviets can reveal.<sup>5</sup>

The most important Anglophone work on French intellectuals and communism, Tony Judt's *Past Imperfect*, is an extended and often blistering indictment of the French intellectual community in the middle of the twentieth century. As such it avoids universal claims about intellectuals — who are 'no better or no worse than other people' and 'not even very different', Judt avows. Yet within the French context Judt, clearly, is also concerned with the 'special failing of intellectuals', which he uncovers in their peculiar combination of arrogance and self-hatred, intellectual insularity and dilettantish proclivity to speak out on all topics.<sup>6</sup> Even so, Judt's study, which focuses on the postwar decade, is important as a representative



of a different kind of explanatory construct that is in the course of his work applied to a greatly extended chronological period. Rather than a biographical or sociological framework, Judt's study represents one of the most forceful examples of what might be called a political (or macro-political) explanation to the problem of western intellectuals and Soviet communism. By this I have in mind Judt's master theme of the 'indigenous antiliberalism of the French republican intelligentsia', which applies as much if not more to the interwar years as to the postwar period. The relative weakness of the French liberal tradition held a range of philosophical ramifications (for example, the marginalization of neo-Kantian ethical thought) as well as political consequences (an intellectual approval of violence, which drew on the revolutionary and Jacobin traditions and created a special affinity for Bolshevik self-presentations).<sup>7</sup> Romain Rolland, as we shall see, cultivated a lifelong interest in the French revolutionary experience, which along with his participation in socialist culture after the turn of the twentieth century assumed importance in his admiration for Soviet communism under Stalin. Yet the absence of liberalism cannot serve as a sufficient explanation for Rolland's and other French intellectuals' special relationship with the Soviets in the 1930s — if only because those countries with the strongest liberal traditions also produced analogous 'friends of the Soviet Union'. Liberals could be found among the most uncritical Soviet sympathizers.<sup>8</sup>

This article's consideration of Rolland develops a new kind of explanatory framework, which for lack of more elegant terms one might call transnational or transsystemic. In other words, the focus here is squarely on the interaction between Rolland and the Soviet system, which took place in several dimensions. On one level, the examination focuses intensively on points of direct contact between the writer and the Soviets. At the heart of the paper is Rolland's 1935 visit to Moscow and his audience with Stalin, a key moment in Rolland's overall evolution that cemented his transition from independent sympathizer to uncritical 'friend'. New evidence from the Moscow archives on his audience with Stalin will be examined at length. This material has suggested that the category of 'friend of the Soviet Union' — itself another point of contact in that it was the status Rolland was accorded and the status he assumed — is of major importance to the story. The case of Romain Rolland thus allows us to go beyond the formulaic rubric of 'fellow-traveler' in order to examine concepts meaningful to Rolland and the Soviets at the time.

Indeed, the history of the Soviet conception of fellow-traveler is rather distinct from the translated western political epithet for communist sympathizers. The old Russian Social-Democratic term *poputchik* was first applied by Trotskii in his 1923 *Literature and Revolution* to the non-communist, non-'proletarian' Russian literary figures of the 1920s who sympathized with the revolution.<sup>9</sup> The term then made its way into other European languages (*compagnon de route*, *Mitläufer*), evoking pro-Soviet enthusiasm rather than Trotskii's 'transitional' figure marked by socio-

political unreliability. While in the 1920s *poputchik* became a standard label in Soviet literary politics, the Russian term was rarely applied by the Soviets to their western admirers. The value of recovering the category of *friends of the Soviet Union* (*druz'ia Sovetskogo Soiuz*), widely propagated within the Soviet system as well as embraced by sympathizers like Rolland, is that it leads to an investigation of the role these figures played within the Stalinist political and cultural system itself, as well as the perceptions on both sides of what that role signified. This paper will suggest that Rolland's understanding of his status as 'friend', while he made a failed effort to refine it, remained at the core of his 1930s loyalty to the Stalinist regime.

On a second level, this transnational approach is concerned with intermediaries and the roles they played as Rolland simultaneously became a leading pro-Soviet spokesman in Europe and a monumentally celebrated foreign icon within the Stalinist cultural system. Of primary concern here will be Maksim Gor'kii, Rolland's longtime correspondent whose own transition from Old Bolshevik critic of Leninism after 1917 to a primary architect of Stalinism in culture directly influenced Rolland; Aleksandr Arosev, the tormented Rolland admirer at the head of the All-Union Society for Cultural Ties Abroad during the Popular Front, who arranged the 1935 visit and translated during the meeting with Stalin; and Mariia Kudasheva, Rolland's bilingual Russian wife and minor literary figure in her own right, whose role as facilitator of Rolland's Soviet affairs only becomes fully apparent in the light of her weekly correspondence with cultural officials in Moscow.

Finally, the intellectual and cultural underpinnings of Rolland's 'friendship' will be a primary focus of investigation. These will be examined not only in terms of Rolland's lifelong evolution and interior spiritual world, although the published record allows ample opportunity to do so, but as part of a transnational, anti-fascist, leftist, *communisant* culture in Europe that emerged primarily in the 1930s. This anti-fascist culture was nurtured in front organizations and international movements in which Rolland played a prominent part, transmitted in authorized translations or publications abroad of Soviet political and cultural figures, fostered by local communist intellectuals (such as Barbusse and Aragon in France) or European émigrés fleeing Nazism in Moscow, and spread during the years of Popular Front solidarity.<sup>10</sup> A range of leading Soviet intellectual figures and international operators (including Gor'kii and Arosev, among many others) participated in this transnational anti-fascist culture through their own many contacts with the West. The importance of Rolland's participation in this transnational anti-fascist culture does not exclude the possibility, of course, that anti-fascism as a phenomenon within France had its own distinguishing features. At the same time, the new transnational history will have to consider one of the greatest ironies in the Stalin-era engagement with western intellectual allies. Put most broadly, it was during the first phase of Stalinism when Soviet socialism, following what was supposedly the universal path of development for all mankind,

diverged most sharply from the rest of the world. It diverged, moreover, in terms not only of its political and economic order, but also of its highly ritualized and intricate cultural and ideological system, so difficult for even the most eager and sympathetic left-wing foreigners fully to comprehend. The time of the most successful and most universalistic appeals of the newly-constructed Soviet socialism corresponded to the moment of its own greatest particularism.

Both the bridges built by the pan-European anti-fascist culture, constructed with help from Moscow but assuming a vitality of its own, and the gulfs created by the impenetrability of the Stalinist ideological world will assume great significance in the case of Rolland. First, many intellectual currents that flowed into Rolland's intellectual makeup — notably, Wagner, Nietzsche, and aspects of turn-of-the-century socialist culture — also assumed importance in the long trajectory toward Stalinist culture. But they were *faux amis* in the sense that they, like Rolland's lifelong involvement with popular enlightenment, social art, and, for that matter, the French Revolution, fostered a merely superficial sense of familiarity. Second, anti-fascist culture spread and domesticated certain key concepts of Stalin-era culture, and these intrigued Rolland. The 1930s were, after all, years in which French intellectuals produced their own houses of culture, agit-prop theatre, and workers' universities; long before, Rolland was a prime mover in the people's theatre movement and he became enamoured above all with the notions of a 'new man' and the creation of a 'new world' that would regenerate the ailing West.<sup>11</sup> Third, a number of distinct shifts enacted within Soviet culture of the 1930s — the logocentric primacy of literature, the eclipse of the avant-garde, the popular glorification of enlightenment and the new artistic and scientific establishment, the embrace of nineteenth-century high culture, the values of 'culturedness' — appealed specifically to Rolland's outlook. The celebration of foreign 'friends' in official Stalinist culture, which this paper will also examine, seemed to confirm to Rolland his own importance in the creation of that new world toward which anti-fascist culture strove, even as it gave an internationalist veneer to a waxing Stalinist particularism at home. In the light of the simultaneous emergence of a transnational leftist culture including Rolland and a dense Stalinist ideological world in which Rolland also figured, we can better understand one great paradox: European intellectuals like Rolland intuitively felt they grasped and understood Soviet socialism so well at the very moment they misunderstood it so deeply.

### *Proximity and distance: Rolland's path to friendship*

The force of 'context' and 'circumstances' have the potential to be abused in explaining the relationship between European intellectuals and Soviet communism, both because they can deflect attention from other explanations and because they have been used by historians and memoirists to minimize personal and intellectual responsibility.<sup>12</sup> Yet the flip side of the coin, a focus on mentality or philosophy of individual or group without regard for the force of events, is equally one-sided. The

several ways Rolland was representative of the major factors ‘pushing’ and ‘pulling’ the foreign friends into the arms of the Soviet Union are offered here at the outset as both necessary for understanding his transnational interactions with the Soviets and in an effort to promote analysis of the *interaction* between ideas and circumstances.

The era of the five-year plans and the drive to construct socialism, starting in the late 1920s, captured the imagination of western thinkers just as the Great Depression seemed to validate predictions of capitalism’s imminent demise. Several left intellectuals quite critical of Lenin and the Soviet Union in the 1920s, including Sidney and Beatrice Webb, were drawn to the Soviet experiment above all during the era of forced industrialization and collectivization. In fact, it was precisely in the early 1930s that Rolland first expressed to Gor’kii a strong desire to travel to the USSR (in 1931 a planned visit was put off because of ill health), and the attention of Stalin and the Politburo was drawn to this fact.<sup>13</sup> Secondly, the rise of what Furet has called anti-fascist culture in Europe after 1933 first brought a cluster of prominent cultural figures never before associated with communism, such as André Gide, into the Soviet orbit. The mid-1930s was marked by the height of the Popular Front and Franco-Soviet friendship: Rolland’s visit to Moscow in 1935 came in the immediate wake of the signing of the Franco-Soviet mutual aid pact. The French vogue of visiting the Soviet Union increased after 1932 and reached its height after 1934, with 2–3000 French travelers per year and more than 200 intellectuals in the course of 1935.<sup>14</sup> Finally, for those favored by the Soviets, a range of attractive cultural transactions between representatives of European and Soviet culture were a lure as well, such as massive Soviet opportunities for publishing, translation, and publicity available to ‘friends’.<sup>15</sup> Each of the broad factors mentioned above also applies to Rolland — a pacifist admirer of Gandhi who was quite critical of the USSR before the mid-late 1920s, but who became a foreign writer of major stature in Soviet culture in part because of anti-fascism and the Popular Front.

On the Soviet side, the factors prompting the proletarian dictatorship to ‘pull’ sympathetic ‘bourgeois’ intellectuals and to cultivate the major friends such as Rolland can be said to have been caught between the force of cultural diplomacy and ideology. On the one hand, the perceived importance of the ‘intelligentsia’ to western public opinion made all those defined as part of that group figure prominently in Soviet cultural diplomacy as it was institutionalized in the early 1920s. This external commitment never wavered even in those periods, such as Stalin’s ‘Great Break’ (1928–31), when the domestic Russian intelligentsia was most persecuted at home. By the mid-1920s, the All-Union Society for Cultural Ties Abroad (VOKS) was the designated part of an entire multi-agency apparatus dealing with foreign visitors that handled the non-party intelligentsia and ‘culture’. In the case of Rolland, the VOKS, headed by the Old Bolshevik diplomat and cultural official Aleksandr Arosev during the Popular Front years, was one of his

primary Soviet interlocutors and the institution that handled his Moscow tour; the Union of Soviet Writers' Foreign Commission assumed great importance here as well. Soviet foreign cultural initiatives, preoccupied especially with Germany in the Weimar period, turned with great intensity in the early 1930s toward the British and the French. Finally, as literature became a new 'queen of the arts' for the new mass readership of the 1930s generation, foreign writers were granted a special place in the pantheon of outside sympathizers. Even as Soviet cultural diplomacy authorized flexibility toward western intellectuals, however, anti-intelligentsia, anti-bourgeois, and, especially by the 1930s, anti-western currents pervaded early Soviet ideology and domestic cultural politics. There could, therefore, be no univocal stance within the Soviet system on western intellectuals, creating constant tensions in the realms of policy and representation. The challenge became how to integrate the exemplars of contemporary western civilization into a new Stalinist orthodoxy that by the mid-1930s asserted the outright superiority of Soviet culture.

*'An inveterate hero worshiper': the writer and the heroic life*

Rolland came from a Catholic, petit-bourgeois background in Burgandy, and it is to these provincial origins that at least one biographer has attributed his frugal, non-experimental, earnest sobriety, his disdain for café society, and his puritanical morality. Rilke called his private life 'a little spinsterish' and, it has been noted about the author of sixty volumes of personal correspondence, there was 'something excessive about his constant need to write [. . .]'<sup>16</sup> Thin, frail, preoccupied with lifelong health problems, Rolland has reminded any number of observers of a clergyman. From 1895 to 1910, after defending a doctoral thesis in music history, he taught at several leading academic institutions as a historical musicologist, but with his sense of mission and responsibility he came to loathe the professionalization of the academy. Even so, the institutions and the values of the second empire were formative influences in his valorization of the artist/intellectual devoted to the human cause. Underpinning all his social and political engagements — involving successive conversions to the influences of Tolstoinism after the turn of the century, leftist pacifism during and after World War I, Gandhism in the 1920s, and Stalinism in the 1930s — Fisher has identified his 'intuitive feeling of contact with great forces', his sublime connection to humanity and the world, a striving for wholeness to which he attributed artistic creativity. In a 1927 exchange with Freud, Rolland referred to this visceral, spiritual longing for harmony, reconciliation, and epic unity as an 'oceanic' sensibility. Freud saw it as a wishful regression to a childlike state.<sup>17</sup>

Between 1903 and 1912 Rolland wrote *Jean-Christophe*, the monumental *Bildungsroman* based on the life of Beethoven. Here he depicted music as the medium of pan-European and especially Franco-German reconciliation. This form of 'internationalism' was nurtured by his early sympathy to socialism, which dated

from about 1895 and was of a non-denominational type that eschewed class warfare. He also had an early attraction to Russian literature, especially to Tolstoi. In 1902 he wrote *Le 14 juillet*, one of the first in his theatrical series about the French Revolution; the play depicted the heroism of the masses in deciding its own fate and ended in a mass festival. Indeed, Rolland was the driving force in French popular theatre at the turn of the century, an early effort to encourage mass participation and bring theatre to workers' neighborhoods.<sup>18</sup> All these interests, of course, later assumed importance in his encounter with Soviet communism.

In 1914, Rolland's conception of the artist with a social conscience speaking for the human 'spirit' led him to take his Tolstoiism toward outspoken pacifism and activism in politics. His tireless work against the war was a courageous stance dangerous to his well-being and reputation that for a time earned him virtual pariah status. In 1916 he first wrote Gor'kii, whose work at that point he did not know well, but whose opposition to the war linked them together; leading Bolsheviki,<sup>19</sup> including Lenin, found Rolland's antiwar writings useful at the time.

Despite his willingness to go it alone and his preference for quiet contemplation — or perhaps because of it — Rolland was on a constant search for role models and heroic historical actors. Rolland's 1903 popular biography of Beethoven was the prototype for his series of *Lives of Illustrious Men*, followed in later years by biographies of Tolstoi, Michelangelo, Gandhi, and others. Like Jean-Christophe and other novels, his biographies were preoccupied with 'the heroic life'. In all these works, written for a mass audience in an accessible yet serious style of *haute vulgarisation*, Rolland explored the heroic nature of geniuses who, despite all suffering, remained 'continually faithful to humanity'. Fisher has written that Rolland was 'an inveterate hero worshiper', speculating that (aside from all intellectual influences, notably Nietzsche) this ultimately derived from yearnings produced by his ineffectual father and his own frail disposition.<sup>20</sup> Although it has surprisingly gone unnoticed in the biographical literature, Rolland's fascination with Stalin as a heroic man of action, although it only became important in the mid-1930s, became the capstone of a long aesthetic and political evolution.

At first, though, Rolland's reaction to the October Revolution was ambivalent: he welcomed it as a great stride toward universal liberation but abhorred its violence. For him Lenin and Trotskii were energetic and honest but prone to dogmatism and violence. From Gor'kii he learned of the anti-intellectual features of Bolshevism and the regimentation of culture.<sup>21</sup> Yet many of Rolland's young followers, notably Barbusse, were pro-communist intellectuals grouped around the journal *Clarté*. As Barbusse launched himself on a trajectory that took him into the French Communist Party (PCF) in 1923 as one of the party's leading intellectual soldiers, it brought him into conflict with Rolland, who refused to be pulled along this path. In 1921–22 the result was a high-profile debate between Barbusse and Rolland. The former attacked intellectuals for standing above the fray and wrote that 'those who are not with us are against us'; Rolland condemned Soviet

violence, secrecy, intolerance, and centralization and defended the ‘independence of the spirit’. Despite his rejection of communism in this period, he remained on good terms with Barbusse and, Duchatelet has concluded, ‘fascinated’ by the ‘dynamism’ of the Russian Revolution.<sup>22</sup>

The ambivalence Rolland felt for the USSR in the 1920s was reciprocated. The Rolland-Barbusse affair was publicized in the Soviet Union — indeed, Trotskii intervened in 1922 in an *Izvestiia* condemnation of Rolland as a ‘pretentious individualist’ whose ethical and aesthetic preoccupations worked against the Revolution — and this affected Rolland’s status in Soviet eyes in the 1920s. In the pervasive Soviet culture of evaluation he was thus relegated to the nether-world of ‘wavering’ status, a middling group (as in the ubiquitous ‘class analyses’ of the intelligentsia itself in Bolshevik ideological formulations) caught in between the great poles of the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. In his published open letters from Europe in 1926, for example, commissar of enlightenment Anatolii Vasil’evich Lunacharskii tried to forestall Soviet rejection of Rolland: ‘One should not forget that the spirit of the petty-bourgeois pacifist is not inherently hostile to us, nor is it a weak force of no interest to anybody. I think that it is one of the objects of our struggle’. Compare this to Lunacharskii’s 1920s evaluations of Barbusse, who in his later public stature in the 1930s was comparable to Rolland as a ‘friend of the Soviet Union’. In an interview with the mass-circulation newspaper *Evening Moscow* on the eve of Barbusse’s 1927 arrival in Moscow, Lunacharskii said that ‘Barbusse is not Anatole France, a valuable but from time to time wavering fellow-traveller (*poputchik*). Barbusse is one of us (*nash chelovek*), our brother, friend, and comrade [. . .]’<sup>23</sup> To be sure, Barbusse, quite unlike Rolland in this period, had become a Comintern and Soviet agent in the European cultural front organizations, yet at the same time he was classified as an intellectual and ‘friend’ (rather than a communist politician) by VOKS and other Soviet organs. At the same time, Rolland’s lukewarm image inside the USSR began to change at end of the 1920s, and especially after 1929, as he moved noticeably into the consistently philo-Soviet camp.

In his debate with Barbusse, Rolland had turned to the example of Gandhi as a paragon of successful non-violent political action, a clever strategy even though he knew little of Gandhi at the time. As he learned more he entered his Gandhist phase in the mid-1920s, in which he sounded anti-imperialist notes through moral and philosophical themes. Even though this was in many ways a period of flight from politics into spirituality, there are intriguing links between this period in Rolland’s evolution and his later pro-Soviet stance. Through Ghandi, his commitment to pan-European reconciliation became transmogrified into a grander East-West merger, into which Russia/USSR could also easily feed. Further, despite several private reservations about Gandhi, beginning with the latter’s nationalism and culminating in a serious disagreement over his visit to fascist Italy in 1931, Rolland kept those doubts private. His popular, heroicizing biography of the Mahatma, the first documented biography, anointed his latest hero as a messiah for the world.

Even as he immersed himself in Gandhi, a number of developments brought him closer to the Soviet Union. By the mid-1920s he increasingly viewed the USSR as a bulwark against Fascism. Tellingly, he was impressed by the celebration of science resulting from the 200<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the Soviet Academy of Sciences in 1925. An idealized view of Russia as a messianic force that could ‘regenerate’ interwar European civilization, and the striking image of the people’s creation of a ‘new world’ led him to give a public testimonial on the 10<sup>th</sup> anniversary of October Revolution in 1927.<sup>24</sup> In these circumstances, then, the work of the key intermediaries over the course of the 1920s had great potential to register their impact.

In early 1923 Rolland received a letter from a Russian literary admirer, Mariia Pavlovna Kudasheva, who had read the first volumes of *Jean-Christophe*, and they began an eight-year correspondence that changed not only their lives but Rolland’s relationship with the Soviet Union. Kudasheva, or, as she was later known, Marie Rolland, came from that wing of the modernist literary intelligentsia that was able to adapt to the new regime. Born in 1895 in St. Petersburg, the daughter of a French governess and a Russian army officer, Kudasheva was close to such literary luminaries as Ehrenburg, Mandel’shtam, and Pasternak, and she actively participated in intelligentsia literary life during the Civil War. Her first husband, Kudashev, fought on the side of the Whites and died of typhus in the Crimea in 1920. All evidence suggests that from the early 1920s on Kudasheva displayed nothing other than an orthodox enthusiasm for the Bolshevik cause. In the 1920s she worked as the personal secretary of Professor Petr Solomonovich Kogan in the State Academy of Arts (GAKhN). With Kogan at an exhibition in Paris she met the French writer Georges Duhamel, who travelled to the USSR in 1927 and recommended her to Rolland. In all these contacts, Kudasheva exalted the Soviet regime. She also continued to write poetry, served as a guide to visiting French literary figures, and published translations from the French.<sup>25</sup> As the correspondence she initiated with Rolland unfolded, she began to inform him of events in the USSR and translate articles for him from the Soviet press. In April 1928 the increasingly enchanted Rolland wrote to Gor’kii about her for the first time, saying that Kudasheva was ‘passionately taken with Bolshevism’. Kudasheva worked with Rolland on the Russian publication of his collected works, and it was to her that Rolland wrote in 1929 that he was donating the proceeds for scholarships to Moscow University — a token of his ‘sympathy for the educational work of the new Russia’.<sup>26</sup>

After Rolland turned to Gor’kii to arrange a meeting with Kudasheva, he had the opportunity for the first time to see a little bit of the Soviet system in his own personal life. The Soviet authorities initially rejected Kudasheva’s application for a foreign passport to spend three weeks with Rolland in Switzerland in August 1929, despite the fact that her request had been supported by VOKS. This setback prompted Rolland to send several strongly worded letters to his Soviet contacts,



sparking a bout of bureaucratic wrangling on the part of his Soviet supporters. The fact that Rolland prevailed in a relatively short time reflected his importance in Soviet eyes. VOKS wrote to high secret police official Trilesser the day after the receipt of Rolland's letter of complaint to Gor'kii, on 10 August, urging reconsideration of Kudasheva's case. Significantly, it did so by invoking the category of 'friend': 'Romain Rolland is a genuine friend of the USSR, having repeatedly demonstrated the best attitude toward the Union in the European press. Among West European writers with worldwide reputations the USSR has too few friends to offend Romain Rolland'.<sup>27</sup> Yet the relatively slight delay prompted Rolland to complain bitterly to Gor'kii: 'One might think that in Moscow they are busy only with finding ways to lose their last friends among the independent minds of the West. I will never forget this lack of respect for me'.<sup>28</sup> After Kudasheva made further visits to Rolland in 1930-31, she became his secretary and may have become personally close; they were married in 1934. In 1931, Rolland proudly told Gor'kii, 'Mariia Pavlovna has done much so that I can better understand and come to love the new Russia'.<sup>29</sup> While it is difficult to gain genuine insight into Kudasheva's mental world — she appears as both the facilitator of her husband's Sovietophilia and as someone who knew the workings of the Soviet system far better than her ivory-tower consort — 'it goes without saying that the regime that let Kudasheva go abroad' without her son Sergei 'expected her complete loyalty'.<sup>30</sup> As we shall see, Mariia Pavlovna became the executor of all Rolland's Soviet affairs and correspondence, and clearly her presence was a *sine qua non* of his voluminous Soviet contacts of the 1930s.

The second major intermediary in Rolland's Soviet milieu and in his trajectory as a leading 'friend' in the 1930s was Gor'kii. Gor'kii's early criticism of Lenin and his partial estrangement from Soviet power after 1918 influenced Rolland, as the proletarian writer shared occasionally critical impressions of Soviet literary and political affairs with his French correspondent.<sup>31</sup> Gor'kii remained an influential figure in Soviet cultural politics long before his transformation into a key architect of Stalinism in culture. As Gor'kii moved toward full reconciliation with the Soviet regime and the Stalin leadership, his French compatriot moved with him; Rolland was transformed into a (still partially independent) 'friend' in the period after 1929, precisely the time when Gor'kii made his calculated, triumphal return to the USSR. It is in this period that a new dynamic emerged in the Rolland-Gor'kii correspondence: Rolland would worriedly write with one concern or another about Soviet misconduct that had been raised in European debates, and Gor'kii would hasten to more or less explain it away.<sup>32</sup> For Rolland, who had a conduit to Gor'kii's personal secretary in the 1930s, the Soviet cultural colossus was a major source of access as well as information. In 1932 and 1933, when he assumed hands-on power as a maker of cultural policy and regained his early Soviet role as patron extraordinaire, Gor'kii with great relish enthused to Rolland about the enormous strides the USSR was making in enlightening the masses. At the same time,

Rolland's cooperation in publishing Gor'kii's cultural-political essays abroad figured prominently in Gor'kii's personal correspondence with Stalin.<sup>33</sup> Finally, Rolland's own rise to the status of foreign icon within Soviet culture in the 1930s corresponded with the greatest influence of Gor'kii – the Old Bolshevik 'godbuilder' who wished to incorporate elements of heroism, myth, and religion as well as profound respect for European high culture into Soviet socialism. As Rolland shifted from critical supporter of 1927–33 to uncritical and celebrated 'friend' of the Popular Front years, it was the dynamism of Stalin-era Soviet communism and its 'monumentality' that appealed to his sense of 'heroism'.<sup>34</sup>

*Men of letters, men of action: Rolland, Arosev, Stalin (I)*

In a response to the extraordinary Soviet outpouring of letters to him on the celebration of his 70<sup>th</sup> birthday, a major event in the Soviet Union in 1936, Rolland linked his heroic fictional lives to his vision of the USSR:

Comrades, I am happy — 'Durch Leiden Freude' — after the long voyage of 70 years, sown with struggles and pains, I have come to the joy that you are building, to this new city of universal man, where old injustices and old prejudices are and will be forever eliminated.<sup>35</sup>

Because his fictional heroes Jean-Christophe and Colas Breugnen had become the 'companions' of his 'friends' in the USSR, the 'dreams of my art, the hopes of my life' had been realized.<sup>36</sup> As Rolland became a truer friend of the Soviet Union in the 1930s, his lifelong worship of heroic genius began to be trained toward the Bolshevik intelligentsia and in particular Stalin.

A primary piece of evidence for this conclusion is Rolland's meeting with Stalin on 28 June 1935. The meeting was both a pivotal moment in transforming him into an uncritical supporter of the USSR in the mid-1930s and a window into the phenomenon of 'friendship' with the Soviet Union. Because of its importance in the discussion that follows, it is necessary to discuss the evidence in detail, all the more so since most of what has been known about his 1935 trip has come from Rolland's posthumously published 1992 diary.

The Russian transcript produced for Stalin's records and the Soviet leadership, which is housed in the recently declassified Stalin collection (*lichnyi fond Stalina*), differs significantly from two other extant descriptions of the meeting, both contained in Rolland's Moscow diary in the Rolland archive in Paris, which Rolland had instructed was not to be opened for half a century. The first is Rolland's diary entries themselves, published in 1992 under the title *Voyage à Moscou*, which included the writer's journal notes on the meeting with Stalin and other depictions of his stay in Moscow from 23 June to 21 July 1935. These entries were reviewed and edited upon his return home. Second, the diary also contained as an appendix an 'official' transcript of the discussion with Stalin, which was

edited by Stalin personally and then sent to Rolland when he was visiting with Gor'kii; Rolland made a few more changes. Thus emerged a sanitized, official text extant in both French and Russian and agreed upon by both participants. Publication of an edited version of the talk was proposed by Kliment Voroshilov and considered by Stalin and the Politburo, but never carried out. The French version of this edited official transcript, published as an addendum to *Voyage à Moscou*, was produced by Rolland's wife, Kudasheva — who was taking notes in French at the meeting, while Aleksandr Arosev acted as interpreter. (A Russian-language version from the Kremlin's Presidential Archives of this doctored text was published in 1996.)<sup>37</sup> We are, then, dealing with three different records of the meeting: the first two, Rolland's detailed diary description and the truncated and altered official transcript, have long been available in published form, while the third, the Stalin archive variant, is hitherto unknown.

These three versions are somewhat different, and the differences are revealing. In particular, several omissions and subtle variations in the two French versions in Rolland's papers cast the meeting in a different light, with Rolland appearing less worshipful of Stalin and more willing to raise tough questions. Yet it would be an oversimplification to view the Stalin archive text as necessarily more correct and Rolland's diary version merely as incomplete. In many places the quotations recorded in Rolland's French diary provide significantly expanded variations of his own and Stalin's statements. Some of the differences between the diary and the Stalin collection text may stem from the fact that Arosev, who was translating for Rolland, rendered his words (according to Rolland, who must have been relying on his wife in this judgment) 'highly imperfectly'.<sup>38</sup> Perhaps unsurprisingly, the 'official' (yet at the time also unpublished) version of the text, which Rolland brought back to Switzerland, is the most incomplete. At some times it more resembles Rolland's diary version, at other times more the Stalin archive text. All three, then, are imperfect redactions: one deliberately tailored for public consumption but never released; one privately produced by Rolland himself, who probably knew best the words he pronounced but obviously did not want to cast himself in a negative light, even (perhaps especially) to his diary; and a third produced in the Soviet context, for circulation among top Soviet leaders. I want to suggest that is possible to turn the divergences among the three versions to interpretive advantage.

That Rolland associated the Bolshevik revolutionaries, and especially Stalin, with the kind of heroic lives he wrote about in his novels, combining action with a universalistic humanism, is suggested in other sources but dramatically confirmed by his audience with Stalin. Toward the end of the meeting, in the Stalin archive version, Rolland asked the mustachioed dictator about the source of that 'new humanism' of which, he informed Stalin, you are 'the first representative'.<sup>39</sup> Humanism, in Rolland's conception, was linked to serving the human community regardless of borders; the lives of his heroes — Beethoven, Michelangelo, Tolstoy — embodied goodness and simple human qualities. In Rolland's diary variation, he

also refers to the new ‘proletarian’ humanism, but does not call Stalin its first representative, rather dubbing him its ‘exponent’ (*l’annonceur*), citing a recent speech by Stalin on the ‘new Soviet person’.<sup>40</sup> However, in an additional part of his opening statement contained in the French diary variant, he implied that Stalin would transcend the genius of Beethoven: in discussing how millions in the ‘Occident’ looked to the USSR with hope, he remarked, ‘It is not enough to invoke the famous words of Beethoven, ‘O man, help yourself!’ (*Ô homme, aide-toi toi même!*). It is necessary to help them and to counsel them’.<sup>41</sup>

It was precisely the pan-European leftist culture in which Rolland had become a prominent participant that had fostered the ‘fusion of antifascism and progressive humanism’.<sup>42</sup> While crucial to the European leftist intellectuals defending civilization against the fascist menace, the concept of humanism was not prominent<sup>43</sup> in early Soviet ideology or in its mainstream Stalinist incarnations of the day. Stalin himself, who appeared at ease, sharp and savvy in these and similar occasions, nonetheless interpreted Rolland’s question entirely in the context of the ‘internal’ Soviet ideological world: he talked of the Bolshevik cultural revolutionary project of creating a new person, refracted through notions of labour discipline current especially in the 1930s. Liberating ‘individuality’ was linked by Stalin to ‘love of labour’. Shock-workers were ‘the men and women around whom our new life, our new culture is concentrated’, Stalin replied. ‘In the USSR (*U nas*), we hate lazy do-nothings’.<sup>44</sup> This train of thought, jarring in the context of Rolland’s elevated reflections on humanism, was omitted from the ‘official’ edited text and is not present in Rolland’s diary version.<sup>45</sup> However, in tracing the broader intellectual components of Rolland’s admiration for Stalin one can reflect on a greater irony. Certain sources of Rolland’s concern with universal genius, namely his love of Wagner in the 1880s and his enthusiastic reading of Nietzsche in the 1890s, also formed a key undercurrent among those Russian influences that eventually led — partly by the rich legacies to post-revolutionary thought from the prewar trend of Bolshevik ‘godbuilding’ and the Russian ‘Silver Age’ intelligentsia — to the ideals of the Soviet ‘new man’ and the Lenin and Stalin cults.<sup>46</sup> Yet the image of Stalin among 1930s French commentators differed greatly from the Soviet iconography of the emergent Stalin cult; more often than not, French observers depicted Stalin either as a despotic or cynical Oriental or as a simple, fraternal, rough-hewn man of the people. While Barbusse deliberately forged a Francophone Stalin myth that became standard for the French communist subculture, Rolland’s personal form of adulation appears as something distinct to his own intellectual make-up.<sup>47</sup>

We can further explore how Rolland linked Stalin to his own longstanding notions of the heroic life by examining the covert ties of mutual admiration between the French writer and the head of VOKS, Aleksandr Arosev. It was to Arosev that Rolland expressed his fascination with revolutionaries and men of

action, which were to him clearly represented by Stalin; and it was to Rolland that Arosev directed his own emotional yet semi-covert admiration for European men of culture. If the support of the humanist Rolland for Stalinism presents us with a historical puzzle, so too does the exaggerated admiration of the Stalinist Arosev for Rolland and other ‘friends of the Soviet Union’.

