ANALOGY = SCHEMA = CONSTRUCTION = BLENDING = SEMPLATE

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Analogy equals structural similarity. A, B, C, etc. are structurally similar or analogous if, and only if, they share some common structure X. By the same token, X captures a generalization over A, B, C, etc. There are no non-analogical generalizations. Analogies may be right or wrong, easy or difficult to grasp. A, B, C etc. may stand either for particular units or for entire knowledge-domains or for anything in between. Depending on the respective ontology, an analogy between A, B, C, etc. is either discovered or invented (cf. Itkonen 2005: 1.1-4).

“Langacker equates the ability to generalize with the extraction of schemas” (Tuggy 2007: 83). For Goldberg (2006), in turn, generalizations are expressed by means of constructions. It follows that analogy is the central concern of Cognitive/Construction Grammar. The same is true of Fauconnier & Turner –type blending, because only structurally similar wholes can be blended (cf. Itkonen 2005: 1.6). Also the more recent notion of semantic template is based on analogy because it is based on the idea of units “drawn from different subdomains [being] mapped onto the same abstract semantic template [= common structure]” (Levinson & Burenholt 2007: 154).

Relations between units are inherited from the underlying template, just like Goldberg-type generalizations are described in terms of "inheritance hierarchies”. Additional synonyms are provided by Haspelmath (2010: 344): “generalizations = rules = schemas = constraints”. And let us not forget the long overdue rediscovery of analogy in language-acquisition: “Young children make analogies across whole utterances” (Tomasello 2003: 114).

This resurgence of analogical linguistics (when correctly understood) vindicates the grand tradition in the history of Western linguistics which started with Marcus Terentius Varro and has been perpetuated e.g. by von Humboldt (1812), Whitney (1875), Paul (1880), Bréal (1891), von der Gabelentz (1891), de Saussure (1916), Sapir (1921), Jespersen (1923), Bloomfield (1933), Trubetzkoy (1939), Chomsky (1955 [sic!]), Householder (1969), Anttila (1972), Derwing (1973).

The proper understanding of analogy is hampered by a nearly impenetrable fog of confusions and errors. Insistent claims about analogy being “too powerful” (Chomsky, Langacker) have been refuted e.g. by Itkonen (2005: 73-76, 89-94, 203-220; cf. Kac 2008); besides, schemas and constructions are just as powerful or powerless as analogy (except that constructions qua ‘form – meaning pairs’ exclude phonology). There have also been attempts to marginalize analogy by arbitrarily limiting it either to cases “where there is no established schema to directly sanction the newly coined structure” (Tuggy) or to cases involving “structured mapping between [only] two knowledge domains” (Levinson & Burenholt); and so on.

There are several reasons why the term ‘analogy’ should be preferred to any of its rivals. It is well-established not just in (the history of) linguistics, but also, for instance, in artificial intelligence, anthropology, and philosophy of science: “Analogy-making lies at the heart of intelligence” (Hofstadter 1995). “Institutions are based on analogy” (Douglas 1986; Itkonen 2005: 4.2). “Scientific analogies have at least four distinguishable uses: discovery, development, evaluation, and exposition” (Holyoak & Thagard 1995; Itkonen 2005: 4.3)

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