


**Political Frameworks and Private Investments in
Power Generation for the German energy transition**

Dominik Schäuble, Dr., Research Associate
Institute for Advanced Sustainability Studies
Germany

<http://www.concept.ntnu.no/english/>



Institute for Advanced Sustainability Studies IASS in Potsdam

**Political frameworks and private investments in power generation
for the German energy transition**

Dominik Schäuble
Transdisciplinary Panel on Energy Change

The objectives of this talk are ...




- ...to briefly illustrate the **status** of the **Energiewende** in Germany
- ...to review the **investment environments** for conventional and renewable **power generation** and the **current political discussion** on the reform of the **electricity market design**
- ...to discuss a suggestion on a **new refinancing mechanism** for renewables

The Status of the Energiewende

Status


Reduction of GHG-Emissions



Source: UBA, 2014

- Reduction of **24%** until 2013 (wrt 1990)

Status Reduction of GHG-Emissions




Source: UBA, 2014

- Reduction of **24%** until 2013 (wrt 1990)
- Reduction target for 2020 (-40% wrt 1990) will be **failed** without strong additional measures

Status

Power Generation Mix Germany





Source: AG Energiebilanzen, Agora Energiewende

- Recent development determined by Energiewende policies and fuel/CO₂-prices

Status

Installed Power Generation Capacity Germany



Source: Ministry for Economics and Energy, 2014


- Despite the shut-down of 8 nuclear power plants installed generation capacity increased in recent years
- Generation overcapacity

Investment environment I: conventional power generation – current conditions and discussions

Conventional generation


Revenues for investors

- Electricity sales in energy-only market EOM [€/MWh]
- Pricing based on marginal cost merit-order
- Spot market: Intraday, Day-ahead
- Derivatives market: Futures/Options (up to 6 years ahead)




Source: Agora Energiewende, 2013

Conventional generation The Problem



Source: Agora
Energiewende, 2013




Quelle: Frontier auf Basis von Platts Power Vision

Source: Frontier Economics, 2014

Supply from renewables has resulted in...

- ...a **decrease in operating times** of gas- and hard coal-fired generation
- ...a **decrease in electricity prices** especially at midday
- Many hard coal-fired and most gas-fired power plants are not able to generate sufficient revenues to cover their fixed costs

Conventional generation The Problem



Source: LBD, 2014

Range below maximum annual load	2007	2012	2022 New EEG
100 MW	1	1	1
1.000 MW	1	5	5
5.000 MW	210	140	70
10.000 MW	1.870	810	340

- In the future significant capacities will be needed for a short time only

The **fundamental questions**:

- Does the current market design (EOM with minor modifications) guarantee security of supply in the long run?
- In other words: Given the current market design, will there be sufficient investment in dispatchable power generation to have a secure supply at all times?
- If not, what major market design changes are needed to guarantee security of supply in the long run?

Basically, there are **two concepts** discussed at the moment:

- Refinancing of investments **entirely through revenues from the EOM** (high prices in scarcity situations) [€/MWh]
- Partial refinancing of investments through **payments for the provision of dispatchable generation capacity** [€/MW]

Conventional Generation

The Discussion Process – Capacity Mechanisms



- **Energy only market 2.0 with strategic reserve**
 - Revenues for electricity sales [€/MWh] only
 - Reserve outside the market [€/MW and €/MWh] for rare scarcity situations
 - Size of reserve determined by regulatory authority
- **Centralized capacity market**
 - Revenues for provision of generation capacity [€/MW] and electricity sales [€/MWh]
 - All generators can bid
 - Capacity requirement determined by regulatory authority
- **Focused centralized capacity market**
 - Revenues for provision of generation capacity [€/MW] and electricity sales [€/MWh]
 - Only selected generators can bid: with low operating times, flexible, clean
 - Capacity requirement determined by regulatory authority
- **Decentralized capacity market**
 - Revenues for provision of supply capacity [€/MW] and electricity sales [€/MWh]
 - All generators can provide capacity certificates
 - All consumers (i.e. end consumers, traders) are required to back up their electricity demand by capacity certificates

Conventional Generation

The Discussion Process – 4 Official Assessments



- **Federal Ministry for Economics and Energy** commissioned four assessments to evaluate the ability of the energy-only market to provide **security of supply** and to evaluate the suggested **capacity mechanisms**
- Major **evaluation criteria**: effectiveness, efficiency, regulatory risk, international compatibility
- Consistent **conclusion**
 - **Adjusted Energy-only market** is the means of choice
 - If a safety net is politically desired, the EOM 2.0 can be supplemented by a **reserve**
 - The **decentralized capacity market** performs better than the centralized capacity markets in most evaluation categories
- However these conclusions depend on several **preconditions...**