Arosev was among the handful of most Europeanized top Stalinist officials of the 1930s. He presided over VOKS less than four years, from his appointment in March 1934 until his execution in 1938, but that tenure corresponded with the heyday of the Popular Front.<sup>48</sup> Several crucial aspects of this paradoxical man become clear only from his diary, excerpts of which have been published. There Arosev records how he chastised himself as a failed man of culture who was acting out the part of a Soviet bureaucrat. Inverting official 1930s orthodoxies about Soviet cultural superiority, he perceived a crisis of culture inside the Soviet Union that corresponded to the Great Depression in the West. ‘Like a Scythian or a Mongol, I harbour within myself a great nostalgia (*toska*) for the West’, he wrote in 1935.<sup>49</sup> Yet the archives reveal a different side of Arosev: an intensely ambitious if not always savvy administrator, he constantly used his close friendship with Molotov and his Civil-War era ties with Ezhov to get a leg up in the political hierarchy. As head of VOKS, Arosev peppered Stalin with a barrage of proposals in the mid-1930s to boost the standing of VOKS and single it out from within the many-headed hydra of the party-state apparatus as the acknowledged headquarters for dealing with Soviet cultural ties with the outside world.<sup>50</sup> In his late-night diary entries he depicted his access to leading European fellow-travellers, such as his weekly contacts with Henri Barbusse in 1934, as a source of deep intellectual satisfaction, but at his VOKS post they were a tool in his repeated attempts to arrange audiences with Stalin.<sup>51</sup>

Arosev had longstanding ties with Rolland that, according to his account, dated from his time in Paris in the prerevolutionary emigration. He boasted about Rolland to Stalin in 1931 as a prime contact he had made in the French-speaking world when he was angling for a diplomatic post in France. On 17 May 1935, it was Arosev who forwarded Rolland’s request to meet with Stalin during his upcoming visit, and who offered to brief Stalin on the French writer’s ‘mental make-up’.<sup>52</sup> Thus, his efforts to use his contacts with the European ‘friends’ to meet and involve himself more closely with Stalin finally came to fruition during Rolland’s 1935 visit.

It is a key aspect of Arosev’s diary that he expressed personal admiration for many European intellectuals with whom he associated in the 1930s, who he felt restored his ‘cultural’ side. The figure he admired most was unquestionably Rolland. In a 1935 Union of Writers talk, to be sure, he depicted Rolland as torn between his pacifist inclinations and the need for social revolution, and this position ‘between two poles’ was typically portrayed as analogous to the intermediate class position of the intelligentsia in general. But he also called

Rolland a ‘genius’ and implied he had a deeper understanding of the USSR than others: ‘among the [West-European] intelligentsia, even the greatest representatives, with the exception, perhaps, of such geniuses as Romain Rolland, there is, I think, an insufficient understanding of us’.<sup>53</sup> The portrait of Rolland in Arosev’s diary is more emotional and unambiguous. In his 1935 diary entry from Villaneuve, Rolland’s villa near Geneva, Arosev wrote that ‘the conversations with this great man moved me completely [. . .]. One wants to work like the bird sings, that is, as he does. Simple. No, I have never breathed in the atmosphere of the work of thought and literature as here, at his [Rolland’s] place’.<sup>54</sup>

If Arosev was fascinated with the ‘great artist’ and ‘great man’, as he called Rolland, the French writer was equally fascinated by Old Bolsheviks like Arosev, and through him Stalin. ‘Again he became interested in who Stalin and Molotov were, what the lives of revolutionaries were like in the underground. Again I told him about prison and exile’, Arosev recorded in his diary about the 1935 meeting at Villaneuve. Kudasheva shared Rolland’s reaction to Arosev: ‘You see how people struggled, and I have lived such an uninteresting life’. Arosev then recorded: ‘I became ashamed at these words. I consider my own life to be boring and very ‘external’, I would like to live the life of the mind like him [. . .]’ In a different context, a 1935 book published in a mass edition, Arosev noted publicly how Rolland ‘more than once came back to the personality of our leader’, demonstrating great interest in comrade Stalin. Arosev repaid the compliment by dubbing Rolland a ‘creative’ or cultural revolutionary.<sup>55</sup>

Rolland’s identification of the lives of Bolshevik revolutionaries with the heroic, creative, larger-than-life figures he wrote about in the cultural sphere is evident from other sources as well. For example, he expressed the very same fascination with the Bolshevik underground to Fedor Nikolaevich Petrov, Arosev’s predecessor at VOKS in the early 1930s.<sup>56</sup> The collection of essays Rolland published in 1935 on his literary ‘companions’ — Shakespeare, Goethe, Hugo, Tolstoy — was entitled *Compagnons de route*, suggesting a linkage between the object of his fellow-travelling and these cultural giants. These chapters, moreover, were followed by a final essay on Lenin, whom Rolland had criticized while alive but rediscovered in the 1930s. The Russian revolutionary tradition, he suggested in this 1935 work, could be mated with the European cultural legacy: ‘Two maxims, paradoxically, which complete each other: “We must dream”, says the man of action [Lenin]. And the man of dream [Goethe]: “We must act!”’<sup>57</sup> A letter posted to J.-P. Samson from the Soviet Union in 1935 gives a more intimate sense of the personal inadequacy that Rolland felt when he suppressed his doubts in order to worship men of action: comparing himself to Hamlet, he wrote that he could not be like Fortinbras because he had too much ‘compassion’ and ‘horror’ in his heart. In Hamlet young Fortinbras lives a kind of parallel life to that of Hamlet; he is the son of the late king of Norway, while Hamlet is the son of the dead king of Denmark. But rather than remaining to watch his mother marry a new king, Fortinbras left to

fight foreign wars. At the end of the play, as Hamlet dies of poison, the royal line of Denmark spent, he offers his throne to the successful warrior Fortinbras, whose French name means ‘strong-in-arm’. Rolland wrote: ‘But as opposed to me, Fortinbras is right’ (*Mais contre moi, Fortibras a raison*).<sup>58</sup>

*Negotiations over status: Rolland, Arosev, Stalin (II)*

What did the Soviet Union want from its foreign friends, and what was the special relationship with the USSR that Rolland sought? The status of ‘friend of the Soviet Union’, through which these questions were refracted, was an informal and contingent one, but it held meaning to both sides. Its origins lay in the early 1920s, when cultural societies of ‘friends of the new Russia’ were founded in Europe, the first in Germany in 1923. In this connection, ‘friends’ implied the non-communist intellectuals sympathetic to the Soviet project — as distinguished, for example, from other ‘bourgeois’ figures pursuing closer relations for reasons of scientific cooperation, trade, diplomacy, or geopolitics. While it had many ambiguities, it should be stressed, the category ‘friend of the Soviet Union’ held real significance in Soviet cultural diplomacy, for it was used by VOKS officials in their classification and treatment of Rolland, among others.<sup>59</sup>

The category thus had a good deal of flexibility in terms of the countries, class background, and political tendencies of those to whom it applied, but was nonetheless linked especially to leftist, non-party, West European intellectuals. However, in the world of Soviet political culture those who were neither party members nor proletarians faced formidable obstacles in the amount of trust that could be invested in them. As the delegates to the massive 1927 ‘Congress of Friends’ in Moscow were hearing grandiose speeches about the meaning of their friendship, for example, a ‘conspiratorial’ document distributed to the Communists on the congress presidium passed more severe judgments about them: one should not ‘conceal that these [non-party] circles represent in political terms among the most passive elements’, and that the conference’s majority of ‘social-democrats, anarchists, and intellectuals in general have a number of prejudices toward the USSR’. The goal was to ‘turn [them] into our defenders in the capitalist world’. And for this, a total ‘rebirth’ into supporters of the entire Bolshevik program was unnecessary.<sup>60</sup> As this suggests, Bolshevik elites harboured great distrust of even their best European ‘friends’ for many reasons. Intellectuals of ‘alien’ political persuasion from bourgeois countries could easily lose friendship status if they were perceived to be not fulfilling the role for which they were valued most highly — that of ‘defenders’ of the Soviet Union who could influence public opinion abroad (and hence also, it was believed, the climate affecting foreign relations toward the USSR). In the early 1930s, for example, VOKS reports attacked ‘false’ foreign friends who represented themselves as sympathizers but who criticized the USSR when they returned home. In 1936, Gide was massively repudiated in the USSR

(and by communist and non-party writers such as Rolland) when his critical book *Retour de l'URSS* suddenly turned him from friend to enemy.<sup>61</sup> Since the very factors that led the Soviets to categorize these figures as 'friends' rather than fully-fledged comrades (that is, their social and political standing as non-party members of the intelligentsia) could easily be transformed into the prime basis for their repudiation, the only thing maintaining them in their precarious position as friends was virtually unconditional public loyalty.

The category of 'friend' also held significance for Rolland and other Soviet sympathizers. As Rolland assumed the stance of unconditional supporter of the USSR in the early 1930s, he frequently invoked his status as friend as he secured a range of services facilitating his role from his Soviet contacts. In these years, Rolland used VOKS as his contact organization of first resort, sending requests concerning Soviet publications, troubleshooting with other Soviet institutions, and personal matters relating to Kudasheva's family. VOKS was devoted, as one historian has put it, to 'logistical support' for the 'communicator's [friend's] operations'.<sup>62</sup> If Rolland's status as European friend conferred a range of privileges, he along with other intellectuals in his position also clearly felt it allowed him to give political advice to the Soviets about the European scene and, demonstrating perfect understanding of Soviet priorities, the loyalty of fellow intellectuals. For example, VOKS reported Henri Barbusse telling his hosts during his visit in 1928 that his old associate Rolland was a person 'who always left an exit behind him' for a retreat. In 1931 Rolland himself said the following to Gor'kii about a certain member of the Swiss-Soviet friendship society: 'if he is today a friend of the USSR, then he (as they say), "came from afar!"'<sup>63</sup>

Rolland's audience with Stalin in 1935 reveals his understanding of the importance of public loyalty and a high degree of preoccupation with his status as 'friend of the USSR'. The several disparate issues he raised to Stalin in his lengthy initial statement at the meeting — including the imprisonment of erstwhile Trotskii supporter Victor Serge, which had become a *cause célèbre* among French intellectuals after the Belgian-Russian revolutionary was exiled to Orenburg in 1933 — were presented to Stalin in a similar way. They were raised as if to suggest that Rolland (as opposed to others) was a totally loyal 'friend of the USSR', and that friends such as himself should be provided with special explanations of Soviet motivations to aid them in their cultural-political battles abroad. Even the 'truest friends of the USSR', as Rolland put it — transparently with himself in mind — were kept poorly informed on the motivations behind the changing policies of the Soviet state.<sup>64</sup> This state of affairs, he continued, put them in awkward situations in explaining the twists and turns of Soviet policy, particularly since the 'psychology' of French youth and intellectuals was not sufficiently dialectical. Rolland was 'completely certain that [Serge] deserved his punishment [. . .] but it is necessary to explain that fact to the masses of friends of the Soviet Union'. Thus was each and every question posed to Stalin.<sup>65</sup> In Rolland's diary account, he does not, however,



elaborately assure Stalin that he agrees in advance that various Soviet measures are correct. Rolland thus comes across as less sycophantic and even capable of raising difficult questions. Indeed, this led Duchatelet to conclude that Rolland ‘did not hesitate to ask Stalin important questions and demand their clarification’.<sup>66</sup> The archival version suggests it is more likely that another kind of clarification — Rolland’s attempt to prove himself one of those ‘truest friends’ — was in fact taking place.

Stalin, as might be expected, dealt with the writer’s questions with ease. Rolland’s queries treated the Soviet Union as an ideological experiment to be justified to the intellectuals, rather than either a revolutionary or a great-power state. Stalin claimed that draconian Soviet laws for juvenile ‘bandits’, which caused concern in Europe, were merely on the books for purely ‘pedagogical’ purposes, but that fact could not be advertised or the measure would lose its effect.<sup>67</sup> It is possible as well that Stalin announced the release of Serge at this moment as a kind of gift to Rolland. Tellingly, Rolland had taken up Serge’s cause after 1933 despite palpable distaste for his ‘ultra-left’ criticism of the Stalin course — precisely in order to neutralize an incident damaging to the USSR’s reputation among European intellectuals. Typically, here as well Rolland believed he could provide valuable advice about European sensibilities in his capacity as Soviet friend. During their conversation Stalin at first said he did not remember Serge, but then quickly noted that he was in Orenburg in good condition: ‘We do not need him and we can release him to Europe at any time’.<sup>68</sup>

The only tense moment in the meeting came when Rolland proposed a solution to keep the best friends of the Soviet Union informed by empowering a special institution specifically for that purpose. The background to this motion was that for years Rolland had complained to Gor’kii that he was not given sufficient information on Soviet cultural and political policies, and that keeping him informed would increase his effectiveness in European debates about Soviet socialism. Gor’kii, while giving his old correspondent occasional updates, wrote in 1933 (on the eve of Arosev’s appointment) that VOKS would be reformed and could do a better job than he in informing ‘our friends abroad’.<sup>69</sup> As head of VOKS Arosev had visited Rolland in Switzerland and arranged the details of his visit in 1935. Now, Rolland told Stalin that VOKS could give him the privileged access he required: ‘Such an institution could be, for example, VOKS, if it were given great political significance’. Stalin, unaware of this prehistory and immediately suspicious, made clear he thought Arosev, the translator, was putting words in Rolland’s mouth.<sup>70</sup> The exchange was excised from the ‘official’ version and does not appear in Rolland’s diary.

To sum up: Rolland’s meeting can be understood as an attempt to assure Stalin of his unwavering loyalty as a ‘friend’, at the same time pleading for more privileged Soviet information that would bolster his position among European intellectuals by answering their latest doubts about Stalin’s USSR. In his meeting

with Stalin he was attempting to negotiate and refine that status.

During his week in Moscow, Rolland visited the Kremlin, the Bolshoi Theatre, a VOKS reception with select politicians and intellectuals, and reviewed a workers' physical culture demonstration on 28 June in Red Square that inspired him greatly. The subsequent three weeks at Gor'kii's country house were marked by visits from a series of delegations of Palekh artists, metro workers, musicians, writers, youth from Anton Semenovich Makarenko's labour commune, and cinema directors, as well as a dinner with Stalin and his henchmen. Study of his diary and correspondence reveals Rolland was not totally uncritical of Stalin and Gor'kii, noting the former's 'maliciousness' at table and the latter's willingness to sanction brutality. While the ability of the watched Gor'kii to have frank conversations with Rolland during this period is doubtful, Rolland did hold substantive talks over the course of his visit with several people critical of the Soviet system, notably his own stepson Sergei Kudashev. From similar encounters he was told about the terror in Leningrad after the Kirov assassination and other aspects of 'cruel reality'. Since the late 1920s, moreover, Rolland had studied important contemporary literature about the Soviet Union, such as the valuable 1926 work of René Fülöp-Miller, *Geist und Gesicht des Bolschewismus*. None of this mattered; the visit to Moscow and his meeting with Stalin cemented his loyalty to the USSR. Invoking the heroic building of a 'new world' by the Soviet people in this period, a dynamic and monumental act that would regenerate the Occident, Rolland in this period intensified his use of key concepts prevalent in both Stalinist and anti-fascist culture such as the 'new man' and 'engineers of human souls'. In a specific shift that can be dated to the summer of 1935, he switched to publishing public commentary mainly in communist and fellow-travelling publications and, despite ongoing private concerns, ceased all public criticism of Soviet policies.<sup>71</sup> Writing to Stalin on the eve of his departure from Moscow, Rolland's tone was solemn as he pledged his 'genuine conviction' that the duty of all humanity was to defend the heroic Soviet creation of a new world from all its enemies. 'From this duty – you know this, dear comrade – I have never retreated, and will never abandon as long as I live'.<sup>72</sup>

### *Romain Rolland and 1930s Soviet culture*

The manager of Rolland's Soviet contacts was his wife, Mariia Pavlovna Kudasheva, and throughout the mid-late 1930s her most important and reliable channel of exchange appears to have been Mikhail Apletin, the Secretary of the International Organization of Revolutionary Writers (MORP) and the Foreign Commission of the Union of Soviet Writers. Apletin had been a high official at VOKS in the early 1930s, where he already served as Rolland's correspondent and, in effect, aide. He continued this work at the Union of Writers, regularly sending Madame Rolland books, articles, and letters, acting also as a courier for everything her husband wrote and she translated for Soviet audiences or correspondents.

Occasionally Apletin would write the great man himself in French, at other times he wheedled for Rolland to contribute to one or another project, such as a 1934 request for a few pages for the book *Writers of the World on the USSR*. For her part, Kudasheva sent Apletin letters as often as two or three times per week in the mid-1930s. In a typical example from 2 May 1937, she asked Apletin to send Aleksei Tolstoi's Peter I as well historical works on the tsar ('I have read with Rolland almost all the prose of Pushkin') and conveyed answers to about 20 letters from the USSR.<sup>73</sup> After Rolland's 1936 jubilee, at a time when the show trials troubled Rolland but he had achieved the height of his fame inside the Soviet Union, Kudasheva began to voice objections to the demands that his Soviet friendship imposed: 'it is unseemly, ridiculous to write each October, each May 1, each jubilee, etc. for five [Soviet] newspapers! [. . .] Rolland has for a long time been indignant about this. . . He should write for genuine, new occasions, when he himself wants to and is able to'.<sup>74</sup>

In return for the constant demands for his output, Rolland relayed requests through his wife for such items as a copy of Stalin's *Voprosy leninizma* and gramophone recordings of the voices of Gor'kii and Stalin. Rolland also used his position, for example, to recommend French works that the Soviet publisher 'Academia' might do well to translate.<sup>75</sup> The voluminous Kudasheva-Apletin correspondence was businesslike, but *en passant* a good deal of information on Rolland's day-to-day activities was conveyed to Moscow, along with occasional displays by Kudasheva of her own political sentiments: 'These days we are very much [. . .] following the events in Spain. The future of the French 'popular front' will be decided there as well [. . .] How strange it is that there are people who wish to turn us back to the middle ages, to a beastly, animal [. . .] world!'<sup>76</sup>

At least one intriguing document suggests Kudasheva was involved in consulting with her Soviet correspondents on the political direction of Rolland's affairs. In 1935 an excerpt from one of her letters to an unknown Soviet addressee was collected in a folder of Arosev's high-level materials on his European travels:

About the Italian Petrini — I read just last night in the anti-fascist newspaper 'Avanti' that he was put on trial and freed (in Italy) and he had been apparently sentenced to 20 years in prison! This forces one to think that he was a provocateur — and thus the Soviet government probably because of that 'gave him up' (if that is the case). If this was so, it would be wonderful if R. [Romain Rolland] could answer his correspondents, who have twice written him all about this affair. This would be a stunning blow to their (anarchist-Trotskyist) 'movement'! At present all anarchists, and many others, are adhering to the Trotskyist movement!<sup>77</sup>

Whatever Kudasheva's oft-discussed relationship to the Soviet secret police was, she appears here as an emotional, speculative amateur as opposed to a seasoned conspirator. That this portion of Kudasheva's letter was excerpted suggests it was distributed within the Soviet bureaucracy.

Kudasheva facilitated but did not single-handedly create the vast scope of

Rolland's Soviet contacts, the very extent of which prompts us to ask about the roles he and other friendly foreign luminaries played within Stalinist culture. First of all, it is clear, despite the great 1930s shift toward assertion of Soviet superiority over the West in culture as in other realms, the trappings of internationalism and international affirmation remained a top priority for the Soviet press and cultural establishment. That Soviet media demand for Rolland was not coordinated by any single clearing-house is suggested by several pieces of evidence – from the stream of requests from a motley array of Soviet publishing initiatives to local mistranslations of his French comments that found their way into some provincial newspapers. Rolland replied to fan mail by playing the role of wise authority for Soviet schoolchildren and young writers.<sup>78</sup> He was also called upon to lend his international prestige by making formal statements on important milestones, such as the death of Gor'kii, and was expected to play well-publicized roles in political campaigns involving foreign perceptions of the USSR. The brouhaha resulting from Gide's 'betrayal' at the end of 1936 — his critical *Retour de l'URSS* sold 100,000 copies in two months — is especially instructive in that an intervention by Rolland inside the Stalinist ideological world reverberated back, apparently against his wishes, into Europe. Although Rolland's relations with Gide had been strained for a long time before the mid-1930s, and Rolland strongly disapproved of the criticism of the Soviet Union during the height of the Spanish Civil War, Rolland did not at first wish to join in the communist-led attacks on his fellow man of letters. But he could not refrain from making his opinion known in the USSR in especially harsh terms. Rolland wrote ostensibly in response to a collective of German workers in Magnitogorsk (foreigners chosen for their familiarity with Soviet life and their indignation at Gide's 'slander'). He delivered a stinging repudiation of his countryman that played up what Stalinists referred to as 'double-dealing': the substance of Gide's worthless critique was less important than his reluctance to speak up openly with his criticisms inside the USSR. This meant he was not 'honest' and played 'a double game'.<sup>79</sup> Rolland's publication was then relayed back to Europe via French Communists.<sup>80</sup> Significantly, statements on the Soviet Union by foreign authorities such as Rolland were considered by Soviet cultural officials to hold far more weight with the Soviet populace than the very same propaganda emanating from within the USSR.<sup>80</sup> Even as it became the Stalinist orthodoxy to assert the superiority of Soviet culture, the prestige of western intellectuals seemed to carry the greatest weight in making that assertion.

As Rolland's works were translated into Russian and published in mass editions from the late 1920s on — by November 1937 the number of copies had reached 1.3 million — Rolland's literature also became a lasting Soviet phenomenon. While the Soviet reception of Rolland remains to be researched, we can at least consider features on both sides that facilitated the literary match. First and foremost, from early on Rolland embraced the social role of art and rejected avant-garde experimentation. These crucial features of his work during the era of Socialist

Realism and the eclipse of avant-garde ‘formalism’ can be contrasted to André Gide’s aestheticism, which led Gide always to feel uncomfortable with Soviet cultural development in the same period.<sup>81</sup> Rolland, like the massively translated Theodore Dreiser before him, was dubbed a ‘critical realist’ — not quite as good as the label ‘non-party Bolshevik’ inside the USSR, but the next best thing to being a true Socialist Realist — and this corresponded with his elevation by the Soviet press to the status of one of the great foreign literary friends.<sup>82</sup> Like Dreiser as well, Rolland was both politically acceptable and the author of prose that could be popularized to a mass Soviet audience. Literary critic Apletin, for example, a key member of the Union of Soviet Writers’ Foreign Section, expressed reservations about Gide’s complex style in the preparations for the latter’s visit in 1936: ‘This is not Rolland, this is a writer who is less accessible to the Soviet reader’.<sup>83</sup>

No matter how great Rolland’s presence was in Stalinist culture, his own access to it was sharply restricted. Indeed, when Rolland used his honoured position in Soviet culture to attempt to convey something that genuinely jarred with the reigning orthodoxy, or which might clash with his own Soviet image, he could simply be filtered out. In 1937, for example, the anti-fascist activist made an attempt to get his reply to two jingoistic Novgorod schoolgirls into the Soviet press:

It is dangerous to be too proud and self-satisfied, as it seems to me you are. You are right to love the USSR and be proud of it, but you are incorrect to consider that it has overtaken all other countries. (‘In the USSR’, you write, ‘everything is the best. The best scientists, the best writers, the best musicians, athletes, engineers, artists’. Such overconfidence can bring great misfortune [. . .] The sons of the USSR must not reject pan-humanism and fall into nationalism.

Rolland pointedly concluded his letter by saying that the Nazis considered themselves the chosen race; national pride was one of the first phases of fascism.<sup>84</sup> Kudasheva forwarded this letter to Apletin, suggesting he give it to a youth newspaper like *Komsomol’skaia pravda*, since ‘we would consider it *useful* to publish such a letter’. Despite further inquiries by Rolland, who was very interested<sup>85</sup> in whether or not the editors had rejected it, there is no record of a response.

The planning of Rolland’s 70<sup>th</sup> jubilee in 1936 gives insight into the incorporation of foreign friends into the extensive apparatus of official celebrations and ritualized cultural anniversaries. Apletin took the initiative two months in advance, laying out a multi-media celebratory evening (*torzhestvennyi vecher*) in the large hall of the Moscow conservatory that in the event was draped with portraits of Stalin, Molotov, Kaganovich, and Rolland.<sup>86</sup> The evening included an exhibition, poems, literary scenes in a musical drama from Rolland’s work, scholarly talks, and a recorded greeting from the *maitre* himself. It also included the screening of a special documentary film of Rolland’s 1935 Soviet visit. Testimonials were given by Soviet writers and factory workers familiar with his

works. The scale of the event was underscored by the devotion of an entire issue of *Literaturnaia gazeta* to the jubilee, reproductions of the evening by Union of Writers' groups in the major cities around the country, a radio broadcast, and biography of Rolland mass-produced for the occasion. This was, of course, an event that could flatter and impress the foreign luminary; the Foreign Commission sent Rolland an album containing 400 Soviet newspaper clippings on this 'major holiday'. Yet it was also a way of marking Soviet devotion to high and world culture, and of course the Rolland jubilee was conceived with political goals in mind. Apletin called it a 'special gathering of writers and intellectuals of other professions that can give an excellent occasion (*povod*) for further mobilization in the struggle against fascism and war, for the defence of culture'. But there was a subtler political message as well: the organizing principle of the celebration was conceived as 'R. Rolland's path to revolution'.<sup>87</sup> The notion of path, of course, affirmed the core conception of a teleological progression toward higher consciousness in the telling of Rolland's biography. Ultimately, it implicitly affirmed the superiority of the end-point of his path, which is his embrace of the Soviet order.

In the press coverage of the event that was placed in newspapers from Minsk to Vladivostok, Rolland was hailed as holding an 'honoured place' among all the European writers who had become friends of the Soviet Union: in an oft-repeated phrase, he was the 'spiritual leader' (*vozhd'*) of the 'best part' of the 'foreign intelligentsia'. Arosev, in his own widely published newspaper article, wrote that Rolland was an enlightener of the masses; Rolland's interest was in great artists who did not want just to study the world, but to change it. He realized that all true art was revolutionary, but that art alone was not enough, something also recognized by 'the greatest genius of mankind comrade Stalin'. A female and a male factory worker published testimonials: 'you read [*Jean-Christophe*] and you realize how difficult it is to develop talent in capitalist conditions and [. . .] what great opportunities there are for any talent here, in the USSR!' 'My norm is 23 per shift, and I do 40–46. But I still have much to learn and study from the culture of the past [. . .]'<sup>88</sup> In this rendering, Rolland became a living relic, a precursor to Soviet art, the culture of the future. Yet even these commentaries remind us that by translating Rolland and other selected western writers in mass editions over many decades, the Soviet cultural establishment elicited reader responses that could hardly be fully prescribed.

Rolland's seventieth birthday was celebrated in Paris as well, but in a very different way. The *soirée d'hommage*, held in the main hall of the Palais de la Mutualité and marked by an appearance by Leon Blum, was structured around a rather different script. Orchestrated in part by the PCF, it was a celebration of leftist unity and anti-fascism in which Rolland became the 'symbolic grandfather of the Popular Front'. Rolland's evolution was also depicted as complete, not in its embrace of Stalin's USSR but in the continuation of a line of great humanists

stretching back to Shakespeare, Goethe, Beethoven, and Tolstoi.<sup>89</sup> Friendship with the USSR had thus brought Rolland the height of adulation in Moscow and in Paris, but the differing celebrations underscore the disjunctures between Stalinist and European anti-fascist culture even as they overlapped in the simultaneous elevation of Rolland.

In the years ahead, Rolland's public loyalty as a Soviet friend would be put to a severe test. Rolland repeatedly wrote to Gor'kii in an attempt to secure permission from Stalin for use of 'this weapon', meaning publication or even partial public description of his talk with Stalin, but was never given approval to make public even any portion of the truncated transcript of their meeting.<sup>90</sup> In a letter sent to the Soviet press on the twentieth anniversary of the October Revolution, during the height of the purges, Rolland depicted Stalin as the heir of the French Revolution. The ex-pacifist who had greeted the revolution in 1917 with warnings about 1792 and the excesses of the Convention now declared: 'L'Oeuvre de la Convention, interrompue, se continue; et le monde nouveau, par nous rêvé, par vous s'edifie. Salut à Staline le constructeur [. . .]'<sup>91</sup>

One important personal matter seems to have been a factor in Rolland's refusal to break publicly with the USSR during the purges, although it is debatable whether it was the primary one: Kudasheva's son Sergei remained in Moscow at the Mathematical Faculty of Moscow University along with his wife and grandmother. The Foreign Commission of the Union of Writers played a role in aiding Sergei and facilitating Rolland's contacts with his stepson. In 1937 Rolland invoked his status as literary 'colleague' (*confrère*) to secure a better apartment for 'my little Russian family'. Apletin wrote to Kudasheva in 1938 that a two-room apartment (rather than the three-room apartment requested) had been obtained through Molotov. In June 1940, Apletin informed Rolland that he had 'taken all necessary measures' and Sergei was accepted by the rector of the university to graduate study in his field.<sup>92</sup> Sergei was killed fighting the Nazis in 1941.

In numerous unanswered letters to Stalin attempting to protect friends and acquaintances from the purges, Rolland, clearly hoping for influence, continued to assure Stalin that he would remain loyal.<sup>93</sup> Rolland's purge-era correspondence with another of the Soviet Union's most ardent supporters in the French literary world, Jean-Richard Bloch, suggests how both were disturbed by the Moscow trials yet came to a conscious decision to remain silent in public so as not to hurt the already 'troubled' Soviet public image. In a 3 March 1938 letter to Bloch, Rolland continued to express hope that unpublicized advice from 'the best friends of the USSR' would help the Soviets realize the 'publicly disastrous consequences' of the purges on the anti-fascist Popular Front.<sup>94</sup> In 1938, therefore, Rolland repeatedly turned down opportunities to condemn the Great Terror in the USSR. But it is also significant that in that year he distanced himself from open declarations of support for the Soviets and ceased direct contact with Soviet organizations. This new reticence came despite Apletin's continuing, voluminous contacts with Kudasheva

and Soviet efforts to keep Rolland on the side of ‘civilization’ against ‘barbarism’ — by taking a public stance on the veracity of the evidence presented in the show trials. Kudasheva continued to point to her husband’s age and ill health to sidestep constant Soviet requests for statements on every holiday and occasion.<sup>95</sup> Apparently more significant to Rolland than the blood purges was the devastating shock of the Nazi-Soviet Pact of 1939. In private letters and in his diary, Rolland strenuously condemned Stalin’s cynical treason and regretted his mistake of believing a new world was being built on the principles of humanism. He resigned from his figurehead position in the French Association of Friends of the USSR, but again he did so without making the move public. He continued to maintain public silence on matters Soviet; one prime reason articulated in his private papers was the desire not to aid the Soviet Union’s enemies. He lived to sanction something of a reconciliation with the Soviet embassy in Paris in 1944. However, in that year before his death he had no interest in resuming his former political positions or activities.<sup>96</sup>

Along with all the circumstances this paper has described, Rolland was prompted to act — to cast his lot with Stalin — by a concrete set of ideas about heroic action, the epic dynamism of the communist revolution, and the positive features of Soviet culture in the age of Stalin. No abstract ‘lesson’ about intellectuals or politics can therefore substitute for understanding the mindset that permitted his shocking capability for mistaking Stalinism for humanism. Soviet manipulation alone, moreover, was not sufficient to turn this high-minded man of conscience into Moscow’s obedient servant. Unexpected as it may sound, contributing factors were some of the great intellectual and aesthetic currents in the European culture he wished to defend. Crucial as well were a range of ‘transnational’ ties that bound him to his chosen role of Stalin supporter. Among the most important of these, this article has attempted to show, were his adherence to the informal yet almost contractual bargain he had forged as a ‘friend of the Soviet Union’. In exchange for his unconditionally pro-Soviet public stance, Rolland received the extensive services of Soviet cultural organizations and an extraordinary prominence within Soviet culture. He got, in other words, what the Soviets were prepared to offer. Yet Rolland, who attempted to alter the relationship in several ways by pleading for better Soviet information, offering advice, and attempting to exert influence, was never able to change the terms of this implicit bargain, in which the Soviet side had the upper hand. Rolland, finally, played his part during a brief conjuncture in the 1930s when a pan-European anti-fascist culture overlapped with a vastly different yet closely interrelated Stalinist culture. The manner in which the first prompted him to misjudge the second was a key reason for his blindness. He maintained the outward face of loyalty that was at the core of his status as friend of the Soviet Union, even as inside the Soviet Union the greatly sharpened xenophobia brought on by the purge era, the decimation of the institutions and leaders of Soviet cultural diplomacy, and the Nazi-Soviet pact denuded that category of the bulk of its former significance.



## Notes

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<sup>1</sup> David James Fisher, *Romain Rolland and the Politics of Intellectual Engagement* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), pp. x, 4.

<sup>2</sup> Bernard Duchatelet, *Romain Rolland tel qu'en lui-même* (Paris: Albin Michel, 2002), esp. pp. 9, 11, 393–401.

<sup>3</sup> See Paul Hollander, *Political Pilgrims: Travels of Western Intellectuals to the Soviet Union, China, and Cuba, 1928–1978* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981); Robert Conquest, 'The Great Error: Soviet Myths and Western Minds', in Conquest, *Reflections on a Ravaged Century* (New York: Norton, 2001), pp. 115–49; Stéphane Courtois, introduction to Courtois et al., *Le livre noir du communisme. Crimes, terreur, répression* (Paris: Robert Laffont, 1997); Stephen Schwartz, *Intellectuals and Assassins: Writings at the End of Soviet Communism* (London, 2000), pp. 9–17, 80, 139.

<sup>4</sup> See David Caute, *The Fellow-Travelers: Intellectual Friends of Communism* (rev. edn.) (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988); François Furet, *The Passing of an Illusion*, trans. by Deborah Furet (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1999). For an important pre-archival work on the Soviet reception of foreign visitors, see Sylvia R. Margulies, *The Pilgrimage to Russia: The Soviet Union and the Treatment of Foreigners, 1924–1937* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1968). For a valuable recent study of the Soviet Union in French intellectual life that is empirically much richer than Furet's extended essay, see Sophie Coeuré, *La grande lueur à l'Est: Les français et l'Union soviétique 1917–1939* (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1999). This work gains much by examining both sides of the French political spectrum, but it also does not fully grapple with the Soviet side of the interaction. For a collective biography of French travelers to the USSR focusing on the voyage itself, see Rachel Mazuy, *Croire plutôt que voir? Voyages en Russie Soviétique (1919–1939)* (Paris: Odile Jacob, 2002).

<sup>5</sup> For further critique of the existing historiography, see Michael David-Fox, 'The Fellow-Travelers Revisited: The 'Cultured West' Through Soviet Eyes', *Journal of Modern History*, 75 (June 2003), 300–35.

<sup>6</sup> Tony Judt, *Past Imperfect: French Intellectuals, 1944–1956* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), pp. 149, 131, 154, 205–26.

<sup>7</sup> Judt, quotation p. 154; on anti-liberalism, see esp. pp. 229–45.

