Immigration & Egalitarianism

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My article trying to fill
the gap in the literature

- "Other countries may seek to compete with us; but in one vital area, as a beacon of freedom and opportunity that draws the people of the world, no country on earth comes close. This, I believe, is one of the most important sources of America's greatness." **President Ronald Reagan. Farewell speech, July 19, 1989.**

- "They are eating the cats, they are eating the dogs…. **Donald Trump (US)**

- **"They are eating the swans ….**Nigel Farage (UK)

- Han de Haas—immigration policies based on myths and distortions (irrational)--a more rational discussion will benefit both migrant sending communities and hosts

- Founding father, Benjamin Franklin.

- …[F]oreigners will generally be apt to bring with them attachments to the persons they have left behind; to the country of their nativity, and to its particular customs and manners. They will also entertain opinions on government congenial with those under which they have lived; or, if they should be led hither from a preference to ours, how extremely unlikely is it that they will bring with them that temperate love of liberty, so essential to real republicanism? There may, as to particular individuals, and at particular times, be occasional exceptions to these remarks, yet such is the general rule. The influx of foreigners must, therefore, tend to produce a heterogeneous compound; to change and corrupt the national spirit; to complicate and confound public opinion; to introduce foreign propensities (cited in Rampell 2015).

- the Number of purely white People in the World is proportionably very small. All *Africa* is black or tawny; Asia chiefly tawny; America (exclusive of the newcomers) wholly so. And in Europe, the Spaniards, Italians, French, Russians, and Swedes, are generally of what we call a swarthy complexion; as are the Germans also, the Saxons only excepted, who, with the *English*, make the principal Body of White People on the Face of the Earth.

Most research done on attitudes (developed countries)—mixed evidence (why might attitudes not capture structures and broad processes??)—attitudes have remained stable between 2000 and 2020, welfare generosity etc has changed especially in strong welfare states. Are public attitudes decisive about party politics? Compromises? political strategies? institutional factors? Economic imperatives? Or are publics swayed by elite positions and discourses?

Theoretical mechanisms

- Immigration increases ethnic and cultural heterogeneity—reduces social affinity

- Lower affinity reduces appetite for generosity (welfare)—why pay for others?

- Social frictions—because of diverse preferences – exaggerated othering—labor competition

- Instrumentalizing others for capturing passionate majorities—politics of fear

- Polarization and dissensus reduces support for egalitarian institutions, processes, and policies—welfare chauvinism (??)

- If these psychological mechanisms are fundamental, then we should see these across all geographic and cultural contexts

- If the mechanism in dependent on politicization, then we might see divergent outcomes –– Europe vs Japan

- Varieties of Democracy data measuring various forms of egalitarianess

- 1. Universal welfare system 2. Egalitarian access to rights and resources (egalitarian societal structure, policies, institutions across gender and social groups) 3. equality of access to services 4. equality of access to health

- Immigrant stock share of the total population—-people born elsewhere + children of two parents born elsewhere (independent of naturalization)—includes refugees—UN migration data (r = 0.989 with World Bank data based on UN census data)

- A few controls—GDP per capita, urban population share, level of democracy, oil rich economy

- OLS with two-way fixed effects, standard errors robust to temporal and spatial correlation

- Estimating the variation within each group over time, controlling for time-invariant heterogeneity across groups, and controlling for factors that affect all groups in a given period.

- Causal identification?

- Valid instrument problem—instrument exclusion criteria

- Endogeneity due to revers causation—immigrants to egalitarianess or egalitarianess to immigration?? I can test whether egalitarianess encourages more immigration—the welfare magnet thesis—if confirmed, then immigrant share should be positively correlated

- Endogeneity due to OVB—you can try to identify "how much" basic result might be due to unobservables

Figure I. The average trend of egalitarianism and universal access to welfare among the Western Industrialized countries and the Rest, 1990–2020

Figure II. The average trend of the share of the immigrant population for Western industrialized countries and the Rest, 1990–2020

Figure III. The average total government domestic consumption per capita among the industrialized (Western) democracies, 1960–2023

Table 1. Two-way fixed effect regression estimates of the effects of the immigrant share of the population on egalitarian governance, 1990-2021

|	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Dependent vars	univ.welfare	Egalitarian	eq.services	eq.health
Immigrant population stock% (ln)	0.13***	0.01***	0.08***	0.17***
	(0.02)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.03)
GDP per capita (ln)	0.01	0.00	0.17***	0.03
	(0.03)	(0.00)	(0.02)	(0.04)
Electoral democracy	0.77***	0.22***	0.47***	0.41***
	(0.07)	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.09)
Urban population% (ln)	0.33***	0.03*	0.34***	0.40***
	(0.08)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.11)
Oil rents / GDP (ln)	0.08**	-0.00	-0.01	0.03
	(0.04)	(0.00)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Constant	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Observations	5,051	5,051	5,050	5,051
Number of groups	172	172	172	172
Standard errors in parentheses				
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1				
all x vars lagged 1 year				

Table 2. Two-way fixed effect regression estimates of the effects of the immigrant share of the population on egalitarian governance among Western industrialized democracies, 1990–2021

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Dependent vars	univ.welfare	Egalitarian	eq.services	eq.health
Immigrant stock% (ln)	-0.06**	-0.01**	0.09***	-0.26**
	(0.03)	(0.00)	(0.02)	(0.11)
GDP per capita (ln)	0.60***	0.00	0.59***	-0.37**
	(0.08)	(0.01)	(0.11)	(0.14)
Electoral democracy	1.23	0.52***	-0.07	6.13***
	(1.07)	(0.10)	(0.50)	(1.32)
Urban population% (ln)	-0.79***	-0.04*	0.67***	0.84***
	(0.19)	(0.02)	(0.24)	(0.16)
Oil rents / GDP (ln)	-0.07	-0.00	-0.00	-0.02
	(0.06)	(0.00)	(0.04)	(0.06)
Constant	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Observations	706	706	706	706
Number of groups	23	23	23	23
Standard errors in parentheses				
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1				
all x vars lagged 1 year				

Two-way fixed effect regression estimates of egalitarian governance on the rate of change of immigrant shares of the population, disaggregated by a global sample and a sample of only western industrialized countries, 1990-2021

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Dep var = Delta Immigrant k	Global	Industrial	Global	Industrial	Global	Industrial
Immigrant k % t–1	–0.02***	–0.03***	–0.02***	–0.03***	–0.02***	–0.03**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Universal welfare	0.00	0.02***				
	(0.00)	(0.00)				
Egalitarianess			0.05***	0.19***		
			(0.02)	(0.07)		
Equal Health access					–0.00	0.01***
					(0.00)	(0.00)
Per capita income (ln)	0.02**	0.02*	0.02**	0.03***	0.02**	0.04***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Electoral democracy	0.02***	0.11	0.00	0.03	0.02***	0.02
	(0.01)	(0.07)	(0.01)	(0.08)	(0.01)	(0.08)
Urban populalation % (ln)	–0.02	–0.01	–0.02	–0.02	–0.02	–0.04*
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Oil rents / GDP (ln)	0.00	0.01*	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.01
	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)
Constant	–0.06	–0.23	–0.08	–0.38**	–0.07	–0.21
	(0.07)	(0.15)	(0.07)	(0.15)	(0.07)	(0.15)
Observations	4,883	683	4,883	683	4,883	683
Number of groups	172	23	172	23	172	23
Standard errors in parentheses						
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1						
All X vars lagged one year						

Global sample – dep var = egalitarianess –– treatment – migrants pop k %

Only developed – dep var = equal health access–– treatment = migrant pop k%