Conventional Generation

Preconditions that need to be discussed



- Amount of **demand-side capacity** that can be activated without capacity payments
 - Longterm **self-committment of decision-makers** concerning the acceptance of high scarcity prices (no price limits)
 - **Stable long-term political frameworks** concerning e.g. support for renewables and combined-heat-and-power, EU emissions trading scheme
 - „Peak-load-pricing“ vs. Abuse of market power
 - Difference in **Weighted Average Cost of Capital** (WACC) between EOM2.0 and capacity markets (1%)
- What about **resilience** of regulation? -> Sensitivity Studies


Investment environment II: renewable power generation – recent developments

Renewables

Revenues for investors

The **basic concept** so far:


- **Regulated** technology-specific **prices** for electricity generation from renewables (feed-in tariffs or rolling market premium) **guaranteed for 20 years**
- **Feed-in guarantee** for renewables
- Feed-in tariffs and their degression with time **determined by legislative bodies**
- **Costs** are allocated to the **electricity consumers** (EEG surcharge)
- **Low risk** investment with decent revenues
- **Dynamic deployment** of renewables
- Extraordinary **structure of investors**




Renewables

The (Perceived) Problems

- Increasing costs and electricity prices
- Distribution of costs
- Market integration of renewables
- Uncoordinated deployment
- EU state aid regulations



Source: AGEE-Stat, 2014



Source: BDEW, 2014

Renewables

Reform of the EEG 2014 - The solution?



Effective since 1 August 2014

Costs:

- **Corridor** for targeted renewable share instead of defined minimum shares
- Stricter **control of deployment rate** for each technology (2.5 GW/a for Wind Onshore and solar PV, 100 MW for Biomass, 6.5 GW until 2020 for Wind Offshore)
- Premium determination via technology specific **tendering** latest by 2017 (pilots for utility-scale solar PV and current discussion about design of tendering)

Cost distribution:

- EEG surcharge (30%) on **self-consumption**
- Total volume of exemptions (EEG surcharge) for energy-intensive industry probably stable


Market integration:

- Direct-to-market sale with **rolling market premium** instead of feed-in tariff as the future default mechanism

New refinancing mechanism for renewables:
If rising electricity prices are perceived as a
problem (see EEG Reform), existing generation
capacity needs to be addressed

The 'Innovation Fund' The Objective

- Stabilize retail electricity prices for households and industry by stabilizing the EEG surcharge (price increases have an impact on the level of acceptance of the Energiewende)





Source: BDEW, 2014

The 'Innovation Fund'

The Rationale

- A large share of the current costs for renewables is attributable to the **deployment of renewables in the past** (mainly solar PV between 2009 and 2012)




- The strong decrease of renewable technology costs suggests a **technology development** process and creation of **economies of scale**
- Renewable technology development creates **positive externalities** -> public support and financing justified (Future generations enjoy the benefits of renewable technology development)
- Other power generation technologies have been supported through public expenses (e.g. nuclear) -> **leveling the playing field**

The 'Innovation Fund'

The Concept

- So far the feed-in tariffs have been refinanced entirely via a **surcharge on the electricity price**
- We suggest a **partial refinancing via a fund** which is fed from the state budget or from the capital market (debts)
- Total differential costs for the deployment of renewables are refinanced via a **reduced surcharge** (FIT < e.g. 9 Ct/kWh) **and the fund** (FIT > e.g. 9 Ct/kWh)



Source: Matthes et al., 2014;
own calculations

- State budget or debts, but who pays? (Distributional effects)
 - Tax payers via tax increases (which?)
 - Specific societal groups via reduction of state expenses elsewhere (where?)
 - Future tax payers via debts and tax increases
 - Future electricity consumers via debts and EEG surcharge
 - Future electricity generators via debts and levying of RES-profits after FIT-period

General open question:

- Is the government willing to incur debts to finance parts of the transformation effort (despite the current austerity policy)?
- Costs for electricity consumers will rise anyway (further expansion of renewables, grid development,...), stretching costs for investments which have long lasting benefits should be considered seriously

Dominik.Schaeuble@iass-potsdam.de
Transdisciplinary Panel on Energy Change @ IASS



Institute for Advanced Sustainability Studies e.V.
Berliner Straße 130
D – 14467 Potsdam
Web: www.iass-potsdam.de