<sup>8</sup> Judt briefly considers the problem Anglo-American fellow-traveling poses for his thesis, only to preserve his stress on French exceptionalism: 'As important as the opinions themselves is the way in which they are expressed, the numbers of people expressing them, and the status and influence of those people within their community' (Judt, 248). But in the 1930s, as opposed to the postwar decade, the prominence and quantity of pro-Soviet American and British intellectuals is not open to doubt. The longevity of Sovietophilia in postwar France, moreover, certainly has much to do with immediate 'circumstances' (the

postwar intellectual reaction to Vichy, the fact that the French Communist Party was not tainted by it, and the communist role in the Resistance) that Judt deplures as an inadequate explanation. These observations, of course, hardly invalidate the importance Judt's work attributes to national style in intellectual life, as shown elsewhere, for example, in the centrality of economic modernization for American intellectuals' views of the Soviet system (David C. Engerman, *Modernization from the Other Shore: American Intellectuals and the Romance of Russian Development* [Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003]).

<sup>9</sup> Lev Davydovich Trotskii, 'Literaturnye poputchiki revoliutsii', in *Literatura i revoliutsiia* (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo 'Krasnaia nov'', 1923), pp. 40–83.

<sup>10</sup> See esp. Katerina Clark, 'Germanophone Intellectuals in Stalin's Russia: Diaspora and Cultural Identity in the 1930s', *Kritika*, 2 (Summer, 2001), 529–52; Clark, 'The Author as Producer: Cultural Revolution in Berlin and Moscow', paper presented at the Workshop on New Approaches to Russian and Soviet History, College Park, MD, 2003.

<sup>11</sup> Fisher, p. 236.

<sup>12</sup> Judt, pp. 6–7 and *passim*.

<sup>13</sup> Romain Rolland to Maksim Gor'kii, 15 February 1931, in *M. Gor'kii i R. Rollan. Perepiska* (Moscow: 'Nasledie', 1996); A. B. Khalatov (Zav. OGIZ) to I. V. Stalin, 15 May 1931, in '*Schast'e literatury*': *Gosudarstvo i pisateli 1925–1938. Dokumenty*, ed. D. L. Babichenko (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 1997), pp. 112–13.

<sup>14</sup> Ludmila Stern, 'The Creation of French-Soviet Cultural Relations: VOKS in the 1920s and the French Intelligentsia', *AUMLA: Journal of the Australasian Universities Language and Literature Association*, 89 (May 1998), 45; Coeuré, p. 170.

<sup>15</sup> See Hollander, *Political Pilgrims*, pp. 174–75.

<sup>16</sup> Fisher, p. 13.

<sup>17</sup> Fisher, pp. 10–12; see also Duchatelet, *Romain Rolland*, p. 11.

<sup>18</sup> Fisher, p. 23.

<sup>19</sup> Fisher, pp. 39–46; Harris, p. 17.

<sup>20</sup> Miriam Krampf, *La conception de la vie héroïque dans l'oeuvre de Romain Rolland* (Paris: Le Cercle du Livre, 1956), p. 96; Fisher, pp. 27–29.

<sup>21</sup> Fisher, pp. 53–59, 65.

<sup>22</sup> On the Rolland-Barbusse debate see esp. chap. 5 of Fisher; see also Duchatelet, *Romain Rolland*, pp. 231–45.

<sup>23</sup> A. V. Lunacharskogo, ms. of 'Pis'ma iz Parizha (pis'mo tret'e)', for *Krasnaia gazeta*, 17 January–6 February 1926', in RGASPI f. 142, op. 1, d. 133, l. 84; see also l. 119–20; Lunacharskii, 'Dlia 'Vechernei Moskvvy', RGASPI f. 142, op. 1, d. 152, l. 7–8; 'Privetstvennoe slovo t. A. V. Lunacharskii Anri Barbiuss. 18 sentiabria 1927 g'.', l. 5. On the publication of the Barbusse-Rolland correspondence in *Izvestiia*, see Coeuré, 34–35. On Trotskii's 16 May 1922 *Izvestiia* article, 1 October 1922 article in *Clarté*, and 7 October 1922 article in *L'Humanite*, see Fisher, p. 107.

<sup>24</sup> Duchatelet, *Romain Rolland*, pp. 265–77; Fisher pp. 147–204.

<sup>25</sup> M. P. Arakelova and A. A. Gorodnitskaia, "'Ocharovannaia dusha": M. P. Kudasheva-Rollan', in *Rossiiskaia intelligentsia na rodine i v zarubezh'e*, ed. Tat'iana Aleksandrovna

Parkhomenko (Moscow: Rossiiskii institut kul'turologii, 2001), pp. 161–75; Duchatelet, *Romain Rolland*, pp. 284–313. Duhamel, in his travel notes, suggested that the secret police deployed the feminine ‘temptations’ of Kudasheva, referring to her as an *intrigante révolutionnaire* who wished to enter the history of belles-lettres and that of the revolution at the same time. He is probably the source of persistent rumors that she was a secret police agent (Coeuré, pp. 65, 67; Duchatelet, p. 398). During the purge era, Henri Guilbeaux accused Kudasheva of being the source of Rolland’s pro-Soviet stance, which Rolland considered an ‘outrage’ at the time (Duchatelet, pp. 331–32). Theories of GPU/NKVD manipulation of Kudasheva are repeated without documentation in Vladimir Fedorovskii and Gonzague Saint-Bris, *Les Egeries russes* (Paris: J. C. Lattes, 1994), pp. 263–79. In my view, some sort of relationship with the Soviet secret police can safely be taken for granted, yet speculation without evidence should not overshadow consideration of all those factors involved that can be analysed on the basis of the archival record.

<sup>26</sup> Rolland to Mariia Kudasheva, 18 September 1929, GARF f. 5283, op. 1a, d. 129, l. 120–21.

<sup>27</sup> Iu. V. Mal'tsev. Brio. predsedatelia VOKS. Tov. Trilesseru. Zam. Pred. OGPU', 10 August 1929, GARF f. 5283, op. 1a, d. 125, l. 54.

<sup>28</sup> Rolland to Maksim Gor'kii, 5 April 1928 and 6 August 1929, in *M. Gor'kii i R. Rollan*, pp. 159, 163.

<sup>29</sup> Rolland to Gor'kii, 2 June 1931, in *M. Gor'kii i R. Rollan*, p. 194.

<sup>30</sup> Arakelova and Gorodnitskaia, p. 171. Yet these two admirers of Kudasheva appear eager to explain away her pro-Soviet stance, and they ignore material suggesting that Kudasheva was actively facilitating Rolland’s increasing loyalty to the USSR. See also Bernard Duchatelet, ‘Introduction’, in *Voyage à Moscou (juin-juillet 1935)* (Paris: Albin Michel, 1992), pp. 57–64.

<sup>31</sup> On Gor'kii’s literary and political activities in the 1920s, see Natal'ia Nikolaevna Primochkina, *Pisatel' i vlast': M. Gor'kii v literaturnom dvizhenii 20-x godov*, 2<sup>nd</sup> edn (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 1998); on Rolland, see esp. pp. 153, 162–63, 238.

<sup>32</sup> See, for example, the exchange of 25 and 28 January 1928 in *M. Gor'kii i R. Rollan*, pp. 144–51. This volume was prepared for publication but blocked from release in the 1960s. See also Fisher, pp. 222–24.

<sup>33</sup> Gor'kii to Rolland, 5 August 1932, in *M. Gor'kii i R. Rollan*, pp. 228–30. ‘Kopiiia pis'ma t. Gor'kogo Rollanu (prislano Kriuchkovym)’, RGASPI f. 558, op. 11, d. 719, l. 10–11; Gor'kii to Stalin, 13 March 1933, l. 113.

<sup>34</sup> Quotations from Fisher, p. 233; see also chapter 9; Duchatelet, *Romain Rolland*, pp. 300–10.

<sup>35</sup> Romain Rolland, letter for distribution to Soviet correspondents, 29 January 1936, RGALI f. 631, op. 11, d. 283, l. 45–48.

<sup>36</sup> Romain Rolland, letter for distribution to Soviet correspondents, 29 January 1936, RGALI f. 631, op. 11, d. 283, l. 46.

<sup>37</sup> ‘Tysiachi liudei vidiat v SSSR voploshchenie svoikh nadezhd’. Zapis' besedy Romena Rollana s I. V. Stalinyim 28 iyunia 1935 goda', *Istochnik*, 1 (1996), 140–52; most details

given above on the genesis of this edited text are drawn from the editorial introduction, pp. 140–42.

<sup>38</sup> Arosev ‘*traduit fort imparfaitement, et Macha, dans la mesure du possible, le rectifie*’. Rolland, *Voyage à Moscou*, p. 126. Arosev, already no doubt very nervous in the presence of Stalin, had to watch as Rolland’s wife tried to correct him in front of the suspicious Stalin. Later, Arosev desperately defended the quality of his translation and questioned Madame Rolland’s motivations in his letters to Stalin. See ‘A. Arosev. TsK VKP(b). Tov. Stalinu’, 14 July 1935, GARF f. R-5283, op. 1a, ed. khr. 276, l. 187–91. Arosev denounced several writers in Gor’kii’s entourage directly to Stalin for their role in exerting a bad influence on Rolland and Kudasheva. He especially singled out another major Soviet-European cultural mediator, Sergei Tret’iakov, alleging to Stalin that he was the source of an ‘oppositionist’ influence on Madame Rolland that changed her pro-Soviet outlook. ‘He [Tret’iakov] always tried to underline that the genuine writer’s milieu (obshchestvennost’) is one thing, and the Central Committee is another’ (l. 190).

<sup>39</sup> ‘Beseda t. Stalina s Romen Rollanom. Pervodil razgovor t. A. Arosev. 28.VI.sg [1935]’, with handwritten addition: ‘ne dlia pechati’, RGASPI f. 558, op. 11, ed. khr. 775, l. 1–16, here l. 13.

<sup>40</sup> It is also produced this way in the French translation of the ‘official’ edited version — see Rolland, *Voyage à Moscou*, p. 245.

<sup>41</sup> Rolland, *Voyage à Moscou*, pp. 133, 127. The day after the meeting, Arosev reported to Stalin that Rolland was ‘personally’ taken with the leader, that he was ‘ready to kiss’ Arosev, and that he said he had ‘accomplished the main act of my life’. Rolland further was said to have told Arosev that Stalin had the directness that only ‘great men’ possess. Arosev to Stalin, 29 June 1935, GARF f. 5283, op. 1, d. 276, l. 71–72. Given Arosev’s attempts to flatter Stalin for over a decade, these quotations perhaps say as much about Arosev as about Rolland.

<sup>42</sup> Coeuré, p. 258.

<sup>43</sup> In a 1934 Union of Writers’ evaluation of Rolland, his ‘individualistic humanism’ and pacifism are mentioned after his Gandhism as the ‘weakest part of his ideological credo’ (‘Inostrannaia komissiiia. Frantsiia. Biograficheskie svedeniia o frantsuzskikh pisateliakh’, RGALI f. 631, op. 14, ed. khr. 716).

<sup>44</sup> ‘Beseda t. Stalina s. Romen Rollanom’, 28 June 1935, RGASPI f. 558, op. 11, ed. khr. 775, l. 15.

<sup>45</sup> Rolland, *Voyage à Moscou*, p. 133 and p. 246 respectively.

<sup>46</sup> See esp. Katerina Clark, *Petersburg, Crucible of Cultural Revolution* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995); Krampf, pp. 45–64.

<sup>47</sup> See esp. Coeuré, pp. 234–35.

<sup>48</sup> For a full-length analysis of Arosev, see Michael David-Fox, ‘“Stalinist Westernizer”?’ Aleksandr Arosev’s Literary and Political Depictions of Europe’, *Slavic Review*, 62 (Winter 2003), 733–59.

<sup>49</sup> Diary entry of 4 June 1935, excerpted along with many other entries in Ol’ga Aroseva, *Bez grima* (Moscow: Tsentrpoligraf, 1999), p. 77.

<sup>50</sup> For example, see ‘Sekretariu TsK VKP(b) tov. Stalinu. Dokladnaia zapiska. O propagande sovetskoi kul’ture zagranitse i razvitie raboty VOKS. 5/3/35’, GARF f. R-

5283, op. 1a, d. 276, l. 72–83. For proposals to the Politburo and the Central Committee, see d. 308, l. 59–64; d. 277, l. 99–104.

<sup>51</sup> Arosev to Stalin, 23 October 1934, 7 July 1935, 22 January 1936, all in RGASPI f. 558, op. 11, ed. khr. 695, l. 156–57, 158–59, 160.

<sup>52</sup> Arosev to Stalin, 25 January 1935, GARF f. R-5283, op. 1a, d. 276, l. 26; Arosev to Stalin, 31 July 1931, RGASPI f. 558, op. 11, ed. khr. 695, l. 59–60; Arosev to Stalin, 17 May 1935, GARF f. R-5283, op. 1a, d. 276, l. 109; Arosev to Stalin, 23 May 1931, RGASPI f. 558, op. 11, ed. khr. 695, l. 56–57.

<sup>53</sup> ‘Stenogramma doklada A. Ia. Aroseva, ‘O vstrechakh i besedakh s vidneishimi predstaviteliami zapadnoevropeiskoi intelligentsii’. 4-go maia 1935 g’., RGALI f. 631, op. 14, ed. khr. 311, l. 20, 22.

<sup>54</sup> Aroseva, 67 (Arosev diary entry from 7 January 1935); see also the account of Rolland’s ‘ecstasy’ on hearing about Stalin’s underground revolutionary struggle in ‘Stenogramma doklada A. Ia. Aroseva’, l. 20.

<sup>55</sup> Aroseva, 69, Diary entry from 7 January 1935; Aleksandr Arosev, *Besedy i vstrechi s nashim i druz’iami v Evrope* (Moscow: Zhurnal’noe i gazetnoe ob “edinenie”, 1935), p. 45.

<sup>56</sup> F. N. Petrov, *65 let v riadakh Leninskoi partii. Vospominaniia* (Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1962), p. 128.

<sup>57</sup> Quoted in Fisher, p. 255. Goethe was the key icon in the Germanophone anti-fascist culture of the period.

<sup>58</sup> Cited in Duchatelet, *Romain Rolland*, pp. 321–22.

<sup>59</sup> For example, GARF f. 5283, op. 1, d. 278, l. 10–11; GARF f. R-5283, op. 12, d. 328, l. 18.

<sup>60</sup> ‘Zamechaniia k proektu resoliutsii. S[overshenno] konspirativno’, signed A. I. Rykov, RGASPI f. 495, op. 99, d. 12, ll. 15–16.

<sup>61</sup> ‘F. N. Petrov. Predsedatel’ VOKS. Tov. M. M. Livtvinovu. Kopia — tov. Messingu. Zam. Pred. OGPU, 3 ianvaria 1930 g’., GARF f. R-5283, op. 1a, ed. khr. 160, l. 24.

<sup>62</sup> Ludmila Stern, *French Intellectuals and Soviet Cultural Organizations in the 1920s–1930s* (unpublished doctoral thesis, School of Modern Language Studies, University of New South Wales, Australia, 2000), pp. 352–56, quotation p. 356.

<sup>63</sup> See the VOKS report on Barbusse, 26 June 1928, GARF f. 5283, op. 8, ed. khr. 62, l. 155–56; Rolland to Gor’kii, 15 February 1931, in *M. Gor’kii i R. Rollan*, p. 182.

<sup>64</sup> In Rolland’s French diary version, there is no reference to the ‘truest’ friends, but he rather refers to the Soviet Union’s ‘foreign friends’, speaking of himself as ‘an old friend and a fellow-traveller (compagnon de route) of the USSR’. See Rolland, *Voyage à Moscou*, pp. 127, 128.

<sup>65</sup> Rolland took care to repudiate his pacifism, something clearly anathema to the Communists, assuring Stalin that 3–4 years ago he had concluded that we ‘sympathizers of the USSR’ cannot stand for ‘integral pacifism’, that is, against war under any circumstances. All quotations from the Rolland-Stalin meeting in this and the next two paragraphs are from the Stalin archive version, “Beseda t. Stalina s Romen Rollanom”, 28

June 1935', RGASPI f. 558, op. 11, ed. khr. 775, l. 1–16, unless explicitly noted otherwise.

<sup>66</sup> Duchatelet, 'Introduction', 81, repeated in idem, *Romain Rolland*, p. 321.

<sup>67</sup> In an aside, suggestive of the way in which many of the most pro-Soviet Western intellectuals continued to think about the USSR in terms of Asiatic backwardness, Rolland in his diary later noted: '*Et, pour la première fois, à l'évocation de ces crimes féroces, commis dans l'ombre par des femmes et des enfants, je voit cette réalité, que nous oublions, en Occident: la vieille Russie barbare, atroce, qui subsiste encore, et que les dictateurs bolcheviks ont à comprimer*'. Rolland, *Voyage à Moscou*, p. 132.

<sup>68</sup> Several speakers had spoken of Serge in the January 1935 International Writers' Congress for Defence of Culture in Paris (Fisher, p. 245). In the archival and official versions of his Stalin meeting, Rolland comes across in the exchange about Serge as uninformed and naïve, as he gushes with relief to Stalin that he had been told that Orenburg was some sort of desert. Tellingly, this is absent from his own diary account, in which he already knows Serge is in the city of Orenburg. Instead, in his own diary description, Rolland makes a savvy pitch to Stalin about the harm caused to European public opinion as a result of Serge's three-year exile, and even makes a reference to the Dreyfus affair. See Rolland, *Voyage à Moscou*, pp. 128–2. Rolland also enlisted Gor'kii on behalf of Serge after the meeting with Stalin, since Gor'kii contacted secret police chief Genrikh Iagoda and kept Rolland informed. See Gor'kii to Rolland, 29 August 1935 and 12 September 1935, in *M. Gor'kii i R. Rollan*, pp. 313–15; on Rolland's motivations in the Serge affair after 1933, see Duchatelet, *Romain Rolland*, p. 315; Stern, 'French Intellectuals', pp. 70–74.

<sup>69</sup> Gor'kii to Rolland, 1–2 August 1933, in *M. Gor'kii i R. Rollan*, p. 273. See also Rolland to Gor'kii, 21 July 1932 and 20 July 1933, pp. 224–27, 270 and passim.

<sup>70</sup> 'Beseda t. Stalina s Romen Rollanom', 28 June 1935', RGASPI f. 558, op. 11, ed. khr. 775, l. 3.

<sup>71</sup> Duchatelet, *Romain Rolland*, pp. 317–25, 277, 252; Fisher, pp. 245–50.

<sup>72</sup> 'Pis'mo romen Rollana tovarishchu Stalinu. 20.VII.1935', RGALI f. 631, op. 11, d. 283, l. 13. See a similar declaration in Rolland to Kerzhentsev, 4 April 1936, RGALI f. 631, op. 14, ed. khr. 729, l. 19.

<sup>73</sup> Apletin to Kudasheva, 14 May 1934, RGALI f. 631, op. 14, d. 741, l. 44–45; Kudasheva to Apletin, 2 May 1937, l. 42–43. Rolland also used VOKS and Gor'kii's secretary to maintain Soviet contacts, but according to Kudasheva, Apletin was far more reliable (l. 73).

<sup>74</sup> Kudasheva to Apletin, 12 June 1937, RGALI f. 631, op. 14, d. 741, l. 54–55; Kudasheva to Apletin, 4 September 1937, l. 70–71.

<sup>75</sup> Kudasheva to Apletin, 8 September 1937, RGALI f. 631, op. 14, d. 741, l. 72–73; Kudasheva to Apletin, 4 June 1937, RGALI f. 631, op. 14, d. 741, l. 49–50.

<sup>76</sup> Kudasheva to Apletin, 22 July 1936, RGALI f. 631, op. 14, d. 741, d. 729, l. 127.

<sup>77</sup> 'Vypiska iz pis'ma zheny Romen Rollana ot 30/XII-35 goda', GARF f. 5283, op. 1a, d. 324, l. 32. Italics in orig.

<sup>78</sup> Kudasheva to Apletin, 28 December 1936, RGALI f. 631, op. 14, d. 741, l. 201; Romain Rolland, 'Au cercle littéraire R. Rolland, Section Artistique, Moscou', RGALI f.

631, op. 14, d. 741, l. 102.

<sup>79</sup> ‘Romen Rollan ob Andre Zhide. Otvetnoe pis'mo inostrannym rabochim Magnitogorska', RGALI f. 631, op. 14, ed. khr. 718, l. 33; ‘Pis'mo Romen Rollana', Bakinskii Rabochii, 21 June 1936, l. 5. On Rolland's condemnation of Gide in L'Humanité on 18 January 1937, see Harris, p. 156; Duchatelet, pp. 330–31.

<sup>80</sup> ‘Zasedanie Ino. Komissii SSP SSSR 29-go maia 1936 g'., RGALI f. 631, op. 14, ed. khr. 5, ll. 2–34, here 23–24.

<sup>81</sup> F. J. Harris, *André Gide and Romain Rolland: Two Men Divided* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1973), p. 68.

<sup>82</sup> Jeffrey Brooks, *Thank You, Comrade Stalin! Soviet Public Culture from Revolution to Cold War* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), p. 149.

<sup>83</sup> ‘Zasedanie ino. komissii SSP SSSR 29-go maia 1936 g'., RGALI f. 631, op. 14, ed. khr. 5, l. 19.

<sup>84</sup> Romain Rolland to Galia and Natasha Isaeva, 26 September 1937, RGALI f. 631, op. 14, d. 74, l. 98–99.

<sup>85</sup> Kudasheva to Apletin, 27 November 1937 and 29 December 1937, RGALI f. 631, op. 14, d. 74, l. 97, l. 104.

<sup>86</sup> ‘70 let Romen Rollanu. Torzhestvennyi vecher v bol'shom zale konservatorii', *Komsomol'skaia Pravda*, 30 January 1936, in RGALI f. 631, op. 14, ed. khr. 735, l. 17.

<sup>87</sup> ‘Mikhail Alptein. Sekretar' MPRPa. Predsedateliu Ino. Komissii SSP SSSR tov. Kol'tsovu, M. E. 8.XII.1935', RGALI f. 631, op. 11, d. 283, l. 76; see also l. 75; ‘V Bol'shoi zale konservatorii', program of 29 January 1936, l. 63; for dozens of congratulatory letters sent to Rolland, ll. 52, 55–62; on the album, RGALI f. 631, op. 14, ed. khr. 729, l. 55–56.

<sup>88</sup> ‘Stat'i sovetskoi pechati o prazdnovanii 70-letii so dnia rozhdeniia R. Rollana', RGALI f. 631, op. 14, ed. khr. 735.

<sup>89</sup> Quotation Fisher, p. 257, see also p. 256; Duchatelet, p. 324.

<sup>90</sup> Gor'kii to Stalin, 29 August 1935 and 8 December 1935, RGASPI f. 558, op. 11, ed. khr. 720, l. 80; Romain Rolland to Stalin, 1 October 1935, RGASPI f. 558, op. 11, ed. khr. 775, l. 120.

<sup>91</sup> RGALI f. 631, op. 14, d. 74, l. 91; on 1917, Coeuré, p. 26.

<sup>92</sup> Romain Rolland to Stavskii, 20 September 1937, RGALI f. 631, op. 14, d. 74, l. 74; Apletin to Kudasheva, 7 October 1938, RGALI f. 631, op. 14, d. 754, l. 43; Apletin to Rolland, 9 June 1940, RGALI f. 631, op. 11, d. 283, ll. 11–12. See also Stern, ‘French Intellectuals', pp. 425–26.

<sup>93</sup> Romain Rolland to Stalin, 1 October 1935, RGASPI f. 558, op. 11, ed. khr. 775, l. 120, 121–22; Rolland to Stalin, 27 December 1935, l. 125–30; Rolland to Stalin, 18 March 1937, ‘l. 140–41; Rolland to Stalin, 29 December 1937, l. 154–55; unaddressed letter by Rolland about Arosev's wife, whom he did not know but whose mother had contacted him, 26 January 1939, l. 162–63. See also the positive report on Rolland's relations with the USSR distributed by the head of the central Committee's Kul'tprop, Angarov, to Stalin, Kaganovich, and Andreev. RGASPI f. 558, op. 11, ed. khr. 775, l. 123.

<sup>94</sup> Rolland to Jean-Richard Bloch, 3 March 1938, Bibliothèque Nationale, Fonds Jean-Richard Bloch, cited along with other correspondence in Stern, 'French Intellectuals', pp. 87–88.

<sup>95</sup> Apletin to Kudasheva, 1 August 1938, RGALI f. 631, op. 14, d. 754, l. 40; Kudasheva to Apletin, 26 October 1938, l. 43.

<sup>96</sup> On Rolland from 1938 until his death, see esp. Duchatelet, pp. 340–92.



# BLUEPRINT FOR A CULTURAL REVOLUTION: HERMANN HENSELMANN AND THE ARCHITECTURE OF GERMAN SOCIALIST REALISM

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*Socialist realism, introduced to the East German architectural establishment as their nation's new design culture in 1950, brought with it much more than just the USSR's Stalin-era aesthetic. It presented new models of cultural authority, expectations of architects as socialist role models, and innovative systems of reward and discipline — all of these managed by a centralized design bureaucracy linked to party and state through a complex web of cross-membership. This article examines the Pauline conversion of a former German modernist, the architect Hermann Henselmann, and the rite of passage that yielded a loyal member of the intelligentsia and a poster child for Stalinist human reform. Henselmann's role in a campaign to bring Socialist Realism to West Germany is also considered, along with the results of this cultural initiative.*

The closing act of a cultural revolution that changed the course of architecture in East Germany was staged at Berlin's State Opera House on 8 December 1951.<sup>1</sup> Before a painted backdrop depicting Schinkel's neoclassical Schauspielhaus, and with performances of works by Mozart, Bach, and Beethoven serving as background music, the founding members of the new Deutsche Bauakademie (DBA) were ceremonially inducted. In the audience were East German architects, engineers, party leaders, and worker activists decorated as 'Heroes of Labour'; design delegates from the USSR, Poland, and Czechoslovakia, and representatives of the Soviet Control Commission. The celebration was retroactive, in view of the fact that the DBA had been organized the previous January at the behest of the Central Committee of the Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands (SED).<sup>2</sup> At the DBA's opera house debut, membership was formally conferred upon leaders of the organization's three leading design collectives, including Hermann Henselmann, director of the DBA's Meisterwerkstatt I, honoured for his design of Hochhaus Weberwiese, a diminutive 'highrise' apartment celebrated as East Germany's first

native work of socialist realist architecture. It was a career triumph for an architect who, just months earlier, had been denounced as ideologically suspect in the SED newspaper *Neues Deutschland*.

The inauguration's keynote address was given by no less of an authority on cultural politics than Walter Ulbricht, the General Secretary of the SED Central Committee. A German communist party organizer who had found refuge in Moscow from 1938 through April 1945, when he returned to Berlin, Ulbricht was preparing his nation for the 'accelerated construction of socialism' in accordance with Stalin's model of linked cultural and industrial revolutions. It was no coincidence, he asserted, that the Bauakademie and East Germany's first Five-Year Plan had been unveiled in the same year. Both countered developments farther west and demanded simultaneous advances in cultural and economic progress:

In contrast to the monotonous, uncultured buildings of West Germany, our buildings should simultaneously aspire to higher aesthetics [. . .] and economical construction. The Deutsche Bauakademie has the noble task of retrieving the honour of architecture as an art, and developing German architecture as a German art of building. In the wake of the functionalism and the formalism of the so-called Bauhaus style, which — particularly in West Germany, as introduced by the Americans — have led architecture to a dead end, it is necessary to base the new German architecture upon Germany's classical legacy and the progressive architectures of all nations, above all, Soviet architecture.<sup>3</sup>

Ulbricht's address disclosed the terms and contradictions of East German socialist realism. To reject the Bauhaus design heritage of the Weimar Republic and instead emulate Soviet design precedents would nurture German identity, yielding a regional cultural renaissance. German socialist architecture also would take its cues from the neoclassicism of the Prussian empire, since the 'Bauhaus style' was a capitalist — hence American — influence. Socialist realism's new German masters embraced these paradoxes to attain their accolades as heroes of postwar architecture: all had been committed modernists just a year earlier.

The arrival of socialist realism in East Germany, a twentieth-century socialist cultural revolution based on neoclassical aesthetics and advanced by a bureaucratic avant-garde, defies the interpretive orthodoxies of art and architectural history. It also resists explanation through reductive narratives focusing on the victims and victimizers of a dictatorship. Germany's Stalin-era cultural revolution, more than its counterparts in other People's Republics, demands accounting in terms of architects' choices and motives. In contrast to other postwar Eastern European nations, in which 'architects felt themselves drawn into a compulsive sequence of events [in which] [. . .] they had little scope for independent action,' as described by Anders Åman, East Berlin's architectural establishment germinated in the only Soviet Bloc capital with an open border to the West.<sup>4</sup> With the alternative of a modernist design architectural practice available just across town, East Berlin's DBA leaders decided, quite literally, not to walk out on Stalin-era socialist realism.

'More than simply a superpower face-off having broad political repercussions,'

according to anthropologist Katherine Verdery, ‘the cold war was also a form of knowledge and a cognitive organization of the world.’<sup>5</sup> A critical distinction separating modes of cultural production across the cold war divide involves the notion of an avant-garde and its entitlements. The emergence of European aesthetic modernity canonized artists as social visionaries. Alienation and autonomy were both the curse and privilege of a vanguard maligned for its provocations, but anointed for its reinvention of art to express fresh perspectives on the collective project of modernization. State socialism eventually claimed to have made this service to society obsolete. As the ‘vanguard of the proletariat’, the Communist Party constituted a political avant-garde ordained with the task of divining the path from one historical epoch to the next. Under Stalin, party leadership consolidated its franchise on visionary authority, annulling any claim upon creative autonomy among the design intelligentsia. Writers, artists and architects recognized by the party for helping to realize its prophetic master narrative were rewarded for their efforts.<sup>6</sup> A social contract, dubbed the ‘big deal’ by Soviet cultural historian Vera Dunham,<sup>7</sup> provided privileged status and consumption in return for ‘party-mindedness.’ The perks that constituted state socialism’s incentive system for the intelligentsia burgeoned during the postwar era, as Vera Tolz has documented.<sup>8</sup>

The SED’s import of socialist realism into East Germany transmitted much more than an aesthetic. It brought new models of cultural authority, specific expectations of architects as socialist role models, and systems of discipline and reward — all of these managed by a centralized design bureaucracy linked to the party and government ministries through a complex web of cross-membership. Even with these bargaining advantages, however, the SED remained plagued by resistance to its cultural reprogramming efforts. An eighteen-month-long battle of wills had preceded the DBA’s consecration. The struggle was triggered by the ‘Sechzehn Grundsätze der Städtebau’ (‘Sixteen Principles of City Planning’), a typescript presented on 28 April 1950 to East German delegates in Moscow by their Russian hosts. The document summarized Soviet architectural and urban planning practices, and was intended for emulation. Months later, it became law through national reconstruction legislation. Paragraph 12 of the ‘Aufbaugesetz’, which called for the founding of a ‘German architecture academy’, had engendered the DBA, an organization charged militant advocacy with the socialist realism.<sup>9</sup>

Germany’s Soviet Military Administration (SMAD) had provided ample foreshadowing for the campaign to transplant Soviet culture to East Germany. Fulmination against aesthetic deviance steeped in ‘American cultural barbarism’ became a staple of East Berlin’s media after September 1947, when Aleksandr Dymshits, the SMAD head of cultural affairs, publicly protested western contamination of German arts and letters.<sup>10</sup> His charges were repeated with increasing shrillness both by SMAD officers and East German authorities.<sup>11</sup> A war

on modernist abstraction was launched in January 1951 by Vladimir Semenov, political advisor to the SMAD commander-in-chief. In the SMAD-affiliated newspaper *Tägliche Rundschau*, writing under the pseudonym N. Orlov, Semenov published a two-part broadside entitled ‘Wege und Irrwege der modernen Kunst’<sup>12</sup> (‘Methods and Mistakes of Modern Art’). Critiques heard for years in the context of literature, socialist realism’s founding genre, were elaborated in a critical onslaught directed at those German artists who looked westward for inspiration. A drubbing was also in store for architects. ‘It can hardly be disputed that a drastic change is required in German architecture’, Semenov railed. ‘Here the long-standing reign of the fatuous formalist movement has led to the prevalence of a gray, arid, cheerless, monotonous, dishonest architecture, which has disfigured German cities with expressionless and oppressive housing-containers’.<sup>13</sup> In a trope that would be exercised repeatedly by DBA administrators, Semenov portrayed modernist mass housing as the progeny of nineteenth-century workers’ barracks, rather than the product of a twentieth-century movement to reform them.

A focused assault on East German architectural practice followed Semenov’s broadside. ‘Im Kampf um eine neue deutsche Architektur’ (‘In the Battle for a New German Architecture’), a *Neues Deutschland* article by Kurt Liebkecht, president of the DBA (and nephew of German communist martyr Karl Liebkecht) refuted modernism’s applicability to socialist reconstruction. Liebkecht’s position was rebutted one month later in a rejoinder by Ludwig Renn, a novelist who had immigrated to East Germany from the West. Renn took issue with Liebkecht’s ‘brusque rejection of the Bauhaus style’ and found his ardour for ‘frostyclassicism’ bewildering. Liebkecht’s ‘self-righteous tone’ and ‘authoritarian finality’, in Renn’s opinion, had done little to advance an important debate.<sup>14</sup> A *Neues Deutschland* editorial on the same page dissected Renn’s essay and found a multitude of ideological errors. As proof of how far astray he had gone on the issue of formalism, the editors cited parallels with a critique of Liebkecht published in the West German daily *Neue Zeitung*, which they ascribed to ‘the Trotskyite agent Ernest Salter’ — an attribution as sensational as it was absurd, given that the newspaper in question was affiliated with the US Military Occupation Government. According to *Neues Deutschland*, Renn had fallen prey to ‘a sleight of hand by the American propagandists of cosmopolitanism’.<sup>15</sup>

Renn, it could be said in turn, had fallen prey to a slight of hand by editors of the SED’s news organ. The simultaneous publication and demolition of his polemic had been scheduled to coincide with the fifth congress of the SED central committee, which opened the next day, on 15 March. Before closing, the congress issued a resolution reproduced in major East German newspapers under the banner: ‘Der Kampf gegen den Formalismus in Kunst und Literatur, für eine fortschrittliche deutsche Kultur’ (‘The battle against formalism in art and literature, for a progressive German culture’). Conditions throughout the visual arts were said to be dire:

In architecture, which confronts great tasks in the context of the Five-Year Plan, what hinders us the most is the so-called 'Bauhaus-style' and the underlying constructivist, functionalist philosophy of many architects [. . .] The point of departure for the majority of architects is abstraction and the mere technical side of building, neglecting the artistic form of the built object and spurning connections to past exemplars. The interior design of apartments, administrative buildings, workers' clubs, cinemas and theaters reveals the same situation. And that is also the case in the design of mass-produced furniture and household utensils.

The SED's assessment, the most pessimistic to date, was accompanied by specific prescriptions for 'raising the artist's consciousness'. Direct contact between artists and activist workers would end the intelligentsia's isolation. Self-criticism among artists was to be reported in language accessible to working class readers.<sup>16</sup>

Over the course of 1951, East German dailies carried reports of galloping advances in architecture's 'anti-formalism' campaign. Just eight months after the SED congress issued its resolution, a *Neues Deutschland* headline proclaimed: 'Formalismus in der Baukunst endgültig überwunden' ('Formalism in architecture finally overcome').<sup>17</sup> It was an epistemological upheaval of the first order. Architects reoriented themselves within an unfamiliar aesthetic and ideological landscape. They learned to repudiate cultural false consciousness, discern modernism's subversion of social progress, and embrace the progressive aspects of Prussian neoclassicism. Forging consensus for this worldview was an equally arduous collective task. Success stories portrayed architects blazing trails leading 'from the Bauhaus to the Stalinallee', to cite the title of a biography of Richard Paulick, who repudiated his modernist schooling to become the head of DBA Meisterwerkstatt III.<sup>18</sup> How this cultural revolution was made possible can be mapped through case studies of architects who voluntarily shed their former architectural convictions to become the militant force behind a socialist realist avant garde.

### *A rite of passage*

The best publicized example of an architect's successful rehabilitation from modernist proclivities was that of Hermann Henselmann.<sup>19</sup> His was no easy victory. From a socialist realist point of view, Henselmann's climb to the apex of the East German design community had begun inauspiciously. In 1946, as director of Weimar's Hochschule für Bildende Kunst, he had wanted to transform the school into a postwar Bauhaus — a fact purged from his official biography for a decade.<sup>20</sup> A few years later, during his tenure at East Berlin's Institut für Bauwesen (IfB), a state-sponsored architectural planning and research organization, he had appropriated party doctrine in an attempt to legitimize modernist design practices. But in 1951 Henselmann experienced a change of heart. It came through a rite of passage in

which, just as in a socialist realist novel, character development echoed the Marxist stages of historical progress. Discarding bourgeois notions of creative autonomy, Henselmann forged a new socialist persona and rose to the top of East Berlin's architectural establishment, where his perseverance was well rewarded.

Ideological arrogation of the concept of 'realism' was the basic tactic of resistance to Soviet design theory. Henselmann exercised this stratagem in his opening address in 1946 as the new director of Weimar's Hochschule. Commenting on the 'large number of artists who are waiting for a diktat [. . .] from the Soviet administration', Henselmann declared:

Marxists know that art grows out of the social situation of an entire age. It would be un-Marxist to try and force a particular kind of art upon people by means of devices and diktats. Realism is an attitude, not a style.<sup>21</sup>

When bureaucrats from the East German Ministry of Construction returned from Moscow in the summer of 1950 bearing the 'Sixteen Principles of City Planning', Henselmann (who had been slated to participate in the Moscow trip, but was dropped from the roster at the last moment) found much to criticize in the document. Its theoretical prescriptions were 'insufficiently modified from the Stalinist proposition that culture must be socialist in its content and national in its form'. The document's 'defective' German translation was 'schematic and mechanical', he maintained, containing Russian transliterations that were 'unnecessary and not colloquial'. Its specifics were 'altogether too dictatorial' — sometimes literally, as in praise for avenues used as an urban 'axis', a design term which, Henselmann protested, 'was in a very embarrassing sense made colloquial by Hitler'.<sup>22</sup> Henselmann and his IfB supervisor Hans Scharoun took it upon themselves to amend the 'Sixteen Principles' to make them more amenable to modernism, and circulated their revisions among colleagues with a request for feedback.<sup>23</sup> Henselmann's draft employed a definition of 'realism' used by the Marxist philosopher and literary critic György Lukács — who would soon renounce it, join Hungary's Stalinist cultural revolution, and denounce the Bauhaus as quintessential bourgeois decadence.<sup>24</sup> Scharoun's 'Sixteen Points' stripped the original document of its prescriptive character, transforming it into a series of open-ended, poetic maxims.<sup>25</sup> These revisionist exercises attempted to stem the impending Sovietization of East German architecture: a high stakes game that meddled with wisdom received from the hearth of state socialism.

In 'Formalismus und Realismus', a two-part article published in August and September 1950, Henselmann again arrogated to himself the cultural revolution's postulates. Departing from Soviet precedent, he defined 'formalism' without reference to style, but rather as the fetishizing of superficial form: a condition which he claimed was intrinsic to capitalism. Seeming to join the new wave of veneration for Prussia's neoclassical heritage, he lionized Schinkel for conveying in architecture the French Revolution's ethos. But, departing radically from the

emerging German socialist realist canon, Henselmann went on to diagnose Schinkel as a cultural schizophrenic. This was said to be evident in the Prussian neoclassicist's lapses of 'dreaming backwards' into a gothic revival style. This affliction was said to demonstrate the 'tragedy' of a 'progressive' architect attempting to satisfy bourgeois patrons.<sup>26</sup> The importance of this trope was revealed in the essay's second instalment, which tackled the problem of Weimar modernism. Its architects, Henselmann asserted, 'came out against the prevalent commodification of architecture', thus constituting 'a progressive tendency within the conditions of capitalist society'. Even postwar modernism retained vestigial evidence of this 'character of "rebellion"'. But formalism ultimately had won out in the west, Henselmann conceded, despite modernist alienation from capitalism's 'disordered conditions.' 'The boldest designs never were built. As the likelihood of their being realized receded, projects became increasingly utopian'.<sup>27</sup> As with Schinkel, the tragedy of the modernist architect lay in the distortion of progressive design under a repressive social order. This line of reasoning was familiar to socialist realist ideologues, who employed it to celebrate Prussian neoclassicism while denigrating its social and political context. Henselmann's appropriation of the argument was deeply heretical, proposing that 'formalism' could be eradicated by transplanting modernism into the healthy context of socialist patronage.

Tolerance for Henselmann's nonconformism evaporated in the fall of 1950. That October, an alarming report was delivered to Construction Minister Lothar Bolz by Heinrich Rau, an SED Politburo member. While visiting collective farms in the district of Neurippin, Rau had interviewed agricultural workers for their views on Henselmann's proposal for an agrarian cultural facility. According to Rau, they thought the design so 'insane' that it revealed deliberate sabotage.<sup>28</sup> Whether this allegation was spontaneous or stage-managed is certainly subject to question. But as far as the party was concerned, proletarian distress was a sign that Henselmann was dramatically out of synch with the new social order. The architect was targeted in an article by Liebknecht launching 'The Battle for a New German Architecture'. 'His work does not correspond with our reality', Liebknecht complained. 'His designs aestheticize form and do not express the idea of our social order'.<sup>29</sup> But Henselmann refused to budge. For a lecture series organized around the socialist realist theme 'Studies in National Tradition', he presented a talk in April 1951 on the Bauhaus. In the discussion that followed, Bolz rejected Henselmann's thesis that 'Bauhaus architects had been subjectively progressive, but objectively reactionary'. 'Enough has been spoken about the positive side of the Bauhaus', Bolz insisted. 'The negative side should at last be pointed out'. Three other audience members — Mart Stam, who had taught at the Bauhaus, and Edmund Colleijn and Selman Selmanagiç, who had studied there — ventured to redirect the discussion from its purely negative focus. They were cut down by Liebknecht, who quoted Zhdanov to support his views. The most distressing problem for many designers in attendance was voiced by Hans Hopp, the leader of DBA

Meisterwerkstatt II, who interjected that ‘accusations made against the Bauhaus then must be made against all architects [who are products] of this time’.<sup>30</sup> By this criterion, nearly every member of the East German architectural bureaucracy was ideologically compromised.

Despite the danger signals, Henselmann defended his views. He insisted in a letter critical of Liebknecht’s DBA management:

The ‘formalism–realism’ discussion must be continued so that a clear relationship to aesthetics can be determined. The question of formalism within different social constructions, its specific qualities in the era of imperialism, the question of epigonism and the critical assimilation of our national heritage (namely how this critical assimilation should be effected) have been touched upon, but not clarified.

The discussion is stuck at a halfway point.<sup>31</sup>

Henselmann was mistaken. At the SED congress in March, the party had promulgated clear definitions of these terms and published them in national newspapers, along with negative examples of formalism and positive examples of realism culled from Soviet sources. True, a socialist realist architecture based on German national tradition had yet to be created. That was the task assigned to Henselmann and his DBA colleagues.

Resistance to Soviet architectural ideology on the part of most East German designers collapsed during the summer of 1951. Party officials and city administrators used the design of a housing complex on the Weberwiese site, beside an East Berlin boulevard renamed the Stalinallee, as an opportunity to bring DBA architects into line. At a meeting of SED leaders and DBA design chiefs on 25 July, party representatives condemned the latest Weberwiese proposals as ‘formalist.’ The three DBA Meisterwerkstätte, led by Henselmann, Hopp, and Paulick, were asked to come up with new designs in eight days: a gruelling production deadline that was only the beginning of Henselmann’s particular ordeal. A week later, Rudolf Herrnstadt, the editor of *Neues Deutschland*, published an account of the architectural stalemate in a full page article, ‘Über den Baustil, den politischen Stil und den Genossen Henselmann’ (‘On building style, political style, and comrade Henselmann’). According to Herrnstadt, DBA architects were still offering housing conforming to a design approach promoted by capitalist profiteers to exploit workers, and by American imperialists to liquidate German cultural identity. Functionalism was passé, according to Herrnstadt. Socialist architecture had to incorporate the nation’s neoclassical heritage — illustrated by a photo of a Junker country estate of the sort that had been demolished by the score to provide recycled building materials for the SED’s agrarian resettlement program a few years earlier.<sup>32</sup> There was no middle ground in the war between formalism and humanism, according to Herrnstadt. It was an ‘either–or’ condition. ‘One can only be for one or the other: for man as minion or as master of creation, for war or for peace, for Washington or — for Berlin!’<sup>33</sup> The verdict against Henselmann was



based on this binary logic. ‘He converses emphatically and with erudition’, Herrstadt wrote, ‘and as a rule is only unclear when it comes to a detail: if he is for or against.’ While meeting with SED leaders about the Weberwiese project and ‘talking about this and that’, Henselmann had observed that East Berlin’s new neoclassical Soviet embassy had received ‘mixed reviews in architectural circles, as everyone knows’. When asked his own opinion of the building, the architect had changed the subject. ‘So’, Herrstadt adjudicated, ‘did Henselmann do harm after all? Of course’.

He perpetrated an offence against the political style we demand of our comrades. If you consider the Soviet embassy or whatever other building bad — say it. [. . . ] It shows neither insight nor modesty, however, when one defends indefensible ‘work’; pointlessly talks away months and years about the same thing; occupies the attention and energies of others and thus obstructs further development. What does an artist, who has become disengaged, but is in truth progressive, do? He retreats, in the stillness says of his critics: I’ll show these people a thing or two, works with all his strength (political and professional), makes the connection, and finally emerges with work of such beauty and power that it knocks the wind out of yesterday’s critics.<sup>34</sup>

Henselmann could no longer complain that ‘the discussion is stuck at a halfway point’. Herrstadt named two options — friend or foe — and issued instructions for joining the former camp. In despair, Henselmann visited Berthold Brecht to say goodbye before leaving for West Germany. Brecht empathized. The Central Committee had denounced as formalist his most recent opera, ‘The Interrogation of Lukullus’, even censoring its title (subsequently changed to ‘The Sentencing of Lukullus’). Despite such travails, Brecht insisted that art had no future under capitalism. His defence of state socialism lasted until 4 AM, and in the end<sup>35</sup> convinced Henselmann to stay.

On 3 August, Herrstadt published ‘Unsere Architekten antworten’ (‘Our architects answer’), a sequel to the earlier denunciation. He reported that, rather than the eight days allotted to come up with revised designs for the Weberwiese site, Henselmann, Paulick, and Hopp had produced results in only five. The new designs were ‘usable — meaning beautiful, humanistic, and a departure from functionalism’. Herrstadt expressed special enthusiasm for Henselmann’s project. ‘The architectural details [. . .] show the architect’s efforts to assimilate the building elements of the Berlin tradition (Schinkel) into a grand conception which expresses the standards of people today’ (see Figure 1). This achievement was to be understood ‘as Henselmann’s answer, his contribution on the theme of criticism and self-criticism’. City council members unanimously supported Henselmann’s project, and Herrstadt congratulated the architect for advancing SED goals.<sup>36</sup>

Henselmann’s fall and rise was a perfect Stalin-era morality fable. But one thing about this story literally did not add up: its chronology. Henselmann had made his gaffe about the Soviet embassy at a meeting on 25 July, at which party

representatives demanded new Weberwiese plans in eight days. DBA studios responded successfully in five. The next day Herrstadt commemorated this triumph not with praise, but with a withering exposé ‘On building style, political style, and comrade Henselmann’. The denunciation, in other words, was published the day after its subject made amends; or put differently, Henselmann learned his lesson from the editor’s criticism before it appeared in print. With a suitable design for the Weberwiese already on the drawing board, the newspaper could have pulled its editor’s humiliating article. But a temporary sacrifice of Henselmann’s reputation was part of a plot, in the literary sense.

The cultural correlate of proletarian triumph, according to Stalin-era ideology, was socialist realism. It might arrive with the stuttering false starts that had infuriated the SED leadership, or the *ex nihilo* flash achieved by DBA architects, but arrive it would, producing its own major talents. The moment Henselmann decided to become one of them, he volunteered himself as an exemplar of a culturally-specific narrative of human progress. Its plot line was well established in Soviet literature, the original and paradigmatic socialist realist genre, which transposed Marxism’s stages of historical progress on to a protagonist’s life history in a master plot common to all narrative forms, including journalism.<sup>37</sup> Like Henselmann, the ‘positive hero’ of the typical postwar Soviet Bildungsroman was a leader and an organization man around forty years old, whose life story pivoted on the acquisition of self-mastery and full political consciousness, according to literary historian Katerina Clark.<sup>38</sup> The catalyst for his transmutation was ‘a relatively experienced and politically advanced character [who] helps one less advanced to “progress” by some combination of personal example and persuasion’.<sup>39</sup> This rite of passage symbolically resolved ‘the conflicts and contradictions of society’.<sup>40</sup> Henselmann’s epiphany transformed a recidivist ‘formalist’ into the creator of Germany’s first native work of socialist realist architecture. It was a novel situation, in both senses of the term, and was interpreted accordingly.

Henselmann offered his penitence for past cultural offences in textual and architectural forms. ‘Der reaktionäre Charakter des Konstruktivismus’ (‘The Reactionary Character of Constructivism’), a repudiation of his allegiance to Bauhaus modernism, appeared in *Neues Deutschland* on 4 December 1951, four days before the DBA induction ceremony. The tract’s title, which approached the Russian avant-garde as the paradigm for all modernist



Figure 1. A model worker-activist looms over Henselmann's Weberwiese Tower in a 1952 poster promoting the 'National Building Program for Germany's Capital', and its goal of making Berlin 'more beautiful than ever'.

movements, framed the architect's Socialist Realist conversion with standardized

tropes of Soviet discourse.<sup>41</sup> Henselmann's Weberwiese block, the architectural artifact of his conversion, starred in propaganda for the East German National Reconstruction Program which conflated the capital's transformation with that of its citizens, and was honoured as the progenitor of the monumental architecture soon arrayed along the Stalinallee.<sup>42</sup> As the first of its kind, the Weberwiese tower was said to demonstrate the influence of Berlin's neoclassical tradition, specifically that of Schinkel's Feilner House of 1829. This claim does not stand up to even cursory cross-examination. The progenitor of the stubby nine-storey block is revealed in its unlikely name: Hochhaus Weberwiese ('Weberwiese Highrise'.) Rather than a critical appropriation of Schinkel, the building was a miniaturized copy of a Moscow skyscraper — and a diagrammatic one at that, featuring an ominous, cave-like entry and ceramic tile cladding embossed with what graphic designers call 'dingbats' (decorative doodles) rather than the semiotically dense ornament celebrated in Soviet and later East German exemplars. Henselmann's Weberwiese was a public relations fraud: a masterwork at the time one was required; but so ill-proportioned, poorly laid-out, expensive to build and banal in detailing that, in the terms of Stalin-era aesthetic criticism, its design would have otherwise been condemned as 'primitive and schematic.'

Henselmann refined his handling of socialist realism in subsequent work on nearby residential highrises flanking the Stalinallee: buildings that repudiated every architectural ideal he had espoused a few years before. Reconstruction, he had told a lecture audience in 1947, would yield local variants of 'the modern way of building, long the subject of study and experimentation throughout the world, while we here [in Nazi Germany] celebrated the resurrection of a new tradition of slavery with bunches of antique limestone columns'. Postwar Germans, he insisted, would have to 'say goodbye to the idea that a residential building must be an individually-designed work of art'. The rigid conformity of building alignment along the street edge would be dissolved by a dispersed urban pattern that eliminated the 'frivolousromantic' penchant for broad avenues.<sup>43</sup> In putting his stamp on the Weberwiese and its Stalinallee spawn, Henselmann deserted the precepts he had previously pursued with militant zeal.<sup>44</sup>

As a prominent confederate of the socialist realist avant-garde and a poster child for the conquest of formalism, Henselmann became an East German celebrity. A publicity photo taken in 1952 summarized his hard-earned successes as architect and parable (see Figure 2). Henselmann points toward the future in Lenin's iconic pose, flanked by two construction workers who direct their gaze accordingly, wearing optimistic smiles. The heroic trio builds a symbolic bridge between the proletariat and intelligentsia, and, in compositional terms, a visual connection between unfurled blueprints and a tower of scaffolding signaling their realization. The image can be dismissed as mere propaganda, or analysed as evidence for two interpretations of Henselmann's life story, neither mutually exclusive. One involves the epiphany of an architect who accepted party guidance, learned from

Soviet precedent, and was rehabilitated through self-criticism: the cultural revolution's recipe for social and ideological integration. The other is the notion of a Faustian bargain, a 'big deal,' as Vera Dunham calls it, through which the architect accepted the forced choice of modernism or socialist realism on the SED's terms, as the difference between 'man as minion or as master of creation'. In any case, by remodeling himself as an exemplary work of socialist realism, Henselmann emerged a victor of 'The Battle for a New German Architecture'.



Figure 2. Hermann Henselmann, centre, flanked by two construction workers in an East German publicity photo, c. 1952.

## *West German reaction*

East Germany's cultural revolution rendered visible the nation's incorporation into the East Bloc, a state-socialist alternative to the military and economic alliance of nations forged by the US Marshall Plan and NATO. Socialist realism was the aesthetic signifier of this 'other' postwar vision of transnationalism, appraised by historian György Péteri as modern history's 'largest deliberately designed experiment in globalization'.<sup>45</sup> For the briefest of historical moments, a family of imagined neo-traditional regionalisms, 'national in style' but Soviet in gestalt, rallied to resist the 'International-style' modernism used by the US in its own efforts at cultural diplomacy. Socialist–realist ideologues proclaimed the West's modernism part of a plot to 'disassociate the people from their native land, from their language and their culture, so that they adopt the "American lifestyle" and join in the slavery of the American imperialists'.<sup>46</sup> The assessment was alarmist, but not groundless. America's patronage of modernism, intended to undermine the European prejudice that the nation was a military and technological superpower ruled by parvenus, was reflected in commissions for sleek glass-and-steel consulates, America-Haus cultural centres, and US State Department overseas housing across West Germany. The 1952 Mutual Security Agency exhibition 'Wir bauen ein besseres Leben' ('We're building a better life') revealed modernism's grooming by the US State Department as a stylistic *lingua franca* of international consumer capitalism. By the end of the decade, US cultural programmes overseas were championing abstract expressionist painting and atonal music as artifacts of America's 'freedom of expression'.<sup>47</sup> In this dubious marriage of art and politics, modernist aesthetics — by common definition 'non-representational' — were said to represent core American values: a propaganda achievement so unlikely that it bordered on the sublime.

The socialist–realist cultural revolution was a dream come true for US propagandists and West German anticommunists. Evidence that the SED's 'construction of socialism' involved wholesale Sovietization was being handed over on a platter. The US-sponsored *Neue Zeitung* sent reporter Eduard Schönbeck over the border masquerading as a sympathetic labour volunteer. His dispatches ridiculed East Berlin's 'pioneering achievement in progressive domestic culture'. Infiltrating Henselmann's Weberwiese tower, Schönbeck wrote of 'barracks-like corridors', paint that flaked off walls at a touch, and families tired of putting their home on display at the state's behest. He called the Weberwiese a 'failed copy of a Soviet "skyscraper" in Moscow', and compared SED functionaries, who publicized the building's telephone system and garbage disposal chutes as 'new inventions', to naive Red Army peasants witnessing 'the miracle of "water out of walls"' upon their first encounter with indoor plumbing.<sup>48</sup> Other West German newspapers joined in the fray. A 1952 cartoon from *Der Kurier* depicted a billboard of Stalin gloating over the highrises that proliferated across the skyline, with a scurrying

East Berliner confessing that they reminded him of prison watchtowers. West German media suggested that the mandate to ‘learn from the Soviet Union’ had reduced East Berlin to a police state characterized by cultural and technological underdevelopment.

The Weberwiese was also targeted by the Marshall Plan’s Mutual Security Agency (MSA). A US press release distributed throughout Western Europe elaborated on Schönbeck’s charge that the tower housed only the socialist ‘new class’ that constituted the ‘true GDR model family’.<sup>49</sup> The MSA photo-essay ‘That’s How the Privileged Live’ showed a billboard outside the Weberwiese disclosing the names and occupations of residents (see Figure 3). This labeling of the building’s human contents was a ritual of Soviet provenance intended to prove an




Figure 3. Bystanders read a list of the residents in the Weberwiese housing block, in a photograph circulated by Marshall Plan publicists in West Germany under the title ‘That’s How the Privileged Live’. The accompanying press release stated that ‘new apartments in East Berlin are allotted by government control-led organizations’ (sic) and that ‘eastern party offices expect special success from the possibilities of having tenants constantly surveyed by people’s police and house foremen in the same building’. (Courtesy US National Archives at College Park MD, Still Pictures Division, RG286 Ger 2454).

equitable distribution of new housing across the entire social spectrum, from workers to bureaucrats.<sup>50</sup> MSA publicists offered a different reading. ‘Priority is given to top activists, top workers and functionaries and to the so-called “creative intelligentsia.” Here the lucky inhabitants of a new skyscraper apartment block are



listed on the outside to encourage ordinary citizens — still housed in ruins — to follow their example’.<sup>51</sup> Rather than symbolizing a proletariat delivered from the slums and ensconced in workers’ palaces, US propagandists depicted the Weberwiese as a monument to the redistribution of scarce resources to the socialist state’s favoured servants: a rhetorical gambit intended to underscore the egalitarian emphasis of West German social housing policy. Architecture journals in the Bundesrepublik published firsthand accounts of how the new East German patterns of state patronage were impoverishing design professionals. An anonymous article in *Neue Bauwelt* by an East Germany émigré reported that private-sector construction had all but evaporated, and that socialist state regulations had reduced architects’ fees to just over half of what was customary in West Germany, making a living wage the prerogative of employees in state design collectives.<sup>52</sup> The imposition of a ‘foreign doctrine’ in East German architecture, more than just a matter of style, had ravaged the economic basis of the architectural profession, and led to a ‘flight of qualified labor’ serious enough to prompt the SED to devise policies to combat it.<sup>53</sup>

The Weberwiese tower was also vulnerable to criticism on functional and economic grounds. *Neue Bauwelt* reproduced the building’s floorplan, pointing out ‘captive’ bedrooms accessed only by passing through another bedroom, awkward window locations determined by facade-driven planning, and vast amounts of space wasted on circulation. ‘If this highbrow-representational housing isn’t “formalist”,’ the editor needed, ‘then perhaps Herr Doktor Liebknecht would be kind enough to tell us why.’<sup>54</sup> Indeed, socialist realist rhetoric proved so alienating to West German architects that statements by party authorities, reproduced verbatim, could be used as counter-propaganda.<sup>55</sup> *Baukunst und Werkform* published an address by Ulbricht on architecture in its entirety, suggesting sarcastically that someone must have slipped a Third Reich script into the party secretary’s hands as he was ascending the podium: ‘devilish sabotage’ was the only plausible explanation for the resemblance to ‘a speech by the leader of the [Nazi] Kampfbund’.<sup>56</sup> *Neue Bauwelt* editorialized:

As for the architecture [of the Weberwiese], we’d rather not get into a protracted discussion here: we experienced the Third Reich. That something like this again is possible is horrifying. We know just where the spirit of this architecture leads; the memories remain locked in our bones.<sup>57</sup>

Parallels drawn between German Nazi- and Stalin-era architecture seized upon their analogous rejection of the Bauhaus legacy, advocacy of the classical tradition as an antidote to ‘rootless cosmopolitanism’, and creation of a party-managed cultural bureaucracy regulating the design profession. West German architecture’s version of totalitarian theory was the countermyth to the East German linkage of postwar capitalist and earlier imperialist building cultures. Both analogies were reductivist and self-serving. The facile association of totalitarianism with

traditionalism in design misrepresented Nazi architecture, which had emphasized neoclassicism, but also celebrated modernist industrial design in pictorial volumes like *Das Bauen im Neuen Reich* as an expression of technological prowess.<sup>58</sup> The totalitarian paradigm, when applied to design, obscured memories of the Third Reich's 'reactionary modernism', and preserved postwar West German architecture as the preserve of the modern industrial design (and designers) previously employed in building the infrastructure of Hitler's military-industrial complex.<sup>59</sup>

### *Waging the battle in the West*

As its title suggested, the 'Battle for a new German architecture' was to be waged not just in the East, but throughout divided Germany as the culture of unification. 'The Tragedy of West German Architecture', as proclaimed in the title of an exposé by the editor of the DBA journal *Deutsche Architektur*, was 'a matter of importance for all Germany'. The formalism of 'ugly, artistically worthless slabs built in the American "global style" [*Weltstil*]' was said to be part of a plot to 'cripple and destroy the national consciousness of the West German people'. Phase one had entailed aerial bombardment of historic German towns. Phase two was visual bombardment by 'ostentatious concrete highrises' that, according to party secretary Ulbricht, were 'nothing less than a repetition of the medieval fortress tower in American form'. That many of these high-rise bastions were bank headquarters was said to prove the collusion of modernism, monopoly capitalism and US imperialism. The comparative similarity of new bank headquarters in West Berlin and New York's UN building was cited as ominous evidence of the new 'American "colonial architecture"' and its global ambitions.<sup>60</sup>

Since German cultural and national unification were said to be synonymous, the DBA's mission for East German architects was not only to repulse 'the spread of cultural barbarism' from America, but also to propagate Socialist Realism westward.<sup>61</sup> Topping the agenda at the initial meeting of the executive committee of East Germany's National Construction Campaign in 1951 was 'promotion [of the Stalinallee] among the population of West Berlin and West Germany, especially specialist colleagues, in collaboration with [. . .] Professor Henselmann'.<sup>62</sup> East Germany's preeminent defector from the modernist camp was to assume a leading role in opening a western front for the 'Battle for a new German Architecture'.

At the urging of leaders from the DBA and the Ministry of Urban Planning, a pan-German symposium on reconstruction was proposed for August 1952 in Dresden to showcase the Stalinallee and pitch Socialist Realism to western sympathizers. Its sponsors estimated that an 'All-German Architectural Circle' would attract 450 West German participants. In the end, only eighteen visitors from the Bundesrepublik attended.<sup>63</sup> Henselmann's keynote speech attempted to convey the new socialist realist design vocabulary to this target audience. Terms like

‘architecture’ and ‘beauty’ had to be carefully defined, he maintained, since their meaning now differed in East and West Germany. ‘Architecture’, as defined in *The Great Soviet Encyclopedia*, expressed the progress made by a nation and its people toward higher stages of being. ‘Beauty’ was aesthetic excellence characterized by ‘forward-looking, consciousness-developing strength’. On authority of Zhdanov, Malenkov, Gor’kii, and Stalin, Henselmann defined socialist realism as the ‘mastery of seeing’ permitting ‘faithful artistic representation of reality in its [process of] revolutionary development’. This creative method’s most successful examples, from theoretical works to new cities and monuments, were available for examination in the USSR.<sup>64</sup> If West German designers found Henselmann’s talk a journey through foreign territory, the speaker left no doubt that all of its roads led to Moscow.

While Russia loomed large in the Dresden symposium, much of the discussion focused on German national tradition. To resolve the conundrum of how national tradition, according to Stalin, served to undermine national chauvinism, Henselmann distinguished ‘cosmopolitanism’ — a bourgeois and reactionary vision of global culture — from ‘internationalism’, defined by Zhdanov as ‘respect for other nations’ individuality and existence’.<sup>65</sup> Henselmann argued that, as the aesthetic correlate of ‘true internationalism’, socialist realism provided a Hegelian resolution to the clash of provincial and cosmopolitan impulses that had haunted twentieth-century German culture. While socialist realism was characterized by ‘beauty and its effect on raising consciousness’ rather than return on investment, Henselmann boasted that the socialist system empowered architects. They were given a vital role in inspiring workers, and in turn learned from the proletariat. Because new buildings were owned collectively, workers influenced design directly through public discussion. ‘Some architects don’t like this’, Henselmann confessed, ‘but they have to get used to it’. East Germany’s leaders also were design enthusiasts: Ulbricht and Grotewohl, Henselmann divulged, ‘study massive technical volumes on architecture’.

The speech ended with a surprise for West Germans who were inspired to participate in the building of socialism, but feared they might lack a basic qualification. According to Henselmann, provided one was not actively against it, one did not have to be a socialist to enlist in ‘the battle for a new German architecture’. Socialist realism could be practiced by those not explicitly committed to its politics, and any professional could apply for a tour of duty in the style’s eastern homeland.<sup>66</sup> Henselmann’s presentation sounded like a recruitment talk because that is exactly what it was. Five months later the SED Central Committee targeted six occupational categories for systematic recruitment, architecture being one of them. According to the party directive, ‘a great number of professional conferences and conventions are to be held in East Germany, and West German personalities will be invited to attend such conventions and informal talks.’<sup>67</sup> The Dresden ‘All-German architectural circle’ had provided the recruitment scheme

with an early dry run, albeit a poorly-attended one.

Self-identified West German ‘agitators’ trumpeting the superiority of East German reconstruction programme also had a part to play in broadening ‘the battle for a new German architecture’ and enticing sympathizers to head East. Their leader was Hermann Zess, an architect with Hamburg’s city planning board and a communist party member.<sup>68</sup> As in Henselmann’s case, Zess’ rejection of modernism repudiated his previous work. In 1946, Zess had been a member of the architectural consortium responsible for the design of Hamburg’s ‘Grindelberg highrises’, a cluster of gargantuan slabs containing apartments initially intended for employees of the British occupation government, but soon inherited by the city as municipal housing. The project, widely hailed in design circles as Germany’s first exemplar of postwar modernism, was dubbed ‘Hamburg’s Manhattan’ by local newspapers, and reviled as ‘American-style concrete barracks’ by local communists.<sup>69</sup> Over the course of 1952, Zess and his collaborators in West Germany’s socialist realist underground held meetings in Bad Oeyenhausen, Bamberg, Bremen, Bremerhaven, Buxtehude, Hamburg, Hanau, Hanover, Kiel, Lübeck, and Offenbach. Maintaining a supply of propaganda material from East Germany presented a greater obstacle than attempts by the Bundesrepublik’s *Amt für Verfassungsschutz* (Office for the Protection of the Constitution) to suppress their missionary work. Reporting back to East Berlin, Zess marveled: ‘Our meetings occur with an openness that would have been unimaginable in 1951’.<sup>70</sup> Popular response to the agitprop program in the west was mixed. Zess proudly reported that ‘among our professional colleagues, recognition of the west’s hopelessness is beginning to sink in.’ But reactions deviated from Marxist expectations. ‘It is a peculiarity of our current situation that, at the moment, discussions and lecture events held with members of the intelligentsia have gone much better than those with working-class circles’. As the agitators traversed West Germany, their efforts often coinciding with cultural events sponsored by the Society for German-Soviet Friendship, they left behind a network of local cells, an expansion strategy based on communist party precedent. Zess’ ‘Hamburg working circle’ remained the nerve centre and organizational model for all other chapters.<sup>71</sup>

Recruitment of western specialists through invitations to ‘corresponding institutions in East Germany’<sup>72</sup> also was given a trial run by Zess. He urged the DBA to extend invitations to Werner Hebebrand, a distinguished planner teaching in Hanover, to Otto Meyer-Ottens, Braunschweig’s city architect, to Konstanty Gutschow, a former administrator of Speer’s Nazi-era reconstruction program and to Georg Münther, Lübeck’s municipal building director.<sup>73</sup> Among the potential recruits, only Münther accepted. He ultimately emigrated, took a teaching position at Dresden’s Technical Academy, and remained in East Germany. But he was the exception.

The attempt to recruit design professionals as partisans in the ‘Battle for a New German Architecture’ was extraordinarily misguided. Not only was the campaign

shrugged off by most West Germans, but as early as 1950 it had also unleashed a flood of East German design talent headed westward. From the start of the ‘anti-formalism’ campaign, state officials were aware of the aversion it inspired. But faithful reproduction of Soviet ideology, and not the satisfaction of a local constituents, motivated East Germany architectural policy. An internal Ministry of Construction memo noted in February 1951:

The unanimous opinion in professional circles is that a new style of architecture can neither be compelled nor immediately expected. This, without question, creates an impression among the public that we architects sit spellbound, not daring to move, as if confronted by a predator.<sup>74</sup>

Having originated at the Politburo’s highest level, the mandate for cultural revolution was unflinching, alienating architects just as the West’s magnetic attraction was being amplified by an economic boom. The East Berlin journal *Planen und Bauen* told its readers that ‘flight to the West’ was fueled by US propaganda and its promise of easy money, but in reality would result in poverty and unemployment.<sup>75</sup> However, unemployment already plagued designers in East Germany, where the reconfiguration of the design profession had made it all but impossible to practise architecture without being employed by one of the state’s design bureaux or industrial facilities. Complaints streamed into the Ministry of Construction. A letter of July 1951 protested: ‘Since the beginning of this year, there not only is absolutely no possibility for us independently employed architects to receive commissions, but even contracts already issued are being withdrawn and handed over to state-owned design firms’.<sup>76</sup> Architecture’s ‘collectivization’ only added to the growing list of incentives for designers to head West.

Upon arrival in the West, émigré architects encountered the cultural revolution’s antipode: a society in which style was determined by market conditions and fragmented structures of patronage, rather than a hegemonic political or aesthetic ideology. In the memorable phrase coined by design historian Werner Durth, ‘*Wirtschaft wird Zeitgeist*’ — a ‘miracle economy’ was becoming West German architecture’s ‘spirit of the times’.<sup>77</sup> The German modernism of the first postwar decade was for the most part bland, self-effacing, even proclaiming a certain ‘stylelessness’. Although the results were pronounced an artistic failure even in their own time, after the trauma associated with a previous German campaign of ‘representational building’, the notion of a contemporary non-style was a comforting affectation. It dissimulated the fact that this modest postwar modernism, said to have roots in the Weimar Republic, also traced its provenance to the ‘progressive’ branch of Third Reich architecture.<sup>78</sup> East Germany imported this unprepossessing building style in the later-1950s, as Khrushchev-era ‘de-Stalinization’ discredited decorative extravagance and addressed a housing shortage exacerbated by improvident construction practices. Within the East German architectural establishment, a spate of reverse defections back to

modernism followed suit. In 1956, at a municipal meeting attended by SED officials, Henselmann felt confident enough about the new trend in Soviet architecture to call the socialist-realist Stalinallee, crowned by his own tower blocks, East Berlin's 'Kinderkrankheit' (childhood hilliness).<sup>79</sup> Having learned the lessons of an earlier cultural revolution, he was familiar with the adaptive requirements for continued membership in the socialist state's avant-garde.

## Notes

<sup>1</sup> The term 'cultural revolution', although not used in the early 1950s by the SED, is used by scholars today to refer to the party's attempt to consolidate ideological control over the arts in 1951. This usage differs somewhat from the term's use in the GDR when it came into vogue much later in the nation's history. See, for example, . . . *einer neuen Zeit Beginn. Erinnerungen an die Anfänge unserer Kulturrevolution 1945–1949*, ed. by Institut für Marxismus-Leninismus beim KZ der SED (Berlin: Aufbau-Verlag, 1980).

<sup>2</sup> Richard Linnecke, 'Der Deutsche Architektenkongreß 1951', *Planen und Bauen*, 6 (1951), 32; Werner Durth, Jörn Düwel, and Niels Gutschow, *Ostkreuz. Architektur und Städtebau der DDR* (Frankfurt and New York: Campus, 1998), vol. 1, 246.

<sup>3</sup> Walter Ulbricht, *Das nationale Aufbauwerk und die Aufgaben der deutschen Architektur* (Berlin: Amt für Information der Regierung der DDR, 1952), p. 8.

<sup>4</sup> *Architecture and Ideology in Eastern Europe During the Stalin Era: An Aspect of Cold War History*, trans. by Anders Åman and Roger and Kerstin Tanner (Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 1992), p. 165. Åman asserts that this condition described the entire Soviet Bloc, a claim contested by this paper.

<sup>5</sup> Katherine Verdery, *What Was Socialism, and What Comes Next?* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), p. 4.

<sup>6</sup> See Katerina Clark, *The Soviet Novel: History as Ritual* (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1985), pp. 15–24; and Boris Groys, *The Total Art of Stalinism: Avant-Garde, Aesthetic Dictatorship and Beyond*, trans. by Charles Rougle (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992).

<sup>7</sup> The 'big deal' was coined by Vera Dunham in the context of the Stalin-era 'middle class' of the 1930s (Vera S. Dunham, *In Stalin's Time: Middle-Class Values in Soviet Fiction* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976)); but the term has been applied as well to the intelligentsia (Sheila Fitzpatrick, *The Cultural Front: Power and Culture in Revolutionary Russia* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1992), pp. 8–9; Vera Tolz, "'Cultural Bosses' as Patrons and Clients: the Functioning of the Soviet Creative Unions in the Postwar Period', in *Contemporary European History*, 11 (February 2002), 87–105).

<sup>8</sup> Vera Tolz, "'Cultural Bosses' as Patrons and Clients', pp. 99–103.

<sup>9</sup> 'Gesetz über den Aufbau der Städte in der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik und der Hauptstadt Deutschlands, Berlin (Aufbaugesetz), vom 6. September 1950', in *Für einen fortschrittlichen Städtebau für eine neue deutsche Architektur*, ed. by Deutsche Bauakademie (Leipzig: Vereinigung Volkseigener Verlage, 1951), pp. 7–11.

<sup>10</sup> Dymshits' first attack on cultural policy in the American zone of occupied Germany

was made at an SED Party meeting in Berlin, and came in response to an editorial in the US newspaper *Die Neue Zeitung*, which stated that German cultural affairs did not require management by Allied occupation authorities. Dymshits claimed that this US cultural policy reflected reactionary forces which ‘frivolously and energetically reject everything democratic’. His attack, published in the SMAD newspaper *Tägliche Rundschau*, was considered by OMGUS officers a serious breach of the diplomatic agreements upon which quadripartite governance was based. OMGUS ‘Report of Staff Conference’, 27 September 1947, Microfilm M1075, Roll 3, US National Archives at College Park MD.

<sup>11</sup> For a chronological survey of essays in this debate, see *Dokumente zur Kunst-, Literatur-, und Kulturpolitik der SED*, ed. by Elimar Schubbe (Stuttgart: Seewald Verlag, 1972).

<sup>12</sup> N. Orlov, ‘Wege und Irrwege der modernen Kunst’, *Tägliche Rundschau*, 20 and 23 January 1951. Semenov revealed in his 1995 autobiography, *Von Stalin bis Gorbatschow*, that he wrote under the pseudonym N. Orlov after 1947. Werner Durth, Jörn Düwel and Niels Gutschow, *Aufbau. Architektur und Städtebau der DDR*, vol. 2, p. 135, fn. 16.

<sup>13</sup> N. Orlov, ‘Wege und Irrwege der modernen Kunst’, *Tägliche Rundschau* 23, 20 January 1951.

<sup>14</sup> Ludwig Renn, ‘Im Kampf um eine neue deutsche Architektur / Ludwig Renn antwortet Dr. Kurt Liebknecht’, *Neues Deutschland*, 14 March 1951.

<sup>15</sup> ‘Stellungnahme des “Neues Deutschland”’, *Neues Deutschland*, 14 March 1951.

<sup>16</sup> ‘Der Kampf gegen den Formalismus in Kunst und Literatur, für eine fortschrittliche deutsche Kultur. Entschließung des Zentralkomitees der Sozialistischen Einheitspartei Deutschlands auf der Tagung am 15., 16., und 17., März 1951’, *Tägliche Rundschau*, 18 April 1951.

<sup>17</sup> ‘Formalismus in der Baukunst endgültig überwinden’, *Neues Deutschland*, 29 November 1951.

<sup>18</sup> ‘Vom Bauhaus zur Stalinallee’, Bundesarchiv Berlin-Lichterfelde, SAMPO DH2 DBA A/98.

<sup>19</sup> Biographical works on Henselmann include: Christian Borngräber, ‘Hermann Henselmann’, in *Baumeister. Architekten. Stadtplaner. Biographien zur baulichen Entwicklung Berlins*, ed. by Wolfgang Ribbe and Wolfgang Schäche, (Berlin: Stapp Verlag, 1987), pp. 559–74; Jörn Düwel, ‘Hermann Henselmann — Ein Baumeister des Sozialismus?’ *Deutsches Architektenblatt*, 28 (1996), 1840–41 and 2028–29; and Wolfgang Schäche, ‘Zu Person und Werk von Hermann Henselmann,’ in *Hermann Henselmann. ‘Ich habe Vorschläge gemacht’*, ed. by Wolfgang Schäche (Berlin: Ernst & Sohn, 1996), pp. 11–22. Henselmann’s selected writings are collected in two volumes: *Hermann Henselmann. Gedanken, Ideen, Bauten, Projekte* (Berlin: Henschelverlag, 1978) and *Vom Himmel an das Reißbrett ziehen. Hermann Henselmann. Baukünstler im Sozialismus*, ed. by Marie-Josée Seipelt and Jürgen Eckhardt (Berlin: Verlag der Beeken, 1982).

<sup>20</sup> Christian Schädlich, ‘Der Neubeginn an der Staatlichen Hochschule für Baukunst und bildende Künste Weimar im Jahre 1946’, *Wissenschaftliche Zeitschrift der Hochschule für Architektur und Bauwesen Weimar*, 13 (1966), 508.

<sup>21</sup> Henselmann, *Drei Reisen nach Berlin*, cited in Åman, *Architecture and Ideology in Eastern Europe During the Stalin Era*, p. 177.

<sup>22</sup> Hermann Henselmann, 'Vorschläge aus dem Ministerium für Bauwesen vom 5. Juli 1950', Bundesarchiv SAMPO Berlin-Lichterfelde West, DH2 DBA B38/I.

<sup>23</sup> 'Protokoll der Abteilungsleitersitzung,' 16 June 1950, Bundesarchiv SAMPO Berlin-Lichterfelde West, DH2 DBA B38/I.

<sup>24</sup> Lukács' ideas about realism appeared in German translation in *Neues Deutschland*, 8 July 1949. The newspaper's excerpt from his speech, given in Budapest a month earlier, was entitled 'Der höchste Grad des Realismus,' and is reproduced in *Dokumente zur Kunst-, Literatur- und Kulturpolitik der SED*, ed. by Elimar Schubbe (Stuttgart: Seewald Verlag, 1972), pp. 119–20. On Lukács' views on the Bauhaus, see Ákos Moravánszky, 'The Architecture of Socialist Realism in Hungary 1951–1955', *The Harvard Architectural Review*, 6 (1987), 32–37.

<sup>25</sup> Hans Scharoun, 'Sechzehn Grundsätze über Städtebau', 10 June 1950. Quoted in *Reise nach Moskau. Quellenedition zur neueren Planungsgeschichte*, ed. by Institut für Regionalentwicklung und Strukturplanung (Berlin–Erkner: IRS, 1995), pp. 175–76.

<sup>26</sup> Hermann Henselmann, 'Formalismus und Realismus', *Planen und Bauen*, 4 (1950), 244–46.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 282–84.

<sup>28</sup> 'Akttenotiz', 10 October 1950, Bundesarchiv SAMPO Coswig, DH1.44468.

<sup>29</sup> Kurt Liebknecht, 'Im Kampf um eine neue deutsche Architektur', *Neues Deutschland*, 13 February 1951.

<sup>30</sup> 'Protokoll über den 1. Diskussionsabend im Haus des Kulturbundes am 19. April um 18 Uhr mit einem Vortrag von Herrn prof. Henselmann zum Thema: "Das Bauhaus"'. 21 April 1951, Bundesarchiv SAMPO Coswig, DH1.44484.

<sup>31</sup> Hermann Henselmann to Kurt Liebknecht, 31 May 1951. Bundesarchiv SAMPO Berlin-Lichterfelde West, DH2 DBA I 32.

<sup>32</sup> East German newspapers, particularly those servicing rural areas, promoted a campaign of revulsion for aristocratic country homes in the late-1940s, at the height of the agrarian resettlement campaign. Stately Junker estates were depicted as the former sites of decadent orgies, and as late as 1950, newspapers could proudly display a picture of a new farm house 'built from the rubble of a manor house' ('Wende in der deutschen Agrarpolitik', *Der Mittags-Echo*, 15 September 1950). In 1954, West Germany's 'Citizen's Association for the Protection of Historical Fortifications, Castles and Homes' estimated that 800 of such structures had been demolished in East Germany since the war's end ('800 Schlösser zerstört', *Die Welt*, 20 September 1954).

<sup>33</sup> Rudolf Herrstadt, 'Über den Baustil, den politischen Stil und den Genossen Henselmann', *Neues Deutschland*, 31 July 1951.

<sup>34</sup> Rudolf Herrstadt, 'Über den Baustil, den politischen Stil und den Genossen Henselmann', *Neues Deutschland*, 31 July 1951.

<sup>35</sup> Hermann Henselmann in Hermann Henselmann, Helmut Hentrich and Wilhelm Wortmann, 'Architekten sind keine Kinder der Niederlagen', p. 373.

<sup>36</sup> Rudolf Herrstadt, 'Unsere Architekten antworten', *Neues Deutschland*, 3 August



1977.

<sup>37</sup> Katerina Clark, *The Soviet Novel*, pp. 5–6; Sheila Fitzpatrick, *The Cultural Front*, pp. 216–19. Soviet historian Jeffrey Brooks argues that Stalin-era journalism was the original source of the discursive tropes fundamental to Socialist Realist fiction: Jeffrey Brooks, ‘Socialist Realism in Pravda, Read All about It!’ *Slavic Review*, 53 (Winter 1994), pp. 973–991.

<sup>38</sup> Katerina Clark, *The Soviet Novel*, p. 201.

<sup>39</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 171.

<sup>40</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 202.

<sup>41</sup> Hermann Henselmann, ‘Der reaktionäre Charakter des Konstruktivismus’, *Neues Deutschland*, 4 December 1951.

<sup>42</sup> The development of the Hochhaus Weberwiese is chronicled in ‘Der Erstling: Zur Baugeschichte der Weberwiese in Berlin’, in Jörn Düwel, *Baukunst voran! Architektur und Städtebau in der SBZ/DDR* (Berlin: Schelzky & Jeep, 1995), pp. 135–51.

<sup>43</sup> Hermann Henselmann, ‘Grundsätzliche Probleme der Städtebaues’ (public lecture given in Dresden), 2 July 1947, Henselmann Nachlaß, 120.01.589, Akademie der Künste, Abteilung Architektur, Berlin.

<sup>44</sup> Henselmann later would dismiss the East German capital’s socialist realist building program — including his own contributions to it, presumably — as a ‘childhood disease’ (Johanna Böhm-Klein, ‘Wohnen, Geschäftsleben und Infrastruktur der Stalinallee’, in *Karl-Marx-Allee. Magistrale in Berlin*, ed. by Helmut Engel and Wolfgang Ribbe [Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1996], p. 152), contradicting the contention that ‘[. . .] the work [East Bloc Stalin-era] architects did reluctantly and under compulsion was not necessarily inferior to the work that coincided with their own values’. (Åman, *Architecture and Ideology in Eastern Europe During the Stalin Era*, p. 177).

<sup>45</sup> György Péteri’s Introduction to this book, p. 5.

<sup>46</sup> G. Alexandrov, cited in Edmund Colleyn, ‘Die Americanisierung des Stadtbildes von Frankfurt am Main’, *Deutsche Architektur*, 1 (1952), 151.

<sup>47</sup> Serge Guilbaut, *How New York Stole the Idea of Modern Art: Abstract Expressionism, Freedom and the Cold War* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983).

<sup>48</sup> Eduard Schönbeck, ‘Mit der Leica im Weberwiesen-Hochhaus’ and ‘Die “formalistischen Eierkisten” schämen sich. . .’ *Die Neue Zeitung*, 4 and 5 November 1952.

<sup>49</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>50</sup> On the Stalin-era practice of labeling congregate housing with the names and professions of residents, see Steven Kotkin, *Magnetic Mountain: Stalinism as a Civilization* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1995), p. 198.

<sup>51</sup> Records of the Agency for International Development (successor organization to the Marshall Plan’s Mutual Security Agency), RG 286, Ger 2451–2454, Still Pictures Division, National Archives at College Park MD.

<sup>52</sup> ‘Der Architekt in der Sowjetzone’, *Neue Bauwelt*, 15 (1952), 229.

<sup>53</sup> ‘SED Richtlinien über Massnahmen gegen die Republikflucht und zur Werbung von Fachkräften in Westdeutschland’, intercepted and translated by US 66<sup>th</sup> CIC Group,

Region VIII, CS Team, VIII-15020, 20 February 1953. IRR (Impersonal Name Files), German Democratic Republic Soviet Zone 12/52–6/53, RG 319/631/31/52/04, Box 30, National Archives at College Park MD.

<sup>54</sup> ‘Man baut woanders anders’, *Neue Bauwelt*, 6 (1943), 830.

<sup>55</sup> This technique was employed in ‘Sowjet-Architektur als Vorbild’, *Die Neue Stadt*, 5 (July 1951), 275–77.

<sup>56</sup> Comment by Alfons Leitl; Walter Ulbricht, ‘Der Aufbau der Städte und die Fragen der Architektur’, *Baukunst und Werkform*, 4 (1952), 48–52.

<sup>57</sup> ‘Man baut woanders anders’, *Neue Bauwelt*, 6 (1943), 830.

<sup>58</sup> *Das Bauen im Neuen Reich*, ed. by Gerdy Troost, (Bayreuth: Gauverlag, 1943), vol. ii. The oversize architectural pictorial was published in a first edition of between 12–22,000 copies; pages 66–79 are dedicated to modernist industrial design.

<sup>59</sup> On the history of totalitarian theory and its academic and popular uses see Abbot Gleason, *Totalitarianism, The Inner History of the Cold War* (New York: Oxford, 1995). The Nazi uses of modernity are explored in Jeffrey Herf, *Reactionary Modernism: Technology, culture and politics in Weimar and the Third Reich* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984). One of the first historical works to stress the Third Reich patronage of modernist design was Barbara Miller Lane, *Architecture and Politics in Germany 1918–1945* (Cambridge MA: Harvard, 1968), p. 204. The most intensive exploration of the survival of Bauhaus modernism in the Nazi period is *Bauhaus-Moderne im Nationalsozialismus: Zwischen Anbiederung und Verfolgung*, ed. by Winifred Nerdinger (Munich: Prestel, 1993).

<sup>60</sup> Kurt Magritz, ‘Die Tragödie der westdeutschen Architektur’, *Deutsche Architektur*, 1 (1952), 57–65.

<sup>61</sup> Otto Grotewohl, ‘Eine Nation — eine Kultur’, *Deutsche Architektur*, 1 (1952), 49.

<sup>62</sup> ‘Protokolle Sitzungen des “Komitees für das nationale Aufbauprogramm”’, Bundesarchiv Berlin-Lichterfelde, SAMPO DH2 DBA/A 53.

<sup>63</sup> Hermann Zess to Stellvertretender Vorsitzende des Nationalen Komitees für den Neuaufbau der deutschen Hauptstadt, ‘Berichtsmonat August’, October 1952, Bundesarchiv Berlin-Lichterfelde, SAMPO DH2 DBA/A 53.

<sup>64</sup> Hermann Henselmann, ‘Vortrag Dresden vor einem gesamtdeutschen Kreis von Architekten über “Fragen der Architektur”’, 31 August 1952, Bundesarchiv Berlin-Lichterfelde, SAMPO DH2 DBA/B/60/2, pp. 2–19.

<sup>65</sup> Ibid., pp. 26–27.

<sup>66</sup> Ibid., pp. 30–46.

<sup>67</sup> ‘SED Richtlinien über Massnahmen gegen die Republikflucht und zur Werbung von Fachkräften in Westdeutschland’, intercepted and translated by US 66<sup>th</sup> CIC Group, Region VIII, CS Team, VIII-15020,

20 February 1953. IRR (Impersonal Name Files), German Democratic Republic Soviet Zone 12/52–6/53, RG 319/631/31/52/04, Box 30, National Archives at College Park MD. East Germany’s plan to recruit architects to replace those fleeing to the West contradicts Anders Åman’s comment that ‘there are no statistics to show the occupations of people who defected to the West during the period we are dealing with — not even for those who

crossed the border between the DDR and the Federal Republic do we have detailed figures — but all the indications are that there were few architects among them’ (*Architecture and Ideology in Eastern Europe During the Stalin Era*, p. 180).

<sup>68</sup> Werner Durth and Niels Gutschow, *Träume in Trümmern*, vol. 2, p. 645.

<sup>69</sup> Niels Gutschow, ‘Hamburg, Moderne als Vision und Wirklichkeit’, in *1945, Krieg — Zerstörung — Aufbau* (Berlin: Henschel, 1995), vol. 23, Schriftenreihe der Akademie der Künste, pp. 358–62.

<sup>70</sup> Hermann Zess to Stellvertretender Vorsitzende des Nationalen Komitees für den Neuaufbau der deutschen Hauptstadt, ‘Berichtsmonat August’ and ‘Berichtsmonat September’, September and October 1952, Bundesarchiv Berlin-Lichterfelde, SAMPO DH2 DBA/A 53.

<sup>71</sup> Ibid.

<sup>72</sup> ‘SED Richtlinien über Massnahmen gegen die Republikflucht und zur Werbung von Fachkräften in Westdeutschland’, intercepted and translated by US 66<sup>th</sup> CIC Group, Region VIII, CS Team, VIII-15020, 20 February 1953. IRR (Impersonal Name Files), German Democratic Republic Soviet Zone 12/52–6/53, RG 319/631/31/52/04, Box 30, National Archives at College Park MD.

<sup>73</sup> Hermann Zess to Stellvertretender Vorsitzende des Nationalen Komitees für den Neuaufbau der deutschen Hauptstadt, ‘Berichtsmonat August’, October 1952, Bundesarchiv Berlin-Lichterfelde, SAMPO DH2 DBA/A 53.

<sup>74</sup> Hans Gerike to Lothar Bolz, 9 February 1951. Bundesarchiv Coswig, SAMPO DH1 44488.

<sup>75</sup> ‘Lohnt die “Flucht nach dem Westen?”’, *Planen und Bauen*, 4 (1950), 320.

<sup>76</sup> Paul Walther to GDR President Willhelm Pieck, 27 July 1951. Bundesarchiv Coswig, SAMPO DH1 44488. A copy of this letter was forwarded to the Ministry of Construction, and filed with many others like it.

<sup>77</sup> Werner Durth, *Deutsche Architekten*, p. 375.

<sup>78</sup> Architectural historian Hartmut Frank is categorical about this: ‘Postwar German architecture does not take up from the era before 1933, as later interpreters to this day would like to believe. Building in the postwar era stands in irritating but unbroken continuity, both in terms of content and personnel, with the prewar and war years’ (*italics mine*). Hartmut Frank, ‘Trümmer: Traditionelle und moderne Architekturen im Nachkriegsdeutschland’, in *Grauzonen. Kunst und Zeitbilder. Farbwelte 1945–1955*, ed. by Bernard Schutz (Berlin: NGBK Medusa, 1983), p. 55.

<sup>79</sup> Hermann Henselmann, 14 March 1956, quoted in Johanna Böhm-Klein, ‘Geschäftsleben und Infrastruktur der Stalinallee’, in *Karl-Marx-Allee. Magistrale in Berlin*, ed. by Helmut Engel and Wolfgang Ribbe (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1996), pp. 151–52.

# BEYOND IDENTITY POLITICS, OR THE POLISH PAST MASTERED: TRANSATLANTIC STRATEGIES IN THE WRITINGS OF WITOLD GOMBROWICZ

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*This paper discusses some of the identity problems raised when analysing the representation of culture in Witold Gombrowicz (1904–1969). Considering how the writer models his hero-narrators on himself and his modern experience of emigration, I explore the paradigms of cultural self-construction in hybrid culture as manifested in his writings, above all in the novel Trans-Atlantyck and two other texts.*

*My argument takes the following course: the Polish émigré writer's postwar representation of identity and human relations so obviously hinges on transnationality (the criss-crossing of national borders) and on multilocation (being intimately linked to many different places simultaneously), that he may be considered a 'casual globalist.' However, he is not explicitly preoccupied with the integration of the South American world into his literature, or vice versa; nor is he engaged in forms of 'activism' traditional to identity politics. Rather, he appears to master his Polish past beyond identity politics, to conjure up his imagined homeland as well as the evasive individual characteristics of his narrators, using his personal experience of exile. In this way, Gombrowicz's eroticization of exile amounts to an intriguing sublimation of ambiguous homosexuality.*

I was distraught, in despair, but I was also glad  
to find myself miraculously sheltered  
behind the ocean.  
*A Kind of Testament*

This essay is a preliminary study of some of the identity problems raised when analysing the émigré literature of Witold Gombrowicz (1904–1969), one of Poland's best known writers, through the lens of 'transatlanticism.' Like many East

European artists and intellectuals of his generation, Gombrowicz was forced into exile first by the Nazis then by the Communist regime: a few days before the fateful date 1 September 1939, the already renowned thirty-five-year-old writer disembarked from an ocean liner that had just brought him to Buenos Aires on its maiden voyage. Instead of a few weeks, he remained in Argentina for the next twenty-four years; in 1964, he sailed back to Europe a celebrated writer, but never returned to Poland.

Bearing in mind that several Slavic émigré writers after Second World War explored transatlantic connections in the course of their work, it seems fair to conjecture, at a time of globalization (which for some has its origins in the history of the transatlantic experience), that a study of Gombrowicz's overseas idiom may tell us something about how people adapted to cultural exchange in the past. If viewed also as a world of transgressive behaviour in gesture and language depicted with an exile's eye, Gombrowicz's work will emerge as even more complex, more revealing: crystallizing and refracting the anxiety of male sexuality at the middle of the last century, his transatlantic writings open up a deeper understanding of connections today between the erotic and the literary.

### *More than just a pleasure cruise*

From The Great Exile Story dramatized in Gombrowicz's semi-fictional writings, we may discern that during most of the 1940s he led a rather miserable and precarious hand-to-mouth existence, largely dependent on his Polish compatriots in Buenos Aires. Only the last eight years or so of his life in Argentina were actually marked by a modest life style and growing literary prestige. But in his new country Gombrowicz was far from cut off from the Old World. On the contrary, he remained in close touch with friends and literary acquaintances in Poland (where the Communist climate fluctuated between liberalization and reaction), with Polish visitors to Argentina, as well as with the established Polish émigré community in Paris, which had a hard time forgiving the writer his 'desertion' from wartime resistance. At the same time, in Argentina he developed new and alternative networks, befriending people of various nationalities and different social strata. This is the context for Gombrowicz's staging of himself as, amongst other things, an exilic writer being obsessively drawn to the Retiro in Buenos Aires, a park area known as the city's centre of homosexual cruising. Here a main concern of mine is with Gombrowicz's eroticism.

There has always been something peculiarly inadequate about Gombrowicz criticism, a more or less direct result of the specific challenges posed by the work and the image of the man himself. Perhaps the most crucial inadequacy of all has been the way criticism has downplayed the central significance of male homosexuality in his oeuvre; his bent for dwelling on same-sex relations has been too one-sidedly interpreted as some sort of ingenious overstatement, as part of a loftier design enabling him to grapple with existential or metaphysical dilemmas.

Only recently have scholars begun to take an interest in what this Polish ‘clown turned bard’ deposited in the margins of his art and concealed, rather than on what he placed at the centre of it and explained.<sup>1</sup> Surely, Gombrowicz’s way of writing also involves the verbal flourish of a certain homo-erotic candour, of strong feelings of desire between men. However, it is more often a question of abstraction or an extended use of metaphors, than of excitement or titillation; our exilic writer is not a smut hound, but rather a pornographer *sui generis*,<sup>2</sup> a provocateur for whom literary eroticism is crucial as a means of transgression, serving a particular project of emancipation.

This becomes evident in his three-volume *Diary 1953–1966*, his autobiographical reflections entitled *A Kind of Testament* (1968), and, most notably, his evocative novel *Trans-Atlantyk* (1953), whose burlesque and grotesque action takes place in the Polonia of Buenos Aires.<sup>3</sup> On the one hand, Witold the narrator is firmly grounded in his Polish experience, in the formative years of his culturally and socially homogeneous home country; on the other, the physical distance that comes with being exiled in a big and pluralistic country offers him an alternative perspective as he attunes himself to the ways and customs of other social and regional groups. In view of Gombrowicz’s ongoing representation of self, transatlanticism denotes here ‘on or crossing over to the other side of,’ but also changing ‘into another state or form,’ or even ‘surpassing, transcending.’ Transatlanticism refers to his iconoclastic treatment of nationalities, cultures, and sexualities as well as to the exotic behaviour of his racy first-person narrators who, more often than not, bear his first name and therefore blur the line between fiction and reality. ‘Witold’ is quintessentially transatlantic: situated on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean, he tends to juggle with the South-American and the Central European perspectives interchangeably. Moreover, Gombrowicz’s writings are global in so far as they capture that ‘I live in an almost/not yet world,’ they dramatize the in-betweenness of a world always on the brink of newness. In the subsequent analysis, my argument will therefore take the following course:

Already in the pre-exilic 1930s, the writer posits his poetics of in-betweenness emphasizing male homo-eroticism and a troublesome Polishness; as ‘Witold’ sails into Argentinian exile, his ambivalent identity travels with him: the motif of the Trans-Atlantic Journey signifies his ‘homeland’ in so far as 1) the journey emerges as an all-embracing metaphor for cultural in-betweenness; and 2) the ‘across’/‘in between’-semantics becomes essential for his ambiguous representation of himself as Polish writer and homosexual man.<sup>4</sup>

### *A dancer’s mask*

Gombrowicz advances his poetics of in-betweenness well before his emigration. It is perceptible in his debut collection of short stories entitled *Memoir From a Time of Immaturity* (*Pamiętnik z okresu dojrzewania*, 1933); the immaturity in question

points to a whole series of significant oppositions, most notably social class (aristocrats or plebeians), cultural background (elitist or mass culture), and sexuality (accepted heterosexuality or ostracized homosexuality). In all of these stories the male hero finds himself trapped in a battle of loyalty between 'Form' (*Forma*) and 'Chaos' (*Chaos*), a dialectical no-win situation where he is torn between the attractions of, on the one hand, the solid closedness of higher established society and, on the other, the ungovernable openness of societies which are low and alternative. This tension is experienced in what Gombrowicz calls 'the interhuman domain' (*sfera międzyludzka*), a social field of force or battle ground where one of two persons at all times aspires to dominate and form the other, or conversely, to be dominated or formed by the other. Particularly revealing for our purposes is the initial story of Gombrowicz's debut collection, the first-person narrative 'Kraykowski's Dancer' ('Tancerz mecenasa Kraykowskiego').

The plot is simple: the hero-narrator, the dancer of the title, is a lonely epileptic who, leading an uneventful and scruffy life, despises, fears, and desperately needs people. He begins a feverish pursuit of the Warsaw lawyer Kraykowski, harassing the latter's wife and spying on him at night in restaurants and parks. The lawyer is at first annoyed by his advances, then angry, then fearful, and finally leaves the city in panic, planning to return when the lovesick suitor has forgotten about him. In the end, the Dancer reacts to the attorney's rejection by suffering a mental breakdown.

The adventures depicted may seem rather unexotic. However, the narrator hints at the importance of his 'object of desire', whose name is derived from the Polish kraj, connoting 'home' and 'homeland' (e.g. *wiadomości z kraju*: news from home) on the one hand, but 'shores' (e.g. *dalekie kraje*: distant shores) as well as 'verge' (e.g. *na samym kraju*: on the very edge), on the other. Besides, he raises suspicion by the simple fact that he never lets the reader know why he brands himself as a 'dancer'. I propose to demonstrate that the frantic Dancer may be perceived emblematically, as a male who performs for pleasure and/or professionally, a Nietzschean would-be seducer ever in motion, a 'professional', for whom eroticism carries joy as well as misery, and yet always the promise of freedom. In highlighting Gombrowicz's spiritual affiliations to the German critic of European tradition, to my mind comes a quotation from the latter's perhaps most personal work *The Gay Science* (1882): 'Slipp'ry ice | is paradise | as long as dancing will suffice'.<sup>5</sup> Himself engaged in such important problems as the role of truth, falsity, and the will-to-truth in human life, Gombrowicz naturally employs the dance metaphor as a vehicle for the expression of his wilder and more subversive emotions.

At this juncture, let me bring in the hero-narrator of another significant story, F. Zantman of 'Events on the HMS Banbury' ('Zdarzenia na brygu Banbury'). Having decided to embark upon a sea voyage from England to Chile, he is soon at the mercy of the ship's captain and its oversexed crew, and, ultimately, is at his wit's end. It is important here to establish the narrator's name as an anagram to the word 'dancer,' Zant-man = Tanz-man.<sup>6</sup> With the morpheme 'Zant' forming the anagram

of the German ‘Tanz,’ an intriguing line leads directly to Gombrowicz’s first published hero, the ‘dance-man’ of his initial short story. As mentioned, the latter places himself in the role of an imbalanced (epileptic) client who struggles obsessively to win the favour of a patron, whilst Zantman, similarly, within his ‘mental aura’ (*aura umysłu*) as a passenger enters into a feverish love–hate relationship with various crew members. More importantly, Zantman too performs the oddest of ‘dances’: while paying the sailors for their services, he tries to settle accounts and create order for himself: ‘[. . .] suddenly, in the shadows of the night, I caught sight of two other sailors walking arm in arm [. . .]. It’s unpleasant — I whispered — that from now on I shan’t be able to look at two sailors without shame, perhaps not even at one’.<sup>7</sup>

The ambiguity of the hero’s references to wild and extreme seaboard behaviour echoes that often contained in the nineteenth-century sea story genre. Like Herman Melville, Gombrowicz too acknowledges the power of the inferior, the immature and unformed; because of their shared respect for the low, neither he nor the author of the ‘homo-eroticized’ novel *Moby-Dick* would, I believe, have understood fully the academic category ‘marginality.’ Moreover, there is intertextual resonance embedded in the very name of the transatlantic liner, namely a coded reference to an imaginary character in the most epigrammatic work of Oscar Wilde, *The Importance of Being Earnest* (1895). As will be remembered, the play is about the courtship and betrothals of Algernon and Jack, two young men-about-town, who are both leading double lives, under false names and characters, to cover their own ‘gay’ diversions. One such mock-identity is Algernon’s imaginary, invalid friend, Bunbury, invented to justify absences from conventional social engagements. Gombrowicz’s pun on the sickly fictitious character from a play by one of the most notorious ‘sodomites’ in literary history, should not go amiss. So what to make of the interconnection between Zantman’s story and that of Kraykowski’s dancer?

### *The art of cruising*

In the anagram ‘Zant’ the borders between the former and the latter text are shifted; the texts, in a sense, enter into one another so that ‘Zant’ may be used to define one particular way in which Gombrowicz’s texts as a whole are structured. Intertextually speaking, the anagram consists of elements scattered throughout the manifest text (for instance, in ‘Events on the HMS Banbury’ or ‘Kraykowski’s Dancer’) that when placed together allow the reader to recognize the coherent structure of a pre-text, an ‘original feature,’ or a primary semantic configuration. As I have indicated, the dancer’s mask forms part of such an essential ‘semantic given’; more precisely, the donning of this mask allows the two heroes in question to exist betwixt and between accepted norms, to cross established borders, sexual as well as cultural, in the face of sickliness and great emotional disorder.<sup>8</sup> A salient example is Kraykowski’s dancer, who fantasizes about the lawyer also seeing to his



financial needs, stages himself as an unconventional kind of performer ('I wasn't distracted, like others, by relatives, acquaintances and friends, women and dances; save one [. . .]'), whose *chorea* — the Greek word for 'dance' as well as for the nervous disorder known as St Vitus' dance — is best characterized by uncontrollable, irregular, brief, and jerky movements.<sup>10</sup>

A similar abruptness and lack of control informs Zantman's erotic experiences at sea, where he too engages in 'one, and one dance only' (*jeden jeden taniec*) to the exclusion of women and general heterosexual etiquette. Once again we are faced with Gombrowicz's homoeroticism, only that, as I have suggested before, the majority of the two heroes' secretive descriptions are not simply 'erotic' in the sense of being exciting or titillating, but are rather abstract and metaphorical; homoeroticism is signalled through speech gestures which show that the act of utterance has become ritualized as an expression of erotic gestures, of actions performed as a symbol to indicate an intention or evoke a particular response, where the ritual of utterance instead of the words is significant. Suffice it here to mention the Dancer who gives an enthused description of Kraykowski's appearance (notably, of the latter's pink fingernails) and fantasizes about him walking out of a public pissoir (the bills being 'paid' beforehand); the hero-narrator refers repeatedly to his own bending over (in anticipation of the lawyer's cane) and to his unrelenting hunch that he should step into the park (where he scandalizes the lawyer), and so on.

Given the Dancer's perception of the 'rapacity of secret relations,' purposeless and barely noticeable, which arise between strangers so as to 'shackle them imperceptibly together with a monstrous bond' (my italics, 10)<sup>11</sup> — words like these might just as easily have been uttered by Zantman — I suggest we develop the dance(r)-metaphor one step further. The Gombrowicz hero is never a principal in an elevated ballet, but rather a regular in an eroticized, low-brow dance hall; for him it is always a question of approaching and being approached (or not) promiscuously. As to this kind of *public cruising*, we could formulate a 'transatlantic' double entendre: the heroes are sailing or travelling about making for nowhere, calling at a series of places, as well as walking around looking to pick up a sexual partner, 'a trick.' The success rate of these endeavours appears to be discouragingly low: whereas Kraykowski's suitor continues to chase his beloved attorney around Warsaw, uncertain whether he will survive the 'journey' because his feelings for his 'guiding star' are 'too strong' (p. 15), the 'danceman' on the ocean liner ends up insisting that he 'doesn't want to know [. . .] the outside is a mirror, in which the inside sees itself' (p. 151); never being capable of surrendering fully to 'life at sea,' he is drained by the emotional distance he has travelled. The Dancer prepares for a longer journey into the Eastern Carpathians wondering whether or not he will ever return, whilst Zantman might not be sailing to Valparaiso after all, but towards 'the blue skies of Argentina.'

In view of the heroes' references to their own mental condition, their *ecce homo*

may well be interpreted as an *ecce-homosexuality* or, to use Eve Sedgwick's term, as a kind of 'epistemology of the closet'<sup>12</sup> — both are yearning to make their getaway from home, from the family-oriented sociality of pre-war patriarchal Poland.<sup>13</sup> What characterizes each one is his decision to enter his own modern, fast-moving, unstructured world of casual relations. To him, a purposeful life is, above all, a Kerouac-style of living 'on the road', a journey: couched in images of 'roaming,' 'going astray', and 'erring,' their language is significantly linked to the notion of being-on-the-move-to-somewhere-else. The possibility of escape at one's own discretion is also a main key to Gombrowicz's fictional universe; it's one of the many paradoxes that while the author loathes pretense and insincerity, his own basic instinct is always to leave a back that door open, so that he can escape.

To sum up: both hero-narrators are erotic misfits who enter the sphere of promiscuous same-sex relations in a bid for control over endless sets of emerging 'forms'. In boarding a transatlantic liner or cruising the streets and parks of the Polish capital, they move, as it were, beyond themselves towards a greater and more global territory. Thus Gombrowicz's pre-war strategy of the deviant<sup>14</sup> involves the master-plot for his later exilic writings, especially for the novel *Trans-Atlantyk* — namely the 'European' passenger on his way to 'Argentina' and the decision to keep moving.

*'An Argentinian novel by a Polish writer'*

The plot of what is arguably Gombrowicz's greatest accomplishment as an artist stems consistently from the initial premise, the fictitious version of the single most dramatic event in his life: the momentous decision to remain in Argentina. At the beginning of *Trans-Atlantyk*, the narrator, a Polish writer called Witold Gombrowicz, describes how he comes to be in South America, and how he ends up staying when war threatens rather than sailing back to England.

As a freshly arrived exile dependent on the help of others, Witold mixes with members of the Polish embassy as well as with an eccentric business trio consisting of a certain Baron and his two boorish partners. More importantly, he is picked up by Gonzalo, an Argentinian millionaire, who introduces him to the homosexual sphere of Buenos Aires, and he soon becomes involved in a scandal. Gonzalo makes sexual advances to the young Pole Ignacy, whose father, an old-fashioned ex-Major, demands satisfaction on behalf of the entire Polish tradition. Witold serves as a second to his queer friend in an absurd duel in which there are no bullets in the pistols; subsequently, the father decides to kill his own son so to restore honour, but is forestalled by Gonzalo who persuades the son to kill the father instead. Finally, an utterly confused Witold brings his friends of various nationalities and sexual inclinations along to a grand Polish feast, where everyone dances — *not* the ceremonial marchlike polonaise (as one might expect), but the 'lowlier' mazurka, sliding and hopping until bursting into uncontrollable laughter.

Significantly, the narrator stages the beginnings of his expatriation by focusing on a specific problem of loyalty. While the dilemma between fidelity to the Polish past and freedom to create oneself as one will — on the margins of the honest Polish tradition — is strongly felt throughout Witold's account, it ends, as mentioned, in a general outburst of hysterical laughter, which in turn neutralizes the dilemma. To be sure, I will not take Witold the narrator's wildly spun 'tales in the city' for a mirror-reflection of Witold the author's genuine and accurate confession, but the fact remains that *Trans-Atlantyk* is what Stanisław Barańczak calls 'the most personal and engaging of all of Gombrowicz's works of fiction.'<sup>15</sup> The writer has chosen to let Witold imitate a specific style typical of the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Polish country squire:

I feel a need to relate here for Family, kin and friends of mine the beginnings of these my adventures, now ten years old, in the Argentinian capital. Not that I ask anyone to have [ . . . ] these Groats of mine, heavy, dark with this black kasha of mine — oh, better not to have it to the mouth save for eternal curse, for my Humiliation, on the perennial track of my Life and up that hard, wearisome Mountain of mine. (p. 3)

Gombrowicz's novel has adopted the generic principles of the Baroque nobleman's oral tale, known in the nationalistically inclined Polish tradition as *gawęda* (rendered here in a seventeenth-century English à la Swift and Defoe), only that in its grotesque representation of the Polish community in Buenos Aires and its pompous patriotic rhetoric about the 'Fatherland' it is vehemently challenged. By endowing the narrator with his own name and his own real-life experiences, he achieves an incongruity between the narrator's questionable identity and the quasi-highfalutin speech he uses consistently in his narrative monologue. As what happens to the writer after his arrival in Buenos Aires is told in a style which by many is felt to be 'quintessentially Polish', the effect is perhaps more provocative than humorous. This is especially so if we take Witold's stylization to be quintessentially transatlantic, the in-betweenness of his account reflecting not only the writer's exilic imagination, but also his monomaniacal quest for identity, in both its national and sexual aspects.

Here again, we find the dialectical dualism 'Form' and Chaos.' Witold finds himself engaged in a battle of loyalty between, on the one hand, the Polish émigré community, whose main representatives are the pompous Ambassador and the chivalrous ex-Major, and on the other, his new society represented by the Argentinian *puto*. In one of his duel-like conversations with Gonzalo, the narrator ends up in a dilemmatic situation similar to that of Zantman and the Dancer, attempting to associate with the heterosexual 'Patria' (*Ojczyzna*) and its homoerotic counterpart 'Filistria' (*Synczyzna*) in equal measure. He throws, nevertheless, an impassioned curse on his countrymen returning to Europe on the same ocean liner he had arrived on, eager to distance himself from Poland and everything Polish: 'Sail, sail, you compatriots, to your People! Sail to the Holy Nation of yours

haply Cursed! Sail to that St Monster Dark, dying for ages yet unable to die! Sail to your St Freak, cursed by all Nature, ever being born and still unborn! [. . .] With this Curse, turning my back on the ship, I entered the town.’ (pp. 6–7)

Considering the weight of this transatlantic gesture, Witold’s sea journey may be understood as an ‘Escape from Planet Poland’,<sup>16</sup> only that he is less trying to break away from Poland and Polishness, than to prepare for the actualization of his own national and sexual identity. Already over the novel’s opening pages, before Gonzalo leads him into the homosexual underworld, his new country gradually takes on the contours of a so-called *queer* site. In the last resort, Witold’s life in Buenos Aires is realized in accordance with the poetics of in-betweenness (‘Sail, sail, so he will not suffer you to Live or Die but keep you for ever between being and Non-being,’ p. 6). In what has rightly been branded an ‘Argentinian novel by a Polish writer’,<sup>17</sup> homoeroticism questions not only nationalist standards but challenges any fixed idea about male sexuality as well.

*. . . and we ride rather smartly, albeit empty, hollow*

While trying to cope with ‘the perennial track’ of his life, Witold welcomes, albeit hesitantly, Gonzalo’s erotic advances: ‘I could have no trace of doubt that my lot was to have happen to me a Puto. It was he and I who before all Walked, Walked as in a couple forever coupled!’ (p. 36). By allowing himself to escape with the Argentinian millionaire into the gender-bending world of homosexual desire, he also suspends the ‘form’ imposed on him by the demands of the stifling Polish émigré community (‘Gombrowicz our guest! . . . the Genius Gombrowicz himself . . . Genius of that Glorious Nation of ours! . . . Great Man of that Great Nation of ours!’, p. 15). Although Witold feigns respectability and pretends, not unlike Zantman, that he knows less than he does — ‘I knew not what he would and what asks for, or perchance Lusts for’ (p. 37) — Gonzalo, who roams the nocturnal city for young men in the most humiliating circumstances, has become his ally.

The protracted ‘walking’ business takes place in the Polish Embassy’s Ceremonial Hall and gestures public cruising, the display of illicit sexual interest. Witold is afraid that he will disgrace himself, but does not leave his companion; on the contrary, he seems compelled to join him (‘I will not desert him in any case since he walked with me and so together we walk’, pp. 40–41). And so the two men escape into the seedy sailor-and-soldier-haunted Retiro park, only to end up in a low-brow dance hall, where Gonzalo is singing at the top of his voice: ‘*Mother forbids the dance. And still I do prance!*’ (p. 47). Witold introduces himself to the old ex-Major, after which Gonzalo, who lusts after his son Ignacy, throws a beer mug at him and is then challenged to a duel! From these racy events onwards, the Polish ‘Patria’ values are most clearly being challenged by those of the Argentinian ‘Filistria’; the narrator relates how he together with the ex-Major and his son are invited to ‘carouse’ at Gonzalo’s estancia (pp. 79–84), a place permeated by hybridity: objects of high art compete with kitsch; pet animals are unnaturally

cross-bred; the queer himself wears pumps and something resembling a cross between a skirt, a dressing gown, and a ladies' blouse; the guests are being attended to by young male servants dressed in skirts, and so on. To top it all, in the middle of the night an orgy takes place.

There is, however, little attraction between the narrator and his Argentinian host, at least not in the conventional sense. Gonzalo prefers young boys, whereas Witold is fascinated primarily by the sheer transgressiveness of his friend's *queerness*. In fact, the former is the latter's alter ego; as rivals, they are both drawn towards the same object of desire, the ex-Major's son. In Witold's own words: 'My father had these many years been dead. Mother far away. Children I have none, and when no Friends nor any near ones, let me at least another's child glimpse, and the Son, although another's, see . . . To the Son, the Son, to the Son, to the Son!'

(p. 73). Gombrowicz's interactional anthropology (within which homo-eroticism is an important form of communication) becomes most evident in the narrator's distancing of himself from such symbolic categories as 'Home', 'Family', and 'Parenthood', whilst, at the same time, epitomizing the immature 'Son' as the only 'value in itself', a constant guarantee of rebirth and rejuvenation. We might say that Witold, like a parodic version of Thomas Mann's Aschenbach, rediscovers his own youth not in Venice, but in Buenos Aires, and understands that it is no longer accessible to him as a living experience. The sense of loss of his youth is compensated through a spectacular symbiosis with youths mostly in a naval or military uniform. In this way, immersing himself in 'inferiority', 'degradation', 'lowness', 'freshness', and 'immaturity', Witold intimates that he has problems with the conventional family.<sup>18</sup>

A word here on the 'Argentinianness' centred around the intriguing figure of Gonzalo. In parts, his world mirrors the fractures of Witold or the 'implied' author. But although Gonzalo is the queer, the *puto*, he adheres to customs and habits which would seem typical of the Argentinian, quintessentially straight 'señorito'; after all, he owns a cattle-farm and commands his servants in a rather old-fashioned 'feudal' style: "'You, such an Idler, why do you not stand? For what do I pay you? Here you must Stand for Parade!'" (p. 84). References to Gonzalo's straddling of genders and sexualities, as well as old and new world values, abound in Witold's account throughout. Indeed, he seems to embrace the currently held view that Buenos Aires of the 1940s was the great South American setting of a culture of mixture (*cultura de mezcla*), archaic and modern, peripheral and cosmopolitan, simultaneously.<sup>19</sup> Here, in view of the hero-narrator's Argentinian 'mirror', Gombrowicz's autobiographical and fictional selves seem to enter into contact with an alien identity, studying it but never adopting it completely, always remaining in-between — in multiculture.<sup>20</sup>

On the whole, the pressure to succumb to the conventions of the old world as represented by the Polish émigré community never ceases; in scene after scene, the narrator describes his weakness in this regard with the phrase 'I fell to my knees'.

But at his Argentinian friend's cattle-ranch, he can explore the values of his new world: 'On a bed by the wall Ignac a-lying is, naked as a Newborn babe [. . .] seemingly as a decent youth he slept. But whilst he sleeps, withim him Knavery, and — ah, God, a Knave he is, naught else, Knave, Knave, capable of any Knavery, and were he given free rein he would become a Knave like to those Knaves!' (pp. 93–94). Not only is Witold revealing here the same-sex attraction he feels towards the youthful Pole, but he also transposes onto him his own 'degenerate' dreams and desires ('were he given free rein he would become a Knave like to those Knaves!'), rendering the 'Newborn babe' his second alter ego. The vacillation between desire and reluctance is underscored by the 'empty, empty' refrain which runs over a total of twenty-five pages; even before arriving at Gonzalo's cattle-ranch, Witold complains: 'Hard that Mountain of mine in the emptiness of that track of mine in that Field of Mine, yet Empty, Empty as if 'twere naught [. . .] so the horses draw the carriage, and we ride rather smartly, albeit Empty, Hollow' (p. 79). The narrator highlights his own tendency of expressing the 'unsayable' whilst, at the same time, pointing to the related void, or loneliness, of his in-between predicament as an exile.<sup>21</sup>

The regularly recurring 'empty, empty' could be a send-up of T. S. Eliot's poem *The Hollow Men* (1925).<sup>22</sup> Although this transatlantic exile liked to be thought of as the most impersonal of poets, looking at the world with a detached and objective eye, critics have indicated that an ambiguous sexual orientation underlay his 'impersonality', one effect of which was to give the impression that he had something to hide.<sup>23</sup> In this light, the Eliotian intertext offers an intriguing angle to Gombrowicz's hero-narrator, whose exilic life too can be said to exist in a shadow 'between the idea and the reality, the motion and the act.'<sup>24</sup> In a word, the author's subtle parody of Eliot's lyrical self culminates, as it were, with the open ending of Witold's story; it is a boisterous repartee to 'The Hollow Men', which ends, resignedly, 'Not with a bang but with a whimper!'<sup>25</sup> Is this another signpost bespeaking the importance of rethinking Gombrowicz's *gay science*, his wild 'art of poetry'?

### *Dancing to a different tune*

Everything must dissolve. When the Polish ex-Major declares that he will commit filicide in order to restore the honour of his defiled name, Witold cries out in horror and disbelief: 'In the emptiness of that Fear of mine, emptily, emptily, swiftly I left the room' (p. 89). The stressing of 'emptiness' is one of several stratagems used to smokescreen his own homoerotic desire, a typical instance of saying both yes and no — craving the son, while sympathizing with the father — of expressing himself in his own 'language of the unsayable'. By implication, the emptiness points at Witold's dual stance: is he insincere and trivial, or drained of energy and emotion, or perhaps both? On the whole, this fluctuation makes it possible for the hero-

narrator to endure exile; there must always be a backdoor left ajar, an exit route available for him ('emptily, swiftly, I left the room'). And yet, towards the culmination of his narrative, the straddling of 'Form' and 'Chaos', Polishness and Argentinianess, heterosexuality and homosexuality, closedness and openness, becomes overwhelming.

As Witold, Gonzalo, the ex-Major and his son, are about to join the Polish émigré community in a traditional feast, the erotically loaded action accelerates. In the woods nearby the Polish Baron is 'riding' on one of his business partners ('[. . .] this sight so Painful and so Awesome, Dreadsome, so O'erdreadsome, that into a pillar of salt I turned and as if frozen could not move', p. 119); inside the banqueting room, Gonzalo has commissioned a friend to constantly mime, or try to 'seduce', Ignacy ('in a Boombam they dance', p. 120): the latter hits a ball, the former drives a peg into a post, the latter hits the ball, the former keeps hammering and so on. Indeed, here the circularity of action blurs the difference between the two young men, and eventually, leads the Pole to second the Argentinian, *his* alter ego, when he kills Ignacy's father; Witold knows full well that the young Pole is prepared to kill the father and shivers at the ensuing scandal ('[. . .] what Shame there will be, indeed he will bam, bam, bam!').<sup>26</sup> The national and erotic tension simply becomes too much for the hero-narrator who opts for neither openness nor closedness. Therefore, parodying the euphoria of the final part of the famous patriotic epos *Pan Tadeusz* (1834), entitled 'Let Us Love One Another', as well as mocking Eliot's words 'Not with a bang but with a whimper!', Witold dissolves his own narrative with ambiguous dancing: 'And so from Laughter into Laughter, they with Laughter Boom, with laughter bam, boom, boom, bam Boom! . . .' (p. 122).<sup>27</sup> Faced with their local guests, the Poles are trying to recreate traditional Polishness in the sensual climate of Argentina. Gombrowicz, however, has suspended the relentless dilemma of having to choose.

Of course, the narrator of *Trans-Atlantyka* is obsessed by Ignacy's immaturity much in the same way as Zantman yearns for the anarchic sailors, or conversely, the Dancer is preoccupied with the maturity of the established lawyer. While going along with the Polish émigré community ('Patria'), Witold is, at the same time, walking within the world of the Argentinian queer ('Filistria'). Considering that he yields to as well as dismisses the sexual excesses at Gonzalo's cattle-ranch, is frightened, appalled but follows him into the parks, only to involve him in a seductive mazurka — we could say that here homoeroticism is steeped in cultural ambivalence. Since homosexuality by itself offers no other conclusion than all-embracing mockery, Witold subjects himself to the in-betweenness of nationalities and sexualities.<sup>28</sup> Indeed, the agenda of every Gombrowicz hero appears to be to represent one's self without really presenting a stable subject. Thus the function of transatlanticism becomes to seduce the reader into participating in a fictional contract whereby he or she is never certain what is invention and what is truth, the latter being, to cite Oscar Wilde, 'rarely pure and never simple'.

Now sociologists have been telling us since the 1970s that modern lives are to be understood as a migration through different social worlds and as the successive realization of a number of possible identities, and that we all possess ‘multiple attachments and identities’ — ‘cross-cutting identities’. With regard to the mercurial doubling described above, would it be it odd, therefore, to consider Gombrowicz’s transatlantic individualization process in the light of various ‘globalist’ concepts of culture? I think not.

### *Gombrowicz going global?*

According to the philosopher Wolfgang Iser, criticism of the traditional conception of single cultures, as well as of the more recent notions of interculturality and multiculturalism can be summarized as follows:

If cultures were in fact still — as these concepts suggest — constituted in the form of islands or spheres, then one could neither rid oneself of, nor solve the problem of their coexistence and cooperation. However, the description of today’s cultures as islands or spheres is factually incorrect and normatively deceptive. Cultures de facto no longer have the insinuated form of homogeneity and separateness. They have instead assumed a new form, which is to be called transcultural insofar that it passes through classical cultural boundaries (my italics).<sup>29</sup>

Cultural conditions thus understood are largely characterized by mixes, permeations, and hybridization; henceforward there is no longer anything absolutely foreign. Everything is within reach. Accordingly, there is no longer anything exclusively ‘own’ either. ‘Authenticity has become folklore,’ says Iser, ‘it is ownness simulated for others — to whom the indigene himself belongs.’<sup>30</sup> Within this contemporary frame of reference, it makes sense to conceive of Gombrowicz and cultural multiplicity on two different levels: on an inner, textual level, where various cultural elements blend together in his exile fiction; and, on an outer, meta-level, where the writer emerges as a ‘transnational actor’ in the context of literary and cultural history. On the meta-level in particular, we may speak of self-representation by constantly challenging the primacy of national, cultural and sexual ‘form’. Interestingly, Gombrowicz’s *Testament* abounds with suggestive identity-probing statements (‘My ‘self’ is nothing but my will to be myself’, p. 77) which are substantiated with backward glances at the origins of the writer’s own life:

In that Proustian epoch of the beginning of the century, we were a displaced family whose social status was far from clear, living between Lithuania and the former Congress Kingdom of Poland [. . .] between what is known as ‘good society’ and another, more middle-class society. These were the first ‘betweens’, which subsequently multiplied until they almost constituted my domicile, my actual homeland. (p. 28)

Note how Gombrowicz initiates the description of his own Polish childhood by



alluding to Marcel Proust, the author of the first great modernist novel in which homosexuality takes centre stage, as both concept for discussion and behaviour for observation. Note too how he stresses his familial situation as a kind of intermediate state, then how 'the first between's' increase in number until they finally make up his 'actual homeland' (*wčasaciwa ojczyzna*). With this declaration alone, it is as if Gombrowicz calls for emancipation from monoglossic bondage, to use the Bakhtinian term; as I have indicated, he shows all the signs of a writer who is linguistically, ideologically and sexually homeless, who has no language of his own, but does possess his own style, his own organic and unitary law governing the way he plays with languages and the way his own real semantic and expressive intentions are refracted within them.

As suggested by Wojciech Karpiński, directness was not something bequeathed to Gombrowicz; he never seems to have looked a person in the eye. Instead he sought reality through an alluring style so vibrant that it transformed his obsessive self-mythology — the staging of his Argentinian beginnings, the returns to his Polish past, the transatlantic journeys into reality.<sup>31</sup> And this is the crux of the matter: for 'transatlantic' Gombrowicz the past exists in the present, which contains the future; the concrete and ever present instance of duration is life itself, for he is his own time. His 'actual homeland' can be said to be virtual. Not unlike a computer-generated environment that (to the person experiencing it) appears real to the senses, home emerges as an imagined location closely resembling reality but also as a differing and potential site, that is a plane of consciousness which is tacit and in all but name, to be deciphered by the reader. Certainly, the most common currency of the globalism exported all over the world today is money and popular culture. In dealing with Gombrowicz's transatlanticism, however, we need to think in a different medium of exchange, which is also a feature of global culture: namely homesickness, or more to the point, a longing for a complete home that no longer exists and never existed.<sup>32</sup>

Again, it's not only about the past, but prospective as well retrospective. The author of *Trans-Atlantyka* directs his gaze not only backwards but sideways, often expresses himself in ironic fragments, undermining both a linear conception of progress and a Hegelian dialectical teleology. Thus Gombrowicz's fantasies of his past, including political as well as personal events, are determined by certain needs of his present and therefore have a direct impact on the realities of the future. Because the present is always too aggressive, he never, not 'even when life is waning,' represents his past clearly, dispassionately, for 'the more this present life is moulded, polished, defined, the further it plunges into the troubled waters of the past in order to fish out what alone can be of use to it in the present' (*Testament*, p. 33). To invoke Svetlana Boym's phrasology, it is Gombrowicz's consideration of the future that makes him take responsibility for his nostalgic tales, whether being directed at Poland or Argentina or a place on the border of the two.<sup>33</sup> Therefore, his transatlantic strategies have little to do with capricious leaps from one plane of

consciousness to another, but evidence rather a 'virtual' realm of cherished hopes and their potential fulfilment, a *dreamscape* across and beyond.<sup>34</sup>

Gombrowicz's understanding of identity and human relations so obviously hinges on transnationality (the criss-crossing of national borders) and on multilocation (being intimately linked to many different places simultaneously) that he may be considered a *casual transculturalist*. In most of his writings, distant localities are linked in such a way that local happenings are shaped by the events occurring on the other side of the Atlantic and vice versa. 'Farewell, America! Yes, but what sort of America? . . . what had they really been, those twenty-four years that sail with me to Europe?' (*Diary III*, p. 71). This quote from the *Diary* referring to Gombrowicz's reverse transatlantic crossing (1964), reflects the writer's use of a literary model, whereby the sea journey is a strange no man's land, suspended between the familiar and the foreign, as well as points to the peculiar circumstances of his return: from the domesticated location (though 'foreign' — Argentina) to the undomesticated location (though 'familiar' — Europe). This is why Gombrowicz dwells more on the fears and the worries connected with his Polish and Argentinian pasts (as well as with his Parisian future), than on his immediate impressions from the journey itself.<sup>35</sup> In fact, it is as though the elderly writer, glancing both backwards and forwards, dramatizes the very problem of straddling different worlds: '*Te quiero*. An Argentinian says, "I want you" instead of "I love you" [. . .] I needed desperately to get close to Europe in no other way except in a state of passionate intoxication with Argentina, with America (pp. 74–75).' In so many of his texts, multilocation seems to imply that the literary persona keeps falling in love with what is different in different places; in some cases, he can even be said to marry the faces and histories of these places, and initiate, as it were, an erotic 'relationship' with them. Gombrowicz's continuous communication with different places in different worlds is also an expression of his transnational 'place polygamy', the gateway to transculturality — or globality — in his own staged life.

So in Gombrowicz's creation of self, the confrontational forces of culture occur not only 'out there' but also at the centre of his life, in circles of friends, at work, at the café, playing chess, listening to music, boozing, having sex, and so on. It may not be deliberate, but in his texts the writer actually leads a 'glocal' life, that is, he moves both globally and locally, now among young hustlers in the parks and backstreets of Buenos Aires or with people at the family estate of his Polish childhood, now among employees of the Polish embassy or with fellow passengers on board a European ocean liner bound for South America. His exile is not tied to a particular place; it is not a staid, settled life. It is a 'perennial track', in a literal and transferred sense; it unfolds as an unbroken chain of journeys by bus, train, ship, and so on, to and from various connections in different national, cultural, and social spheres. Thus Gombrowicz's writings are informed by the kind of multilocation which involves crossing the borders of separate worlds — nations, cultures, sexualities — and whose oppositions must or may lodge in his own life. It would seem that the writer's 'process' of exile is experienced on the level of identity-in-

itself.<sup>36</sup> Similarly, most of us today are certainly transcending our traditional cultural boundaries more and more, we are becoming transcultural. But this does not necessarily mean that our cultural formation is becoming the same all over the world. On the contrary, the processes of globalization and becoming transcultural imply a great variety of differentiation. If Gombrowicz can be said to be ‘going global,’ it would be in this meaning of the word.

*Conclusion: eroticizing exile, or the queer afterlife of Witold Gombrowicz*

Gombrowicz counteracts the traditional notion of cultures as homogeneous islands or enclosed spheres, because internally in his fictional world cultures are determined by a pluralization of identities and because externally his fiction exhibits border-crossing contours. As a transcultural event, Gombrowicz’s postwar prose might be understood not only on the macrocultural level, but in the same way on the individual microlevel: as a writer as well as a human being, he takes on the contours of a cultural hybrid. Thus he belongs to a creative subgroup, or layer of European exile literature, which intends a culture whose pragmatic accomplishments exist not in delimitation, but in the ability to link and undergo transition. As indicated by Gombrowicz’s Polish/Argentinian/non-heterosexual osmosis, there is little threat of homogenization or uniformization.

Obviously, Gombrowicz did not have transculturalization as an artistic programme; he is not explicitly preoccupied with the integration of the Argentinian world into his literature, or vice versa, with the incorporation of his own literature into Argentinian culture. Similarly, he is not engaged in forms of activism traditional to identity politics such as consciousness raising, community and institution building, while setting an agenda centred on gaining recognition of, say, homosexuals as an oppressed group. In fact, as a ‘globalizing agent’ he is incurably inconsistent, which becomes evident in the workings of his central obsession, ‘Form’ and ‘Chaos.’ As shown, this dialectical dualism penetrates his heroes’ most private thoughts and feelings, leading to the following plight: striving for ‘Form’, they gain the acceptance of others but lose their individual uniqueness; on the other hand, letting themselves sink into ‘Chaos’, they remain individually unique alright, but others cannot comprehend and accept them. On the level of the writer’s strategies, it is precisely the fluctuation between total closedness and total openness, between two equally unfavourable alternatives of human reciprocity and culture, that sustains his fictionalizing scheme. In this sense, Gombrowicz’s representation of himself as a Polish as well as homosexual writer in exile is ‘transatlantic’.

In order to grasp the implications of the Gombrowiczian transatlanticism for the construction of sexual identity, let us keep in view the following ‘authorial’ statement: ‘It is not only I who give myself a meaning. Even the others do that. Out of the conflict between these interpretations arises a third meaning which determines me’ (in *Diary III*, p. 85). Gombrowicz’s representation of ‘a third

meaning' renders it possible for him to deal with something which is omnipresent and omnipotent, using his own ambiguous erotics. It is important here that the laboriously carried out 'man meets boy' exploration is not only about age, youth, and sex, but also about fear, loneliness, and the undying hope for connection that makes up the gist of his anthropology. In this connection, Gombrowicz's habit of displacing and concealing erotic content is really about directing and controlling the energy of a primitive impulse ('my monstrosity' is but one allusion to his closeted homosexuality) into activities that are socially more acceptable. Hence the unsettled identity of his hero-narrators which remains, as we have seen, a process or rather a compromise between the self and 'the others', who in principle are always preliminary and open to renegotiation.<sup>37</sup> In this respect, Gombrowicz's transatlantic strategies may be viewed as anti-global in as much as he is forced continually to yield to 'Form' (= an essentialist understanding of nationality and sexuality).

To those subscribing part and parcel to poststructuralist literary theory, the question of the writer's sexual preferences will, undoubtedly, have no relevance for his literary works. Of course, it depends on the motives for reading him. With my approach to the Gombrowiczian void or 'hollowness', I have suggested that the source of his acute responsiveness to the social game and its subtle processes is precisely his own ambivalent identity. Regarding the formation of a homosexual identity, Gombrowicz's use of Ban/Bunburyism takes on a special charge, because he finds himself not only in conflict with the sexual norms and judgments of the surrounding world, but is also permanently in disagreement with himself. Inasmuch as Witold, Zantman, and the Dancer tend, alternately, to camouflage and uncover their erratic movements, leaving the business of deciphering them at the reader's own discretion, the ultimate dancer would seem to be the author himself.<sup>38</sup> In this way, the writer's eroticization of exile amounts to an intriguing sublimation of ambiguous gayness. With his transatlantic strategies he masters his Polish past, conjures up his imagined homeland and the evasive identity of the heroes, using his personal experience of exile. In every aspect, his hero's life story arises out of the author's awareness of his own emotional states and life processes; instead of collectivizing history, he privatizes it, subjectivizes it beyond identity politics — social and political events take on meaning only when transposed into the world of personal concerns.

Although we cannot write for (or to) Witold Gombrowicz, we can, to cite Roland Barthes, 'write' him and contribute to the description of his afterlife. Many of his erotic gestures invite multiple readings, the final ones in particular: 'My words were soon whirled away in a violent dance', he wrote.<sup>39</sup> A great dancer is not just performing (a role) but being (a dancer); in my opinion, the dance in question was meant to be. What would I have liked to talk about with Gombrowicz? About his intimate secrets, the harbour inns and the Retiro Park that he frequented, the kindness of casual friends and strangers on whom he depended — all of which is accessible to others in so far as it could be transformed into his work? As to the

importance of his being earnest, my answer must come in the words of Karpiński: 'I know an honest conversation would not have been possible with Gombrowicz, but I do know that I can always resume my conversation with his work'.<sup>40</sup> In this essay I have tried to do so.

## Notes

<sup>1</sup> See, for example, Stanisław Eile, 'Clown Turned Bard: Witold Gombrowicz,' *Modernist Trends in Twentieth-Century Polish Fiction* (School of Slavonic and East European Studies, University of London, 1996), pp. 103–15; *Gombrowicz's Grimaces: Nationality, Modernism, Gender*, ed. by Ewa Ziarek (State University of New York Press, 1998); Anton Sergl, 'Don't Cry For Me,' *Anzeiger für Slawische Philologie*, 28/29 (2000), 357–72; Knut Andreas Grimstad, 'Co zdarzyło się na brygu Banbury? Gombrowicz, erotyka i prowokacja kultury,' *Teksty drugie*, 3 (2002), 57–69; German Ritz, 'Język pożądania u Witolda Gombrowicza,' *Niś w labiryncie pożądania. Gender i płęć w literaturze polskiej od romantyzmu do postmodernizmu* (Warsaw: Wiedza powszechna, 2002), pp. 196–261.

<sup>2</sup> *Pornografia* (1960) is the title of Gombrowicz's novel whose action takes place in wartime occupied Poland in 1943: it revolves around two middle-aged men who lust after a seventeen-year-old boy during a visit at a country estate.

<sup>3</sup> Henceforth all Gombrowicz quotations, unless otherwise specified, will refer to *Diary 1953–1966*, vol. 1–3, trans. by L. Valllee (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1988); *A Kind of Testament*, ed. by D. de Roux and trans. by A. Hamilton (London: Calder & Boyars, 1973); and, *Trans-Atlantyk*, trans. by C. French and N. Karsov (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994).

<sup>4</sup> I would like to thank my anonymous readers for their excellent suggestions and very useful comments, as well as my friends and colleagues who have discussed many aspects of this essay with me, especially Zbigniew Basara, Włodzimierz Bolecki, Astrid Brokke, Greg Castillo, Catriona Kelly, Jadwiga Kvadsheim, György Péteri, Ursula Phillips, and Nina Witoszek.

<sup>5</sup> Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Gay Science*, ed. by B. Williams, trans. by J. Nauckhoff and A. del Caro (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), p. 14.

<sup>6</sup> Włodzimierz Bolecki establishes this anagrammatic connection in his 'Tajemnica Kosmosu', in *Jan Błoński i literatura XX wieku*, ed. by M. Sugiera and R. Nycz (Cracow: Universitas, 2002), pp. 281–83.

<sup>7</sup> W. Gombrowicz, *Dzieła*, vol. i, Cracow 1986, p. 145. The translation is my own.

<sup>8</sup> Gudrun Langer makes a similar point in her 'Witold Gombrowicz's Erzählung 'Zdarzenia na brygu

Banbury' als homoerotischer Maskentext', *Zeitschrift für Slawistik*, 42 (1997), 291.

<sup>9</sup> Translation based on Christopher Makosa's version. See <http://www.cmakosa.com>.

<sup>10</sup> Saint Vitus was invoked against epilepsy, while 'the falling sickness' itself was associated with the devil and diabolic possession.

<sup>11</sup> The phrase 'monstrous bond' echoes Gombrowicz's many allusions to his own

homosexuality in Testament. Consider, for example, the references to his ‘own private, shameful miseries’ (p. 36), to himself as ‘a bizarre monster’ (p. 37) and ‘abnormal’ (p. 39), to his ‘most hideous monsters’ (p. 39), ‘accursed pathology’ and ‘deepest shames’ (p. 66), and to ‘the horror of my life’ (p. 153).

<sup>12</sup> Eva Kosofsky Sedgwick, *Epistemology of the Closet* (London, 1991).

<sup>13</sup> A similar view is taken by Jerzy Jarzębski in his article ‘Gombrowicz: ucieczka z rodzinnego domu’, *W Polsce czyli wszędzie. Szkice o polskiej prozie współczesnej* (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo PEN, 1992), pp. 19–37.

<sup>14</sup> Leonard Neuger introduces this concept in his ‘Polskość jako cel’, *Teksty drugie ½* (1991), 15.

<sup>15</sup> Stanisław Barańczak, ‘Introduction’, in W. Gombrowicz, *Trans-Atlantyk*, trans. by C. French and N. Karsov (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994), p. xiv.

<sup>16</sup> See Sergl, 2000, p. 7ff.

<sup>17</sup> Barańczak, 1994, p. ix.

<sup>18</sup> Gombrowicz seems to indicate, however, that none of these key words are tangent to the ‘truth’ of his life, none of them ‘even approximately convey the nature of this secret’ (*Testament*, p. 95).

<sup>19</sup> Eduardo P. Archetti, in his *Masculinities: Football, Polo and the Tango in Argentina* (Oxford & New York: Berg, 1999), argues that in Buenos Aires key stereotypes of masculinities were created through the modernization process of the early twentieth century, ‘as part of a general quest for identities, imageries and symbols, making the abstract more concrete’ (p. xiii).

<sup>20</sup> Ritz, 2002, p. 199.

<sup>21</sup> I agree with Ewa Płonowska Ziarek that ‘the fear of emptiness within masculinity itself, paradoxically represented in the text as fear of “the lack of Fear,” or the threat of effeminization, provokes the most fierce mobilization of the national spirit.’ See her article ‘The Scar of the Foreigner and the Fold of the Baroque: National Affiliations and Homosexuality in Gombrowicz’s *Trans-Atlantyk*’, in *Gombrowicz’s Grimaces: Nationality, Modernism, Gender*, ed. by E. P. Ziarek (State University of New York Press, 1998), p. 233.

<sup>22</sup> As suggested by Carolyn French and Nina Karsov, ‘Translator’s Note’, in W. Gombrowicz, *Trans-Atlantyk*, trans. by C. French and N. Karsov (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994), p. xxv.

<sup>23</sup> See, for example, Gregory Woods, *A History of Gay Literature: The Male Tradition* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999), pp. 121–23, 187–88.

<sup>24</sup> T. S. Eliot, *Selected Poems* (London: Faber and Faber, 1954), pp. 77–80.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid.

<sup>26</sup> I should like to stress here that it is not my intention to propose an exclusively ‘transatlantic’ reading of Gombrowicz, nor to argue that his narrators are only tempting the readers into entering a world of transgressive behaviour. Rather, the lens of transatlanticism offered is meant to help elicit additional insights into the writer’s works and their poetics, or ‘erotics’, as the case may be. Regarding *Trans-Atlantyk*, one might well argue that the

parody of the Polish *gawęda* perpetuates and varies archetypical topics of the baroque such as vanity, hollowness, and circularity. The figure of the ambassador may serve as another example of ‘baroqueness’: when he holds court in his residency in Buenos Aires, parades Witold Gombrowicz as a national Polish bard or gathers a hunting party of Argentinian and Polish dignitaries, there is little but hollow pomp and mere gestures to re-create the myth of proud and glorious Polishness anchored in the country’s aristocratic tradition. Indeed, alternative readings of the novel would see the categories of hollowness, vanity and circularity at work on a historical, individual, and metaphysical level.

<sup>27</sup> For the exclamations ‘boom’ and ‘bam,’ the Polish original has *bach* (flop! plop!) and *buch* (slap! smack!) respectively; the sexual connotations are perhaps strongest in relation to the latter, which is derived from the verb *buchnąć*, meaning ‘to spurt, to come in gusts’.

<sup>28</sup> Witold also testifies to ambivalence as existence. As a stranger in culture, he is ‘veritable proof that the “naturalness” of the local order is artificial, conventional. By virtue of the contradiction whose embodiment they are (according to the governing self-images of the social order), strangers prove constantly that the world might also have been different’. Ulrich Beck, *Democracy without Enemies*, trans. by M. Ritter (London: Polity Press, 1998), p. 25.

<sup>29</sup> With his concept of transculturality, Welsch seeks to articulate this altered cultural constitution. See W. Welsch, ‘Transculturality: The Puzzling Form of Cultures Today’, in *Spaces of Culture: City, Nation, World*, ed. by M. Featherstone and S. Lash (London, 1999), pp. 194–213.

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 195.

<sup>31</sup> Wojciech Karpiński, ‘Gombrowicz’s Style’, in W. Gombrowicz, *Diary: Volume One*, trans. by L. Vallée (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1988), p. viii.

<sup>32</sup> In this sense, Gombrowicz’s nostalgia (from *nostos* — return home, and *algia* — longing/algos — pain) is a sentiment of loss and displacement, but also — how he would hate to have to admit it! — a ‘romantic’ expression of his own fantasy.

<sup>33</sup> Svetlana Boym, *The Future of Nostalgia* (New York, 2001), p. xviff.

<sup>34</sup> Consider Gombrowicz’s tip-off to those interested in his writing technique: ‘I offer the following recipe: Enter the realm of dreams’ (*Diary 1*, p. 79).

<sup>35</sup> See Dorota Kozicka’s paper, ‘Trzy zapisy morskich podróży: Uniłowski, Gombrowicz, Białoszewski’, presented at the international symposium *Gombrowicz — nasz współczesny*, Cracow, 22–26 May 2004.

<sup>36</sup> Although Gombrowicz was separated from his (communist) homeland and depended largely on supporting institutions such as the journal *Kultura* and the émigré publishing house ‘Institut Littéraire’ in Paris, he can be said to anticipate the new type of emigrant ‘transnational’ author of the postmodern era when great isolation has come to an end. In this connection, Gombrowicz’s in-between fiction enables him, at least on and off, to liberate himself psychically from the inherent constraints that were expected of him, and thus is able to move much more freely in his artistic searches. For a discussion on Poland’s ‘fully-fledged’ transnational émigré writers of today, see George Z. Gasyńska’s ‘Inscribing Otherness: Polish–American Writers After the Great Divide’, in *Living in Translation: Polish Writers in America* (Amsterdam & New York: Editions Rodopi B. V., 2003), pp.

331–77.

<sup>37</sup> Bearing in mind the writer's introduction of 'false identities' imposed upon characters, as well as his characteristic point-of-view acrobatics, it is not surprising that the pervasive 'me' of Gombrowicz remains an enigma, a teasing cipher, a carefully orchestrated metafictional puzzle to which there is no one solution.

<sup>38</sup> I think Gombrowicz's writings make sense as the site of a struggle between homosexual and homophobic energies. In *Testament* (p. 33), referring to his own youth, he writes: 'Even then I led a double life. Within me I felt something obscure which nothing could bring to the light of day. Besides, I was quite incapable of loving. Love was refused me, once and for all, from the start, but was that because I couldn't give it a form, an expression of its own, or because I didn't have it in me? I don't know'.

<sup>39</sup> Gombrowicz, 1973, p.50.

<sup>40</sup> Karpinaski, 1988, p.xvi.



# A COMMUNIST TAKEOVER IN THE DREAM FACTORY — APPROPRIATION OF POPULAR GENRES BY THE EAST GERMAN FILM INDUSTRY

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*During the 1960s the East German state-controlled film studio DEFA drastically increased their production of popular genre films. This development was propelled by the competition from an unrelenting flow of western radio- and television signals transgressing the Berlin Wall. These East German genre films took their iconographical cues from the commercial genres of Western Europe and Hollywood, but filled the forms with appropriate socialist content.*

*In this article I investigate this appropriation of internationally established film genres in the GDR as a point of convergence between the transsystemic discourse of popular culture and the strong isolationist efforts of the GDR state. Through empirically informed close analysis of the musical *Heißer Sommer* and the western *Spur des Falken*, I aim to show how these very awkward negotiations between isolation and integration led to a reinvention of the genres in question, and how this process can be traced in the films' narratives.*

## *Introduction*

Film censorship in the GDR in the late 1960s was among the strictest in Eastern Europe. Films from capitalist countries were shown only after being scrutinized by a censorship board, and often films from the other socialist countries, including the Soviet Union, could not be screened in the GDR because their content was deemed in violation with local cultural policy.<sup>1</sup> However, this isolationist stance was somewhat ironically accompanied by a substantial import of American and West European films and a commitment to imitating the enemy's product within the national film industry.<sup>2</sup>

Highlighting this self-contradictory relationship to the west, I want to contribute to the lifting of the thick cold war mist which obscures the degree to which one of the most isolated of all state-socialist countries (post-1961 GDR) was nevertheless

deeply embedded in a transsystemic flow of pop-cultural concepts and ideas. My angle of incidence in this article is to explore how this flow was interpreted and handled within East German cultural policy. Although it is obvious that pop-cultural phenomena, like everything else in the public sphere, were affected by the cold war antagonisms of the 1960s, detailed studies of these processes are still scarce. This article attempts to counter the commonly held belief that postwar film making in Eastern Europe was only about oppressed film makers struggling to smuggle subversive political metaphors past evil censors. While this may be a very important part of East European film history, its long-time position as the dominating trope for books and articles on East European film has all but eclipsed the vast range of entertainment films which were produced under communist rule.

Drawing on previously unpublished archival material in textual analyses of the two most popular East German films of 1968 — the western *Spur des Falken* and the musical *Heißer Sommer* — I trace and examine changes which were made within these genres as they were transferred from Hollywood and Western Europe to an East German setting. This interweaving of archival material with textual readings reveals the very awkward negotiations which took place between the requirements of established genre conventions and specific cultural policy demands placed on film makers in the late 1960s GDR.

### *Cultural–historical context*

The cultural climate in the GDR in the second half of the 1960s is known as the absolute freezing point in the republic's cultural history. However, culturally the decade started out on a quite positive note.

After the erection of the Berlin Wall in 1961 many groups in East German society were subjected to stricter surveillance and harsher state control than before. For many artists, however, the new isolation brought a certain degree of liberalization of censorship. Now that the so called *antifaschistischer Schutzwall* (anti-fascist bulwark) was in place the East Germans could finally feel 'safe and free amongst their own', according to official propaganda.<sup>3</sup> Thus, for a while, the artistic expression of contemporary social critique was officially regarded as a way of bettering and bolstering the socialist republic, rather than as acts of subversion. Over the next four years East German filmmakers became increasingly courageous in tackling social problems on film. This was done without the hitherto required socialist realist concept of 'the superimposition of the better 'soon' on a still imperfect 'now'.<sup>4</sup> An increasing number of stories about non-political and/or rebellious youth and their problems with society, parents, and Party were now being told with an unusual honesty and directness. These films were known as *Gegenwartsfilme* (contemporary films).

In 1965 this trend came to an abrupt end. During the 11<sup>th</sup> Plenum of the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party (SED) in December of 1965 the Party ruthlessly struck down on what they termed a 'bourgeois scepticist' movement by

banning almost a whole year's production of films and blacklisting both established and up-and-coming film makers. The wrath of the SED in the winter of 1965 and the spring of 1966 also touched other groups of artists, as well as writers, publishers and people working in television. This purge has later come to be known as the *Kahlschlag* (clear-felling) of talent and ambition in East German cultural life.<sup>5</sup>

One of the first films to emerge from this 'deforested' cultural landscape was the first ever East German western. *Die Söhne der Großen Bärin* (The Sons of the Great Mother Bear) premiered at East Berlin film theaters on 18 February 1966. It was instantly recognizable as a western — complete with cowboys, Indians, and noisy saloons — and became one of the biggest hits in GDR film history.<sup>6</sup> Over the next ten years the East German state-monopolized film company Deutsche Film Aktiengesellschaft (DEFA) produced ten western films and four musicals.<sup>7</sup> Some attempts had previously been made by DEFA within the musical genre prior to the *Kahlschlag*, but the post-1965 musicals represented a new, youthful style and clearly expressed the ambition to compete with American and West European popular genre films — on the competitors' home turf, so to speak.

### *Pop-culture as cold war battleground*

American and West German popular culture was from the very start of East German history viewed as a thoroughly decadent and dangerous phenomenon. In an important cultural policy document of the early 1950s the impact of American beat music was described as:

a veritable mudslide of boogie-woogie [. . .] being released on the German people through radio, film and gramophone records, a slide which our German Democratic Republic in no way will remain untouched by. It would be a mistake to underestimate the dangerous, warmongering role of the American hit tune music.<sup>8</sup>

This basic premise in the battle against American and West European pop music remained unchanged throughout the 1960s.<sup>9</sup> Certainly the erection of the Berlin wall in August 1961 stemmed the flow of West European and American recordings and related fan magazines etc., but there was no stopping the boundless radio waves and television signals emanating from powerful transmitters in West Berlin. Conflicts between local administrators of culture and members of popular rock 'n' roll bands reached a peak in 1965. The available documents from the Ministry of Culture leave no question about the seriousness with which this trend was treated. The belief in the 'warmongering role' of pop music went straight to the top of the socialist party leadership.<sup>10</sup>

An illustrative example is the political impact made by one small concert review printed in the socialist party newspaper *Neues Deutschland* on 4 April 1965.<sup>11</sup> At

the end of this short review the claim was made that there was no essential difference between capitalist and socialist dance music. This statement was regarded as outrageous by the cultural authorities, represented by the Culture Division of the Central Committee, and to clear up any confusion surrounding the ideological status of western pop music the article was soon after discussed in meetings between representatives from the Ministry of Culture and leaders of the SED's youth organization FDJ in Leipzig.<sup>12</sup> Later it was the subject for two consecutive sessions in the Culture Division of the Central Committee.<sup>13</sup> In the months to come many so-called beat bands were banned from performing and rock and beat music was singled out as one of the serious threats to socialist society during the aforementioned *Kahlschlag*-Plenum in December of 1965. This was the culmination of a long-lasting debate over the role of popular music in socialist society. Already in 1961 the Agitation and Propaganda Division of SED's Central Committee had released an official newsletter with the telling title 'NATO-Politik und Tanzmusik' where — in an echo of the above cited 1951 document — the West German *Schlager* music was attacked as decadent, vindictive, anti-humanist war propaganda, in which 'mankind is offended and beauty is violated'.<sup>14</sup> Radio Luxembourg and the US sponsored Berlin-based radio station RIAS were singled out as the prime offenders of mankind. The newsletter concluded that new legislation to restrict the further distribution of western pop and dance music would be introduced, with legal basis in existing constitutional bans against 'chauvinism and war propaganda' and 'distribution of anti-humanist ideology'. Significantly, the newsletter also stated that film was the only other art form, apart from the Schlager- and dance music, with which one could reach the whole of the young population, and which therefore had to be very closely monitored and regulated.

### *Accommodating the young through entertainment*

Much as the Cultural Division of the Central Committee wanted to stem the flow of western beat-music and popular film, they were also committed to keeping the young East Germans happy, or at least, enthusiastic about the continuous progress of the socialist state. The creation and preservation of this progressive enthusiasm in the hearts of the young was placed high on the political agenda in the late 1960s. At the 7<sup>th</sup> Congress of the Socialist Unity Party (SED) in 1967, the head of state Walter Ulbricht devoted a significant part of his key speech on 'social development at the completion of socialism' to the role of the arts in socialist society.<sup>15</sup> This was necessary and expected since there was much uncertainty and scrambling in the cultural community as a result of the harsh crackdown on culture in 1965. In order to see clearly the changes in cultural climate and policy towards popular culture at this point it is illuminating to compare Ulbricht's deliberations over art and society at the 1967 7<sup>th</sup> Party Congress with corresponding statements made at the (pre *Kahlschlag*) 6<sup>th</sup> Party Congress held in 1963. It soon becomes clear that the

language had changed in two specific respects related to the challenges posed by western influence on East German popular music and film. Firstly, the demarcation towards the West had become much sharper because the local cultural sector had failed to counter the surge of western influence. In a passage about entertainment art from 1963 Ulbricht could say that ‘in earlier times music was simply copied from the West [. . .] and there is much that is good and progressive there’.<sup>16</sup> While his description of the role of entertainment art in the west in 1967 — especially in West Germany — would typically sound like this: ‘Through the overwhelming majority of products from a manipulated *Unkultur* under the ideological influence of monopolistic capitalism, a distorted view of man is systematically being developed in West Germany.’<sup>17</sup> He followed this claim with an explanation of how commercial capitalist culture manipulates consumers into subservience and servility:

This manipulated *Unkultur* is intended to distract the consumers from any criticism of the imperialist system of domination, but at the same time make them adapt the historically outdated ethical ideals of the capitalist world, in order to make economic exploitation and political oppression seem like laws of nature.<sup>18</sup>

The second major change of emphasis from 1963 to 1967 was the call for the development of a socialist *Unterhaltungskunst* (entertainment art) to counter the ‘decadent’ and ‘soulless’ entertainment from the West. Ulbricht complained that much still remained to be done before the full potential of socialist entertainment was realized and said that all artists should consider this problem very seriously, and that ‘all possible efforts must be made [. . .] in order to create a socialist *Unterhaltungskunst*.’<sup>19</sup> In Ulbricht’s view there was one obstacle in particular which held up the development of entertainment forms that could rival those of the enemy. Far too many artists claimed that it was beneath their dignity to make entertainment art, according to Ulbricht, despite the fact that a plan for the development of socialist entertainment concepts had been laid already by the Bitterfelder Conference in 1959.

It was in other words the authorities who were pushing for entertainment while the artists were holding back. This was also the case within DEFA. The conflict between art and entertainment had polarized into a standoff between influential DEFA film makers on the one side and cultural policy enforcers in the studio leadership and censors at the Film Bureau in the Ministry of Culture<sup>20</sup> on the other. In a report from January 1964, from the leader of the Culture Division of the Central Committee, Siegfried Wagner, to the very powerful leader of the Ideology Commission, Kurt Hager, Wagner proudly states that the new leadership at DEFA has ‘energetically taken up the battle against the disapproval [among certain DEFA film makers] of entertainment genres, which for a long time obstructed development in this field.’ The obstruction was identified as intellektuelle *Geschmäcklereien* (intellectual taste-quibbling) against primitiveness and

platitudes, on the part of snobbish film makers who did not realize the need for films which filled the all-important criterion of *Massenwirksamkeit*.<sup>21</sup>

The renewed and sharper demarcation towards the west, combined with the encouragement to explore every entertainment genre, were the cultural policy signals needed to set off the flourish within exotic and traditionally escapist genres such as the western and the musical in post-*Kahlschlag* GDR film.<sup>22</sup> It turns out that the outpouring of westerns and musicals from DEFA in the late 60s and onwards — which at first glance could seem like a fairly bizarre phenomenon — was one of very few options left open to DEFA filmmakers after the severe backlash of the social-critique films of the pre-*Kahlschlag* years.

### *Appropriating the musical*

In the following I will shed some light on what actually happens to a genre upon its appropriation by GDR film makers, and reveal aspects of the process by which its properties are made to fit in with the current political environment. After very briefly addressing the American, Soviet and West German musicals' relation to the East German variety, I will analyze specific sequences from the musical *Heißer Sommer*. These sequences will serve as examples for the measures of appropriation and how they materialized in a finished film.

The musical is considered by many critics to be the most fanciful and escapist of all film genres — its narrative infrastructure being dependent on the so-called 'integrated' song numbers, with truly unrealistic depictions of people bursting into song in public places accompanied by invisible orchestras. The promise of fame and/or fortune drives the protagonists to surmount obstacles and to get their reward (financial and/or amorous) in the end. Also, in the American musical, the exhibition of material wealth and general flamboyancy came to be among the expected ingredients. Such organized capitalist and escapist daydreaming, diverting the people's attention from the matters of real life and socialist progress, was wholly unacceptable in the context of GDR cultural life. As illustrated in the following 1967 statement by Dr Jahrow, chief film policy advisor for the Film Production Division within the Ministry of Culture's Film Bureau: 'The deciding factors of personality development and the central aesthetic problem for socialist art lies in the interactions between Man — work — culture.'<sup>23</sup>

The Soviet film industry had, rather successfully, appropriated and reinvented the musical genre in the 1930s and 1940s. A row of entertaining musicals were made with stories appropriate to the Communist world view, where the ideals of optimism and popularity inherent to the concept of socialist realism was exploited to the full. The Soviet musical was dominated by tales of revolutionary heroics and optimistic tales of proletarian heroes of collectivization and industrialization. The fact that film makers in the Soviet Union had already appropriated the musical was obviously important to East German film makers in legitimating their own

employment of the genre, but pathos-filled tales from the revolution or the factory environment was not what the youth of the GDR craved in the late 1960s. The youth wanted stories of relevance to them, which were modern and had a western feel to them — something in the line of what they would be listening to on the radio, and could catch glimpses of on West German television shows. In other words the successful socialist appropriation of the genre in the Soviet Union had to be replaced by a new, youthful, contemporary and nationally flavoured version to meet the demands of the day. Among other things, the influence of the immensely popular West German musicals — known as *Schlagerfilme* — had to be taken into account. Especially the *Schlagerfilme* featuring the young couple Conny Froboess and ‘the German Elvis’ Peter Krauss.<sup>24</sup>

An important factor to keep in mind at this point is that although GDR youth could not watch the *Schlagerfilme* in GDR cinemas, the hit-songs integral to the concept of such films were frequently played on West German radio, and were occasionally performed on West German television.<sup>25</sup> Hit songs from the popular British youth musicals of the time, like the ones featuring Cliff Richard, were also easily accessible through Radio Luxembourg and other pop music channels.<sup>26</sup> In addition to this influence from the outside, the very popular (East) Berlin Youth Club’s radio station DT64 played a lot of music from Western Europe and the US, constantly violating the state quota of less than forty per cent music from capitalist countries.<sup>27</sup>

This embeddedness in the transsystemic flow of popular culture — through the airwaves of modern broadcast media — could not possibly be ignored by the cultural authorities or the makers of popular film.

### *Heißer Sommer (1968)*

As a concrete example of how the DEFA film makers dealt with this challenge I have chosen the musical *Heißer Sommer* from 1968. The film tells the story of two groups of young East Germans who are on the way to spending their summer holiday in a small fishing village on the Baltic coast. In a cat and mouse game the two groups, of eleven boys and ten girls, compete to get there first. During their stay one of the girls, Brit, is courted by both of the leading males, Kai and Wolf. Aside from this triangular love affair driving the plot, the narrative mainly consists of scenes where the teenagers play tricks on each other and innocently misbehave as one would expect a group of youngsters on holiday to do. On the periphery of the love triangle of Brit, Kai, and Wolf, stands Stupsi, the always sensible ‘leader’ of the girl group, who secretly harbours romantic feelings for Kai. At the climax of *Heißer Sommer* Kai and Wolf have a dramatic fist fight over Brit, but are brought to their senses by members of the two groups, headed by the sensible Stupsi, and are asked to explain themselves.

The plot is wrapped up somewhat disappointingly, if one expects a classical

happy ending. In the second last sequence Kai fools around with a towel over his head, chasing bikini-clad girls around a water pump, and though blindfolded, ends up with his arms around Stupsi. The obvious interpretation of this scene would be that they were meant for each other, and that fate had brought them together, especially since the status of the actors (Frank Schöbel playing Kai and Chris Doerk playing Stupsi) as a couple in real life was more than well known to the GDR audience at the time.<sup>28</sup> Stupsi, despite having shared some tender moments with Kai earlier on in the film, rejects him and effectively sends him off to look for Brit. In a short clip we see Brit giving Wolf a look of disdain, leaving the coast clear for Kai and Brit finally to get together. They kiss and smile at each other, and Wolf makes a gesture of approval. In a moment of comic relief one of the other boys asks Stupsi if she's got a boyfriend yet. She rolls her eyes at him and falls over on her back, kicking off the last song number where all the boys and girls for the first time take part together in synchronized movements to the rhythms of the main theme of *Heißer Sommer*.

By this rapid lapse into song and dance the love between Kai and Brit is left hanging in the air and a feeling of strangeness — which goes for the whole film — is reinforced, a sense that something is not right about the love story. The only time we really get a feeling of sparks flying in this film are the scenes from an afternoon where Kai and Stupsi (played by the real life couple) spend some time together alone. Nothing Kai says or does to Brit in the rest of the film is nearly as affectionate as the tenderness between him and Stupsi. The couple Kai and Brit share the screen several times for duets and dance numbers, where they declare their love for one another, but these sequences consistently fail to convince. The reasons for Brit's interest in Kai are fairly well developed, while the grounds for Kai's attraction to Brit remain strangely vague. It is almost as if the only real proof of Kai's love for Brit must be deduced from the power of the punches he delivers to her other suitor. What might be the significance of the fact that the conflicts roused by the love triangle, which is supposed to be the plot's motor, are so unconvincing? And how to interpret the fact that the resolution of these conflicts and the chosen outcome, although a 'happy end', is so unsatisfying?

The answer can be found in the process of political appropriation of the genre and its narrative required in order for this film to see the light of day in East Germany. Researching the documents from the GDR Ministry of Culture's Film Bureau is enlightening in this respect. In a letter by the chief director of DEFA, requesting permission to screen *Heißer Sommer*, he claims that with this film the musical genre has made a leap forward by 'the fact that in this film an attempt is made to capture aesthetically, and engage the viewer in, the influence of the collective on the individual and the influence of the individual on the collective.'<sup>29</sup> In other similar documents further emphasis is placed on the fact that 'at the centre of the action stands the morally oriented story of the relationship between Brit, Wolf and Kai, who do not withdraw from the group, but always stay in close



connection with the collective actions of both the youth groups.<sup>30</sup>

This clearly shows that prime importance was placed upon the depiction of the inter-conflict between the individual and the collective — as opposed to the intra-conflicts between the individuals involved in the love triangle. A few references were also made to the cheerful (heitere) characteristics of the musical genre, but this aspect of the genre was consistently subordinated to the individual/collective story and was only ever mentioned as an effective means to heighten the youth's positive feelings about their homeland GDR. The idea of amusement for amusement's sake, as a form of relaxation, did not exist in this discourse. In the censorship protocols and other available documents from the Film Bureau the entertaining aspects of any film's narrative were explained and assessed in relation to the film's potential *Massenwirksamkeit*. It appears as if the entertainment arts, in which Walter Ulbricht and the SED believed so strongly, always had to be excused for being entertaining. Very often the promotion of a supposedly specific socialist *Lebensgefühl* and *Lebensfreude* (experience/joy of living) was used as the cornerstone argument for focusing on the fun and recreational sides of life, as opposed to work related subjects.<sup>31</sup>

It is hard to say, on the basis of the sources presently available, what the film makers themselves really wanted out of the making of entertainment genre films, but surely some of the directors choosing this format wanted first and foremost to amuse their audience and have a good time while making such films. Jo Hasler, the director of *Heißer Sommer*, in an interview a few years after the film's release, appeared to be very pleased by the signals coming from the 8<sup>th</sup> SED Party Congress in 1971 that there was 'all possible reason for happiness in our [socialist] world, and therefore the arts may not be frugal with the cheerful colour tones.'<sup>32</sup> This was, from the Party point of view, obviously meant as a directive to paint the happiness of the socialist world with fresh colors and not as general permission to have more fun. Thus, the melancholy artist had reason to beware, while a director of cheerful genre films, like Jo Hasler, could exploit such an opportunity and make more entertaining films than before. Whether the late Jo Hasler willingly conformed to the demands of socialist realism, and the closely related ideal of content-over-form, is irrelevant however. The product, *Heißer Sommer*, speaks for itself as a cultural artifact. The tale it tells us is one of very awkward negotiations between the wish, on the one hand, to capture a large young audience by adopting a transnational popular genre, making an uncomplicated film about summer and love, and, on the other hand, the need to tell an 'effective', morally and politically educational story.

This brings us back to the reasons for the badly functioning love story of *Heißer Sommer*. I believe that the core of the problem lies in the fact that Chris Doerk and Frank Schöbel both appear in it. The following analysis can serve as an illustration of the difficulties arising when a global genre formula is given a local flavor which interferes with the motives behind the strictly political appropriation for didactic purposes.

Doerk and Schöbel's status as two of the biggest and most beloved celebrities in the GDR in the late 1960s made them very attractive to film makers. They would automatically draw a large audience and hence heighten the *Massenwirksamkeit* of any film they appeared in. Casting the couple Doerk and Schöbel as the pair who get together at the end of the movie would have drastically heightened the emotional impact of the happy end, but would simultaneously have contradicted the political morality tale that the cultural authorities — represented by the Film Bureau at the Ministry of Culture — wanted to tell. In other words, the story in this case had to be 'tamed' in order to contain the possible emotional engagement by the audience in the love-story part of the narrative. This reveals the inherent contradictions in the film makers' assignment. They were expected to draw a youth crowd with the help of a fresh film genre, popular music and much-loved stars, but should at the same time avoid overwhelming them to ensure that they also got the ideological message. An alternative, hypothetical, conclusion of the film, with Schöbel and Doerk — playing Kai and Brit — embracing over the end credits, would have been a rousing finale that would have overshadowed the educational tale, and would thereby have subverted the main message: that the responsibilities within the collective take precedence over the personal needs and feelings of the individual.

This problem still exists in the film as it is, with Kai and Brit crossing the line between their respective collectives (boy group/girl group) and their individual wishes (forming a competing unit as a pair). The way I see it, attempts are made to correct this 'flaw' in the manuscript by covering it up in the montage. In the end sequence, as in most of the earlier scenes involving the developing love between the lead characters, the montage and placement of song and dance numbers consistently deny us the pleasure of engaging in the emotions of the characters — presumably guiding our attention away from the 'individualistic' love story towards 'the morally oriented story' of the primacy of the collective over the individual. The very sudden break-off of Kai kissing Brit in the end sequence, and the quick joke propelling us into the final synchronized choreography of the collective movement of all the boys and girls, is exemplary of this practice and can at best be interpreted as an intentional Brechtian *Verfremdungseffekt*. As such, it succeeds in denying us any grain of sentimental indulgence with the happy pair, struggling hopelessly to keep our attention glued to the film's political metaphors for the struggle between individualism and collectivism.

Contributing to this *Verfremdungseffekt* is the way in which the character of Stupsi is drawn. For some reason, never explained in the film's narrative, Stupsi does not give in to the obvious temptations of the hot summer. She may dance around a bit and be cheerful, but aside from that her role throughout the film is that of the platonic, sensible personality. This seems like an odd choice for a lead character of a musical about boys and girls enjoying a hot summer by the sea. Again the strangeness is due to the fact that there is nothing within the film's plot which motivates or explains this aspect of Stupsi's behavior, but rather the external

political demand to display the unrealistic, ideologically correct demeanour of the so-called ‘socialist personality.’ Stupsi’s character is obviously designed to operate as the film’s ‘positive hero’, as prescribed by the doctrine of socialist realism. That is to say the central character who will, in the face of different dilemmas, always make the correct choices according to socialist politics and morality, supposedly functioning as an unambiguous, exemplary model for the members of the audience.

In spite of several such bizarre decisions in the process of appropriation of the musical genre for the production of *Heißer Sommer* the film reached the number two spot among the most successful films in the GDR in 1968.<sup>33</sup> It was only surpassed by the enormously popular *Spur des Falken*.<sup>34</sup> This means that already by the summer of 1968 — one year after Ulbricht’s call for a radical strengthening of the *Unterhaltungskunst* — entertaining genre films dominated audience figures. *Spur des Falken* was the third East German western — or *Indianerfilm* — to be made, and the first to be based on an original DEFA manuscript. I will return to analyses of sequences from this film towards the end of the article, after addressing some crucial points related to German western-tradition and the role of the Indian in the *Indianerfilme* and in the Marxist world view.

### *Appropriating the Western*

The western genre enjoyed a long-standing tradition in Germany long before it was taken up by the East German film industry. The German western tradition is almost as old as the genre itself. With Karl May’s immensely popular narratives about Chief Winnetou and the Teutonic pioneer Old Shatterhand (35 volumes published between 1875 and 1909), the Germans had their own western author and their own Germanic style western hero to look up to. After World War II, however, May’s fiction was banned in the Soviet sector of Germany on the grounds that it exhibited undesirable bourgeois attitudes. Klaus Mann’s accusations against May for being ‘The Cowboy Mentor of the Führer’ also contributed significantly to keeping his books out of GDR distribution.<sup>35</sup> May’s fiction came thus to live an intense shadow-life in the socialist republic. When some of these books were brought to the big screen in West Germany in the early 1960s, East German youth traveled in large numbers to cinemas across the border of Czechoslovakia to see their beloved heroes in action.<sup>36</sup>

Witnessing this pilgrimage, a group of DEFA film makers began considering the idea of appropriating the western by treating its classical frontier narratives from the perspective of Marxist historical materialism and the socialist world-view. Through this ingenious turn they were able to develop a western film variety which was immensely popular with the youth, had the educational value of explaining key concepts in historical materialism and at the same time painted a very unflattering picture of the historical roots of contemporary American society. This turned out to be the recipe for the ideal massenwirksamer film. The irresistible appeal of this

formula proved capable of overturning even an old SED veto declaring the western genre an unhealthy and possibly ‘criminalizing influence on young minds.’<sup>37</sup>

The DEFA western played to the East German audience’s affinity for the May westerns, in that it moved the Indian to the centre of the narrative. The ‘noble savage’ image of a ‘good Indian’ was a familiar concept since May’s novels prominently featured ‘noble savages’ like Chief Winnetou. However, such a peaceful relationship between a ‘good Indian’ and the white oppressors was not only in conflict with local GDR ideology, but contradicted the very foundation of Marxism. Consequently, the peace-loving Indian of the ‘noble savage’-type was often presented as naive and foolish in the *Indianerfilme*. The DEFA Indian differed significantly from chief Winnetou in that he was not prepared to be a wise and gentle friend to the white imperialists. The DEFA Indian was an empowered, stony-faced Indian chief, sporting big muscles and loaded guns, uncompromisingly devoted to chasing off the whites, if necessary by burning whole settler villages to the ground.

The East German westerns were deliberately launched as *Indianerfilme* and not as westerns or cowboy films, which were the current labels in other parts of the world. The idea was to place the Indian hero at the centre of the action and to depict how the west was really won, thereby exposing the brutal and cynical nature of capitalism — as an example pertaining both to the past, the present, and the future. In 1970, during a film discussion with 350 workers at Leipzig’s Bau- und Montagekombinat, the script writer of several *Indianerfilme*, Dr Günter Karl, explained the purpose of the films as follows: ‘To represent the inhumane, capitalist order of society in all its brutality — this we consider to be our task.’<sup>38</sup>

But how could this new western hero serve as a model for the contemporary East German film-goer? Did the two have any common denominator? To the contemporary viewer, the demand for this kind of connection between the history that unfolds on the screen and the political and practical needs of the times may seem fairly absurd. But, as I have already demonstrated in the analysis of the musical, such clearly defined needs and goals were the ‘to be, or not to be’ of popular films in the GDR in the 1960s. What the Indian hero and the East German film-goer supposedly had in common was their disapproval of the behavior of the white Americans on the nineteenth-century American continent — and in a wider sense — a general resistance against world-wide, capitalist imperialism. This political affinity notwithstanding, the fusion of a correct Marxist interpretation of history and the role of the Indian hero, with whom the audiences were supposed to identify, entailed great contradictions.

### *The Indian as the western hero*

Within the Marxist understanding of history — the basic premise for the *Indianerfilm* with which the GDR film makers had to comply — the historical evolution of society goes through a chain of predetermined stages. Each of these

stages is placed in a hierarchy of development according to the ownership of the means of production. A simplified representation of the stages could be made as follows:

- 1 Primitive communism (*Urgesellschaft*)
- 2 The slave society (*Sklavenhaltergesellschaft*)
- 3 The feudal society (*Feudalismus*)
- 4 The bourgeois or capitalist society (*Kapitalismus*)
- 5 Socialist society (*Sozialismus*, a transitional phase to communism)
- 6 The classless communist society (*Kommunismus*)<sup>39</sup>

Marx posited a necessary historical evolution where each new phase would transcend the preceding one — often through violent upheaval, that is, revolution. The narratives of the *Indianerfilme*, always revolve around a conflict between the Indians who represent ‘primitive communism’ and the whites, who represent the ‘capitalist society.’ According to the film makers, one of the main tasks of the Indianerfilm was the representation of these evolutionary stages and their utter incompatibility with one another.

As a positive hero the primitive communist Indian fitted the East German cinema because of the specific status of primitive communism within this Marxist system. Here primitive communism was the bearer of many values which were later realized in communism proper. With its collective aspects and approximate classlessness in particular, the stage of primitive communism was considered closest to the communist utopia in ideological terms, even though they were far removed in time. It is important to keep in mind, however, that the first evolutionary stage (as well as the four consecutive stages) constituted a condition and an order of society which, due to historical necessity, had to be abandoned on the road leading towards the utopia. In the hyper-industrialized GDR of the 1960s any back-to-nature oriented quest was deemed reactionary and counter-revolutionary. At this point, the representation of the Indian hero became really problematic.

Although in the *Indianerfilme* the Indian was portrayed as the hero, everybody knew that the real-life battle for the Wild West was won by the whites. Moreover, the form of society which was represented by the Indian could hardly, in the East German socialist context, be depicted as a desirable or valuable alternative to the industrialized conditions of contemporary society. So what kind of victory could the Indian hero be afforded? Only symbolic quasi-triumphs of striking down the odd white individual who represented the capitalist system. Greater victories were out of the question. Within this oversimplified version of Marxian history, the value of primitive Indian society could not be granted serious analysis without simultaneously implying a politically undesirable lamentation over it. Unfortunately the *Indianerfilm*-makers’ solution to this problem was usually to opt for hopelessly one-dimensional Indian characters and very limited descriptions of

Indian society.

Another possible understanding of the role of the Indian in the *Indianerfilme* is to consider him as a symbolic representative of a larger group of people in the contemporary world, namely oppressed native inhabitants of third world countries. Among the East European countries the GDR had by far the strongest interest and involvement in the de-colonized African countries.<sup>40</sup> The SED boasted an energetic Afrikapolitik and contributed to the establishment of Marxist–Leninist governments in several African countries. They also had education programs through which African students could receive scholarships to study in the GDR. These were efforts which were closely linked with the global ambitions of communism and were actively presented as proof of the GDR's status as the home of internationalistic, altruistic socialism. In this perspective the *Indianerfilm* image of the righteous battle of an indigenous people against capitalist oppressors could easily be interpreted as a metaphor for the current process of de-colonizing Africa.<sup>41</sup> Referring to the success of some *Indianerfilme* screened in Africa and the Middle East, the writer of several *Indianerfilm* manuscripts, Dr Günter Karl, told reporters that 'I think the success of our adventure-series in Arab and African countries can be traced back to a given possibility of identification with the Indian people's struggle for liberation.'<sup>42</sup>

That may be so, but such historical parallels could also include some difficult anachronisms and paradoxes. Firstly, communism as a societal system or political force did not exist as an alternative to the historical development on the American continent in the mid/late nineteenth century, and could therefore not enter the scene and save the day. Socialist solutions to the conflicts were only alluded to in the *Indianerfilme* through rather strained metaphors. Secondly, if the antagonists of the capitalist oppressors in the *Indianerfilme* were a tribe of primitive communists, trying to hold back the wheels of time, so to speak, they would be taken to represent a reactionary force rather than a progressive one. This, as I have touched on earlier, was the reason why primitive Indian society was never depicted as a realistic or desirable alternative to capitalism. This last point was not a problem for the saviour image of the GDR in Africa, however. There the sympathy for the natives was always closely connected to support for 'revolutionary movements' and the establishment of 'progressive governments'.

### *Spur des Falken (1968)*

The film *Spur des Falken* from 1968 was the third of the *Indianerfilme* and the first to be based on an original script, which meant that the scriptwriter, Dr Karl, was free to construct the plot according to the ideological ideas he wanted to get across, without any interference from authors who wanted the film to stay true to their original conception of the story.<sup>43</sup> Now there were no obstacles in the way of the complete appropriation of the western for socialist purposes. Consequently *Spur*

*des Falken* at times works like a children's-book version of the Marxist view of history.

The film tells the tale of the Indian chief Weitspähender Falke and his tribe, living in the Black Hills in the second half of the nineteenth century, just as the gold rush is about to hit the area (around 1876). The main antagonist is 'Snaky' Joe Bludgeon (sic!), a ruthless property speculator ready to kill anything and anyone who stands in the way of his insatiable greed. After some back and forth between the Indians, some reasonably friendly small-time gold diggers and Joe Bludgeon's bloodthirsty gang, total war breaks out between the Indians and the whites. Bludgeon blows up a small mountain close to the Indian's camp site, killing women and children (with obvious reference to American atrocities in Vietnam), and the Indians take righteous revenge by setting the whole settler village on fire. The cavalry arrive too late to stop the fire, but rescue the whites from the wrath of the Indians.

In a surprising inversion of genre conventions the attack by the Indians is accompanied by rousing, victorious orchestra music, making the subsequent single horn fanfare signaling the arrival of the cavalry seem impotent by comparison. This contrast is repeated as the cavalry attack the Indians. Dramatic, gloomy music makes the cavalry appear as evil butchers, but as the Indians ambush them the victorious theme instantly swells up again.

After this encounter with the cavalry the other Indian chiefs decide to pack up and leave for a safer area, while Weitspähender Falke goes after Bludgeon one last time. In solid western tradition the film ends with a climactic fight between the good guy and the bad guy. Once Bludgeon is killed Weitspähender Falke joins his tribe and moves north with the hope of a better life there. Even this very brief outline of the plot should give some impression of a new version of the western genre in the making.

The film is, because of the way the plot was designed, absolutely filled with examples of historical and political allegories. One of the most striking is the way in which Bludgeon's character is constructed to fit the ultimate evil in classical Marxism: the state of monopolistic capitalism. Monopolistic capitalism is described, in a contemporary East German reference book, as the ultimate phase of capitalist imperialism, characterized by the 'fusion of the power of the [business-] monopolies with the powers of the state [including the military], giving the financial oligarchies the ability to control directly all aspects of life in society.'<sup>44</sup> This fusion of powers is clearly suggested in a scene early on in the film, contributing to the construction of Bludgeon's character: After having bragged about his previous atrocities against Indians to eager listeners on the train on the way to Tanglewood (the settler village in the film) Joe Bludgeon is greeted with a big smirk and a manly embrace from the local cavalry chief, Captain Holland, as he steps down from the train. Holland asks him whether everything worked out in Washington, and Bludgeon replies with the rhetorical question: 'Did it ever not work out for me in Washington?' They both smile, and have a dirty and

conspiratorial laugh. The monopolistic capitalist (Bludgeon) embraces the representative of the military power (Holland) who asks whether the state (Washington) is on board. Bludgeon's immediate and arrogant reply signals that he takes this alliance for granted. The basic infrastructure of monopolistic capitalism is secured.

A little earlier in the film, before Bludgeon's entry, we are made familiar with some of the other characters. From the top of a hill Weitspähender Falke and his companion, on horseback, are looking down on two white men, Pat and Chat, as they are washing for gold in a small stream at the bottom of the valley. The companion looks worried and says to Falke: 'You're right, the yellow metal makes them lose their minds', Falke replies: 'Many white men will come here to our mountains. The iron horse will bring them here from far and near.' They both ride down the valley, and greet the men in the white man's language.<sup>45</sup> In a reasonably friendly tone the men make the exchange of a deer against a nugget of gold, and everyone seems to be pleased. In the perspective of the Marxist view of history the Indians and Pat and Chat are for the time being functioning on a fairly equal level of development. Both parties live very primitively, more or less from hand to mouth. By exchanging gold nuggets for game, they participate in a form of barter economy, where both parties are trading in natural goods. Because of this equality in 'mode of production', which is of seminal importance in Marxist theory, no-one is exploited and they can live peacefully side by side. Already in this early scene we do get clear hints, however, that we are witnessing a fragile relationship. According to the Marxist view of history, which I outlined earlier, and which it was the film makers' express intention to communicate in the *Indianerfilme*, the different levels of development can not exist side by side. They were regarded as incompatible by definition and a clash between different levels could only result in the exploitation and subsequent annihilation of the former by the latter. The interesting tension in this scene is caused by the ambiguous status of gold in the exchange between the Indians and the whites.

The gold nugget is in one sense only a 'yellow metal' extracted from nature, but in the white man's world it is almost equal to money in use and (symbolic) value. One obvious alarm signal, to the effect that the friendly and equal relationship will not last for long, is set off by a remark from Chat, one of the gold diggers. Bragging about the size of a nugget he has just found he says 'another one of these and I could buy the whole valley!' The following worried and suspicious facial expressions of the two Indians remind us who actually 'owns' the valley, distinctly illustrating the incompatibility between the system of private property of the capitalist society and the communal property of primitive communism.

These are two typical scenes from *Spur des Falken* where scriptwriter Dr Günter Karl explains to the audience, in broad, unmistakable strokes, how the situation of monopolistic capitalism developed on the American frontier in the 1870s. All researched reviews of *Spur des Falken* and interviews conducted with their makers confirm the intention of such an historical materialist reading of the film, which is



consistently referred to as *die historische Wahrheit* (the historical truth).<sup>46</sup> The few documents available related to the film's way through the channels of censorship also prove that the official motives for making western-themed entertainment films were fundamentally educational, and that *Spur des Falken* in this respect displayed 'a remarkable stylistic unity of entertainment and education.'<sup>47</sup>

To a certain extent, I actually agree with this last statement. In spite of the badly functioning Indian character, the *Indianerfilme* managed to draw incredible crowds and, although in an oversimplified and banal way, they were probably fairly effective in influencing historical consciousness among their predominantly young audience. The historical materialist interpretation of American history, which was offered by the *Indianerfilme*, was already standard school curriculum for the audience. Thus, the two-hour exposure to the *Indianerfilm*'s peculiar angle on the frontier myth supplied only the finishing touch to an already established understanding of historical evolution.

### *Conclusion*

With this article I wanted to demonstrate how the study of the often overlooked formula products of popular culture can be valuable angles of incidence to the understanding of cold war reality. As stated at the beginning of the article, the overwhelming majority of studies into the cinema of Eastern Europe have been concerned with artistically ambitious film projects and their legacy as part of dissident movements. In my present look at vastly popular entertainment films, however, the focus is moved from the area of dissidence and conflict to the film industry's day-to-day operations, thus revealing more about how the mainstream production system worked for those prepared to comply, rather than the more common — and somewhat exhausted — focus on the troubles of the critical or dissident film maker.

With their peculiar mix of familiar commercial genre conventions and socialist propaganda, GDR popular genre films embody a key dimension of the East German experience — namely the constant negotiation between isolation and imitation. The somewhat tragic, self-contradictory nature of this mediation becomes evident when we analyse pop-cultural products such as *Heißer Sommer* and *Spur des Falken*. These films, as I have shown, are evidence of a conscious strategy of imitation. The aim being to take on the enemy's forms, re-dress them, and channel their allure into a *Massenwirksamkeit* in service of socialist progress. Continually counteracting this strategy, however, were the coexisting strategies of isolation, like the systematic restrictions on travel and on the import of printed matter from the West, made possible by the erection of the Berlin wall. This self-contradictory relationship to western culture was a direct result of the critical leak in the 'iron curtain' caused by the constant flow of television and radio signals emanating from powerful transmitters in West Berlin. The musicals and westerns of the GDR were created at the very point of convergence between these strategies

of isolation and imitation. Placed under analysis they thus reveal both the high level of GDR integration in the non-terrestrial, transsystemic discourse of popular genres, as well as the steps of appropriation taken to align them with central policy demands of the period.

### Notes

<sup>1</sup> The board consisted of twenty-five persons, ranging from writers and film critics to representatives from the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 'Zusammensetzung der Auswahlkommission für ausländische Spielfilme', 04.03.1969, from the Central Committee's Culture Division (ZK Abt. Kultur) to Kurt Hager, BArch DY30/IV A2/9.06/131. On the problem of too critical or liberal films from socialist countries: 'Problemspiegel', 25.05.1967, from Hauptverwaltung Film (HV-Film) to Kurt Hager, BArch DR1 4213, p. 35.

<sup>2</sup> Approximately thirty per cent of all films screened in the GDR were imports from non-socialist countries. This proportion was fairly stable in the period I will be discussing. See for example G. Schulz *FILMOGRAFIE — Ausländische Spiel- und abendfüllende Dokumentarfilme in den Kinos der SBZ/DDR 1945–1966* (Berlin: Bundesarchiv-Filmarchiv & DEFA-Stiftung, 2001), and 'Neuzulassungen ausländischer Spielfilme', HV-Film Abt. Zulassung, BArch DR1 4717.

<sup>3</sup> The closing of the borders in 1961 was, in hindsight, obviously done to stop East Germans from fleeing to the West. The perception of the borderclosing at the time, however, was more complex. The official propaganda image of the wall as a safeguard against the imperialism of the West seems to have worked on certain sections of the population — especially within the arts and the intelligentsia — and the government made some minor liberalizing moves to give the impression that the closing of the border meant more freedom internally. (See for example K. Schroeder, *Der SED-Staat* (München: Econ Ullstein List Verlag, 2000), p. 172) In the area of film making, censorship was slackened and more social critique was tolerated. Many film makers report that they felt it as a relief when the wall was in place. (See for example film maker Frank Beyer's autobiography *Wenn der Wind sich dreht* (Berlin: Der Econ Verlag, 2001), pp. 106–08) One DEFA film maker told me that even though the borderclosing cut him off from contact with his own parents in the West, he still believed it at the time to be the necessary thing to do. (Interview with DEFA dramaturg Hans-Joachim Wallstein, Berlin, 10.07.2003).

<sup>4</sup> S. Fitzpatrick *The Cultural Front: Power and Culture in Revolutionary Russia* (New York: Cornell University Press, 1992), p. 227.

<sup>5</sup> See E. Honecker Bericht des Politbüros an die 11. *Tagung des Zentralkomitees der Sozialistischen Einheitspartei Deutschlands 15.–18. Dezember 1965* (Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1966). For post-1989 analysis see for example: *Kahlschlag, Das 11. Plenum des ZK der SED 1965 — Studien und Dokumente*, ed. by G. Agde (Berlin: Aufbau Taschenbuch Verlag GmbH, 2000), E. Richter: 'Zwischen Mauerbau und Kahlschlag — 1961 bis 1965' and K. Wischniewski, 'Träumer und gewöhnliche Leute — 1966 bis 1979', in *Das zweite Leben der Filmstadt Babelsberg: DEFA 1946–1992*, ed. by R. Schenk (Berlin: Filmmuseum Potsdam & Henschel Verlag GmbH, 1994), pp. 158–211 and pp. 212–63, respectively.

<sup>6</sup> According to official statistics by the state run film distributor PROGRESS Film Verleih a staggering 8,285,136 East Germans had seen the film within its first year of release. See M. Seifert, *Die Indianerfilme der DEFA — ausgewählte Beispiele unter besonderer Betrachtung der Expositionen* (Berlin: Hochschule für Film und Fernsehen der DDR, 1978, unpublished Diplomarbeit), p. 3.

<sup>7</sup> Musicals: *Reise ins Ehebett* (Trip to the Conjugal Bed, Jo Hasler, 1967), *Hochzeitsnacht im Regen* (Wedding Night in the Rain, Horst Seeman, 1967), *Heißer Sommer* (Hot Summer, Jo Hasler, 1968) and *Nicht schummeln, Liebling!* (Don't cheat, Darling!, Jo Hasler, 1973); Westerns: *Die Söhne der Großen Bärin* (The Sons of the Great Mother Bear, Josef Mach, 1966), *Chingachgook, die Große Schlange* (Chingachgook, the Big Snake, Richard Groschopp, 1967), *Spur des Falken* (Trace of the Falcon, Gottfried Kolditz, 1968), *Weißer Wölfe* (White Wolves, Konrad Petzold, 1969), *Tödlicher Irrtum* (Fatal Error, Konrad Petzold, 1970), *Osceola* (Konrad Petzold, 1971), *Tecumseh* (Hans Kratzert, 1972), *Apachen* (Apaches, Gottfried Kolditz, 1973), *Ulzana* (Gottfried Kolditz, 1974) and *Blutsbrüder* (Blood Brothers, Werner W. Wallroth, 1975).

<sup>8</sup> 'Realismus: die Lebensfrage der deutschen Musik [Rede von Nationalpreisträger Prof. Ernst H. Meyer auf der Gründungskonferenz des Verbandes Deutscher Komponisten und Musiktheoretiker, 3. April 1951, Auszug.]', reprinted in *Dokumente zur Kunst-, Literatur- und Kulturpolitik der SED* (Stuttgart–Degerloch: Seewald Verlag, 1972) ed. by E. Schubbe, p. 188.

<sup>9</sup> I use the example of popular music as an illustration of the broader confrontation between East German cultural authorities and western popular culture because this debate was more pronounced than the corresponding debates about popular film. The reason for this difference was the great availability of western music (via radio and television) and the low cost and effort of putting together a band. The film medium's dependence on specialized equipment and considerable capital made it less of a public domain.

<sup>10</sup> See later references to Walter Ulbricht's speech at the SED's 7<sup>th</sup> Party Congress in 1967.

<sup>11</sup> 'Butlers Boogie' (04.04.65) *Neues Deutschland*, Berlin.

<sup>12</sup> 'Kurzbericht über die Besprechung bei der Bezirksleitung der FDJ in Leipzig am 13. Mai 1965 . . . Gibt es eine sozialistische und eine kapitalistische Tanzmusik?', BArch DY30/IV A2/9.06/159.

<sup>13</sup> 'Ursachen für das Überhandnehmen negativer dekadenter Erscheinungen in den Gitarrengruppen', 11.11.65, and 'Ergänzung zu den Ursachen über das Überhandnehmen negativer Erscheinungen in den Beat-Gruppen', 18.11.65, both from the Central Committee's Culture Division, BArch DY30/IV A2/9.06/159.

<sup>14</sup> *NATO-Politik und Tanzmusik*, a newsletter explaining the need for renewed strength and legislation in the battle against western pop music. Released as 'Parteiinternes Material' by the Agitation and Propaganda Division of the SED's Central Committee in 1961, BArch DY30/IV A2/9.06/159.

<sup>15</sup> 'Die gesellschaftliche Entwicklung in der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik bei der Vollendung des Sozialismus [Referat Walter Ulbrichts auf dem VII. Parteitag der SED, 17. bis 22. April 1967, Auszug]', reprinted in *Dokumente zur Kunst-, Literatur- und Kulturpolitik der SED* (Stuttgart-Degerloch: Seewald Verlag, 1972), ed. by E. Schubbe, pp. 1251–61.

<sup>16</sup> ‘Die Entwicklung der sozialistischen Nationalkultur [Rede Walter Ulbrichts ‘Das Programm des Sozialismus und die geschichtliche Aufgabe der sozialistischen Einheitspartei Deutschlands’ auf dem VI. Parteitag der SED, 15. bis 21. Januar 1963, Auszug]’, reprinted in *Dokumente zur Kunst-, Literatur- und Kulturpolitik der SED* (Stuttgart–Degerloch: Seewald Verlag, 1972), ed. by E. Schubbe, p. 815.

<sup>17</sup> ‘Die gesellschaftliche Entwicklung in der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik bei der Vollendung des Sozialismus [Referat Walter Ulbrichts auf dem VII. Parteitag der SED, 17. bis 22. April 1967, Auszug]’, reprinted in *Dokumente zur Kunst-, Literatur- und Kulturpolitik der SED* (Stuttgart–Degerloch: Seewald Verlag, 1972), ed. by E. Schubbe, p. 1259.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid., p. 1257.

<sup>20</sup> In the following I will be referring to the Hauptverwaltung Film (HV-Film) as the Film Bureau at the Ministry of Culture.

<sup>21</sup> Massenwirksamkeit was a central term in official GDR discourse on film. It meant ‘politically effective on the masses’, but because of its very positive connotations at the time it was overused and was sometimes used synonymously with ‘popular’. In this concrete case it means both. Wagner is attacking bourgeois snobbishness towards the popular in general at the same time as promoting politically persuasive films. ‘Vorlage zur Weiterentwicklung des sozialistischen Spielfilmschaffens’, 24.01.1964, Siegfried Wagner reporting to Kurt Hager on the development of the GDR feature film production, BArch DY30/IV A2/9.06/122.

<sup>22</sup> Several attempts were also made within the space travel science-fiction genre. For example *Signale — ein Weltraumabenteuer* (Signals — a Space Adventure, Gottfried Kolditz, 1970).

<sup>23</sup> ‘Einige Gedanken zur Einschätzung der ausgelieferten Produktion des DEFA-Spielfilmstudios im 1. Halbjahr 1967’. Written by Dr. Jahrow, film policy advisor (filmpolitischer Mitarbeiter) for the Film Production Division (Abteilung Filmproduktion) in the Film Bureau at the Ministry of Culture. BArch DR1 4534.

<sup>24</sup> *Wenn die Conny mit dem Peter* (Fritz Umgelter, 1958), *Conny und Peter machen Musik* (Werner Jacobs, 1960).

<sup>25</sup> As many as 3,216,000 TV licences were issued in the GDR by the end of 1965, which means close to two hundred TV sets per thousand inhabitants: cf. *UNESCO Statistical Yearbook 1966* (Paris: UNESCO, 1965),

p. 490). More than  $\frac{2}{3}$  of GDR territory were within reach of BRD (West German) television signals, and most people would view both East and West German broadcasts. In a study by Zentralinstitut für Jugendforschung in Leipzig, performed in 1973, over seventy per cent responded that they listened to western radio stations several times per week, and over forty-seven per cent answered that they watched BRD television broadcasts several times per week. Source: ‘Kulturell-künstlerische Interessen und Möglichkeiten Jugendlicher 1973–74’, Zentralarchiv für empirische Sozialforschung an der Universität zu Köln. Available online at: [http://134.95.45.164/c:/ISYS\\_DDR/cb/6077cb.pdf#xml=http://134.95.45.164/ISYSquery/IRL6DE.tmp/58/hilite](http://134.95.45.164/c:/ISYS_DDR/cb/6077cb.pdf#xml=http://134.95.45.164/ISYSquery/IRL6DE.tmp/58/hilite), p. 22.

<sup>26</sup> The most relevant titles are: *The Young Ones* (Sidney J. Furie, 1961), *Summer Holiday* (Peter Yates, 1963), and *Wonderful Life* (Sidney J. Furie, 1964).

<sup>27</sup> DT 64 enjoyed great popularity with East German youth. Their call-in programs received as much as 1000 calls per show, and the station yearly received up to 50,000 cards and letters from their listeners. See

B. Paulu, *Radio and Television Broadcasting in Eastern Europe* (Minneapolis: The University of Minnesota Press, 1974), p. 242. The conflict over the 60/40 quota is evident in ‘Einschätzung DT 64’, 26.08.1965, a short report issued by the Central Committee’s Culture Division, and in ‘Analyse des Musikprogramms des Senders DT 64’, 07.04.1966, a more detailed report by representatives of the state record company’s artistic council (VEB Deutsche Schallplatten: Künstlerischer Bereich), BArch DY30/IV A2/9.06/159.

<sup>28</sup> Pop singer and fashion model Chris Doerk and Schlager singer Frank Schöbel were the GDR ‘dream couple’. They got married on 19 September 1966 and sang together in countless shows and played together in the very successful musicals *Heißer Sommer* and *Nicht schummeln, Liebling!* When Chris Doerk was due with their son Alexander in April 1968 the nation is said to have been ‘holding its breath’ in anticipation. In the subsequent months all interested could follow the life of the little family on television shows as well as in the illustrated monthly *Neues Leben*. This sort of celebrity exposure was very unusual in the GDR, and makes the history of Doerk and Schöbel unique in the cultural history of the GDR. For a detailed study, see Claudia Fellmer’s PhD dissertation *Stars in East German Cinema* (Southampton: University of Southampton, 2002), especially pp. 166–76. Frank Schöbel’s autobiography, *Frank und frei* (Berlin: Aufbau Taschenbuch Verlag, 2000), is also of interest.

<sup>29</sup> ‘Stellungnahme für die Zulassung des Filmes “Heisser Sommer”’, 20.12.1967. DR1 (BA-FA) Zulassungsprotokoll 138.

<sup>30</sup> ‘Einschätzung’ of *Heißer Sommer*, from the Film Policy Division (Filmpolitische Abteilung) of the Film Bureau at the Ministry of Culture, 09.01.1968. DR1 (BA-FA) Zulassungsprotokoll 138.

<sup>31</sup> Prominent in the following documents: ‘Einige Gedanken zur Einschätzung der ausgelieferten Produktion des DEFA-Spielfilmstudios im 1. Halbjahr 1967’, 18.06.1967, by Dr Jahrow, film policy advisor for the Film Production Division (Abteilung Filmproduktion) in the Film Bureau at the Ministry of Culture, BArch DR1 4534, p. 28; ‘Zu einigen Grundzügen der Entwicklung des Kinospießfilmes in der DDR bis 1980’, 01.04.1967, BArch DR1 4540, p. 7, as well as in an assessment of film criticism against the entertainment films of 1968: ‘Stellungnahme zur “KINO-EULE” im “Eulenspiegel” nr. 28 (2. Juliheft 1968) von Renate Holland-Moritz’, 24.07.1968, BArch DR1 4213, p. 22.

<sup>32</sup> Interview with Jo Hasler, included in a press release in connection with the XII. Filmtage 1973. Bundesarchiv-Filmarchiv, Filmmappe 12206.

<sup>33</sup> K. Wischnewski, ‘Träumer und gewöhnliche Leute — 1966 bis 1979’, in *Das zweite Leben der Filmstadt Babelsberg: DEFA 1946–1992*, ed. by R. Schenk (Berlin: Filmmuseum Potsdam & Henschel Verlag GmbH, 1994), p. 223.

<sup>34</sup> According to the state distributor PROGRESS Film-Verleih statistics a total of 4,643,725 persons had seen the film within its first year of release. See M. Seifert, *Die Indianerfilme der DEFA — ausgewählte Beispiele unter besonderer Betrachtung der Expositionen* (Berlin: Hochschule für Film und Fernsehen der DDR, 1978, unpublished

Diplomarbeit), p. 3.

<sup>35</sup> On the Klaus Mann/Karl May connection see G. Gemünden, 'Zwischen Karl May und Karl Marx: die DEFA-Indianerfilme (1965–1983)', *Film und Fernsehen*, 1 (1998), 39.

<sup>36</sup> F.-B. Habel, *Gojko Mitic, Mustangs, Marterphäle: Die DEFA-Indianerfilme* (Berlin: Schwarzkopf & Schwarzkopf Verlag, 1997), p. 7.

<sup>37</sup> 'Östlicher Western' (07.07.65) *Der Spiegel*, Hamburg.

<sup>38</sup> 'Indianerbiwak im BMK Süd' (11.07.70) *Leipziger Volkszeitung*, Leipzig.

<sup>39</sup> This somewhat schematic listing is compiled by taking the description of these phases in Marx and Engels, 'First Premises of Materialist Method' from *The German Ideology* written in the 1840s (New York: International Publishers, 1970), pp. 42–57, and combining it with a contemporary East German interpretation which can be found in *Kleines Wörterbuch der Marxistisch-Leninistischen Philosophie*, ed. by Buhr and Kosing (Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1974) pp. 86–88, pp. 153–55, and pp. 258–59.

<sup>40</sup> For a detailed study, see G. M. Winrow, *The Foreign Policy of the GDR in Africa* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).

<sup>41</sup> Hans-Joachim Wallstein, dramaturg for nine Indianerfilme, told me that this Africa-connection was discussed in relation to the production of the Indianerfilme, but that the filmmakers were consciously avoiding too obvious references to de-colonized Africa (Interview with Hans-Joachim Wallstein, Berlin, 10.07.2003).

<sup>42</sup> 'Abenteuer, Aktion, Indianer?' (23.07.71) *Schweriner Volkszeitung*, Schwerin.

<sup>43</sup> DEFA dramaturg and script writer Günter Karl had several disputes with Professor of History Liselotte Welskopf-Henrich, who authored the books on which the first *Indianerfilm* was based. The disagreements were related to oversimplification of historical facts and conditions when turning her books into film. She once complained that a certain set piece for *Die Söhne der Grossen Bäarin* looked more like a camping site in the GDR than an actual Indian camp, BArch DR 117 BA 1780, and interview with Hans-Joachim Wallstein (Berlin, 10.07.2003).

<sup>44</sup> *Kleines Wörterbuch der Marxistisch-Leninistischen Philosophie*, ed. by Buhr and Kosing (Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1974), p. 141.

<sup>45</sup> Supposedly English, although they all speak German in the *Indianerfilme*.

<sup>46</sup> Evident in the following articles: 'Die Indianer aus dem Kaukasus: "Morgen" — Interview mit DEFA-Regisseur Dr. Gottfried Kolditz' (30.07.1967) *Der Morgen*; 'Der "Spur des Falken" folgen "Wiesse Wölfe"' (29.03.1968) *Bauernecho*; 'Gojko Mitic sitzt wieder im Sattel: Neue Abenteuer in "Spur des Falken"' (06.04.1968) *Nationalzeitung Berlin*; 'Sommer, Kino Freilichtbühne: Drei Beiträge der DEFA zu den Sommerfilmtagen' (30.06.1968) *Neues Deutschland*; 'Indianerbiwak im BMK Süd' (11.07.70) *Leipziger Volkszeitung*; 'Abenteuer, Aktion, Indianer?' (23.07.71) *Schweriner Volkszeitung* — to name but a few.

<sup>47</sup> 'Einschätzung des Films "Spur des Falken"', Filmwissenschaftliche Abteilung, 14.03.1968. DR 1 (BA-FA) Zulassungsprotokoll 284.



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